


















Handling of Facts and Forensic 



















Table of Contents 
 
 
Preface ........................................................................................................................................ 4 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 6 
I. Order of procedure of penal adjudication in Cicero’s age ...................................................... 9 
II. Homicide—murder of relatives, poisoning (Pro Roscio Amerino, Pro Cluentio) .............. 14 
II. 1. Lawsuit of Sextus Roscius from Ameria ..................................................................... 14 
II. 1. 1. Historical background of Pro Roscio Amerino .................................................... 14 
II. 1. 2. Statutory regulation of the crime of par(r)idicium .............................................. 16 
II. 1. 3. Handling the facts of the case in Pro Roscio Amerino ........................................ 19 
II. 2. Lawsuit of Aulus Cluentius Habitus ............................................................................ 28 
II. 2. 1. Historical background of Pro Cluentio ............................................................... 29 
II. 2. 2. Applicability of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis in Cluentius’s lawsuit ....... 32 
II. 2. 3. The “charge” of iudicium Iunianum and bribe in court of justice ....................... 34 
II. 2. 4. Handling the charge of veneficium ...................................................................... 48 
II. 2. 5. Rhetorical tactics and double handling of the facts of the case in Pro Cluentio . 51 
III. Election bribery (Pro Murena, Pro Plancio) ..................................................................... 59 
III. 1. Lawsuit of Lucius Licinius Murena ........................................................................... 59 
III. 1. 1. Historical background of Pro Murena ............................................................... 59 
III. 1. 2. The order of election of consules and ambitus – the role of associations .......... 62 
III. 1. 3. Contentio dignitatis as rhetorical strategy in Pro Murena ................................. 69 
III. 2. Lawsuit of Cnaeus Plancius ....................................................................................... 76 
III. 2. 1. Historical background of Pro Plancio ............................................................... 77 
III. 2. 2. Contentio dignitatis and patronus’s auctoritas as rhetorical tactics .................. 78 
IV. Crimes of violence (Pro Caelio, Pro Sestio, Pro Milone) ................................................. 90 
IV. 1. Lawsuit of Marcus Caelius Rufus .............................................................................. 90 
IV. 1. 1. A Bona Dea scandal—beginnings of the fight between Cicero and Clodius .... 90 
IV. 1. 2. Historical background of Pro Caelio ................................................................. 94 
IV. 1. 3. Ludi Megalenses as theatrical background of the lawsuit .................................. 96 
IV. 1. 4. The “improvised” comedy as rhetorical strategy ............................................... 98 
IV. 2. Lawsuit of Publius Sestius ....................................................................................... 105 
IV. 2. 1. Historical background of Pro Sestio ................................................................ 106 
IV. 2. 2. Cum dignitate otium – definition of fundamental political values ................... 110 
IV. 2. 3. The basic values defined in Pro Sestio in De re publica ................................. 116 
IV. 3. Lawsuit of Titus Annius Milo .................................................................................. 118 
IV. 3. 1. Historical background of Pro Milone .............................................................. 119 
IV. 3. 2. Lawsuit of Milo – Cicero’s narrative and Asconius’s description ................... 122 
IV. 3. 3. Handling of the facts of the case in Pro Milone............................................... 129 
IV. 3. 4. The published version of Pro Milone – reasons for publication ...................... 131 
IV. 3. 5. The motif of killing the tyrant as further development of lawful defence ....... 132 
V. Caesar as judge and the injured party (Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, Pro rege Deiotaro) .. 138 
V. 1. Marcus Claudius Marcellus’s case ............................................................................ 138 
V. 1. 1. Changes in the relation between Cicero and Caesar in the mirror of Corpus 
Ciceronianum ................................................................................................................. 138 
V. 1. 2. The historical background of Pro Marcello and its place in Cicero’s philosophy 
of the state ...................................................................................................................... 142 
V. 1. 3. Rhetorical tactic in Pro Marcello ...................................................................... 145 
V. 1. 4. Sapientia Caesaris ............................................................................................. 150 
3 
 
V. 1. 5. Clementia and sapientia—alternatives of the Caesar image and Caesar’s self-
image .............................................................................................................................. 153 
V. 2. “Lawsuit” of Quintus Ligarius .................................................................................. 159 
V. 2. 1. Historical background of Pro Ligario ............................................................... 160 
V. 2. 2. Procedural issues of the lawsuit ........................................................................ 165 
V. 2. 3. Pro Ligario as deprecatio .................................................................................. 167 
V. 2. 4. Clementia Caesaris ........................................................................................... 169 
V. 2. 5. The issue of legitimacy of Caesar’s power in the mirror of Pro Ligario .......... 171 
V. 3. “Lawsuit” of King Diotarus ...................................................................................... 175 
V. 3. 1. Historical background and procedural law awkwardnesses of Pro rege Deiotaro
 ........................................................................................................................................ 176 
V. 3. 2. Shaping Caesar’s image as rhetorical tactics in Deiotariana ............................ 178 
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 186 
Lists of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ 187 
I. Abbreviations of Antique Sources .................................................................................. 187 
II. Bibliographical Abbreviations ....................................................................................... 192 
Indices .................................................................................................................................... 205 
I. Index of Sources ............................................................................................................. 205 












Quintilian wrote about Cicero: “…he was born as a gift of providence so that all power of 
rhetoric could manifest itself in him. Who can teach more profoundly, move deeper than he 
can; and has anybody ever had more enthralling grace? We might think that he achieves 
easily what he wrings out by force, and when by his enormous power he drives the judge to a 
direction contrary to his standpoint, the judge seems to follow him voluntarily rather than to 
be swept away by him.”1 The present monograph intends to get closer to understanding the 
mechanism of operation of this impact by analysing ten pieces of the orator’s life-work more 
profoundly from legal and rhetorical aspects in terms of the lawyer’s handling of the facts of 
the case and rhetorical tactics applied by Cicero in these speeches. As they are oral pleadings 
and statements of the defence—since Cicero undertook to “represent” the charge only once in 
his career, in the proceedings against C. Verres—we have grouped the ten speeches according 
to the facts of the case that provide grounds for the charge, and (as a general rule that allows 
exception) the chronological order. 
The speeches given in defence of Sextus Roscius from Ameria in 812 and in defence of Aulus 
Cluentius Habitus in 66 were delivered in lawsuits brought by the charge of homicide—
par(r)icidium and veneficium. These two speeches were made at the very beginning of 
Cicero’s career—as he established his reputation as an orator by Pro Roscio Amerino as a 
twenty-six years old young man—and in the first third of it (preceding consulship in 63); so, 
the former oratio shows great promise of becoming the master of rhetorical strategy and 
demonstrates his handling of the facts of the case now constituting an individual system, yet 
not free from certain exaggerations of a young man, and the latter one reveals the orator’s 
ingenious tactics, now mature, leading (misleading) the court of justice with formidable 
assurance. The speeches made in the lawsuit of Lucius Licinius Murena in 63 and in the 
lawsuit of Cnaeus Plancius in 55 were delivered in defence of future magistrate having won 
the (consul’s and aedil’s) election but charged of election bribery by competitors defeated in 
the fight for the office, and so these speeches give a captivating and exciting view of the 
practical operation of the Roman election system, and the lawyer’s, orator’s handling of the 
facts of the case that kept the candidates’ eligibility rather than historical facts of the case in 
view when judging election bribery. Furthermore, it deserves attention that in Pro Murena—
by this speech Cicero provides defence as a consul in office of his successor following him in 
the rank—it is the voice of the politician at the summit of his career in public affairs and the 
mature orator fully aware of the influence he can produce on the court of justice that can be 
heard. 
The speeches given in defence of Marcus Caelius Rufus and Publius Sestius in 56 and in 
defence of Titus Annius Milo in 52 were made in a lawsuit brought by the charge of vis. Vis 
(publica) as crimen covered a general group of crimes that comprised several state of facts 
from violent disturbance of public order to certain cases of manslaughter. The historical 
background of all the three speeches is provided by the personal and, for political reasons, 
hostile relation between Cicero and Clodius, who forced him into exile in 58 for one year. By 
Pro Caelio the orator defended his one-time disciple against the charge moved by Clodius and 
his elder sister, Clodia, who can be most probably identified with Catull’s Lesbia, and Pro 
Sestio was made as refutation of the charge brought by Clodius, who sent Cicero into exile, 
                                                 
1
 Quint. inst. 10, 1, 109–110. …dono quodam providentiae genitus in quo totas vires suas eloquentia experiretur. 
Nam quis docere diligentius, movere vehementius potest, cui tanta umquam iucunditas adfuit? Ut ipsa illa quae 
extorquet impetrare eum credas, et cum transversum vi sua iudicem ferat, tamen ille non rapi videatur sed sequi. 
2
 All dates relating to ancient events in this volume are BC. 
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against Sestius, who resolutely fought for calling Cicero home. In their analysis, as Pro Sestio 
was delivered in March and Pro Caelio, Cicero’s wittiest speech that presented a real comedy 
to the court of justice, was given in April, we have upset the chronological order prevailing 
within the chapters—which does not cover a highly relevant difference in time in the present 
case—in order to connect Pro Sestio more organically with Pro Milone which shows close 
thematic relation with it, i.e., the speech made in defence of Milo who killed the primordial 
enemy, Clodius. Pro Milone represents an exception in two aspects both among the speeches 
analysed in the volume and left to us as Cicero’s life-work: on the one hand, this is the oratio 
whose original was delivered by the orator in a lost lawsuit, however, later on, guided by 
political considerations, he published its revised version; on the other hand, Pro Milone is the 
speech of which we exactly know that the version published by Cicero and left to us is 
different from the oration given before the court of justice not only in style and structure but 
in its essence. Both Pro Sestio and Pro Milone are essential constituent parts and sources of 
Cicero’s philosophy of the state that produced hardly overestimatable impact on European 
thinking, that is, in them Cicero as an orator and a politician, trying in vain to get back to the 
summit of his former influence, formulates his concept on the theory of the state pointing far 
beyond the handling of the facts of the case and the rhetorical tactics as well as the rhetorical 
situation, which later on crystallised and constituted the subject matter in his theoretical 
works. 
The three speeches discussed in the last chapter—the so-called orationes Caesarianae, i.e., 
Pro Marcello and Pro Ligario given in 46 and Pro rege Deiotaro delivered in 45—are 
arranged not so much around a single state of facts, instead, they are connected by the fact 
that the addressee of all the three speeches is Caesar. The speech made for the benefit of 
Marcus Claudius Marcellus is only seemingly a statement of the defence, actually it is a 
political speech: in it Cicero, who sided with Pompey in the civil war, and later on was 
granted pardon by Caesar, expressed his thanks to the dictator in the senate for the pardon 
given to one of the leading figures of the anti-Caesarian forces, Marcellus. By Pro Ligario 
Cicero defended Quintus Ligarius before Caesar as judge, who also took a position in the civil 
war against Caesar, and who—after he had been given acquittal in legal terms and pardon in 
view of the real political situation—appeared among Caesar’s assassins on the Ides of March 
44. The oratio made in defence of King Deiotarus is the fruit (if possible) of a both legally 
and rhetorically more delicate and critical situation: the judge of the case is identical with the 
injured party of the act brought as a charge, Caesar, that is, the proceedings, conducted in the 
absence of the accused, in which eventually no judgment was passed, should be considered 
manifestation of Caesar’s arrogance, who made mockery of the lawsuit, rather than a real 
action-at-law. All the three speeches have outstanding significance both in terms of the 
lawyer’s/orator’s handling of the facts of the case under circumstances far from usual or 
regular, and the development of the relation between Cicero and Caesar as well as the 
thoughts on the theory of the state framed by Cicero, the analysis of the fight against Caesar’s 
dictatorship gaining ground, for the sake of saving the order of the state of the Republic.  
At this point, let me express my thanks to professors Egon Maróti, János Zlinszky and Imre 
Molnár from whom I received so much help, encouragement and precious advice during the 
years for translating Cicero’s rhetorical works and analysing them in terms of rhetoric and 
Roman law.  
 






According to tradition, an oration—using the terminology introduced by Cicero and 
Quintilianus—is made up of the following parts, as it were arising from the nature of the 
thing3: the prooemium, in which the orator tries to win his audience’s attention; the narratio, 
that is, description or narration of the facts of the case; the argumentatio, that is, the 
argument, discussion of the facts of the case, which can be disputed due to what is contained 
in the narratio regarding either their fact-based nature or their (legal) assessment; and the 
peroratio, that is, summary of what has been said, which is at the same time a call addressed 
to the judges with respect to the decision to be adopted in the case.4 In Cicero’s youth—an 
account of this is given in De inventione and Auctor ad Herennium—in addition to the above, 
ars oratoria distinguished the following parts of the speech: the propositio, that is, accurately 
naming the disputed point, following the narratio; the partitio, i.e., outline of the division, 
structure of the argumentatio. Furthermore, the argumentatio was divided into confirming, 
i.e., positive and refuting, i.e., negative parts: confirmatio and refutuatio. The peroratio had to 
contain the enumeratio, that is, summary of what has been said, the indignatio, that is, 
whipping up antipathy towards the opponent, and the conquestio, arousing sympathy for the 
defended case.5  
At the same time, we must make it clear that this textbook pattern can be applied to Cicero’s 
speeches with strong restrictions only,6 as the theoretical categories and system of rhetoric, 
the praecepta—as it is emphasised by both Cicero7 and Quintilian8—can be useful references; 
yet, rhetoric as a theoretical system arises from rhetorical practice, art of rhetoric and not the 
other way round.9 This fact was, of course, recognised by the authors and works that summed 
up the theory of rhetoric, distinguishing ordo naturalis from ordo artificiosus demanded by 
causa in the dispositio, i.e., the structure of the speech.10 (Wilfried Stroh uses the following 
military comparison aptly to the relation between the two ordines: the science of strategy can 
teach the commander how to set the battle array in a combat, however, in a combat victory, 
success is the only measure and goal; therefore, in a given case, depending on the features of 
the terrain and the size and character of the enemy’s army, he can set the battle array contrary 
to the textbook example, if this will promise success.11) The young orator, having perfectly 
acquired the theory of rhetoric, could draw further inspiration from the speeches heard on the 
Forum: praecepta docent, exempla trahunt! It is not by chance that Cicero published the 
written version of his delivered speeches because he wanted to set exemplum, among others, 
to young people who desired to acquire the practice of rhetoric.12 The three supporting pillars 
of the oration are inventio, that is, finding arguments arising from recognition of the rhetorical 
and lawsuit situation; dispositio, that is, arrangement of what the orator has got to say and the 
arguments, editing them in a structure; and elocutio, that is, (form of) performance; and 
dispositio is provided by the overall effect of three factors: causa, praecepta and exempla. It 
                                                 
3
 Cic. De orat. 2, 307; Quint. inst. 2, 17, 6. 
4
 Cf. Cic. part. 4; De orat. 2, 311; Quint. inst. 8, prooem. 7. 
5
 Stroh 1975. 12. 
6
 Neumeister 1964. 7ff. 
7
 Cic. De orat. 1, 109. 145; 2, 232. 
8
 Quint. inst. 2, 17, 5ff.; 5, 10, 120; 7, 10, 10. 
9
 As analogy cf. Paul. D. 50, 17, 1. Non ex regula ius sumatur, sed ex iure, quod est, regula fiat. 
10
 Auct. ad Her. 3, 16f.; Cic. De orat. 2, 307f.; Quint. inst. 4, 2, 85; 4, 1, 70; 7, 1, 12. 63; 7, 2, 40. 
11
 Stroh 1975. 13. 
12
 Cic. Brut. 122. 127. 164; Att. 2, 1, 3; 4, 2, 2; Q. fr. 3, 1, 11. 
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is within their frameworks that the orator can carry out his threefold task, movere, delectare, 
docere, and that is how flexanima atque omnium rerum regina oratio can be created.13  
In the analysis of Cicero’s speeches, one should never forget about two essential 
circumstances. On the one hand, Cicero never published his speeches in the form that they 
were delivered but in a revised and edited form. On the other hand, they are addressed to the 
audience and by no means to the analyser who wants to interpret them word by word or to the 
readers in general; the written text is a dead material, it was made alive by the orator’s voice, 
gestures, the interaction between the speaker and the audience—in the Antiquity versions 
published subsequently were also read out, more precisely, performed continuously and 
aloud. The edited nature of the speeches, as a matter of fact, did not mean what Jules Humbert 
presumed,14 namely, that during the lawsuit Cicero took the floor several times—which can 
be true—and in the published speech these parts can be identified, i.e., can be and should be 
separated, and by this dissection they should be put back to their “original” place in the 
process of the lawsuit;15 instead, it only means that the delivered and the written text is more 
or less identical in terms of its essential content and form; yet, certain differences need to be 
taken into account, however, their extent—except for Pro Milone—is not on the merits: in 
other words, the published speech is not a starting point and raw material for reconstructing 
the delivered oratio. 
When editing the speeches for publication, Cicero, as a matter of fact, might have modified 
the text—and in certain cases, for example, in Pro Murena and Pro Caelio at certain points he 
did modify it16—sometimes in order to spare the sensitivity of the parties concerned in the 
lawsuit, but these modifications must have been by no means considerable, in other words—
except for the above mentioned Pro Milone—did not lead to “forging” the speech. This will 
be supported if we examine Cicero’s intention to publish the speeches. In addition to setting 
exemplum to those who study the craft/art of rhetoric, in several cases, Cicero was 
undoubtedly driven by political intentions to publish his speeches because he wanted to raise 
a monument to the memory of his own deeds and achievements17 by making his speeches 
available to “eternity”. It cannot be denied that regarding certain political speeches—e.g. the 
Catilinarian orations—he was accused in the Antiquity already for the published text 
excessively differing from the delivered one18. As, however—and this is increasingly true 
regarding the oral pleadings—he was led by the intention to set exemplum, at most he might 
have woven certain information into the text that seemed to be irrelevant in the lawsuit or was 
public knowledge but was possibly indispensable for the reader of the speech as background 
information, thus making the speech a complete whole. Furthermore, it should not be 
forgotten: publication of oral pleadings did not arise primarily from political motivation, and 
by a completely rewritten speech the orator could have highly shaken his own 
trustworthiness.19 The distortions, “shifts of the point” in the handling of the facts of the case 
and the argumentatio, easier to identify in the written version, which could not strike the 
judges who only listened to and did not read the speech and could not turn back the pages, 
were not disturbing either20—it was just by this that Cicero (who proudly declared that in 
                                                 
13
 Cf. Cic. De orat. 2, 187. 
14
 Humbert 1925. passim 
15
 See Stroh 1975. 31–54. 
16
 Cf. Classen 1985. 3f. 
17
 As evidence of Cicero’s awareness of his achievements see Ps.-Sall. Cic. 5. O, fortunatam natam me consule 
Romam! 
18
 Cf. Dio Cass. 47, 7, 3. 
19
 The reasons of changes will be analysed in the chapter about Pro Milone. 
20
 Cf. Classen 1985. 7. 
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Cluentius’s case he threw sand, that is, dust into the judges’ eyes21) wanted to show to people 
who read him: that is how one must achieve the goal, have success, win a lawsuit!  
As we “should” read the published speeches (in accordance with Cicero’s intention too) 
continuously, without turning over and back the pages, that is, without any interruption and 
break; thus, the analysis—basically contrary to the author’s intention, i.e., the nature of the 
work—can in each case only comment on the speech, whose prime aim is to produce impact 
on the audience and achieve success. So, we should not forget about the fact that the 
description, “labelling” of the parts of the given speech by the technical terms of rhetoric 
often cannot say anything about the oratio itself: that is where the dividing line of rational 
aesthetics—and rational analysis at all—runs. We can take even the St Peter’s Basilica to 
pieces: limestone, marble from Carrara, gilding—yet, the arithmetical addition of limestone, 
marble from Carrara and gilding will not produce St Peter’s Basilica as a result. The whole is 
always more than the sum of its parts! 
  
                                                 
21
 Quint. inst. 2, 17, 21. 
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I. Order of procedure of penal adjudication in Cicero’s age 
 
 
In the legal terminology of the age of the Republic the term “quaerere” indicated a body, 
which was operated under the control of the magistrate, consisting of iudices, and was to 
adjudge certain crimes. In what sense does the activity denoted by the verb quaerere apply to 
the operation of the court, or its specific elements? Most often quaerere denotes the activity 
of the magistrate controlling quaestio, sometimes that of iudices,22 however, it is not used for 
the parties’ activity in the lawsuit. It is unclear what the function quaerere originally covered. 
Theodor Mommsen supposed that as part of the quaerere activity the magistrate controlling 
quaestio addressed questions to the defendant and the witnesses regarding the case. It is hard 
to prove this assumption because descriptions are available only from the periods after Sulla, 
and in this epoch the role of the magistrate and the iudices were rather passive, the way the 
lawsuit was conducted was controlled by the parties. Thinking of the criminal proceedings of 
the archaic age it is hard to imagine—knowing the complicated structure of the Roman order 
of procedure of this age strictly adherent to form—that the magistrate was free to address 
questions to the parties. 
Furthermore, quaerere can be explained in two other ways: this term was used to denote the 
investigation conducted by the quaestio on the case, or the question of the magistrate 
controlling the quaestio addressed to iudices regarding the defendant’s guilt. The first 
interpretation fits the order of procedure used in the 1st century B.C., but cannot be applied—
as Theodor Mommsen’s assumption cannot be either—to the legal order of the archaic age. 
The latter interpretation can be seen as fully corresponding to the early order of procedure, 
and can be brought into harmony with the sources of the 1st century, if it can be supposed that 
the original meaning of the word had obscured, and that is why certain loci refer to iudices as 
the subjects of quaerere.23 It is in this sense quaestiones perpetuae can be postulated from the 
2nd century using Cicero’s formulation.24 These forums can be called permanent because at 
the beginning of the official year the praetor urbanus made a list enumerating the name of the 
members of the courts of justice typically assigned to adjudicating specific crimes, which was 
in effect throughout the year, so there was no need to set up new courts of justice in each case. 
In addition to quaestiones perpetuae, or ordinariae, there were quaestiones extraordinariae 
(although this term does not occur in sources), which were usually set up to adjudge cases 
with heavier political weight.25  
Several hypotheses have been made in the literature to explain the origin and development of 
the procedure of quaestio,26 and for a long time it was supposed that this form of procedure 
evolved not earlier than the 2nd century, so, for example, Theodor Mommsen discovered the 
analogy of the procedure of the recuperatores in it,27 and Hitzig tried to explain it with 
influence produced by Greek judicial process.28 However, taking the fact into account that 
both lex Calpurnia from 149 regulating quaestio repetundarum, the oldest form we have 
knowledge of, and lex Acilia repetundarum included provisions on the typical Roman legal 
institution sacramentum in action,29 then this theory becomes groundless. A drastically new 
and still prevailing result was attained by Wolfgang Kunkel, who believed that the Romans 
                                                 
22
 Mommsen 1899. 187. 
23
 Kunkel 1974b 35. 
24
 Cic. Brut. 106. 
25
 See e.g. the Bona Dea trial. 
26
 See Lengle 1971. 25ff. 
27
 Mommsen 1887–1888. I. 182. 
28
 Hitzig 1909. 41f. 
29
 Lex Acilia 23. 
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strictly separated the institutions of coercitio and iudicatio right from the outset; and—
contrary to Theodor Mommsen’s interpretation—the option of provocatio ad populum 
referred only to the latter. The scope of comitial adjudication covered crimes of political 
nature, while other kinds of crime were assigned to the scope of iurisdictio by the magistrate, 
which meant nothing else than adjudging the case under the quaestio.30 
At the turn of the 3rd and 2nd centuries, in the organisation of the state having assumed the 
form of an empire, penal iurisdictio exercised solely by the magistrate and the popular 
assembly no longer seemed to be properly efficient because an institution system set for 
frameworks of a city-state could not be expected to survey matters increasingly extensive both 
in terms of territory and complexity and especially to judge them competently. For these 
reasons, more and more often they reached back to the legal institution of quaestiones 
extraordiariae applied earlier sometimes in judging political crimes.31 Livius gives an account 
of a case, which can be accepted as authentic, where originally they wanted to roll up a 
conspiracy in Capua—for this purpose a special dictator was elected, then, the control over 
the proceedings was taken over by the consuls—however, soon suspicion was cast on 
organisations set up in the city of Rome, suspicious of corrupt practices32 and the 
investigation was conducted thereafter following this track.33 Initially, similar kind of punitive 
court of justices were set up much rather for suppressing organising activity of the unruly 
allies,34 however, from the first half of the 2nd century more and more often they used this 
legal institution also for investigating the cases of former Roman magistrates. Initially, the 
quaestio extraordinaria was set up in each case by senatus consulta,35 or by plebiscita too,36 
yet, the senate continued to draw certain cases to its own powers.37  
The quaestio was chaired by some magistrate, who announced the judgment of the consilium 
iudicum; so, in the case of these quaestiones it is possible to speak about regular iudicium 
publicum. However, regarding all the matters that the accounts describe it should not be 
forgotten that they came into the limelight in relation to deeds or persons that aroused public 
interest, and presumably that is why the senate took great care to investigate and set the form 
of imposing sanction on them. As regards judging crimes of perpetrators from lower layers of 
people, not carrying any political significance, it is hard to imagine that in each case a senatus 
consultum or as well plebiscitum adopted specially for this reason would have dealt with 
them; it is more probable that they were decided by the tresviri capitales, who could proceed 
ex officio or on the grounds of reporting.38  
On the setup and order of procedure of iudicia publica prior to A C. Gracchus very few data 
have been preserved, but the following can be established with tolerable certainty: in the event 
of quaestiones extraordinariae constituted in some cases by senatus consulta and plebiscita 
the participants of the quaestio, as a matter of fact, had to be gathered again in each case, the 
head of the procedure (quaesitor) was appointed by the senate. Presumably the senate also 
had its say in selecting the members, but could also entrust a quaesitor to do so. A permanent 
list of senators eligible for being members in the quaestio most probably did not exist; all the 
more as the number of senators was too low to make it possible to set up several lists.39 
                                                 
30
 Kunkel 1962. 21ff. 
31
 Kunkel 1974b 46. 
32
 Liv. 9, 26, 9.  
33
 Liv. 9, 26, 6f. 
34
 Liv. 10, 1, 3; 28, 10, 4; 29, 36, 10f. 
35
 In the early period of the Roman Republic quaestiones extraordinariae could be set up only by senatus 
consulta. 
36
 E.g. the case of M. Popilius Laenas (consul in 173-ban) and L. Hostilius Tubulus (praetor in 140).  
37
 Cf. Liv. 39, 41, 5; 40, 37, 4; Cic. Lael. 37; Val. Max. 4, 7, 1. 
38
 Cic. Caecil. 50; Cic. Cluent. 39. 
39
 Kunkel 1974b 51. 
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In view of the above it becomes clear that quaestio extraordinaria was nothing else but a 
committee established by the senate to investigate a particular case, which selected and 
delegated members from its own staff, whose composition was thus determined fairly 
arbitrarily, allowing ample ground for entertaining political sympathy and antipathy disguised 
in law. In the development of the legal order it must have become an aim to create 
quaestiones perpetuae, that is, to set up lists including names of citizens who could be 
nominated and elected members of quaestiones that would stay in effect during the entire 
official year. This was, however, prevented by the low number of nominees since at that time 
the senate consisted of only three hundred persons, and the lists would have needed to include 
a multiple of the headcount necessary for conducting the proceedings. In theory there were 
two ways to eliminate this obstacle: either by raising the number of the members of the 
senate, or by terminating the privilege setting forth that only citizens ranked among senators 
were allowed to elect a member of the quaestio. During the times unsuccessful attempts were 
made on three occasions to raise the number of the members of the senate to six hundred 
persons,40 which later only Sulla managed to achieve for no other way did he see it possible to 
ensure the legislative monopoly of the senate.41 From the decades between C. Gracchus and 
Sulla sources report on the existence of a quaestio perpetua de veneficiis with full certainty, 
and the existence of quaestiones perpetuae can be assumed with great probability also in the 
event of crimes endangering the stability of public life (ambitus42 crimen maiestatis, 
peculatus43). Quaestiones were chaired by the iudex quaestionis, which office was established 
most probably by C. Gracchus. 
The date of creating quaestio de sicariis and quaestio de veneficis is not known; however, 
they certainly existed before 130 because at that time L. Cassius Longinus (consul in 127) 
provably fulfilled the chairman’s office of quaestio de sicariis.44 According to the general 
view, Sulla merged these two courts of justice (quaestio de sicariis et veneficis);45 yet, for 
example, Andrew Lintott presumes that they continued to operate separately.46 Nevertheless, 
this does not seem to be probable because in this case the two states of facts would have been 
regulated also by Sulla in two separate acts.47 At a locus Pomponius refers to Sulla’s court of 
justice purportedly set up for investigating par(r)icidium;48 however, competent literature 
agrees with the point that par(r)icidium also fell within the powers of quaestio de sicariis et 
veneficis, and Sulla did not set up an independent quaestio de par(r)icidio,49 as it is proved by 
the oratio, Pro Roscio Amerino, analysed by us. Erich S. Gruen presumes the existence of an 
independent quaestio de par(r)icidio before Sulla;50 however, Cloud convincingly refutes this 
hypothesis, and points out that murder of relatives—depending on its means and form of 
committing—was to be judged before the quaestio de sicariis or quaestio de veneficis.51 
Sulla’s jurisdiction reforms kept and renewed the system of quaestiones perpetuae to the 
extent that only persons ranked among senators were allowed again to participate in the 
quaestio as jurors, and in 81 he stipulated the order of procedure in a law. From these laws no 
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more have been preserved by sources, i.e., Cicero’s speeches and the writings of the jurists of 
the period of the Roman Empire, than what served their own purposes. That is, what can be 
discerned from the orators’ arguments regarding the process of the proceedings, and what 
continued to be in effect in the period of Augustus and in later legislation since the lawyers of 
the classical age of jurisprudence were mostly not interested in legal history. In the mirror of 
the above, we have sure knowledge of the existence of Sulla’s laws creating the following 
permanent quaestiones: de sicariis et veneficiis,52 lex Cornelia testamentaria nummaria,53 lex 
Cornelia de iniuriis,54 lex Cornelia maiestatis,55 lex Cornelia repetundarum.56 Concerning the 
existence of lex Cornelia de ambitu some doubt might arise; and no source on the existence of 
a possible lex Cornelia de peculatu is available.57 
Although several registers have been preserved with the list of the members of the quaestio, 
their composition, the form of assembling them, they mostly lack any systematic structure and 
are hard to survey, and give detailed account of cases that for some reason do not meet the 
usual order of procedure; so, they do not entitle the author to draw conclusions from them 
with full certainty with a view to answering the above questions. A point of reference is 
provided by the epigraphic material on the establishment of quaestio repetundarum 
introduced by C. Gracchus; yet, it cannot be considered the prototype of quaestiones.58 
Accordingly, the names of the potential members of quaestio repetundarum were included in 
a list consisting of four hundred and fifty persons to be compiled by the praetor peregrinus 
within ten days from entering into office on the grounds of the census from the range of 
citizens who belonged to ordo equester. The members of quaestio who were to adjudge the 
given case were selected from this list—read out by the praetor before the contio and 
confirmed by taking an oath on its authenticity—as follows. First, the accused was obliged to 
name all the jurors with whom he were kin or brothers-in-law, or maintained fiduciary 
relation as a member of the same sodalicium or collegium. Then, in twenty days the 
prosecutor selected one hundred from the four hundred fifty jurors who were not allowed to 
maintain the above relations with the prosecutor (editio). After that, in forty days the accused 
was allowed to reject fifty from the one hundred designated jurors (reiectio). The fifty persons 
so produced constituted the jury of the quaestio repetundarum. Since only the lex 
repetundarum gives an account as a creditworthy source of the order of procedure of this 
period, the author can only presume that in the periods before Sulla the other quaestiones 
operated also on the grounds of the editio and reiectio principle.59  
Through Sulla’s legislation the exclusive right of participation in the quaestiones was restored 
to the ordo senatorius, and by that the range of potential jurors significantly narrowed, which 
did not allow the exercise of principle of editio and reiectio widely exercised formerly by the 
parties. Thereafter, jurors were selected on the basis of sortitio, and the parties’ right of 
rejection became very limited. The key sources on the order of procedure of this period are 
provided by Cicero’s speeches. He handled certain procedural issues in detail in several 
speeches, those against Verres and the one delivered in defence of Cluentius. The members of 
the quaestiones were designated on the grounds of the register of senators which was divided 
into ten decuriae, where each decuria included the names of sixty senators, of whom those 
who fulfilled some magistrates were not eligible as potential jurors; so, one decuria provided 
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approximately forty-fifty senators. Each of these decuriae was assigned at the beginning of 
each official year to a specific quaestio,60 and in specific lawsuits it was from them that jurors 
were selected by drawing lots.61 Although both of the parties had the option of reiectio, albeit, 
within a narrow scope, an accused not belonging to the order of senatores was allowed to 
reject three, an accused belonging to the ordo senatorius was presumably allowed to reject 
somewhat more jurors.  
The quaestio established from the decuria of the senate through sortitio and reiectio had a 
much lower headcount than those before Sulla’s time. The composition of this body possibly 
further changed when any of them died, or did not take part in the work of the quaestio for 
reasons established and approved by law, in these cases the headcount was completed from 
another decuria of the senate.62 One of the most clearly observable cankers of Sulla’s 
quaestiones was liability to be bribed, which was enhanced by the low number of members. 
That is what made L. Aurelius Cotta praetor enact lex Aurelia iudiciaria in 70, which 
terminated the legislative monopoly of the order of senatores, and ordered to compile the list 
of jurors from each of the orders of senators, knights and aerar tribunes. Cicero reports that in 
this age three hundred senators were allowed to act as jurors. The lists were compiled at the 
beginning of his year of office by the praetor urbanus, most frequently he took over his 
predecessor’s list after having made necessary amendments. In particular lawsuits—as it can 
be ascertained from quite limited number of sources—the jurors were selected not from the 
list of nine hundred but from the chapters thereof divided into specific quaestiones. 
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II. Homicide—murder of relatives, poisoning (Pro Roscio Amerino, Pro Cluentio)  
 
 
II. 1. Lawsuit of Sextus Roscius from Ameria  
 
Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino is Cicero’s first “criminal case”, in which he tries to clear his 
defendant of the charge invented by his relatives and the dictator’s confidant under the pretext 
of Sulla’s massacres. Sextus Roscius junior was charged with patricide by his relatives 
asserting that he had his father murdered in June 81. By the assistance of Sulla’s confidant, 
Chrysogonus the relatives attained that the victim’s name—although he was considered the 
dictator’s adherent—should be included in the register of persons inflicted by proscriptio, and 
so his property could be sold by auction, of which both Chrysogonus and the relatives of the 
murdered man had their handsome share, except for, “as a matter of fact”, Roscius senior’s 
son, who was thus done out of his inheritance. To enjoy the treacherously obtained property in 
safety, they wanted to get the lawful inheritor out of the way by a well-thought out 
Justizmord, therefore, they charged him with par(r)icidium. The case covered a dangerous 
political swamp, so they thought that none of the illustrious advocates of the age would 
undertake the defence. However, the young Cicero resolved to represent the case that seemed 
hopeless not so much for legal but much more for political reasons; his undertaking—which 
was eventually crowned by success—required a lot of courage, precise handling of the facts 
of the case and rhetoric skill, yet, in the long run established the reputation of the ambitious 
advocate and launched his career as an orator and a man of public affairs. Afterwards, the 
orator speaks about the acknowledgement obtained through the successful statement of the 
defence, on the one hand; and, seriously criticises his own one-time overflowing, unrestrained 
style, yet, appreciating his own courage, on the other.  
First, we intend to shed light on the historical situation (II. 1.); after that, we outline the 
statutory background of the crime that provides grounds for the charge (II. 2.); finally, we 
analyse the handling of the facts of the case applied in Pro Roscio Amerino and the rhetorical 
tactics by which he uncovered the real movers of the invented charge and their motivation and 
attained the acquittal of the accused (II. 3.). 
 
II. 1. 1. Historical background of Pro Roscio Amerino 
 
By his oration delivered in 80 in defence of Sextus Roscius from Ameria, the twenty-
six/twenty-seven years old Cicero assumed the role of counsel for the defence in a criminal 
action for the first time.63 This period of the Republic of Rome saw the so-called Sulla 
restoration, under which the commander had himself named dictator vested with powers 
entrusted with law-making and governance of the state (dictator legibus scribundis et rei 
publicae constituendae)—he was helped to obtain this procedure legitimising all his former 
acts by the interrex, the law proposed by L. Valerius Flaccus. After his victory, on 1 
November 82, at Porta Collina, Sulla proscribed the adherents of his enemies, Marius64 and 
Cinna, that is, on the grounds of lex Cornelia sive Valeria he imposed proscriptio on them.65 
Their names—through Sulla’s proscriptiones approximately four thousand seven hundred 
citizens were killed—were put on a table (the phrase pro-scribere comes from here), and 
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citizens were obliged to capture the persons concerned and report the place where they stayed 
to the authorities. Twelve thousand denarius blood-money was offered for each person 
inflicted by proscriptio, and if the owner subjected to proscriptio was killed by his slave, in 
addition to money reward, he was given status libertatis and “Cornelius” as nomen gentile. 
Descendants of persons inflicted by proscriptio were deprived of eligibility; their property 
devolved to the state and was sold by auction on the Forum, which created a real state of 
paradise for professional buyers up (sectores).66 
Such danger-fraught historical times carry, by nature, the opportunity of abuses; the facts of 
the case providing grounds for Pro Roscio Amerino serves a text-book example for that. 
Sextus Roscius senior, a respected and well-to-do citizen of Ameria in Umbria, eighty-three 
kilometres north of Rome—who actually lived in Rome—in addition to his significant 
movable estate, owned thirteen estates in the provinces; he entrusted his son cca. forty years 
old at the time of the lawsuit to administer them, with whom he did not maintain a highly 
cordial relation (presumably due to their different conduct of life, the father’s urban, the son’s 
rustic attitude). After the lawful conclusion of the proscriptio and forfeiture of property, i.e., 1 
June 81, Roscius senior, who was returning home from a supper party, was murdered near the 
Circus Flaminius. The relatives, who maintained a hostile relation with the victim, Titus 
Roscius Capito and Titus Roscius Magnus notified L. Cornelius Chrysogonus, Sulla’s 
libertine and confidant. Chrysogonus attained that Roscius senior’s name—although he was 
from first to last Sulla’s committed adherent—was put, subsequently, beyond the statutory 
deadline, on the list of persons inflicted by proscriptio; his goods were confiscated and sold 
by auction. Chrysogonus acted as the professional purchaser—nobody dared to make any bids 
against him—and acquired the property worth six million sestertii for two thousand (!) 
sestertii. And the Roscii were granted great reward; Capito was given three estates, and 
Magnus became the administrator of Chrysogonus’s business affairs. Sextus Roscius junior, 
to save his life, fled from Ameria to Rome where he found shelter in the house of Caecilia, 
who belonged to the notable gens of the Metelli. Chrysogonus, Capito and Magnus, who felt 
that the property so acquired was not secure from contest, decided to get the son of the victim 
out of the way by the invented charge of patricide. Although the charge was rather shaky, they 
trusted that paying regard to Chrysogonus’s relation to Sulla nobody would dare to act as 
counsel for the defence against the prosecutor of doubtful reputation, C. Erucius. Regarding 
this point, however, they were wrong. The young Cicero, who had until then accomplished 
only one case, Quinctius’s private law action, undertook and brilliantly solved the dangerous 
and delicate task. 
To refute the official charge did not seem to be a hard task since Erucius did not even try to 
make the version presented by him too believable,67 the only palpable argument against the 
accused was that he had not immediately interrogated the slaves present when his father was 
murdered and had not had minutes made out of that. When later on he wanted to do that, he 
no longer had the possibility to do so as by then the slaves had belonged to Chrysogonus’s 
suite. So, the difficulty implied in the lawsuit was of political nature. By amazing sense of 
tactics, Cicero hammered it again and again into the audience that just as Jupiter cannot care 
for every tiny problem of mortals,68 Sulla cannot know of the foul deeds of his liberated 
slave.69 Likewise, he called upon the nobility—as they could thank to Sulla that they regained 
their old lustre and influence—to distance themselves from elements like Chrysogonus, 
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thereby again serving Sulla’s intention, who placed great emphasis on fairness of court 
proceedings.70 
Accordingly, the structure of the speech is as follows.71 The introduction (exordium, 
prooemium) prepares the audience for what follows (conciliare)72 so that in the narratio73 the 
presentation of the facts of the case (docere) could be given proper emphasis. In the partitio74 
Cicero outlines the planned order of demonstration, which is followed by the argumentatio 
itself,75 meant to convince (probare). The argumentatio can be divided into three parts: 
Cicero first deals with Erucius,76 then with the Roscii,77 after that with Chrysogonus.78 The 
peroratio of summary character intends to produce effect primarily on the audience’s 
emotions.79 This division is, of course, not carried through mechanically by the orator; at 
several points he makes digressions (egressio, digressio) where he again wants to win his 
audience’s feelings over to his case and his defendant.80 He somewhat separates the person of 
Sulla’s freedman, Chrysogonus from the Roscii, casting the suspicion of committing the 
crime on the latter, and does not omit to stress the victim’s political conviction, loyalty to 
Sulla, and the social role and responsibility of the nobles several times.81 The speech is 
characterised from first to last by a kind of harrowing pathos, which later on the orator 
himself attributed to his young age,82 which he successfully threw off after his studies in 
Greece.83 In Pro Roscio Amerino he used excessive, archaising and everyday language 
elements more often; later on, as a mature orator he distanced himself from them.84 The 
oration—as Roscius junior was acquitted85—and undertaking the perils involved by it86 bore 
worthy fruit to Cicero too, since from then on he was kept in evidence as one of the prime 
advocates of Rome.87 
 
II. 1. 2. Statutory regulation of the crime of par(r)idicium  
 
The charge brought against Sextus Roscius was par(r)icidium, that is, patricide, murder of 
father—similarly, in a broader sense, this phrase was used for the facts of the case when 
somebody knowingly, in bad faith killed a free man.88 Presumably, it goes back to Romulus 
that in accordance with law the Romans did not punish murder of relatives separately because 
they qualified killing of each Roman citizen patricide.89 Later on, the crime of homicide was 
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ranked into three states of facts: they called manslaughter in general homicidium, highway 
murderers and robbers sicarii and poison mixers and vicious murderers venefici. To prosecute 
these acts, Sulla set up a separate quaestio by lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis, until then, 
however, investigation against murderers was carried out by quaestores par(r)icidii.90 Albeit, 
folk etymology deduced par(r)icidium (often written in the form parricidium) from 
patricidium, that is, murder of father, even Theodor Mommsen did not consider it well-
founded in terms of history of language.91 Theodor Mommsen asserts that already in Cicero’s 
age erroneous folk etymology served the use of par(r)icidium, which originally meant 
voluntary manslaughter, as murder of father or relatives.92 
Lex Pompeia de par(r)icidiis discussed par(r)icidium again in a narrower sense, that is, it 
applied it to killing parents, relatives and dependants,93 once the ancient Roman par(r)icidium 
had been replaced by homicidium. Thus, Pompey ranked murder and attempted murder 
committed against relatives in the ascending and the descending line, siblings, parents’ 
siblings, their children, spouse, the betrothed, parents of spouses and the betrothed, child’s 
betrothed and spouse, step-parent, stepchild and liberating patronus under this law.94 The 
occurrence of par(r)icidium in a stricter sense—as our sources prove—was not very frequent 
in Rome; the first murderer of father known by name is known from the times following the 
second Punic war, L. Hostius. The case of the first murderer of mother documented by name, 
Publicius Malleolus was discussed by rhetoric manuals in sufficient details,95 and therefore 
we know the punishment imposed on par(r)icidae, sacking (poenae cullei) in proper details.96 
In the beginning, poena cullei must have been a sacrifice conciliating higher powers, 
procuratio prodigii rather than a sanction.97 The Romans called the customary order, 
standstill of the world pax deorum, which meant gods’ peaceful attitude towards man, and if 
this order was upset, it could be always traced back to gods leaving this standstill.98 Upsetting 
the cosmic order, so, any extraordinary, new event was considered prodigium.99 Par(r)icidium 
was also such a phenomenon violating the cosmic order, pax deorum. 
The etymology of the word prodigium is doubtful; in Alois Walde’s and Johann B. 
Hofmann’s interpretation prodigium comes from prod-aio, which claims that prodigium 
means foretelling and forepointing.100 This approach does not seem to be satisfactory because 
prodigium itself does not state anything, and definitely calls for interpretation; for this reason, 
pontifices used the Sibylline Books or haruspices to carry it out.101 It seems to be a more exact 
interpretation that the word comes from the compound prod-agere, consequently, prodigium 
is nothing else than “supernatural forces which hide behind the surface, breaking through 
this shell, come forth, become manifest”.102 Upon the occurrence of prodigium, be it of either 
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private or state nature, once its meaning has been cleared up, that is, interpreted, procuratio 
had to be carried out, and proposition on its form was made also by the interpreters; if the 
same prodigium recurred more frequently, pontifices always ordered the same conciliation. 
The punishment of par(r)icida, that is, sacking/being sewn in a sack considered procuratio—
which was still in practice in the period of the Roman empire—was carried out as follows. 
After the sentence was delivered, the face of the convicted was covered with wolf skin and a 
wooden sole was tied to his feet so that his breath should not stain the air or his feet the earth. 
After that, he was whipped until he was covered with blood;103 then, he was sewn in a sack 
made of rawhide together with a monkey, a cock, a dog and a viper. This sack with the 
convicted and the animals was thrown into the sea,104 and so the person who had violated all 
natural laws could not be in direct contact with any natural elements, either with water or 
sunshine or earth or air, and could not deface them. Specific animals are often mentioned also 
by authors from the period of the Roman Empire,105 especially because emperor Claudius 
took exceptional pleasure in the spectacle of executing qualified death penalties.106 Why these 
animals were put into the sack beside the convicted cannot be decided with full certainty 
because—the sanction having become a symbol—in several cases antique authors themselves 
were reduced to conjectures.107 They might have played a part in this ceremony as follows: 
the dog as an actor fulfilling tasks of guarding and warning—or possibly failing to fulfil 
them—the monkey as the caricature of man, the snake as a treacherous enemy living in 
wilderness and the cock as the animal of the goddess of the night, Hecate.108 
This cruel punishment, of course, did not threaten Roscius in reality as he would have had the 
opportunity—in view of the fact that he was not par(r)icida manifestus—to exercise ius 
exulandi, that is, the right of going into voluntary exile, which every Roman citizen was 
entitled to in the event that the proceedings conducted against him due to crime sanctioned by 
capital punishment took a turn unfavourable for him and he had to be afraid of being declared 
guilty. So, it is a rhetorical exaggeration by Cicero to repeat it again and again that 
Chrysogonus was thirsting by all means for Roscius’s blood.109 Consequently, exilium was 
not punishment but fleeing from punishment.110 If he had indeed had to be afraid of death 
penalty, Roscius would have had ample opportunity to do so, and the prosecutors would have 
been fully satisfied even with that.111 
The trial itself was held without either the facts of the case having been exactly cleared up or 
possible witnesses having been heard. The place and part of day of the crime was known, the 
date when it was committed was not—similarly, the number of perpetrators or assailants 
remained a mystery. Although Erucius brought out witnesses, to whom questions could be 
addressed by the parties, Cicero claimed that these witnesses were one by one bribed by the 
prosecutors’ money. Slaves’ testimony could be taken into account on the merits in a lawsuit 
only if it was taken from them under torture (tormentum, eculeus). Two slaves could have 
served additional information on the merits in the lawsuit indeed, and the accused could 
deliver his slaves voluntarily for being questioned by torture (in quaestionem polliceri).112 
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Sextus Roscius would have done that with pleasure as his slaves could have proved his 
innocence, but these slaves had been removed from his ownership due to forfeiture of 
property imposed on him, and now he could demand extradition of the slaves only from T. 
Roscius Magnus administering Chrysogonus’s property (in quaestionem postulare). Magnus 
refused to do so; and at that time the rule adopted in the period of the Roman empire was not 
in effect yet that during the action, on the parties’ demand, even in spite of the owner’s will, 
this part of the demonstration, that is, questioning of slaves by torture, could be conducted.113 
In such cases the judge had to decide if the slaves made testimony only upon the effect of 
torture or their confession reflected reality.114 
 
II. 1. 3. Handling the facts of the case in Pro Roscio Amerino 
 
In order to reconstruct the facts of the case of Pro Roscio Amerino, it is evident to set out of 
the narratio115 of the speech. Roscius senior could come and go with a clear conscience in 
Rome even during the time of Sulla’s proscriptiones116 as he had several friends from the 
circles of the nobility, who later on—when the oration was delivered—ran to help his son 
charged with patricide.117 Doom struck him from elsewhere: two of his relatives,118 T. 
Roscius Capito and T. Roscius Magnus, with whom he had maintained a hostile relation for a 
long time, allied to murder him.119 Regarding the details of implementing the murder Cicero 
does not make any effort to clear up mystery either:120 Roscius senior was killed in Rome, 
sometimes in one of the evenings of the autumn of 81, just when he was going home from a 
supper party.121 The news of murder reached Ameria the same evening, however, the 
messenger, Mallius Glaucia—Roscius Magnus’s friend—runs to the house of Roscius Capito, 
instead of the victim’s son to tell the news.122 Ensuing events reveal the goal that moved the 
murderers: to grab Roscius’s property.123 The relatives straight away inform Sulla’s libertine, 
L. Cornelius Chrysogonus, who was just staying in Volaterrae,124 and ask for his help to 
obtain disposal over the property. Chrysogonus appears helpful: although the deadline of 
proscriptiones expired months before, he has Roscius senior put on the list of persons 
inflicted by proscriptio,125 and from that moment his property worth six million sestertii 
becomes confiscable, and it is acquired by Chrysogonus himself for two thousand sestertii.126 
Roscius Magnus is entrusted with administering the property in his capacity as procurator, 
and he is not slow in grasping the opportunity of getting rich quickly;127 from the victim’s 
thirteen estates Roscius Capito seizes three,128 and they simply chase the son of the murdered 
man away from his father’s house.129 
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To demonstrate their indignation, citizens of Ameria send a mission to disclose Roscius’s 
political belonging to Sulla—that he is an adherent loyal to Sulla—and the injury suffered by 
Roscius junior.130 The delegates, however, include Roscius Capito too, who does everything 
to mislead his fellow-delegates;131 and Chrysogonus arranges that the people from Ameria 
could not get before Sulla, and promises them that he himself will take measures to get the 
subsequent proscriptio declared invalid and the victim’s son reinstated in his father’s 
property.132 The naive country kinsmen, getting richer with a resolute false promise, return 
home without having fulfilled their duty; Chrysogonus and his accomplices resolve that they 
need to kill Sextus Roscius junior too so that they could enjoy the treacherously acquired 
property in peace133—the candidate for victim, however, escapes to Rome to his father’s 
friends.134 
Those who desired to keep the property had been left with no other choice than Justizmord: 
they brought a charge against the victim’s son by virtue of patricide.135 The representation of 
the charge was undertaken by Erucius, having already often acted as prosecutor,136 whom 
Roscius Magnus, administrator of Chrysogonus’s robbed property, served with a lot of 
“useful” advice137—yet, Roscius Magnus was not an accusator in the strict sense of the word: 
although, as Cicero claims, he is among the prosecutors,138 and he refers to him as accusator 
in the peroratio,139 the orator would certainly not have omitted to mention Roscius Magnus 
being a prosecutor as exceptional impudence.140 Roscius Capito acted as witness,141 and 
Chrysogonus, as Sulla’s confidant and influential mover of the events, was to assume the part 
to prevent the real background of the facts from being disclosed.142 The prosecution pleaded 
that the murder arose from a family strife: Roscius junior had always hated his father,143 and 
when his father planned to disinherit his son, the son decided to kill his father to avert it.144 
Cicero asserts that only his action has unmasked the vile plot that Chrysogonus himself wants 
to keep Roscius senior’s property, and his accomplices are no other than the murderers 
themselves.145 
At first sight, Cicero’s form of presentation seems to be round and free from contradictions—
especially because young Cicero fulfilling the defence acts as a resolute and clean protector of 
justice and moral. According to several authors, for example, Richard Heinze,146 Gustav 
Landgraf,147 Ernst Lincke148 and Wilfried Stroh,149 Cicero does not properly justify the charge 
against the two Roscii. The motif of their act is logical as both profited from the murder,150 
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yet, at the moment when the murder happened they must have been far from being certain 
about the success of their plan. On the one hand, the period of proscriptions and forfeiture of 
property was long over at the time of the murder, and Chrysogonus did not side with the 
Roscii yet. On the other hand, according to Cicero’s narrative, Roscius Capito was given his 
three estates at the same time151 when Chrysogonus entrusted Roscius Magnus with 
administering the estate grabbed by him: later, however, Roscius Capito appears in the 
delegation of the citizens of Ameria, which wanted to speak for returning the goods of the 
murdered Roscius senior to his son. How come they delegated Roscius Capito to the mission, 
and how could he deceive the rest of the members of the delegation by conspiring with 
Chrysogonus—at least as Cicero claimed? Cicero’s explanation about the credulousness of 
the simple-minded kinsmen from the provinces is, according to Wilfried Stroh, simply a 
topos.152 If Capito was indeed sent to Volaterrae together with the delegation, then he could 
get the estate only later;153 Cicero, however, cannot disclose this version to the judges because 
he would inevitably substantiate the presumption that Chrysogonus bribed Capito as a 
member of the delegation, that is, the commencement of the community of interest between 
them cannot be dated to the period preceding the murder. The interest of the defence requires 
that Capito should be “involved” in the chain of events as early as possible because that is 
what the hypothesis of the Roscius Magnus—Roscius Capito alliance can be founded on. 
The starting point of Cicero’s system of production of evidence should be looked for in the 
following: as the innocence of Roscius junior cannot be proved beyond any doubt—that is, he 
cannot completely refute either that the victim’s son stayed in Ameria and not on the scene of 
the act, in Rome, at the time of the murder or that making a profit as motivation of patricide 
can be clearly ruled out (being subsequently done out of the inheritance does not exclude hope 
for the inheritance at the time of the act)—he needs to find the perpetrator(s) who can be 
substituted for the role of Sextus Roscius junior mentioned in the charge; in other words, he 
needs to make his own version believable.154 It is quite interesting, however, that he does not 
choose the most obvious explanation, which would more or less run as follows: primarily 
Chrysogonus was behind the murder (perhaps with Roscius Magnus as joint offender) since it 
was him who benefited the most from the crime and it was him who prevented the 
interrogation of the eyewitness slaves—and Capito was, first, also indignant at the foul deed 
but was bribed by Chrysogonus and, so, he readily shut his eyes to the iniquity. Cicero knew 
very well that he could not directly attack Chrysogonus! It is not by chance that Cicero does 
not want to hear the delegates from Ameria as witnesses as they would probably testify that 
Sulla’s libertine bribed Roscius Capito and thereby his argumentation would be ruined. Nor is 
it in the interest of the representative of the prosecution, Erucius to hear these testimonies as 
thereby attention would be inevitably drawn to whom the murder was in the interest of in the 
first place—without any special logical skills anybody could infer the answer: the man who 
entrusted him, Chrysogonus. So, albeit, Cicero charges Sulla’s favourite, Chrysogonus, at the 
same time, he acquits him, and shifts the greater part of the weight of the crime onto Capito 
and Magnus.155 
Here, we come up against a rather paradoxical situation. Why did Chrysogonus want at any 
cost to have Roscius junior sentenced for patricide, although he himself put the victim on the 
list of persons inflicted by proscriptio, and it was paying regard to this circumstance that he 
could get his property through auction? Why did Cicero not use the fact of selling the victim’s 
property by auction (venditio bonorum) for proving the innocence of his defendant or lack of 
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his motivation? To these questions Richard Heinze has given a highly probable explanation. If 
Roscius junior had wanted to prove his own innocence, more exactly, lack of crime by 
referring to the fact of proscriptio, thereby, for that matter, he would have served 
Chrysogonus’s interests because he would have acknowledged the lawfulness of selling the 
father’s property by auction and would have deprived himself of the legal grounds for 
reclaiming the inheritance. Verdict of acquittal resting on this basis would have been all grist 
to Chrysogonus’s mill.156 With respect to one element, Wilfried Stroh specifies Heinze’s 
hypothesis, but thereby this explanation is even more confirmed. Citing Sulla’s proscriptio 
laws, Cicero himself distinguished between the two reasons for forfeiture of property and 
auction: on the one hand, the property of those who were actually subjected to proscriptio, on 
the other hand, the goods of those who were killed in armed conflicts with Sulla’s adherents 
were sold by auction ex officio.157 First, Cicero suggests that Chrysogonus was able to acquire 
Roscius senior’s property because he belonged to the first category,158 and at this point the 
orator’s form of expression becomes somewhat obscure; however, later on, when he 
investigates the fact of auction with a lawyer’s eyes, he makes it clear that Chrysogonus had 
intentionally ranked the murdered man to the group of citizens who were done away with 
during the fight against Sulla’s adherents.159 Consequently, not even in theory could Roscius 
junior defend himself by, albeit, acknowledging murder of his father but, paying regard to 
proscriptio, referring to the point that his act was legally not considered crime—even if he 
does not take the burden of patricide (in the present case, not to be sanctioned under criminal 
law, “merely” to be condemned morally) upon himself, it would have been sufficient for him 
to refer to fact that his father was killed during fights.160 The lawsuit would be by all means 
concluded with acquittal, yet, Chrysogonus would have invariably disposed over the 
inheritance—that is, the accused would have been compelled to play the role that he was 
meant to in accordance with the scenario forced upon him by the charge brought against him. 
It was exactly this cast that Cicero wanted to change! 
In his statement of the prosecution, Erucius does not mention either Chrysogonus’s name or 
the fact of venditio bonorum,161 from that moment—in accordance with the logic of the 
prosecution—the defence would be offered two options: either it would too not bring up the 
sale of the property of the murdered by auction or it would found the strategy of defence just 
on this piece of evidence, asserting that the fact of venditio bonorum would prove that 
Roscius senior was killed in the fight against Sulla’s adherents and was not murdered by his 
son. If the defence tried to proceed along the first path, then, in the short run, Chrysogonus 
would become the winner in the case because the accused would be sentenced for patricide, 
yet, simultaneously, it would become clear that Sulla’s libertine unlawfully possesses the 
victim’s goods and could anytime expect a lawsuit brought by the Roscii laying claim to such 
goods. If, however, the defence chose the second path, and Roscius junior were acquitted 
based on Chrysogonus’s tactics—as the murder happened during the fights—then, 
Chrysogonus could keep the property of the murdered and by that the lawfulness of the 
auction would be also proved, and the victim’s son could not lay claim to paternal 
inheritance.162 Thus, Chrysogonus’s interest was exactly acquittal of the accused in such 
form! 
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All this explains why Erucius’s statement of the prosecution was so weak as if he did not 
really strive for the conviction of the accused.163 Cicero claims that Erucius has compiled the 
counts of the indictment so carelessly because he hoped that nobody would dare to defend the 
accused as thereby he would oppose the influential Chrysogonus too—although, 
Chrysogonus’s name was not even mentioned in the statement of the prosecution. If, however, 
we presume that the conviction of the accused was not in the interest of the possessors of the 
property of the murdered—because the version on Roscius killed during the fights and selling 
the property lawfully by auction would have been more suitable for their plans—then, 
Erucius’s low-key statement becomes understandable: the outcome of a well-built effective 
statement of the prosecution would have been unpredictable as, in case of a weaker defence, 
the judges would have convicted the accused. So, the prosecution waited to see to what 
direction the defence wants to proceed: if they step in the trap of the tactics sparing the life of 
the accused but letting the property get lost, then Chrysogonus’s party has achieved their goal. 
If they don’t, then in the later phase of the lawsuit they can increase the pressure on the judges 
aimed at sentencing the accused. So, they have provided an excellent example of how 
brilliantly a bad statement of the prosecution can serve the interests of the prosecution! 
Another trick of the prosecution: Capito brings it to the knowledge of the accused what (either 
true or invented) facts he could disclose to the judges in his testimony. In general, it is not 
customary to “let the opponent into” the strategic secrets of the prosecution—except when 
dropping certain information is nothing else than intimidation. According to the well 
harmonised collusion between Erucius and Capito, although the representative of the 
prosecution retains certain information from the judges, the witness of the prosecution 
“warns” the accused lest he should cherish excessive hopes based on the mild statement of the 
prosecution.164 
Cicero could choose (could have chosen) between the two paths “offered” by the prosecution 
and a third “own” path. If he accepts the lifeline thrown by the opponent, which states that the 
victim’s death was caused not by his son but military actions, he spares the life of the accused 
but he can say goodbye to his property for ever. (A less talented counsel for the defence 
perhaps follows this tactics, for we should not forget: even a hook will be a lifeline for 
somebody drowning!) If he does not bring up the auction not mentioned by the prosecution, 
his defendant can keep his property, yet, he does not clear him of the charge of patricide, his 
life will continue to be in danger. (Who knows what incriminating confessions Capito and his 
associates will come forward with in the lawsuit? The political climate would also make 
conviction for patricide probable—as it is admitted by Cicero too.165) As a matter of fact—
and Chrysogonus had to think of that too—Cicero can unmask and prove the real intentions of 
the prosecution that the aim is nothing else than acquittal of the accused and thereby grabbing 
of his inheritance. Here, however, he might have argued as follows: if the defence doubted the 
lawfulness of venditio bonorum, then, on the one hand, it would put Sulla himself in negative 
light as all that took place on his behalf;166 on the other hand, the judges might include several 
senators who profiteered from the proscriptiones, so, to attack auctions “en bloc” would be a 
serious tactical error. Finally: if the victim was killed not in the fights and was not murdered 
by his son either, the question would righteously arise: who the actual murderer could have 
been. Pursuant to the cui prodest principle, of course, Chrysogonus would be suspected as 
instigator, however, it would call for highly great courage—much rather recklessness—for the 
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defence to search for the perpetrator of the crime among Sulla’s direct confidants, whom the 
dictator has, besides, made the possessor of the goods of the deceased.167 
As a starting point, Cicero chooses the third path but he does not follow it through: on the one 
hand, he makes it clear that the primary purpose of the lawsuit is not to avenge Roscius 
senior’s death but to decide the fate of the property left by him; on the other hand, he leaves 
the effort of the prosecution in obscurity that the proceedings should be concluded by the 
acquittal of Roscius junior. He does everything to prevent the judges from realising the 
opponent’s strategy, what is more: from first to last he hammers into them that Chrysogonus 
wants to have the victim’s son sentenced to death to enable him to grab the property. So, 
Cicero’s form of representation is much more pathetic than reality: the accused is fighting for 
his life rather than his property; and he does not beg the judges to reinstate the party injured 
by proscriptios in this property, he begs them to decide not to deprive the unlucky fellow, 
already done out of his property, of his life.168 He obscures his own tactics too, as its aim is, 
among others, just to get the property of the accused back.169 In the course of that, he, as a 
matter of fact, has to attack Sulla’s favourite, Chrysogonus, who, in his own words, produces 
huge impact on public affairs too170: Cicero claims that the liberated slave has unlawfully 
grabbed the property of the murdered man, and has commenced the lawsuit from the 
background against the victim’s son based on invented charge so that he could keep the 
property. It is literally a matter of life and death for the orator to separate the person of Sulla 
and Chrysogonus strictly from one another: the absolute ruler of the state knows nothing of 
the libertine’s proceeding for if he knew about it, he would not allow that such flagrant 
roguery could be committed under the protection of his name!171 Perhaps, the delegates from 
Ameria managed to appear before Sulla but the dictator refused their request in order to 
favour his confidant—it is not by chance that the counsel for the defence does not summon 
the members of the delegation as witnesses; yet, he is aware that the prosecutor cannot put 
this question to them either since thereby he would shed bad light on Sulla: Erucius is 
compelled to tolerate that Cicero clears Sulla of accusations in the case for if he contradicts 
him, he himself will denigrate the dictator.172 
At this point, in contrasting Sulla with Chrysogonus Cicero’s voice sounds rather false, yet, he 
cannot go too far in the outbursts against Chrysogonus: he can denigrate him just as much as 
it is absolutely necessary for the sake of the case, so, he must clear him of the charge of 
murder, provided that he finds a suitable murderer. That is where Roscius Capito and Roscius 
Magnus come into the picture. In the person of Capito, based on his conduct of life and 
depraved morals173 and the benefit of three estates gained from the victim’s goods, an ideal 
murderer could be found, but the fact that he was elected a member of the delegation sent to 
Sulla—for being a member of the board of the town council of Ameria,174 which otherwise 
makes the obvious character of depraved conduct of life questionable—seems to contradict all 
this. In the case of Magnus, the situation is just the opposite: his conduct of life cannot be 
contested, and only indirectly does he benefit from the victim’s death but he stays in Rome at 
the time of the murder and Chrysogonus appoints him to be the administrator of the property 
acquired in the auction.175 So, one by one they are not suitable for the role of the murderer for 
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Cicero, the two together, however, constitute a pair that perfectly fits in the orator’s form of 
presentation, and that is how Cicero creates from them the pair of Castor and Pollux of the 
case, who operate inseparably in unity of intention.176 
Here, the orator builds the disposition with amazing virtuosity: the usual prooemium should 
be followed by narratio expounding his own version created of the events and the 
argumentatio proving that. However, as his own narratio would not form a rounded whole, 
by placing the most important element of the argumentatio before the narratio he integrates it 
in the prooemium.177 At the very beginning of the speech, by a crushing tirade he brings it to 
the knowledge of the judges: the murder serves the interests of Chrysogonus and not of the 
accused, the purpose of the lawsuit is nothing else than that Chrysogonus could keep the 
unlawfully grabbed property. He has not yet said a word of the murder committed, he right 
away turns the cast of the lawsuit around: Roscius junior’s case itself is a statement of 
prosecution against Chrysogonus, and the representative of the prosecution can at best defend 
its points.178 The judges could not easily withdraw from this influence—they must have felt 
that Cicero has opened their eyes, and from then on they gladly shut their eyes to minor 
contradictions of the defence.179 It is not by chance that in the argumentatio embedded in the 
prooemium, the orator refrains from directly bringing up the murder or investigating after the 
perpetrators for if he does that, in the spirit of cui prodest, he would have cast the suspicion 
on Chrysogonus—and he had to carefully avoid that. So, he must give an account of the form 
of the murder in the narratio.180 After he describes Roscius senior at length, and he does not 
omit to emphasise that he was a committed adherent of the nobility and Sulla himself,181 he 
calls—and for that matter right away as an inseparable pair, in the inner circle of 
Chrysogonus—Capito and Magnus to the stage. 
It is at this point where he formulates his hypothesis on the motif and circumstances of the 
murder. Here come the arguments on the Roscii’s past: Cicero calls Capito an old gladiator, 
which is quite a degrading appositio, and adds that Magnus became his follower too. At the 
same time, the statements regarding the perpetrators’ past can be inferred from the crime 
itself. The narratio follows the order of the events—of course, by increasingly highlighting 
dramatic moments—and breaks through the order of the events at one point only: according to 
the orator’s narrative Capito receives his share from the victim’s property as early as before 
his participation in the delegation, thereby the judges can see that it is proved that he was part 
of the conspiracy from the outset. The argumentatio following the above182 is preceded by a 
brief partitio.183 In accordance with the rules of anticategorica184 Cicero, first, puts forward 
evidence to prove Roscius junior’s innocence,185 then, he starts his attack against Capito and 
Magnus186—his aim here is to protect his defendant’s life. This is followed by the 
argumentation on Chrysogonus’s unlawful grabbing187—here, the orator is driven by the 
motif of getting the robbed paternal inheritance back. Cicero’s narrative on the murder 
already contains the presumption that the auction was from the first illegal.188 
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In the part of the argumentatio, which is aimed at clearing Roscius junior, Cicero starts his 
reasoning by enumerating the so-called argumenta de vita.189 Cicero claimed that the 
representatives of the prosecution could bring up nothing against Roscius junior’s conduct of 
life. Although Erucius charged him with misappropriation of funds (peculatus),190 he was 
unable to produce evidence on the merits to certify his statement. Cicero takes the charge of 
peculatus—which nevertheless referred to some kind of greed—out of the original context 
and by referring it to the scope of other lies, he dismisses it briefly. The exploration of the so-
called argumenta e causa191 is more profound and precise than it would be required by 
Erucius’s pleadings: the orator wins the sympathy of the audience by lengthy digressions and 
introduces more scope for usual topoi (the prosecutors’ bad conscience, high appreciation of 
peasant’s way of life in Rome, etc.). Much more original is the structure of the so-called 
argumenta e facto.192 Although the prosecution asserts that Roscius, as an indirect perpetrator 
with the assistance of slaves, killed his father,193 Cicero ignores this statement and considers 
the following opportunities one by one: Roscius did away with his father by himself, with the 
assistance of others—freemen or slaves from Ameria or Rome. As slaves are listed at the end 
of the enumeration only, the orator judges this opportunity by stating that his defendant—if he 
had been the perpetrator—would have used this tool only in a fit of despair. Yet, he refutes 
this count of the indictment with the greatest of ease, stating that Roscius junior asked that the 
slaves should be subjected to interrogation and, in the course of that, torture, Roscius Magnus 
and Chrysogonus prevented their interrogation. The so-called argumenta e tempore following 
the above prepares the attack against Capito, Magnus and Chrysogonus.194 
In the attack against the opponents, Cicero puts forward his arguments in an order following 
the chronology of the events.195 First, he takes account of the line of argumenta e causa and 
argumenta e vita anteacta with respect to Roscius Magnus presented by the orator as the 
actual perpetrator of the murder.196 The framework of argumenta e facto—more specifically 
argumenta e loco,197 e tempore,198 e tempore consequenti199—is filled primarily by 
expounding the importance of the role of the messenger of the murder, Mallius Glaucia and 
the news forwarded by him to Capito.200 It is by this that Cicero brings the other Roscius, the 
accomplice of the murder, Capito in the picture, against whom he straightaway puts forward 
his reasoning to be formulated on the basis of argumenta e causa201 and argumenta e vita,202 
which he closes with a tirade against the two Roscii.203 Cicero does not carry through the 
analysis of the importance of the news immediately forwarded to Chrysogonus,204 however, 
by stressing the extent of grabbing he allows to presume the motif of the crime.205 Spending a 
long time with the role of the delegation sent to Volaterrae is primarily aimed at increasing 
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the antipathy against Capito.206 At this point, Cicero again turns to the refusal of the 
opportunity of interrogating the slaves,207 which, albeit, supports Roscius junior’s innocence, 
leaves little surface of attack on the movers of the charge as the orator is compelled to declare 
that the present owner of the slaves, Chrysogonus is little interested in the murder itself, only 
by his power (potentia) did he help the infamy of the infamous Capito and Magnus 
(audacia).208 His last “argument” could not have been convincing to the judges either; yet, 
paying regard to the dangerous political circumstances of the case, the orator must have 
thought—as a matter of fact, leaving it open for the judges to draw the conclusion that Sulla’s 
confidant must have had a greater part in committing the murder—that he had better declare 
that as far as he is concerned he tries to judge Chrysogonus’s acts “in good faith”: namely, 
that his corruptness does not make Chrysogonus a murderer.209 
The argumentatio against Chrysogonus hides several difficulties attributable, among others, 
to the deterioration of the text;210 however, building the reasoning reminding of tightrope 
walking between interests could not represent an easy task even to Cicero. First, he qualifies 
the sale of the victim’s property unlawful;211 then, he again emphasises that the idea of the 
lawsuit has been made up and the action is moved by nobody else than Chrysogonus, who is 
motivated solely by the intention to keep the unlawfully grabbed property thereby.212 These 
difficulties must have arisen not so much in outlining the psychological background but in 
presenting arguments in such form that the judges coming from the nobility should not feel 
injured: as a part of them enjoyed the benefits of proscriptiones, Cicero had to refrain from 
doubting the appropriateness and lawfulness of forfeitures of property and auctions for in this 
case he most probably could have been afraid of the nobles setting their rows straight against 
the orator, who attacks the proscriptio and its consequences, and his defendant.213 
Accordingly, first, he sharply separates Chrysogonus’s deeds in the past from the procedure of 
others who benefited from auctions and proscriptiones,214 then, with overwhelming pathos he 
argues that if the judges distance themselves from the corrupt practices of this kind of 
parvenus—quite clearly he refers to the class-consciousness and human envy of the nobles—
the cause of the nobility will shine all the more brightly and immaculately.215 
After the orator has flattered the self-respect of the nobility, he must convince the judges 
simultaneously of two, completely contradictory demands: on the one hand, he must insist on 
that Roscius junior has no other desire than sparing his life, and in return he would be pleased 
to deliver his property voluntarily to Chrysogonus216—on the other hand, he must not forget 
about his actual goal, specifically, that simultaneously with obtaining verdict of acquittal, he 
should get the robbed paternal inheritance back for his defendant. Inspired by a brilliant idea, 
he separates the claim of the accused from his own desire (formulated as a general statement 
for the public): when he begs the judges for sparing Roscius’s life, he speaks on behalf of his 
defendant217—and when he demands reinstating of the lawful property status, he turns to the 
judges in his own voice but on behalf of public order calling for security in law.218 By doing 
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so, he maintains the legal claim for paternal inheritance, but by nothing does he impair the 
passionate course of the peroratio begging for mercy, referring to eternal laws of 
humanity219—and while the judges are listening to Cicero’s soul shaking periods with deep 
emotion, they can safely forget about the real subject of the lawsuit at stake for both of the 
parties: the six million sestertii.220 
It is not without any reason that Cicero himself considered this oration delivered by him at the 
age of twenty-six his masterpiece221 as he solved numerous quite conflicting tasks by brilliant 
rhetorical tactics: he built his own version on the murder, in which he unmasked and at the 
time obscured the opponent’s intentions; on behalf of his defendant he waived the paternal 
inheritance worth several millions, at the same time, on behalf of the public he maintained, 
from first to last, the claim of the accused to get it back; he set up the “hierarchy of infamy” 
where the two infamous Roscii, Magnus and Capito are placed as murderers at one pole, the 
“merely” greedy and corrupt Chrysogonus in the middle, and, compared to the murderers, a 
complete opposite is constituted by the other pole, the dictator, Sulla knowing nothing of 
abuses and foul deeds, whose name has been abused in bad faith by his subjects and 
confidants.222 
While recognising the virtues of content of the speech, Wilfried Stroh criticises its structure at 
several points. He argues that the partes orationis excessively, one might say, in a schoolish 
manner, follow the order set in the literature of rhetorical training, and they allow to infer a 
kind of superstitio praeceptorum,223 almost superstitious insistence on what has been acquired 
in training. Accordingly, Cicero too sharply separates narratio from argumentatio and does 
not finish certain threads once started (so, for example, the references to Magnus’s 
profiteering or to the purported assassination attempt against Roscius junior), which might 
have aroused the audience’s suspicion or at least interest.224 These matters of detail and 
criticised elements would have been probably handled by greater circumspection by the 
mature Cicero, however, we should not forget that this oratio is the second speech of the 
twenty-six years old orator; yet, among cases of greater importance, his first serious and 
successful attempt.  
The formal exaggerations, the Baroque-like amplitudes of the asianism, the pathetic rattle 
sometimes almost crossing the border of good taste were cut off of Cicero’s style by practice 
and further rhetoric studies—nevertheless, the ingenuity of rhetorical disposition, the precise 
yet flexible handling of the legal facts of the case, the masterly implementation of merging 
logical and topical arguments, which later on served the basis of Cicero’s ars oratoria, we can 
see blossoming out already in Pro Roscio Amerino in full pomp. 
 
 
II. 2. Lawsuit of Aulus Cluentius Habitus  
 
The statement of the defence delivered in the criminal action (causa publica) of Aulus 
Cluentius Habitus—Cicero’s longest actually delivered speech left to us—is from 66, that is, 
the year when Cicero was praetor. In certain respect, it is the precious stone of Cicero’s ars 
oratoria since its narrative is vivid, full of turns like a crime story; events, scenes, planes of 
time replace one another boldly, sometimes seemingly illogically but, being subordinated to 
the effect the orator means to attain, in an exactly premeditated sequence. Cluentius was 
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charged, on the one hand, with poisoning his stepfather, Statius Albius Oppianicus. The other 
part of the charge was founded on the criminal proceedings under which eight years before 
Cluentius charged Oppianicus with poisoning attempt against him, as a result of which 
Oppianicus was compelled to go into exile—in the current lawsuit, however, the prosecution 
brought it up against him that the former court of justice declared Oppianicus guilty purely 
because Cluentius had bribed the judges. Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis of 81 served as 
basis for judging crimes that provide grounds for the charge of poisoning; however, the 
prohibition of bribing judges applied to the order of senators only, and Cluentius belonged to 
the order of knights.  
First, we intend to outline the historical background of the oration, so to say, the historical 
facts of the case (I. 2. 1.); then, we turn our attention to the opportunity of applying statutory 
facts of the case, i.e., lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis. (II. 2. 2.) After that—in accordance 
with the system of arguments divided into two of the oratio—we analyse handling of the 
charge of bribe arising in relation to iudicium Iunianum and discussed at length (II. 2. 3.), and 
the counts of the indictment on poisoning commented upon shortly by Cicero, in terms of the 
rhetorical tactics and handling of the facts of the case followed in the speech. (II. 2. 4.) 
Finally, we examine the rhetorical tools of Cicero’s strategy to explore how the orator 
handled, modified or distorted the system of the charges and chronology—to support the 
argument, which can be considered brilliant with a lawyer’s eyes too. (II. 2. 5.) 
 
II. 2. 1. Historical background of Pro Cluentio 
 
Cicero refers to the oration delivered in defence of Aulus Cluentius Habitus in 66 in Orator 
written twenty years later as an example of using the three genres of style in the same 
speech,225 and quotes a truly successfully made phrase226 from it.227 Writing about the orator’s 
power of judgement Quintilian brings up Cluentiana as a textbook example of properly built 
rhetorical strategy,228 and elsewhere he expounds that Cicero threw sand (that is, dust) into the 
judges’ eyes.229 The oration is cited by Gellius too;230 Pliny considers it Cicero’s most 
outstanding rhetorical achievement,231 and from among Claudius Tryphoninus mentions it.232 
Philology of the modern age also devoted considerable scope to the Pro Cluentio, Theodor 
Mommsen refers to the speech as an outstanding example of antique “criminal statistics”.233 
The accused of the lawsuit, A. Cluentius Habitus was born in Larinum in north Apulia 
controlled by the Aurii, Albii, Cluentii and Magii related by manifold marriage connections 
and kinship,234 which shows the reflection of crimes growing wild in Rome235 and it cannot be 
said that at a rate of a small town.236 He lost his father, Cluentius senior when he was fifteen, 
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in 88;237 two years later his mother, Sassia got married again, and to the husband of her 
daughter, Cluentia, that is, her own son-in-law, A. Aurius Melinus, at that.238 That is where 
Cicero dates the bad relation between the accused and his mother from as he claims that 
Cluentius was so much shocked at Sassia’s act that he decided not to maintain any relation 
with his mother.239 Aurius—purportedly as a result of the machinations of St. Abbius 
Oppianicus—fell victim of Sulla’s proscriptiones,240 and Cluentius’s mother married 
Oppianicus, who earlier divorced at least two wives, Papia (Magius’s widow) and Novia, and 
lost two wives, the elder Cluentia and Magia.241 
It is worth noting that to illustrate the hatred between Oppianicus senior and Cluentius Cicero 
does not use the opportunity that he could properly exploit as the psychological motivation of 
the assassination attempted by Oppianicus against his stepson, namely, he does not mention 
how Cluentius responded—possibly with antipathy or anger—to the fact of the marriage of 
his mother and Oppianicus.242 Magia was the mother of Oppianicus junior, who acted as 
accuser against Cluentius, that is, the son of his stepmother in 66. Oppianicus senior 
purportedly wanted to get his stepson, Cluentius poisoned and used C. Fabricius for carrying 
out his plan, who tried to win the help both of Scamander, the libertine and the slave of the 
physician who treated Cluentius for performing the murder.243 It is impossible to clarify how 
much the fact of the assassination attempt could be considered proved; however, Cluentius 
brought a charge first against Scamander, then Fabricius and finally his stepfather, Oppianicus 
senior. The court of justice found all the accused persons guilty; however, Oppianicus was 
convicted with a little majority of the votes cast.244 The lawsuit involved several suspicious 
circumstances, for example, the judges were drawn irregularly,245 the suspicion of bribe246 
emerged with respect to several senators, e.g., C. Fidiculanius Falcula,247 M. Atilius Bulbus 
and Staienus.248  
Based on all that, suspicion extensively spread that the lawsuit was influenced by bribes and 
bribe attempts. In spite of the fact that Oppianicus was convicted, Cicero tries to present the 
case as if Oppianicus himself might have been the briber and it was thanks to this that almost 
half of the members of the court of justice voted for his innocence, in contrast with 
Scamander and Fabricius who were unanimously convicted; on the other hand, Oppianicus’s 
counsel, L. Quinctius suspected Cluentius of bribe as by his formal accusation he eventually 
won success, and used this case for agitating as a tribune before the popular assembly against 
the corruptness of the order of senators constituting the courts of justice.249 Consequently, the 
lawsuit caused political stir and served as grounds for proceedings against several senators 
who participated in the lawsuit as judges.250 Cicero, who defended Scamander in the 74 
proceedings, refers to the case as a textbook example of the bribeability of courts of justice 
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just because Oppianicus was sentenced by only little majority of the votes cast, from which he 
wanted to create evidence of or at least arguments on the bribe committed by the accused.251 
Two years after he was convicted, in 72, Oppianicus senior died in exile but near Rome252—
the prosecution claimed that Cluentius had him poisoned253—however, no factual data are 
available on the circumstances of his death. His widow, Sassia suspected her son (that is, 
Oppianicus’s stepson), Cluentius of having poisoned Oppianicus, and she tried to confirm her 
suspicion by testimonies—primarily forced from slaves—but she did not succeed in it.254 
However, after further deaths occurred, and Cluentius got involved in them under unclarified 
circumstances, in 66 Abbius Oppianicus junior—presumably twenty-one years old at the time 
of the lawsuit255—brought a charge against Cluentius, a member of the order of knights, based 
on Sulla’s lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis, which contained the state of facts elements 
homicide, illegal possession of arms, making and passing on poison for the purpose of 
manslaughter, arson and certain procedural crimes, such as for example bribing the court of 
justice in order to have innocent persons sentenced—however, it extended this later scope of 
state of facts to magistrates and senators only.256 Based on that—paying regard to the letter of 
the law—Cluentius could not be declared guilty in the charge of bribe if for no other reason 
than because he did not belong to the scope of subjects of the law as he came from a family in 
the order of knights and had never held a state office.257 The office of iudex quaestionis was 
fulfilled by Q. Voconius Naso;258 the young Titus Attius, knight of Pisaurum acted on the side 
of the prosecution,259 the defence of Cluentius, who can be most probably considered guilty in 
the charges brought against him, was undertaken by Cicero, a praetor in 66, who attained that 
the accused was acquitted.260 The court of justice consisted of thirty-two jurors, made up, on 
the grounds of lex Aurelia iudiciaria of 70, of senators, knights and aerar tribunes each 
constituting one-third of the panel.261 
The defence followed a double path: it did not come to the main count of the indictment 
immediately; instead, it dealt with the issue of bribe first. In order to support his own narrative 
on bribe, to discuss the subject of bribe more extensively than the accuser: first, he details 
Oppianicus senior’s guilty past record, and deals with two former lawsuits related to the 
assassination attempt against Cluentius. In the introduction Cicero announces that in his 
statement of the defence he will follow the double path indicated by the prosecution and will 
justify why he deals with the first point more profoundly than with the second one: the charge 
of poisoning is fully unfounded, therefore, it can be get done with briefly; the bribe case has 
been generally known for eight years already, and the joint effort of the counsel for the 
defence and the judges will be required to do away with it. The first part of the statement of 
the defence consists of three subchapters, which deal with Oppianicus senior’s past record, the 
poisoning lawsuit of the year 74 and the bribe case. In the second part of the oration, which 
now covers the main count of the indictment, i.e., the issue of assassination committed by 
Cluentius against Oppianicus by poison, the orator passes over other purported acts of the 
accused and the crime of poisoning with lapidary conciseness and almost suspicious ease, and 
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he spends more time only on the testimonies enforced from slaves brought up by the 
prosecution as evidence. 
 
II. 2. 2. Applicability of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis in Cluentius’s lawsuit 
 
In the beginning of the speech, in the prooemium, Cicero strictly separates the charge of 
murder committed by poison and the charge of bribing the court of justice that passed 
sentence on Oppianicus senior eight years before, which was politically highly exploited by 
subscriptor Attius.262 The charge could be based (i) on assassination and mixing of poison, 
(ii) several poisoning attempts and bribing the court of justice, (iii) simply on assassination 
attempt.263 It makes it rather difficult to reconstruct the facts that Cicero both conceals facts 
unpleasant to his defendant and dispenses with elements self-evident to the audience of the 
period but no longer known to the reader of the present day. It is clear that as counsel for the 
defence Cicero’s task was to prove to the judges that his defendant had not committed the 
crime(s) he was charged with—that is, in accordance with the fundamental rhetorical 
principles he had to proceed in compliance with status coniecturalis.264 
To a lawyer’s eyes, one of the most interesting questions of Pro Cluentio is whether the 
charge brought by Oppianicus junior based on lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis against 
Cluentius applied to manslaughter committed by poison only or covered bribe of the court of 
justice too, which the accused committed, as claimed by the accuser, eight years before, in the 
lawsuit against Oppianicus senior. In clarifying the question, as a matter of fact, the problem 
of the reliability of the source base arises as Cicero’s form of presentation and his references 
to the text of the law are most probably tendentious—even if he could not have modified or 
distorted the text of the law on the merits when citing it—and the form of Sulla’s laws left to 
us is from a much later age;265 furthermore, it must be taken into account that the text 
effective at the time of the lawsuit is not necessarily identical with the text left to us.266 
Although the later version of lex Cornelia de falsis sanctions active bribe in court of justice, it 
is not probable that the original lex Cornelia testamentaria contained provisions to such 
effect. In the attempt to determine the counts of the indictment precisely, one should not 
forget about the circumstance that in the quaestio proceedings the accuser was allowed to 
present everything to the jurors that he could bring up against the accused since his aim was to 
declare guilt in general only and not to fix guilt that can be declared in specific counts of the 
indictment since punishment was not based on the discretion of the court of justice.267 We 
cannot know for sure if in delatio nominis it was mandatory to notify the law and if in 
addition to naming the law that provided grounds for the charge it was mandatory to specify 
its exact passage or if it was mandatory to name other counts of the indictment to be referred 
to in the scope of the charge and whether they were binding with respect to the continuation 
of the lawsuit in the event that they were determined.268 
There is a good chance of stating that in the introduction of the lawsuit it was mandatory to 
set the counts of the inducement in writing, as Cicero notes this in De inventione regarding the 
period before Sulla.269 It is worth looking at how much Cicero specifies statutory grounds of 
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the charge of the given lawsuit in his speeches and to what extent he comments on the 
introductory part of the lawsuit (postulatio, delatio nominis, receptio nominis). References to 
the state of facts and charge of de pecuniis repetundis,270 de maiestate,271 de ambitu,272 
peculatus,273 inter sicarios and veneficii,274 iniuriarum,275 furti,276 de vi,277 de alea278 and de 
parricidio279 can be found item by item.280 Furthermore, in several cases he names the 
particular law, for example lex Plautia de vi,281 lex Iulia de pecuniis repetundis,282 lex 
Papia,283 lex Acilia284 and lex Scantinia.285 In several orations he refers expressis verbis to the 
charge being in conformity with the facts of the case, for example, in Pro Roscio Amerino,286 
In Verrem—among others regarding the statues erected287—Pro Scauro,288 Pro Rabirio 
Postumo289 and Pro Ligario.290 
In Pro Cluentio Cicero’s form of presentation is twofold. On the one hand, it gives the 
impression that the court of justice is competent exclusively in the case of poisoning,291 and 
article six of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis on bribing the court of justice does not apply 
to Cluentius as the scope of persons is restricted to the order of senators;292 on the other hand, 
it deals with bribe continuously as crimen. The quaestio chaired by Q. Voconius Naso was 
undoubtedly competent primarily in cases of poisoning—which, as a matter of fact, does not 
exclude bringing up other counts of the indictment—at the same time it contained a section 
that sanctioned bribe.293 It is worth looking at the points referred to by Joachim Classen in 
order to clarify if the charge was in conformity with the facts of the case. In spite of 
incomplete source base it can be pointed out that in no other cases was a charge brought due 
to bribe in court of justice on the grounds of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis as there were 
other opportunities for sanctioning bribe of the court of justice. Furthermore, it is not probable 
that iudex quaestionis would have sustained the charge contrary to the letter of the law, more 
specifically, that the prosecutor would extend the state of facts of Sulla’s law to the order of 
knights, beyond the order of senators. Cicero asserts that Attius often referred to aequitas, by 
which he argued for the extensive interpretation of the law, and Cicero—although he wants to 
protect Cluentius against the peril arising from the suspicion of bribe—does not refer to bribe 
even once as crimen in conformity with the charge, and quotes no testimony to refute it; 
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instead, he underlines it much rather as a point brought up by the prosecution that can 
generate prejudice294 and bias.295 
 
II. 2. 3. The “charge” of iudicium Iunianum and bribe in court of justice  
 
As the starting point of his speech Cicero chose the speech of subscriptor Attius—as the main 
accuser, Oppianicus scarcely said anything296—apparently he recognised it as a rhetorical 
achievement. In his very first sentences he tried to reflect on the opponent’s speech and 
mitigate its effect, which, however, might raise considerable suspicion as to whether he had 
reconstructed the opponent’s argument without any distortion.297 By the appearance that he 
speaks accepting Attius’s division298 he undoubtedly made an effort to give the impression of 
sincerity, insistence on truth and lack of rhetorical tactics to the audience.299 Some paragraphs 
later the hearer or the reader will be surprised to notice that it is just deviation from the 
accuser’s system, individual arrangement of the facts, circumstances and evidence by which 
Cicero wants to convince the judges of his truth, emphasising that they will be able to form an 
opinion and make judgment on what had happened after having learned of the full scope of 
the structure set up by him.300 Cicero looks forward, with trust, to the refutation of the actual 
charge discussed by the opponent—as the orator claims301—just touching on the issue, that is, 
the charge of poisonings (more accurately three poisonings), and he contrasts it with the 
extensively discussed charge sufficiently known to the public, the charge of bribing the court 
of justice passing sentence eight years before; at the same time, he stresses that only the 
charge of poisonings falls within the competence of the court of justice set up now.302 (Based 
on Cicero’s statement of the defence the charges of poisoning brought against Cluentius might 
have been the following:303 poisoning Oppianicus senior by abetment of Strato, Micostratus 
and M. Asellius,304 poisoning C. Vibius Capax305 and assassination attempt against 
Oppianicus junior.306) At the same time he cannot fully ignore the charge of bribe—as Attius 
talked about it at length—instead, he starts a counter-attack: he qualifies this charge libel 
arising from political motifs, and as such a threat that must be taken seriously and whose 
treatment requires the counsel for the defence to use a non-routine strategy and the judges to 
show deep and wise consideration.307 Thereby he manages to make the charge general enough 
as if it were aimed against the fact of bribe and corruption in court of justice only and not 
against the person of Cluentius.308 
By trying to present his defendant as a person persecuted for political reasons for years, the 
orator, as a matter of fact, tries to win the judges’ compassion, to whom he does not omit to 
stress his faith in their objectivity and sense of justice, which he underlines by recurrently 
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using the concept of aequitas.309 At the end of the introduction, Cicero sums up the plan of his 
statement of the defence, in which, however, he mentions the strategy of handling only the 
charge of bribe, which is—according to his earlier statement—legally insignificant.310 
Concerning this point he announces that the charge of bribe is far from being unfounded but 
its direction is totally different from what public opinion has been poisoned with so far: 
namely, in the case of Oppianicus senior the judges were indeed bribed, yet, not by Cluentius 
but against Cluentius.311 By the latter circumstance—which he would not have needed 
necessarily, as it would have been enough for him to clear his defendant by proving: it was 
not Cluentius who bribed the court of justice—he wanted to achieve a double goal: on the one 
hand, he connects the cases of Scamander and Fabricius with the lawsuit of Oppianicus by 
presenting the sentences passed therein as praeiudicium,312 on the other hand, he enables 
himself to deal in depth with Oppianicus’s all foul deeds deemed relevant and suitable for 
deterring the court of justice and the audience. In other words, before going into the defence 
of Cluentius he turns the positions of the fight around and launches an attack against the 
accuser, more exactly against his father.313 
In the following sentences Cicero’s intention becomes even more unambiguous. He explains 
the act taken by the young accuser by his obligations as a son,314 and his own decision to 
expound the crimes of Oppianicus senior at length by his obligations as counsel for the 
defence,315 more specifically by pointing out that if it is possible to help a living person by 
causing harm to a dead person, it must be done.316 By apologising to the judges for perhaps 
dedicating too much room to Oppianicus senior—ensuring them that once he has explored all 
the circumstances of the case, he can clarify the situation of Cluentius defended by him—he 
creates the opportunity for himself to involve all additional information directly or indirectly 
related to the case as he pleases in the scope of the oratio.317 So, in the introduction318 after 
expressing seeming acknowledgement and sympathy for the accuser and the subscriptor as 
well as regret over his defendant’s miserable situation, he resolutely separates the counts of 
the indictment: the bribe that can be perhaps better supported by facts although it is legally 
irrelevant in the given case, yet, it is represented as dangerous for political reasons and the 
assassination attempt having great significance in terms of the proceedings, which, however, 
can be easily refuted—wasting relatively few words on both the accuser and the accused, 
driving the judges’ attention to Oppianicus senior.319 
Cicero begins to describe the events as in a report,320 in a lean style he speaks about the death 
of Cluentius senior, a venerable citizen and about the marriage concluded by Cluentia junior 
with A. Aurius Melinus.321 Soon, he comes to Cluentius’s mother, Sassia, who married her 
own son-in-law. At this point he interrupts his sentence at the word mother and emphasises 
that in spite of all her vileness he calls her mother,322 perhaps all the more because it would be 
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difficult to rephrase the Greek term mētēr amētōr323 in Latin.324 On several occasions he 
emphatically calls Sassia mother so that by contrasting this naming with the foul deeds 
attributed to her he could highlight that the deeds committed by her are unnatural and guilty, 
and as Sassia’s procedure was aimed against her daughter, Cluentia and not against Cluentius, 
the orator can build the connection between the circumstances only through some skilful 
manoeuvres.325 
Contrary to the original announcement—that he intends to discuss Oppianicus’s lawsuit in 74 
and the bribes that took place in relation to it326—Cicero as soon as he utters Sassia’s name, as 
if guided by sudden temper, comes to her marriage concluded with her son-in-law and 
expelling of her daughter,327 and at this point he does not confine himself to enumerating the 
facts objectively; instead, he dramatizes the series of events concerning them in a fortissimo 
imbued from first to last with powerful indignation, shifting from the instrumentation of 
defence to that of prosecution.328 He makes his attack not on the person who is directly related 
with bribe or poisonings but on the person only loosely connected with the charge, by all 
that—in accordance with the basic topos of antique rhetoric—he demonstrates that the 
motivations of the acts of a given person can be explored from his conduct of life.329 It is not 
by chance that Cicero tries to work up temper against Sassia since he somewhat offsets the 
aversion to and prejudice against Cluentius, and tries to present Oppianicus junior’s formal 
accusation as an act of a child’s pietas.330 Before returning to the basic story, he again points 
out that the judges have to listen to all that to be able to understand the full scope of the 
events.331 
Regarding the questions raised by pietas—after he has mitigated the effect that the child’s 
sentiment emphasised by the prosecutor produced on the judges, which was or could have 
been suitable from the first for turning the audience against Cluentius—the orator had to 
tackle the following problems involving great difficulties. Cicero had to decide (i) if he should 
treat crimina veneficii following the prosecutor’s dispositio after iudicium Iunianum or he 
should turn the order round; (ii) if he should proceed status collectionis (that is, referring to 
the interpretation in accordance with the letter of the law) or in accordance with status 
coniecturalis (by denying and refuting the charge of bribe committed by Cluentius); (iii) how 
he should turn the judges’ sympathy aimed at Oppianicus junior towards Cluentius.332 
By this narrative the orator—without coming to the actual refutation of the charges—gave a 
palpable picture, so to say suggesting the prosecutor’s motivation, of the conduct of life of the 
accuser’s stepmother, who was most probably present at the trial.333 By characterising Sassia 
in such form Cicero sheds light on the source of Cluentius’s all troubles, of the intriguing and 
lawsuit conducted against him, thereby while outlining the facts he strives to manipulate his 
audience by powerful psychological effects at the beginning of the speech already to be able 
to rely on value judgements so formulated while building his further arguments. 
After that he again reminds his audience of Oppianicus’s crimes and conviction,334 and in 
order to stop disbelief in Oppianicus’s foul deeds he tries to present Cluentius’s earlier 
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accusation against his stepfather as lawful defence and make solely Oppianicus responsible 
for the failed poisoning attempt335—while in the characterisation of Oppianicus he 
tendentiously speaks about crimina and not the single crimen the sentence is based on as if the 
sentence had been passed due to several crimes.336 By discussing Oppianicus’s penal record 
Cicero finds the point of attack, beside Sassia, in another person not directly concerned in the 
lawsuit, thereby diverting the judges’ attention from the particular case and the accused before 
starting to refute the charge on the merits at all.337 
After that the orator dwells on the fate of Dinaea and her family as well as Magia, Oppianicus 
senior’s second (or third) wife and the accuser’s mother, depicting the murder committed 
against Magia’s stepbrother, Oppianicus’s escape and return under Sulla’s protection with 
vivid colours.338 Cicero mentions the precedents and preparation for Oppianicus’s marriage to 
be concluded with Sassia as a textbook example of Oppianicus’s audacia339 by relating the 
sudden death of his two sons—the accuser’s stepbrothers.340 The narrative might give the 
impression to the superficial spectator—more exactly listener or reader—as if murders had 
taken place or Oppianicus had been responsible for the death of his sons. Looking at the text 
closer it becomes clear that Cicero does not state any of the opportunities expressis verbis, his 
formulation makes it possible to draw any conclusions, however, his tone might have aroused 
his audience’s suspicion with good reason that Oppianicus is far from being innocent in the 
children’s death. By what tools does the orator produce this effect? First, he makes general 
statements on Oppianicus’s and Sassia’s turpitude, then he describes Sassia’s reluctance to 
propose to her new suitor without exactly specifying its cause. After having sufficiently 
excited his audience’s curiosity, as the reason for reluctance he puts the answer to Sassia’s 
mouth that she does not resolve to marry Oppianicus because he has three sons, thereby 
suggesting that Oppianicus was compelled to choose between his sons and his future wife. At 
this point the orator reminds of Oppianicus’s greed and obscurely refers to it that he realised: 
he must find remedy against delaying his wedding-feast in his own house. He does not say a 
word about killing the children by Oppianicus, he only relates that Oppianicus, departing from 
his habit, had one of his sons brought to him, and after he suddenly died, he hastily had him 
buried. Regarding the other son he notes that he was killed; yet, he says nothing about who 
the murderer could have been; then, he draws the conclusion: now nothing was in the way of 
the marriage of Oppianicus and Sassia. These paragraphs are perfectly suitable for shedding 
light on Cicero’s rhetorical tactics in Pro Cluentio. He selects and enumerates various facts 
with good sense, and by his style reflecting contempt he suggests the unspoken conclusion 
with compelling force to his audience: Oppianicus has murdered his own sons for the sake of 
Sassia.341 
It was not by chance that Cicero must have felt: he used this trick so successfully that he can 
bravely draw conclusions regarding the mood of the judges of the former lawsuit under which 
it was not these deaths that Oppianicus was held responsible for.342 He addresses a rhetorical 
question to those listening to him if there is anybody who should consider Oppianicus 
innocent and a victim of judicature defying law.  
While turning to the next part Cicero emphasises that now he will discuss it briefly and will 
soon come to treating the issues closely related to his defendant’s case, that is, not the charges 
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yet, however, to avoid the appearance of unfavourable accuser’s role he does not omit to 
stress again that getting to know all these “antecedents” is indispensable for getting better 
acquainted with Cluentius’s case.343 In what follows Cicero suggests rather than states as a 
sentence Oppianicus’s guilt in the death of certain persons, for example, his first wife, the 
elder Cluentia and her brother, C. Oppianicus,344 focusing on his two “dear” crimes arising 
from his character: murder and bribe in court of justice.345 Although the enumeration of 
deaths is highly effective and dramatic, their discussion brings the audience farther from 
rather than closer to their clarification since the orator does not save the topoi of court of 
justice rhetoric (such as for example “double murder” committed against a pregnant woman) 
and proper tools of style, among others anaphorē, antithēsis, exclamatio and correctio.346 
One could believe that the pathos of the picture cannot be enhanced anymore; yet, Cicero 
takes one step further: he reminds his audience of the kinship relation between Cluentius and 
his mother, Sassia and his stepfather, Oppianicus,347 in the light of which he can legitimise 
Cluentius’s procedure in resolving to bring a charge solely due to the direct danger 
threatening his life.348 This way he presents his defendant’s earlier formal accusation against 
Oppianicus as a step just as necessary as Oppianicus junior’s formal accusation against 
Cluentius, by which he can contrast the incompatibility of Sassia’s role in the lawsuit and 
Oppianicus senior’s assassination attempt against Cluentius with both legal and ethical norms, 
that is, pietas.349 To make direct threat to Cluentius’s life more unambiguously clear, the 
orator now speaks no longer about the fact that the poison was caught in the act350 but that the 
assassination attempt itself was caught in the act,351 and he does not omit to name its motif, 
the greed of Oppianicus craving for his stepson’s inheritance.352 (The fact that according to 
Cicero Oppianicus hoped to become the heir of Cluentius lets one presume that Cluentius did 
not make any last will and testament so the estate devolving to Sassia might have sooner or 
later—as well through a new foul deed of Oppianicus “experienced in murder of wife”353 now 
to be committed against Sassia—devolved to his stepfather.354) 
When describing the preparations for the assassination attempt, Cicero first outlines a rather 
negative picture of Fabricius,355 which is very noteworthy because a few years before he 
defended him as the accused—which he refers to with good sense only somewhat later.356 
Accordingly, Fabricius, entrusted by Oppianicus, tried to get Diogenes, one of the slaves of 
Cleophantus, Cluentius’s physician, to commit the murder but this plan failed since the slave 
betrayed the plan to his master, who warned Cluentius and at the same time sold him the 
slave. At this point the orator relates further events rather—what is more suspiciously—
briefly: the poison was soon handed over and in a few days’ time “reliable persons” not 
specified any closer jumping out of their hiding place discovered the money with the 
Fabricii’s libertine, Scamander.357 Instead of enumerating any further possible proofs he 
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stresses his indignation by rhetoric questions and discloses by efficient exclamatio that 
Oppianicus could not have been acquitted under any circumstances from the charge of 
crimes—tendentiously referred to in plural.358 No doubt, the description of the circumstances 
is far from satisfying and provides several points of attack—as the poison was not found at 
Scamander—because an attempt similarly depicted by the prosecution was torn to pieces in 
Pro Caelio by Cicero himself.359 
General references to the fact that the crimes mentioned in general, not specified any closer 
were obvious and “caught in the act” do not make Cicero’s narrative clearer.360 Reference to 
the fact that the poison was caught in the act and was captured is also rather general as the 
orator does not name the person with whom the poison was captured.361 Concerning senator 
Baebius’s testimony Cicero again formulates obscurely because he states that Scamander was 
caught in the act with the poison and money.362 Prior to that he asserts that Cluentius first 
brought charge against the person whom he caught in the act with the poison in his hand,363 
however, this statement is not valid if for no other reason because elsewhere it is not claimed 
that Cluentius has caught anybody in the act.364 The reference to the Scamander lawsuit—in 
which Cicero acted as Scamander’s counsel for the defence against Cluentius—makes the 
obscurity thicker because in connection with it the orator gives account of the pleading that 
Diogenes and Scamander agreed in handing over medicine and not poison, and recalls the 
question of the prosecution why Scamander made an appointment for a remote spot and why 
he went there alone.365 If Scamander had been indeed caught in the act with the poison, 
Cicero would have certainly worded this point more clearly with more cutting remarks. 
Similarly, his statement made later in the speech that Oppianicus was caught in the act when 
he wanted to poison his stepson can be considered powerful distortion366 because he provides 
no information as to who brought the poison there, and his answer to the question with whom 
the poison was found—due to uncertainties of the texts left to us367—is not unambiguous.368 
The following facts can be established: a libertine was caught in the act with a package 
containing money, and a slave was caught in the act with poison, however, the slave later on 
was given into the ownership of the accuser, that is, Cluentius, so his confession cannot stand 
beyond any doubt,369 and the authenticity of senator Baebius’s testimony, who maintained 
good relation with Cluentius, can be questioned too. In view of the fact that—in the light of 
the above—the proofs do not seem to support Cicero’s argument and his reconstruction of the 
events, he could not be satisfied with simple description of the facts since it would not have 
produced the picture that he wanted to outline; instead, he had to, on the one hand, mitigate 
and distract the judges’ attention by bits of information and obscure suggestions carefully 
placed at clearly separable points and arouse indignation by a stream of questions, and, on the 
other hand, to kindle and grasp their attention with respect to the hypotheses suggested by him 
as necessary conclusions.370 
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Cicero is able to use even the circumstance that in the Scamander’s lawsuit he acted as the 
counsel for the defence of the accused, that is, against Cluentius, to support his own 
argument:371 in the detailed but far from accurate narrative of the facts he presents his 
procedure as proof of his intention to help and sense of obligation rather than personal 
standpoint.372 To conceal his own role, he again makes an attack on Oppianicus, however, he 
leaves no doubt that the conviction of Scamander and the conviction of Oppianicus senior as a 
praeiudicium are closely interrelated.373 The plane of narrative and the plane of argument 
again slide into each other, a fact clear to the attentive reader only—the judges listening to the 
speech certainly did not notice it. The narrative of Fabricius’s lawsuit does not supply us with 
new information, Cicero asserts that owing to his friendship with Oppianicus he is to be 
necessarily considered an abettor or at least a person initiated in the poisoning attempt.374 He 
adds the defence of Fabricius by Caepasius (an untalented advocate) as a comic element to his 
speech as it were to let the judges take a rest after the horrible acts depicted in the foregoing 
but his conclusion drawn from it is again absolutely clear: Fabricius was declared guilty by 
his own conduct, that is, his own sentence.375 Only somewhat later do we learn of the rate of 
the probably unanimous voting from Cicero,376 from which it can be inferred with good 
chances that here again the orator knowingly conceals certain facts and connections.377 
After that, following a long transition full of rhetorical questions and fictitious dialogue,378 in 
which he again underlines the significance of the earlier judgments as it were to prove 
Oppianicus’s guilt, he starts to discuss Oppianicus’s lawsuit.379 His tone gets increasingly 
heated, which enables him to skip longer demonstration and argument without attracting 
attention, and after that he comes to the first actual charge announced at the beginning of the 
speech, not falling within the competence of the court of justice though, the issue of bribing 
the judges in Oppianicus’s lawsuit in 74.380 
When determining the identity of the briber Cicero highly narrows the scope of deliberation 
as he alleges that if it was probably not Cluentius who bribed the court of justice, then it must 
have been done by nobody else than Oppianicus, and if it is proved that Oppianicus was the 
briber, then Cluentius will be freed from the charge.381 This locus was highly appreciated also 
by Quintilian as a textbook example of refutation by remotio,382 disregarding its lack of 
conformity with facts—for in his other orations Cicero did not deny that both the accuser and 
the accused had most probably bribed the members of the court of justice, albeit, with 
different success.383 Being clear, suggesting sincerity, his wording was perfectly suitable for 
lulling the attention of the listener of the period—or the (superficial) reader of the present 
day—as he sets up his alternative by reference to statements excluding each other, and 
henceforth he continues to approach the issue of corruption from the aspect of Oppianicus: by 
proving Oppianicus’s guilt he automatically exonerates Cluentius—in other words, he sets 
himself the task of proving Oppianicus’s guilt rather than Cluentius’s innocence,384 as most 
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probably the prosecution tried to support Cluentius’s guilt rather than Oppianicus’s 
innocence.385 The seemingly self-assured statement that he must present clear and 
unambiguous facts to the judges was meant to dispel possible further doubts of the 
audience—while dispensing with arguments based on probability.386 (It is not needless to say 
that in his oration Cicero does not dedicate too much room to Cluentius’s character study, for 
that matter, he gets down with it by a few commonplaces,387 and makes no effort to support 
his defendant’s irreproachableness by further arguments derived from the scope of vita 
anteacta.388) 
After the introduction consisting of several sentences389 Cicero starts the characterisation of 
Oppianicus’s abettor, senator Staienus.390 In the following part, narratio and argumentatio 
again merge (almost inseparably or at least indistinctively),391 combining unprejudiced 
statements of facts, assumptions placed in proper form suggesting objective information, 
characterisation of persons—undeniably one-sided yet capable of influencing the audience—
(fictitious) dialogues in a personal tone and sometimes witty, sometimes dramatic questions 
inspiring confidence.392 In the course of that by unaffected elegance Cicero disregards certain 
problems and facts; for example, he lets the process of Oppianicus’s lawsuit and the reasons 
for convicting him remain in obscurity, and he gets down with the rate of votes cast by the 
judges by a less lifelike explanation. He asserts that it was just the judges bribed by 
Oppianicus who voted for Oppianicus’s guilt because they found the amount of bribe too little 
or were convinced that the intermediary had embezzled a major part of it;393 the judges who 
wisely deliberated the case and viewed the judgment made in the Scamander and Fabricius 
lawsuits, considered as praeiudicium or meant to be presented by Cicero as such, by keeping 
their distance abstained;394 there might have been (as the orator later obscurely suggests) at 
least ten such judges,395 while five unbribed judges took stand for the innocence of the 
accused.396 To avoid that no doubt should arise in the audience—for that matter righteously—
whether Oppianicus was indeed guilty and if the court of justice was bribed solely by 
Oppianicus, the orator, leaving no time for breath, comes to the consequences, political 
aspects of the lawsuit,397 and at the same time—for reasons of captatio benevolentiae—
formulates open praise to the judges, offering his thanks for newly obtained “security in 
law”.398 
All this he sums up as antecedents only so that he could explore, in accordance with his own 
concept, it was in the interest of whom to bribe the court of justice in the lawsuit in 74?399 He 
suggests that Oppianicus’s guilt was from the outset clear to everybody beyond any doubt; he 
contrasts the prosecutor’s self-assuredness with the desperate flurry of the accused being 
aware of his own guilt, and in the light of the outcome of the lawsuit he makes it clear that it 
must have been in the interest of only Oppianicus—as a last resort—to bribe the members of 
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the court of justice.400 To make his argument more convincing, Cicero brings up Cluentius’s 
accounts, which contain no reference to any payment of such nature, as a proof;401 however, 
he does not mention Oppianicus’s accounts. Picking out some of the arguments of the 
opponent most probably as a result of subjective selection, he repeats them and by speaking 
about them he makes the appearance of refuting them.402 He considers the fact that Staienus 
also voted for Oppianicus’s guilt a trick of Staienus, who embezzled the money, to 
demonstrate to his fellow-judges that Oppianicus had deceived him.403 Concerning the six 
hundred and forty thousand sestertii handed over by Oppianicus to Staienus Cicero notes that 
mathematically it would have been sufficient for corrupting sixteen judges, however, he 
conceals the fact that seventeen votes would have been needed for conviction404 and in this 
case Staienus should have been awarded some allowance beyond the above, which might 
strike the eyes of the reader of the oration but must have been missed by the judges listening 
to it.405 
Here, in theory, he could conclude his reasoning as he has thoroughly described the 
opponent’s character, procedure, the motifs of his deeds, dwelled on the significance of earlier 
lawsuits and can consider corruption of the court of justice adjudicating in 74 by Oppianicus 
proved, however, he has not responded yet at all to the opponent’s more important arguments, 
which he carefully obscured at the beginning of the oration in the partitio. So, now, after he 
has swept off the opponents’ more easily refutable arguments very efficiently, he must turn to 
discussing the arguments of the prosecution more difficult to refute and less easily handled by 
high-sounding commonplaces.406 
To start with he repeats the opponent’s allegation that several judgments were adopted which 
prove that Cluentius bribed the court of justice in the Oppianicus lawsuit, yet he immediately 
gives a comprehensive response to it suitable for distracting the judges’ attention. Masking 
defence by attack, he states that no judgment has been passed in the case of bribe Cluentius 
has purportedly committed and that the judgments referred to and applied to this scope of 
issues by the opponent have no relevance in the case, and that this is the very occasion when 
Cluentius can respond to the charge of corrupting the court of justice.407 This argumentation 
might seem to be peculiar all the more when one considers that Cicero emphasises at the 
beginning of the oratio too that the court of justice ordered to pass judgment on Cluentius is 
competent in the matter of poisonings only, in the matter of bribe it is not.408 After he has 
discussed the issue of bribe at length, by a daring stroke he tries to give the impression to his 
audience that his arguments made so far have not constituted a part of extra causam reasoning 
at all.409 He considers the earlier judgments a part of the campaign of heckling before the 
popular assembly,410 describes them partly as misfortune, partly as irrelevant and insignificant 
in Cluentius’s case, partly as having an outcome favourable to Cluentius, and he contests that 
they can be called “judgments” at all.411 It is in the light of the above that he starts discussing 
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one of the most critical consequences of earlier events, the conviction of C. Iunius, chairman 
of the bribed court of justice that adjudicated in 74.412 
First, he strives to underline that the lawsuit against Iunius—which can be considered the 
outcome of iudicium Iunianum that has become proverbial, a synonym of corrupt 
adjudication413—was tendentious, hasty and irregular; then, he turns the attention to the 
political motifs of the lawsuit; finally, he doubts that the judgment was well-founded in terms 
of content.414 He stresses that Iunius was actually convicted not due to bribe,415 and in this 
argument he generously disregards the fact that in Roman criminal action it was the facts and 
circumstances deliberated in the proceedings and not the statements set forth in the charge 
(indictment) that served as basis of the judgment—all this the orator does, as a matter of fact, 
in order to take the edge of the judgment against Iunius as a praeiudicium.416 He presents the 
proceedings against Iunius as the product of tribunes’ campaign of heckling, calling it a storm 
with devastating power rather than judgment, and contrasts the tools and goals of court 
proceedings with those of influencing public opinion at popular assemblies by strong colours 
and emphatically warns his audience of the dangers of tribunes’ populist campaigns.417 He 
tactfully keeps quiet about the fact that although the lawsuit was commenced on tribunes’ 
initiative the judgment was passed as a result of the decision of the senators’ court of justice, 
that Iunius—as he suggested earlier—was one of Cluentius’s friends,418 and that in the given 
case he himself is conducting political agitation against excesses of people’s party politics; 
instead, he makes the audience aware again and again that the conviction of Iunius is the 
consequence of a storm with ill outcome and not an action at law conducted in accordance 
with rules of procedure.419 It must not be forgotten: the court of justice could not have 
convicted Cluentius de iure in the charge of bribe, if, however, Cicero did not annul this 
charge, nothing would have prevented the judges from declaring the accused guilty in the 
charge of poisoning—primarily not because poisoning was proved but due to their being 
convinced that the bribe had taken place—since no reasons were attached to the judgment and 
the quaestio adjudicated in the issue of guilt based on the overall impression developed about 
the case rather than provedness of the charges; in other words, it would have been possible to 
convict Cluentius due to bribe but by virtue of poisoning!420 
Again he emphasises that Iunius’s case must be strictly separated from Cluentius’s case, and 
as if he believed that too, he considers the conviction of Bulbus, who adjudicated in the 
lawsuit in 74, and further judges brought to court with other charges unworthy of any further 
discussion as insignificant accessory circumstance, paying regard to the fact that it cannot be 
proved that the conviction was based on the case of poisoning of the Oppianicus lawsuit, 
undoubtedly included in the counts of the indictment.421 Thereby Cicero makes resolute 
efforts to take the edge of usability of former judgments as praeiudicium since he is 
compelled to touch upon the Staienus lawsuit quite embarrassing to him, in which he acted as 
counsel for the defence.422 After a longer praeteritio423 he starts to build his argument, and its 
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weak points are not noticed by the audience at first hearing.424 First, Cicero touches upon the 
prosecutor’s statement—whether it was made like that or Cicero replicates his opponent’s 
argument in a somewhat distorted form cannot be known—that Staienus received monies of 
bribe from Oppianicus, which seems to be supported by Staienus’s conduct of life, by using 
argumenta e vita anteacta, and he, of course, keeps quiet about the charge which could be 
brought up in the lawsuit that Staienus was possibly bribed by Cluentius too. He mentions 
Cluentius only when he draws his conclusions in a rather long sentence consciously made 
somewhat incomprehensible, repeating the logically imperfect alternative set up earlier425 
which states that the bribe committed by Oppianicus excludes Cluentius’s guilt, and so using 
as a premise the conclusion made probable earlier and not supported fully with logical reasons 
that the fact of bribe cannot be proved regarding Cluentius he suddenly draws his conclusion: 
the conviction of Staienus—which, similarly to judgments mentioned earlier, cannot be 
considered the result of a properly conducted lawsuit much rather the outcome of a terrible 
blow426—is absolutely not against Cluentius but supports his innocence.427 
By the summary made here Cicero as it were makes the bed for the lawsuit of C. Fidiculanius 
Falcula with an outcome different from the formerly outlined cases, from which he wants to 
make an argument to support his own reasoning. The case of Falcula charged on the grounds 
of crimen repetundarum yet acquitted—who accepted money of bribe as a judge from 
Cluentius in Oppianicus’s lawsuit as the charge claimed—could be undoubtedly brought up 
by Attius. (It is worth mentioning that Cicero makes it unambiguously clear in Pro Caecina 
that Falcula—as both the public and he is convinced about it—voted for Oppianicus’s guilt 
just upon the effect of the amount of bribe received from Cluentius.428) At this point Cicero 
takes Falcula’s case out of the context outlined by Attius and includes it in the order of other 
praeiudicia meant to be considered insignificant so that he could crown his argument by the 
lawsuit concluded by acquittal to reach a favourable end asserting that the poisoning charges 
brought against the judges adjudicating over Oppianicus have nothing to do with Cluentius’s 
case.429 In his argument he emphatically underlines that tribune L. Quinctius conducted a 
campaign of political heckling against Falcula, whose first lawsuit he discusses shortly, the 
second one more profoundly,430 but he places emphasis not on Falcula’s innocence but on the 
sheer fact of his having been acquitted as it were indicating that having knowledge of the 
outcome of the lawsuits against Scamander and Fabricius was absolutely enough for the 
judges to convict Oppianicus without any external influence.431 As Oppianicus was convicted 
by a low majority,432 Cicero somehow has to place his argument on firmer bases since as an 
argumentum for guilt he could bring up only an unanimous or almost unanimous judgment 
with no scandalous consequences for the judges. Therefore, to distract the audience’s 
attention and to lull their vigilance, he starts a lengthy argument interspersed with poetic 
questions on the ways judges formed an opinion, enumerating several respected judges by 
name who voted for Oppianicus’s guilt, whose moral integrity is meant to support the 
lawfulness of the judgment433—although this digression is based on conjecture and 
assumptions, the enumeration by names gave the impression to the audience as if the orator 
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had discussed this issue profoundly in conformity with facts. Accordingly, the political 
background outlined, the emphasis on fomentation and campaign setting out from L. 
Quinctius, the invective against the tribune’s excessive power support the innocence of both 
Falcula and the others,434 so the prosecutor had no other choice than accepting either that the 
lawsuit against Oppianicus was proper and fair or the praeiudicia were irrelevant with regard 
to Cluentius’s lawsuit.435 
In what follows Cicero again strives to annul the arguments of the prosecution and to 
demonstrate that they are insignificant instead of refuting them.436 Just as he does not accept 
the iudicium Iunianum with scandalous outcome, causing great excitement even years later437 
as a real iudicium and as he does not recognise the iudicia of the lawsuits against Bulbus, 
Gutta and Popilius as relevant praeiudicium in terms of the Cluentius lawsuit438 because they 
were not based expressis verbis on the state of facts of bribe received as a judge, at this point 
he tries to shake the formal validity of the litis aestimatio—the “decree” declaring the 
punishment imposed in the repetundae lawsuits—adopted in P. Septimius Severus’s case.439 
Thereby he substantiates the relativity of the sanction of infamia, i.e., loss of honour imposed 
under the censor’s regimen morum,440 and the argument by which he can qualify this measure 
less significant than the judge’s decisions.441 This historical/public law digression must have 
been a refreshing digression to the audience, yet Cicero used this moment for breath to 
undermine the power of censorial moral adjudication by setting up a sophisticated 
alternative.442 According to his argument either censors’ measures have to provide grounds 
for establishing the facts or their measures should be preceded by production of evidence and 
followed by reasons: in the first case they would have tyrant’s power, in the second case they 
should marshal proofs both in favour of Cluentius’s guilt and Oppianicus’s innocence. After 
setting up the logically not fully satisfactory alternative, before the persons present could 
come to their senses, Cicero showers the list of Oppianicus’s all crimes—specified or 
suggested earlier—upon his audience.443 To increase temper, the orator suddenly goes into an 
invective like outburst, he scourges the errors, temporal restrictedness and unfoundedness of 
former censorial measures, taking his examples from his own practice and cases widely 
known to the public.444 
The fact that the censors inflicted infamia on a total of two judges enables Cicero to draw 
further conclusions: he can formulate unfounded charges cited from military practice, and by 
underlining the political motifs of censors’ procedure and the disagreements between them he 
can further reduce the weight of their measures through which he prepares his effort to shake 
the significance of the circumstance brought up by the prosecution, the censorial reprimand 
against Cluentius.445 In addition to asserting that Cluentius’s conduct of life is irreproachable, 
he states that his defendant has not had the opportunity to refute false accusations, 
incriminations and defamation446—and he considers that Cluentius’s innocence has been 
sufficiently proved by this rather obscure sentence. Cicero gets down with Egnatius ‘s last 
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will and testament, in which the father excluded his son from the inheritance who falsely 
adjudicated in the Oppianicus lawsuit upon the effect of purported bribe, briefly by setting up 
a highly sophisticated but not fully satisfactory alternative that cornered the prosecutor,447 and 
criticises the senatus consultum sanctioning the corruption of the judges448 due to its 
inaccurate wording and ineffectiveness.449 
The audience’s attention must have undoubtedly languished after this long, complicated 
argument interspersed with several intellectual manoeuvres—and Cicero’s aim might have 
been successful application of tactics of tiring out450 for once he had disputed and annulled the 
significance of praeiudicia he had to fight with his own statements made earlier.451 Elsewhere 
he tried to use the fact of Scamander’s defence to advance his own purposes,452 just as 
Fidiculanius Falcula’s case;453 he tactfully does not reflect upon his statements made in the 
oration delivered in favour of Aulus Caecina—which Attius most certainly did not omit to 
refer to—and is satisfied with using the general name iudicium Iunianum.454 Although the 
prosecutor most probably confronted him with his statements made in the Verres case on 
corruptness of senators’ adjudication, in his response Cicero remains on the plane of general 
considerations and points out that the content of his oral pleadings—since oral pleadings 
cannot be of such weight as law or court decision—are always the product of the given 
situation and age, that is, does not mirror his own conviction.455 As a parallel he refers to 
outstanding orators of the generation preceding him, M. Antonius and M. Crassus,456 which 
can be considered an effort to distract attention rather than refutation on the merits; yet, it is 
suitable for warning and urging judges to decide the case objectively free from prejudice.457 
Cicero emphasises that he has responded to all relevant charges, or at least all charges deemed 
relevant by the prosecutor, brought up by him against Cluentius with regard to bribing the 
judges in the Oppianicus lawsuit eight years before,458 however, instead of summing up the 
above he starts—in spite of his defendant’s desire459 but for reasons that become obvious later 
on—to expound what Attius most probably expected at the beginning of the statement of the 
defence: the issue of competence of the quaestio, adjudicating in the state of facts of 
assassination and mixing poison, with respect to bribe committed by knights, amounts of 
bribe given to judges since the competence of the court of justice extended to bribes 
committed by members of the order of senators only.460 By choosing defence in terms of 
content and not form he manifests self-assurance and faith in the success of Cluentius’s case 
to the audience and he can keep the judges’ attention alive, who are waiting for the part on the 
merits,461 while tiring them out without being noticed. He explains why he discusses the issue 
of bribe so long by necessity required by pubic interest,462 then he comments on Attius’s 
arguments—albeit, by short references and quotations only463 not to refresh the judges’ 
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memory—by which his opponent compared the letter of the law464 (i.e., the relevant provision 
of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis applies to the acts of the members of the order of 
senators only) with the spirit of the law,465 that is, aequitas,466 which seemed to be justified 
also by changed circumstances for while at the time of the scope of Sulla’s reforms 
administration of justice was considered the privilege of the order of senators, based on lex 
Aurelia enacted in 70 members of courts of justice were made up by senators, knights and 
aerar tribunes each constituting one-third of the panel, and so it could be considered justified 
that identical criminal law norms should apply to persons who fulfilled identical tasks but 
came from different orders.467 
In his reasoning certain common topoi take ample room: he emphasises the importance of 
laws for the sake of maintaining the State and reminds judges of their duty, i.e., the obligation 
to serve laws.468 He analyses relevant passages of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis in 
details,469 and proves that no charge could have been brought against Cluentius for bribe 
based on this law.470 He expounds—and tries to legitimise—the different status and 
evaluation of members of the order of senators and knights, and warns the judges against 
interpreting the provisions of the law extensively through their own judgment, that is, 
interpretation used by them in dispensation of law.471 If Cicero had from the first moment 
adhered to the letter of the law strictly and admittedly, which the prosecutor expected, he 
would have openly acknowledged Cluentius’s guilt in the charge of bribing the court of 
justice and he could have referred to no more than lack of personal scope of the law as a cause 
excluding culpability, however, by that he would have fundamentally shaken the image 
developed and meant to be maintained from first to last about his defendant’s innocence, 
which might have led the judges to infer that Cluentius would not have shrunk back from 
murder either.472 In the summary of his argumentation Cicero, first, formulates praise of 
judges who adjudicate by abiding by the law; secondly, he refers to Cluentius’s innocence, 
now fully proved as he claims in the charge of bribe; thirdly, in connection with the 
polemical, exaggerated and misinterpreting reconstruction of Attius’s train of thoughts he 
formulates warning as a patron and statesman thinking responsibly to the court of justice, 
cautioning the judges that by accepting the extensive interpretation they would shake the 
authority of the court of justice and thereby the fundaments of the State.473 
What causes could have induced Cicero to take his argument to the plane of politics? Nothing 
can be inferred from Attius’s oration since it has not been left to us,474 and the effective text of 
lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis is known from Cicero’s oration only, although he must 
have made no significant modifications therein.475 Joachim Classen raises the following three 
opportunities as possible explanation for Cicero’s tactics. First, it is possible that Attius as the 
prosecutor placed the poisoning cases in the centre of the charge and used the issue of bribe in 
the lawsuit in 74 only for influencing the climate of opinion against Cluentius so that he could 
achieve his goal more safely in the mirror of the past of the accused: to prove the charge of 
                                                 
464
 Classen 1965. 111. 
465
 On the topic of aequitas see Büchner 1954. 11ff.; Carcaterra 1971. 627ff.; Fuhrmann 1970. 80ff.; Fuhrmann 
1971. 53ff.; Nótári 2004. 301ff.; Nótári 2008. 123ff.; Stroux 1926. 
466
 Cic. Cluent. 145. 150. 160. 
467
 Cf. Classen 1985. 76; Stroh 1975. 234; Hoenigswald 1962. 111. 
468
 Cic. Cluent. 146–148. 
469
 Cic. Cluent. 149ff. 
470
 Cic. Cluent. 154. 
471
 Cic. Cluent. 148. 155. Cf. Stroh 1975. 197. 
472
 Stroh 1975. 197f. 
473
 Cic. Cluent. 156–159. 
474
 Stroh 1975. 195ff. 
475
 Classen 1985. 78. 
48 
 
bribe brought against Cluentius in accordance with the spirit—and not the letter—of the law. 
Secondly, it cannot be ruled out that the assassination attempt served only as a starting point 
for him to have Cluentius convicted, by making the judges accept the extensive interpretation 
of the law, due to the bribe committed in the Oppianicus lawsuit held under scandalous 
circumstances and producing not less scandalous after-effects. Thirdly, it cannot be ruled out 
either that Attius was led primarily by political purposes to introduce the extensive 
interpretation of the law implemented in dispensation of justice—at least as a later basis of 
reference to public opinion and adjudication practice.476 
The prosecutor’s primarily political motifs are contradicted by the identity of the participants 
of the lawsuit, more specifically that as a prosecutor solely Attius not having any special 
political significance supported Oppianicus junior not having any major political influence 
either and his mother, the otherwise unknown Sassia from Larinum, and that Cicero provided 
defence alone without using the assistance of one of the orators of the age having influence in 
public affairs, for example, Hortensius. Most probably it was not in the interest of the order of 
either the senators or the knights to implement the extensive interpretation of Sulla’s law to 
the extent that the order of knights should be included in the scope of persons to be sanctioned 
in the case of passive bribe in court of justice since thereby they would have extended the 
scope of persons to be sanctioned in active bribe too, which would have allowed to reveal 
several bribes so far left in obscurity where judges of senator’s rank accepted amounts of 
bribe. Consequently, in this respect concordia ordinum that Cicero desired to attain must have 
been realised indeed against the trend of populares.477 It is worth adding that the court of 
justice reform proposed by M. Porcius Cato in 61, which set the aim of sanctioning all kinds 
of bribe in court of justice, could never assume the form of law, because it would have 
endangered this special form of manifestation of concordia.478 So, there are good chances that 
taking the oration to the plane of politics is one of Cicero’s doings, which is explained partly 
by his selected lawsuit tactics—and not the path he was forced to take by the prosecutor—
partly by the effort to emphasise his own role in public affairs.479 (Cicero is compelled to 
discuss the charge of bribing the court of justice to such an exhaustive extent, among others, 
because the prosecutor most probably prepared and confirmed the charge of poisoning falling 
within the competence of the court of justice psychologically by expounding the events of the 
Oppianicus lawsuit; consequently, the defence necessarily had to refute or at least counteract 
it.480) 
 
II. 2. 4. Handling the charge of veneficium  
 
After this reasoning Cicero makes it clear that what he still has got to say is short and can be 
summed up briefly, by which he not only refers to the length of what he has got to say but 
tries to reduce the weight of the opponent’s charges since—as he claims—these charges are 
pure fiction, and after taking the edge of the campaign against Cluentius they cannot stand 
their ground.481 He responds to the arguments aimed against Cluentius regarding the motifs of 
poisonings—Cluentius’s greed and cruelty—at a stormy speed, more exactly he sweeps them 
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off by a few commonplaces,482 he devotes no more than a few sentences to any of them—
instead of refutation in conformity with facts and consistent argumentation he dedicates room 
to wittiness and invective like outbursts;483 however, from first to last he is able to give the 
impression as if he had refuted Attius’s allegations point by point for the fairly tired out 
audience must have been just as much waiting for the conclusion of the speech. At the same 
time, the orator cannot allow himself not to touch upon material elements, more specifically 
each of the poisonings because later on even the highly tired out judges would have certainly 
noticed that distraction of attention was excessively drastic and for this reason not tactical at 
all.484 
Regarding the charge of murdering C. Vibius Capax, by way of refutation Cicero confines 
himself to the testimony of L. Plaetorius as a rescue witness and emphasising the 
unimpeachable character of the witness, but he tactically keeps quiet about what specific 
points of the testimony make the charge void,485 and substitutes the exact description of the 
case by more general wordings.486 He dedicates somewhat more room to Balbutius’s death, 
which purportedly took place because he drunk up the poison cup made by Cluentius for 
Oppianicus junior at his wedding ceremony.487 In his reasoning, first, he points out the lack of 
any motif, which is based primarily on conclusions drawn from the character of the accused, 
secondly on the allegation that Cluentius had no reason at all to fear Oppianicus junior, but he 
carefully avoids to mention other possible motivations—just those by which he tried to 
support Oppianicus’s assassination488 against Cluentius.489 From the scope of motives he 
picks only the elements that he considered easily refutable, but to make them more authentic 
he crowns his refutation by questions as if he has answered all questions.490 Yet, he does not 
content himself with taking the narrative of the prosecution to elements or with mere 
praeteritio, he refutes Attius’s allegations seemingly in details. He states that Balbutius’s 
death is not the result of murder, which he supports by the later death and purported illness of 
the deceased, which seems to be certified by the testimony of his father, Balbutius senior.491 It 
is worth observing that in his argument he does not deny that the poison was made or that 
Balbutius drank it, instead he takes the edge of the charge merely by the fact that his death 
occurred later and he was ill. So, how is his argumentation built at this point? First, he 
emphasises his defendant’s innocence; then, he doubts the order of the events reconstructed 
by the accused and that their content is true; finally, he crowns this by the testimony of a 
witness who maintains kinship relation with the victim—and is otherwise absent—thus giving 
the impression of refutation on the merits to the judges.492 
After Cicero has concluded the two former cases without but with the appearance of 
refutation on the merits, now he can come to the most essential count of the indictment, the 
issue of poisoning Oppianicus senior by Cluentius with the assistance of M. Asellius as 
abettor,493 which must have been from first to last present in the mind of the judges and the 
audience in the light of which five-sixth of the oral pleading can become understandable. As 
most probably the actual reason for the formal accusation by Oppianicus junior might have 
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been his father’s murder and death, the orator is compelled to depict the victim as 
unfavourably as possible in the first part of his speech so that the formal accusation could 
appear to the judges nothing else than a campaign of revenge motivated by immense hatred 
and he could give a relatively acceptable explanation for the circumstances of Oppianicus’s 
death. In the light of that Cicero had to discuss the bribe in court of justice strictly separated—
and as remote as possible—from poisoning since the fact of the charge brought against the 
stepfather itself could have generated an image in the audience from which the crime of 
poisoning would not have been alien either. Furthermore, this separated discussion enabled 
the orator to refer to the hypotheses set up and conjectures formulated and suggested to the 
judges in the first part of the oration as facts proved in the refutation of the second count of 
the indictment.494 
As the first point of his reasoning Cicero denies that Cluentius had any motif to murder 
Oppianicus,495 what is more—now referring to Oppianicus’s foul deeds enumerated and made 
probable as proved facts—he argues by claiming that Cluentius would have been more 
interested in his stepfather living in exile and poverty,496 however, this (high-sounding) topos 
can be considered unfounded to the extent that Oppianicus was never forced to go to exilium 
and certainly never lived in misery. After that, just as in connection with the Balbutius case, 
he starts to shake particular factual circumstances one by one;497 more specifically, he 
disputes that using M. Asellius as abettor was reasonable498 and that poison put in bread was 
lifelike;499 however, with good sense (at least for the time being) he omits to touch upon the 
testimony of the witness of the prosecution, Strato; instead he starts to relate a real thriller and 
puts Cluentius’s mother, Oppianicus junior’s stepmother, that is, Oppianicus senior’s widow, 
Sassia in the centre.500 In the course of that he does not strive to prove his allegations in 
conformity with facts, he contents himself with highlighting the most repugnant moments of 
the series of events501—and there were good chances for them to duly arouse the tired out 
audience’s interest and maintain their attention—emphasising Sassia’s “well-known” 
cruelty,502 and directing the suspicion of poisoning towards her too.503 
In his presentation, as a matter of fact, he does not shrink back—in order to depict a darker 
image of Sassia—even from contradicting himself hard to be noticed by the audience; for 
example, on the one hand, he speaks about Oppianicus’s highly respected friends;504 on the 
other hand, he stresses that the neighbourhood avoided and despised him.505 Later, giving up 
even the appearance of the objectivity of the narrative, he showers a torrent of exasperated 
questions and commonplaces on the audience and Sassia and, in fact, just at the strategic point 
where he should respond to the allegations of the prosecution in conformity with facts: in 
connection with the third torture of Strabo the slave—it is worth adding: slaves’ testimony 
was considered evidence only in the event that it was taken from them in torture (tormentum, 
eculeus)506—and he declares that the slave’s testimony cannot be evaluated in view of the 
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circumstances of the confession since he was not brought in court,507 without commenting on 
its content on the merits.508 Referring back to the beginning of his oration, in a praeteritio full 
of exaggerations, Cicero discusses Sassia’s foul deeds committed against her son, 
Cluentius,509 and underlines the case of Fabricianum venenum from among them, i.e., the 
poisoning purportedly attempted against her son, and although he does not give account of its 
circumstances, he tries to present it as a fact decisive in terms of the outcome of the lawsuit 
and the verdict of the judges.510 Sassia’s foul deeds culminate in preparing the lawsuit against 
Cluentius,511 when she tried to kill his son by the assistance of the accuser and unlawfully 
exploiting the tools provided by law—when depicting the above Cicero several times 
efficiently contrasts the word “mother” with conduct worthy of a mother and eventually 
makes Sassia her own son’s accuser;512 then, in a powerful invective he presents a stylised 
figure of Sassia as a superhuman, subhuman monster.513 Thereby the orator manages to 
magnify the danger implied by the charge to real vis maior since whereas he classifies 
Oppianicus junior’s acts as procedure guided by a (step)son’s pietas, he presents the mother’s 
motivations as an inhuman campaign of revenge.514 In the peroratio515 Cicero, on the one 
hand, addresses begging to the judges, on the other hand, he crowns his outbursts against 
Sassia.516 
The dispositio applied with respect to the subject, the alternation of detailed reasoning and 
briefly made declarations and the system of arguments and hypotheses confirming each other 
create the construction by which Cicero made Cluentius’s case—not promising much success 
prima facie—successful.517 Undoubtedly, it was a significant achievement that he was able to 
revive the events and after-effects of the Oppianicus lawsuit having taken place years before, 
which became generally known as scandalous moments, and in accordance with his own 
concept, at that.518 Likewise, by masterly tactics he separated arguments, facts and 
circumstances belonging to each other and connected completely separate arguments, facts 
and circumstances, by interweaving the planes of narratio and argumentatio almost 
impossible to unravel.519 
 
II. 2. 5. Rhetorical tactics and double handling of the facts of the case in Pro Cluentio 
 
Discussion of crimina veneficii, that is, actual, legally relevant counts of the indictment in the 
first place could give the impression to the judges that Cicero tries to evade the less 
considerable but highly effective part of the charge, iudicium Iunianum, for this reason, he 
admittedly—in fact only apparently since he starts discussing the Oppianicus lawsuit on the 
merits much later only520—follows the system set up by Attius. Regarding the forced choice 
between status collectionis and status coniecturalis Cicero resolves to perform a stunt, a 
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highly break-neck one, at that, which he, however, already used successfully in Pro Roscio 
Amerino521: he separates his own intentions and his defendant’s interests and claims by stating 
that for him as counsel for the defence it would have been absolutely sufficient to refer to the 
law itself,522 but at the request of Cluentius, who wanted not only to win the lawsuit but to 
restore his reputation523 he has chosen the more difficult way, specifically he wants to prove 
the innocence of the accused not only formally but also substantively.524 By that he can 
absolutely give the impression as if each of the two statuses represented proper weight for 
him to make a success of his case.525 
The double argument technique, at the same time, fits in with the “needs” of the members of 
the court of justice with brilliant accuracy since by applying status collectionis he defends the 
interests of the order of knights adhering to the words of the law, which take them out of the 
scope of culpability;526 at the same time, he arouses fear in them that in the event that the 
extensive interpretation gains ground, charge can be brought at will in the future due to bribe 
against knights too;527 on the other hand, he does not have to be afraid of drawing the anger of 
judges who come from the order of senators because having used status coniecturalis he can 
be sure of their sympathy since by proving bribe committed by Oppianicus and not by 
Cluentius and by having explored that only a few judges were bribed in the Oppianicus 
lawsuit and only Staienus was actually given money,528 through a kind of “washing the Moor 
white”—so kind to senators so much damaged by the events of the lawsuit in 74—he restores 
the honour of the judges in the present case by providing them with a scapegoat.529 With 
respect to the application of two status, in the dispositio of Pro Cluentio, together with 
Wilfried Stroh we can create the following system:530 in the discussion of iudicium 
Iunianum,531 status coniecturalis (i.e., it was not Cluentius who committed bribe) was 
addressed to senators532 and status collectionis (i.e., Cluentius could not be punished pursuant 
to section six of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis) to knights,533 and it is followed by the 
discussion of crimina veneficii.534 
To counteract the sympathy shown towards Oppianicus junior, Cicero chooses a masterly 
tool: he enters in the picture Cluentius’s mother (that is, the widow of Oppianicus senior and 
stepmother of Oppianicus junior), Sassia, who is fired by hostile odium and crudelitas against 
her son, and in whose hands—for she is moving the threads of the charge—Oppianicus junior 
guided by a child’s pietas is merely a tool for accomplishing her revenge.535 It is worth 
examining closer at what points and in what context Cicero mentions Sassia.536  
Directly after exordium/prooemium he names Sassia as a mother guided by cruelty and hatred 
and as the source of the charge.537 The question whether Sassia (as Joachim Classen argues) 
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was personally present at the trial538 or (as Wilfried Stroh and Jules Humbert asserts) was 
absent539 cannot be settled, as Cicero does not address her directly at any point and it is not 
known if she testified or not, and perhaps it is not exceptionally relevant. He emphatically 
alludes to Sassia’s significance in terms of the lawsuit,540 and states that for the sake of saving 
Cluentius he cannot show consideration for her,541 however, it is much later, in the discussion 
of crimina veneficii that we learn what this significance is.542 The minutes of the interrogation 
of the slave was read (caused to be read) by Attius before the court of justice,543 but it is 
doubtful if Sassia’s name occurred in it;544 however, the most probably rather subjective 
reconstruction of the events imbued with rhetorical exaggerations enabled Cicero to make an 
attack against Cluentius’s mother.545 The orator keeps the promise made earlier546 only after 
that, and he presents a stylised image of the mother as monstrum to the judges who probably 
had not known anything about the relation between mother and son before the trial. 
Accordingly, she was already part of the assassination attempt against Cluentius,547 she made 
her stepson her son-in-law in order to enter him as an accuser acting resolutely against her 
son;548 then, after brief summary of the interrogation of the slave549 the orator creates the 
image of Sassia who manipulates witnesses, arrives to Rome to hasten her son’s ruin, holds 
the threads in her hands in the background but hides from public.550 
As the prosecutor most probably did not mention Sassia, instead, tried to strengthen the “pius 
Oppianicus—impius Cluentius” opposition in the judges, Cicero, with good sense, using the 
tool of retorsio criminis let the characterisation set up by the prosecution fall back—if not on 
Oppianicus junior, of whom the orator could not speak much ill for he was young and gave a 
good impression to the judges—on Sassia purportedly manipulating the charge, who seemed 
to be suitable for this role all the more because the fact of her marriage entered into with her 
son-in-law551 around 86 offered the defence the opportunity to expound the topos of a female 
violating the order of nature and for this reason undoubtedly not shrinking back from other 
foul deeds either.552 Cicero achieves all that by brilliant regrouping of the events since it is 
just this ordo artificiosus that allows him to build the narratio divided into two into the 
argumentatio and to get from here straight to the peroratio that fulfils the function of 
invective against Sassia, in which the attention and effort of the judges should be aimed no 
longer at deliberating if Oppianicus junior was right or wrong in taking vengeance for the 
conviction and death of his stepfather but at saving the son from the revenge of the mother, 
who is treading under foot the laws of nature and wants to use administration of justice to 
achieve this goal.553 
In the part on iudicium Iunianum554 Cicero handles the tools of narratio and argumentatio, 
traditionally and theoretically clearly separable and to be separated, with brilliant and 
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deceptive ease. Although after the propostio555 and the interposed narrative on Sassia556 he 
starts the narratio that culminates later in confirmatio,557 its given parts,558 for example, the 
paragraphs on Oppianicus’s foul deeds559 and those relating praeiudicia560 actually fulfil the 
function of probabile e causa working towards the purpose to be proved561 because they are 
meant to support that it was not Cluentius but Oppianicus who might have had and did have a 
reason for bribing the court of justice.562 Similarly, the argument on the amount of bribe as 
probabile e facto partly precedes,563 partly follows,564 that is, surrounds the narratio on this 
topic;565 in other words, the argumentatio discussing these events, outlining an approximate 
chronology is of a narrative kind.566 
This complicated procedure is indispensably necessary for Cicero to make the—lesser 
lifelike—train of thoughts believable to the judges which states that in the lawsuit in 74 it was 
not the winner Cluentius but Oppianicus declared guilty that bribed the court of justice and in 
such fashion, in fact, that the hired intermediary, Staienus promised to hand over the bribe to 
the judges but later he alleged that the accused was not willing to pay, thereby he turned the 
judges against him and made sure that Oppianicus would be convicted, and all that he did in 
order to keep the whole amount for himself. Cicero, however, did not shower this narrative on 
the audience without any preparation, therefore, he was compelled to give reasons for the 
reconstructive narratio by a preceding argumentatio claiming that Oppianicus—being aware 
of his numerous foul deeds and praeiudicia negatively influencing his case—must have had a 
serious motif to bribe the court of justice.567 Cicero, as a matter of fact, gets into conflict with 
his promise that in his speech he intends to follow the order set up by the opponent;568 yet, he 
more or less keeps his promise during the actual narratio, although prior to it he speaks about 
the points not touched upon by the prosecutor. And in long preparatory passages he assures 
the judges several times that he wants to make it short what he has got to say,569 which he can 
do because right at the beginning of the oratio he states that he does not intend to conceal 
anything of the facts of the case and is willing to deal with every circumstance mentioned by 
Attius.570 
Breaking strict chronology can be clearly observed especially in discussing praeiudicia that 
are against Cluentius’s case and the list of Oppianicus’s crimes. The chairman of the 
Oppianicus lawsuit (iudex quaestionis), C. Iunius was convicted in 74, and in the same year 
the senate issued a resolution that made it possible to hold judges affected by iudicium 
Iunianum responsible for bribe.571 In 73, C. Fidiculanius Falcula was acquitted in two 
lawsuits;572 in 72, P. Septimius Scaevola was convicted for crimen repetundarum, between 73 
and 70 M. Atilius Bulbus was convicted for crimen maiestatis; in 70, on the occasion of 
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census M. Aquilius, Ti. Gutta and P. Popilius—just as Cluentius himself—were reprimanded 
by the censors; in the following years Popilius and Gutta were convicted due to ambitus, 
Staienus was convicted on the grounds of other charges.573 The prosecutor presents each of 
these lawsuits and judgments as it were—independently of the nature of the particular 
charge—as the outcome of iudicium Iunianum;574 whereas Cicero, contrary to natural 
chronology, sets up an artificial chronology that suits his intentions as counsel for the defence, 
in which judgments appear as the consequence of the invidia stirred up by tribune 
Quinctius,575 furthermore, by anticlimactic editing, from cases with greater weight576 through 
Septimius Severus’s listis aestimatio,577 censorial measures considered weightless,578 
Egnatius’s last will and testament579 and the senatus consultum580 he gets to his own opinion 
formulated in Verrine orations,581 thereby—by striking a tone ranging from pathetic to 
irony—he gives the impression of decrescendo of the invidia to the audience.582 
Similarly, with respect to Oppianicus’s murders and foul deeds—real ones and those 
attributed to him583—a relative chronology suitable for rhetoric tactics set up by Cicero can be 
clearly observed. The first murder: Oppianicus poisons his wife, Cluentia, Cluentius’s aunt 
with his own hands.584 The second and third murders: Oppianicus poisons the pregnant wife 
of his brother, C. Oppianicus and then his brother to get his inheritance.585 After that, 
following the death of his brother-in-law, Cn. Magius, who named Oppianicus junior as his 
inheritor, Oppianicus senior induces Magius’s pregnant widow to abort the embryo, then 
marries her.586 The fourth murder and counterfeiting of the last will and testament: by the 
assistance of a travelling pharmacist/poison mixer Oppianicus poisons his former mother-in-
law, Dinaea, who had named him as her inheritor in her last will and testament, then, he has 
the last will and testament, from which he had already deleted bequest orders, drafted again 
and has it sealed by a forged seal.587 The fifth murder: Oppianicus gives order to find and 
murder M. Aurius, Dinaea’s son, of whom he learns—he bribes the messenger to provide 
false information for the relatives—that he was taken prisoner of war and lives in Gallia as a 
slave, and to whom his mother left four hundred thousand sestertii.588 The sixth, seventh, 
eighth and ninth murders: by creating the appearance of proscriptio Oppianicus has A. Aurius 
killed, who threatened to sue him due to the assassination of M. Aurius, and has three other 
citizens of Larinum killed under the pretext of the same legal title.589 The tenth and eleventh 
murders: Oppianicus wants to marry A. Aurius’s widow, Sassia, but she does not want to be 
the stepmother of three male children, therefore, Oppianicus kills two of his sons and leaves 
only Oppianicus junior alive.590 Counterfeiting of the last will and testament and the twelfth 
murder: to indicate himself as inheritor Oppianicus forges the last will and testament of 
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Asuvius from Larinum, then has Asuvius killed, and pays off Q. Manlius, triumvir capitalis 
who starts investigations in the case.591 
Changing this chronology Cicero gives account of Oppianicus’s crimes in the following 
chronology: assassination of M. Aurius,592 A. Aurius and three citizens from Larinum,593 the 
two male children,594 Cluentia,595 the sister-in-law and the brother, C. Oppianicus,596 
instigation for abortion,597 counterfeiting of the last will and testament and assassination of 
Asuvius,598 assassination of Dinaea and forging her last will and testament.599 Why was 
Cicero “compelled” to act like that?600 As the narratio is not directly linked to the Cluentius 
case, the orator cannot dwell on specific cases by supporting them by documentary evidence 
or testimonies, instead, he must content himself with flashing the appearance of 
demonstration from time to time.601 Furthermore, possible demonstration would be made 
difficult by the fact that the crime story like narrative is not lifelike because it would be hard 
to explain: why a Richard III like serial murderer Oppianicus, who gets his victims from his 
own family, who settles in their estate, who marries his victim’s widow, was called to account 
for his deeds only one and a half decades after his first assassination; why he was named as 
their inheritor in their last will and testament by several persons during the times although 
they must have known that thereby they hastened their own death; why his brother, C. 
Oppianicus should have made the murderer of his wife his inheritor; why he killed his two 
sons only and left the third one alive; and why he had M. Aurius killed although earlier, when 
forging Dinaea’s last will and testament he had already deleted the bequest ordered to be 
given to the son.602 
The orator does not even try to refute the counter-arguments listed above; much rather he 
makes efforts to avoid that they should occur to the audience at all, that is, to achieve his goal, 
instead of obvious lies, by delicately dislocating and concealing facts and arbitrarily 
determining the dramaturgical order of the cases—and that in doing so he meets success is 
proved by the sheer fact that the authors of later comments did not form a suspicion either, 
and only Wilfried Stroh made an attempt at reconstructing the actual order of events. 
Placing the assassination of M. Aurius first in the order proved to be a masterly trick since as 
“evidence” it was possible to bring up the idle talk about the case and the open threat by A. 
Aurius,603 and as the cause of failure to commence any trial it was possible to bring up the use 
of Sulla’s proscriptiones, that is, the assassination of A. Aurius by political machinations,604 
which supported failure to call Oppianicus to account for his deeds regarding other cases by 
his political influence.605 Cicero eliminates questions that might arise regarding Dinaea’s 
death and last will and testament by similar ingenuity. When Dinaea is mentioned for the first 
time, only her illness and death and the existence of her last will and testament is referred to 
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but counterfeiting of the last will and testament is not,606 and only much later—once he has 
showered the stream of Oppianicus’s crimes on the audience, which as it were makes the new 
and umpteenth murder logical—does the orator bring up the fact of the assassination of 
Dinaea and forging of her last will and testament.607 Cicero explains the momentum that 
Oppianicus was willing to murder also his own sons not from the character of Oppianicus but 
of Sassia, who agreed to marry him only under this condition, and the dark portrait depicted 
of Sassia who married the murderer of her husband608 does not rule out but definitely makes 
the double assassination probable.609 Lack of evidence does not prevent Cicero in his 
narrative at all, he turns necessity into a virtue and reminds the judges of the point that their 
indignation must be dwarfed by the indignation of the court of justice eight years before that 
examined proofs and heard witnesses in details.610 
Referring to shortage of time, Cicero gets down briefly with the assassination of the one-time 
wife, Cluentia and the sister-in-law and brother, C. Oppianicus, however, there are good 
chances that reference to Sassia after the former wife, Cluentia—of whom he does not state 
expressis verbis that she remained Oppianicus’s wife until his death—might make the 
audience believe that Cluentia was Oppianicus’s wife later, after Sassia; and suspicion that the 
orator speaks about events that occurred before 82 does not even arise. Undoubtedly: Cicero’s 
aim must have been just to confuse the chronology and thereby the audience completely since 
he could not prove, only complain of the assassinations listed here.611 The gifts given by 
Oppianicus to the widow of his brother-in-law, Magius by themselves would make only the 
intention to marry probable, however, connecting them not with the marriage but with the 
abortion carried out by Magia upon Oppianicus’s instigation presents them as merces 
abortionis.612 To make the assassination of Dinaea and especially counterfeiting of her last 
will and testament613 lifelike, Cicero inserts the assassination of Asuvius after the above—in 
whose last will and testament Oppianicus was indicated in the first place as inheritor—which 
is supported by the testimony of Oppianicus’s accomplice, Avillius, and thereby inheriting 
through assassination is made the outstanding motivation of Oppianicus’s deeds,614 and so 
poisoning of Dinaea and forging of her last will and testament are now nothing else than 
enhancement of the motives of the Asuvius case.615 
Cicero’s narratio in Pro Cluentio is a beautiful example of the appearance of ordo 
artificialis—and mos Homericus616—in which perspicuitas considered a virtue is replaced by 
the strategy justified by utilitas causae, based on which in the representation of both the chain 
and the internal structure of events elements that are more believable and better supported by 
proofs precede elements that can be proved with difficulties—or cannot be proved at all—as it 
were creating credit and basis for having them accepted too.617 
To give a technical summary of the rhetorical virtuosity of Pro Cluentio: by discussing the 
charge of bribe and the charge of poisoning separately Cicero doubles narratio and 
argumentatio; he inserts propositio, which usually follows narratio, directly after prooemium; 
argumentatio in connection with both the first and second count of the indictment unnoticably 
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and almost inseparably flows together with narratio; peroratio is a logical outcome of 
narratio inserted as conclusion; the narratives inserted extra causam, free handling of 
chronology and joint application of status collectionis and status coniecturalis built on each 
other strengthen the positions of the defence. This rhetorical tactics becomes astonishing just 
by the fact that the listener or the reader never feels that he is the victim of Cicero’s knowing 
misleading, what is more, the links of the narrative are intertwined without spectacular jumps, 
seemingly integrated in a logical order, which is supported also by the fact that, except for 
Wilfried Stroh, modern commentators of the text mostly set out from the order of the events 
outlined by Cicero in order to reconstruct the historical facts of the case.618 
As exemplum of the exemplary combination of the three genres of style of rhetoric Cicero 
himself also referred to Pro Cluentio,619 in which extended introduction, soberly brief 
descriptions, precise argumentation, colourful narrative, reasons full of emotions, pathos and 
irony, linguistic humour and keywords hammered with passion, apposite characterisations, 
polemical statements not free from exaggerations, questions formulated with tormenting 
temper and invective like insertions are combined into a harmony not seen anywhere else.620 
Thanks to Cicero, Cluentius was acquitted; however, as we can learn it from Quintilian’s 
account, the orator himself admitted that he had achieved that by cleverly manipulating the 
judges.621 Perhaps for this reason, Cicero considered Pro Cluentio one of the maximum 
outputs of his orator’s career,622 which both Quintilian623 and Pliny, who praised this oratio as 
Cicero’s most excellent speech, agreed with.624 The oration can be indeed considered 
exemplary: the orator masterly changes elements of style; combines pathos, simple 
description and humour; represents situations and characters appropriate for a crime story 
with apt preciseness; palpably connects arguments and planes of time, except when he intends 
to make obscurity denser, without distorting lucid arrangement of facts. From first to last 
engaging the attention of the audience—since later he himself admitted that he had to throw 
dust in the judges’ eyes during his speech625—and leading the judges qualified to decide the 
case, as a matter of fact, towards the direction he wanted to. 
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III. Election bribery (Pro Murena, Pro Plancio)  
 
 
III. 1. Lawsuit of Lucius Licinius Murena  
 
Cicero delivered his speech in November 63 in defence of Lucius Licinius Murena, an 
applicant for the office of the next year’s consul, who was charged by his competitors with 
election fraud, ambitus. The condemnation of Murena would have broken not only the 
commander’s political career, it would have driven the Republic into serious danger. So, it 
was not only the honesty of a member of the Roman political elite but the stability of the 
Roman State that Cicero was destined to defend, as he clearly states it in his speech. In his 
statement of defence, it is not primarily the personal merits of the competitors, Licinius 
Murena and Sulpicius Rufus that the orator compares, it is their career, the commander’s, the 
jurist’s activity that he puts on the scales of public good, and provides a fairly humorous, 
witty assessment of these. The outcome of the lawsuit is known, the court acquitted Murena, 
who thus was able to start his service as a consul, and take over the office from the previous 
year’s consul and his own counsel for defence, Cicero. 
First, we shall analyse the historical background of Pro Murena, describing the political 
events surrounding the delivery of the speech in details as the oratio was made just at the time 
of revealing Catilina’s plot, and so it cannot be taken out of the context of the stormy political 
conditions of the those months. (III. 1. 1.) After that—in the course of analysing the legal 
background of the lawsuit—we shall survey the order of the election of consuls in the last 
century of the Republic, and the state of facts of election bribery organically related to it and 
the legislation efforts made to impose sanctions on ambitus, not necessarily satisfactory in 
their effect, and the role of associations (collegia) in the election campaign. (III. 1. 2.) Finally, 
we shall discuss the rhetorical tactics used in Pro Murena, contentio dignitatis, that is, the 
strategy typically used in ambitus lawsuits by which Cicero compared development of the 
career and personality of the competing candidates to enable him to demonstrate—not so 
much his defendant’s innocence in the charge of election bribery—much rather eligibility of 
Murena, who won the election, and ineligibility of his opponent, Sulpicius Rufus, to the 
consul’s dignity. (III. 1. 3.) 
 
III. 1. 1. Historical background of Pro Murena 
 
In 63 Lucius Licinius Murena and Decimus Iunius Silanus were elected consuls for the year 
of 62. Apart from them, however, Lucius Sergius Catilina and Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the 
most excellent jurist of his age also applied for this office. Before the election, M. Porcius 
Cato made an oath that he would charge anybody who had won the election with ambitus, 
except for his brother-in-law,626 Silanus.627 In Rome it was far from being a rare thing to 
charge the magistrates elected with ambitus. In 66 both consules designati, P. Cornelius Sulla 
and P. Antonius Paetus were actually condemned, and in 54 none of the four applicants 
managed to avoid the proceedings taken due to ambitus.628 The act of condemning a consul 
designatus, as a matter of fact, was likely to shake the stability of the Republic to a 
considerable extent.629 The fact that the charge made by Sulpicius and Cato went far beyond 
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the usual extent of the possible danger to the res publica was justified by the events taking 
place in the year of 63. The delivery of Pro Murena can be dated to November 63; that is, one 
of the periods burdened with the greatest crisis of the Roman Republic. The year of 63—when 
Marcus Tullius Cicero and Caius Antonius Hybrida became consuls—saw the second 
Catilina’s plot.630 What follows is a brief summary of the key events of the conspiracy.631 
Lucius Sergius Catilina, a very gifted, yet uninhibited patrician from an impoverished noble 
family and an oligarch, who disguised himself as a reformer, gathered people of the widest 
orders and ranks around him, and promised them cancellation of their debt in case he came to 
power. Imre Trencsényi-Waldapfel assumes that Catilina probably did not have a definite 
program, except for seizing power.632 By his “many-colouredness” implied by the 
characterisation by Sallustius Crispus633 he was able to make a few noble citizens side with 
him too.634 After Catilina was defeated in the election of consuls held in the summer of 63, he 
saw no other possibility to obtain power than brute force. To this end, he made arrangements 
for armed actions,635 simultaneously, G. Manlius organised an army in Etruria, and was only 
waiting for Catilina’s order to run to help him with this army.636 Cicero learned of Catilina’s 
plans through the lover of one of the supporting actors of the plot,637 Quintus Curius:638 
Fulvia.639 Of all this and the assassination against the senators scheduled for 28 October 
Cicero gave an account in the senate on 20 October. On 21 October the senate ordered state of 
emergency with senatus consultum ultimum, by that vesting the consuls with full powers to 
take any action necessary to ensure the safety of the State.640 Since the senate had received 
news that on 24 October Manlius started armed actions, and that commotion was observed 
among the slaves in Capua and Apulia, L. Aemilius Paulus Lepidus brought a charge of vis 
against Catilina,641 who in turn offered to place himself under the free custody of a leading 
politician, but nobody was willing to take him.642 During the night from 5 to 6 November, 
Catilina called his accomplices to M. Porcius Laeca’s house, and there announced that he 
would join Manlius, and assigned the roles for triggering armed conspiracy. The only problem 
he had was that beforehand he had to kill Cicero.643 To set Catilina free from this problem, 
two men, senator L. Vargunteius and C. Cornelius from the order of the knights undertook to 
murder Cicero during the morning salutatio.644 Cicero learned of this plan too; and he did not 
let the two assassins who appeared in the morning on 7 November into his house which was 
now protected by armed guards. After that he immediately convened the senate to the Jupiter 
Stator temple where Catilina also appeared to everybody’s great astonishment.645  
It was on this occasion, on 8 November when Cicero delivered the first Catilinarian oration. 
He exposed Catilina’s intrigues646 and called him to leave Rome.647 Catilina suddenly realised 
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that he was completely left alone, he ran out of the senate, and left the city during the same 
night. He pretended to go into exile; actually, he joined Manlius actually. Next day, on 9 
November, in his second speech against Catilina Cicero communicated to the people what had 
happened so far. In mid November it became public knowledge that Catilina took over the 
control over Manlius’s army, so he was declared hostis populi Romani. Catilina had left quite 
a number of his accomplices in Rome, whose presence and functions Cicero learned of from 
Fulvia, but for lack of any evidence they were not able to take any action against them. At this 
point, chance was of help to Cicero: what happened was that the conspirators contacted 
foreign delegates (allobroges648) staying in Rome, and tried to win them to join the plot.649 
Having become aware of this, Cicero put forward the proposal to obtain written evidence on 
the conspirators, what was accomplished.650 Cicero acquired this proof through an attack that 
took place at651 Pons Mulvius.652 
At the session of the senate under the weight of these evidences, the leaders of the plot having 
stayed in Rome were forced to make confession. Of these actions Cicero gave an account in 
the evening of the same day (on 3 December) to the people that gathered on the Forum. It was 
on this occasion when the so-called third Catilinarian oration was delivered. The fourth 
Catilinarian oration was addressed on 5 December at the Concordia temple,653 where 
decision had to be made on what to do with the conspirators having been taken into custody. 
Iunius Silanus proposed to impose the severest, capital punishment, and he was supported by 
the majority. However, Caesar654 voted for confinement for life, and he was supported by a 
few. Here Cicero intervened, and in the fourth Catilinarian oration summing up the opinions 
expressed so far, he asked the senators if they accepted the proposal of Silanus or Caesar; and 
then the scales seemed to tilt in favour of Caesar. Then Marcus Porcius Cato rose to speak, 
who demanded death sentence for the traitors,655 and the senate voted for it. In the evening of 
the very same day the sentence was executed in Tullianum. Cicero was celebrated by the 
people and the senate unanimously as Rome’s saviour,656 and Q. Lutatius Catulus greeted him 
as pater patriae, which title Cicero was proud of until the end of his life. Catilina and his 
troops were defeated in 62 at Pistoria in a battle, and the commander of the army died there 
too.657 
On the grounds of the above, an attempt can be made to place Pro Murena in time.658 
Catilina’s accomplices were not taken into custody yet,659 and Cato had not started his activity 
as a tribune,660 as it was referred to by Cicero too.661 On the other hand, Catilina’s leaving 
from Rome can be defined as terminus post quem, for the speech gives an account of it as an 
event that had already taken place.662 Furthermore, Cicero expresses his wish that Antonius 
should take armed action against Catilina; the relevant order was adopted in a few days after 
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Catilina had left.663 On the grounds of the above, the delivery of the speech can be dated to 
the last days of November 63.664  
The lawsuit involved four prosecutors (Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, M. Porcius Cato, Ser. Sulpicius 
Rufus minor and a certain C. Postumius not specifically known) and three counsels for 
defence (Q. Hortensius Hortalus, M. Licinius Crassus and Cicero). The proceedings were 
terminated with the acquittal of Murena.665 
 
III. 1. 2. The order of election of consules and ambitus – the role of associations  
 
In the age of the Republic of Rome there were four popular assemblies (comitia curiata, 
comitia centuriata, comitia tributa, concilium plebis); however, in the last century of the 
Republic only comitia centuriata, which elected magistratus maiores, including consuls, and 
comitia tributa, which elected magistratus minores, had any practical significance. According 
to tradition, the assembly of centuriae was formed by King Servius Tullius, however, his 
operation can be proved from the middle of the 5th century only. Originally, this comitia 
operated in accordance with a division defined in terms of military companies (centuriae); 
later, however, this military character faded.666 Based on censors’ property estimate, citizens 
constituted one hundred and ninety-three centuriae: cavalry centuriae and foot centuriae, the 
latter divided into classes, which were originally distributed as follows. Knights, who were 
over classes amounted to eighteen centuriae; based on the census their property had to exceed 
one hundred thousand asses. Citizens ranked into classes constituted five classes: eighty 
centuriae with property over one hundred thousand asses, twenty centuriae with property 
over seventy-five thousand asses, twenty centuriae with property over fifty thousand asses, 
twenty centuriae with property over twenty-five thousand asses and thirty centuriae with 
property over eleven thousand asses. Below the classes the five unpropertied centuriae were 
placed: fabri and cornices, each of which had two centuriae, and proletarii one. After 215, the 
representation of the first class decreased from eighty to seventy centuriae, which was divided 
into thirty-five centuriae of the iuniores (encompassing citizens in age groups between 
eighteen and forty-six years) and thirty-five centuriae of the seniores (encompassing citizens 
in age groups between forty-seven and sixty years). Before the elections, one of the centuriae 
of the iuniores was selected by a draw so that it should be centuria praerogativa, i.e., it 
should vote first, as it were to indicate the final outcome of the voting.667 (As a matter of fact, 
the most propertied centuriae did not contain one hundred persons, while the number of 
persons in centuriae that did not have any property amounted to several thousands.) 
Voting took place per centuriae; first, the more propertied voted, after that, the poorer, 
finally—in theory—unpropertied people that constituted a significant part of the population. 
Although citizens’ votes had equal value, votes were aggregated per centuriae, and this way 
eventually each one centuria embodied one yes and no vote depending on the majority of 
votes cast within the centuria. It should be mentioned that counting of the votes did not take 
place upon voting had been terminated but continuously, that is—by a logical twist that seems 
peculiar but served political interests—they continued voting only until the centuriae that cast 
their votes reached a rate of voting over fifty percent. So, for election victory it was sufficient 
if more than half of the one hundred and ninety-three centuriae voted “properly”: eighteen 
votes of the knights and eighty votes of the first class were more than half of the votes of all 
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centuriae. (Later, when the weight of the first class somewhat decreased, it was sufficient if 
twenty centuriae of the second property class joined the knights and the first class.) The first 
ninety-eight centuriae amounted to a fraction of the entirety of citizens only, thus, election 
was far from representing the decision of the majority of citizens.668 It was far from all of the 
citizens who took part in the election because the site of voting, the Campus Martius could 
take seventy thousand citizens, and the total number of citizens several times exceeded this 
number in the 2nd century already. Poorer layers who lived in the countryside mostly did not 
travel to Rome for voting because the time of election of consuls fell on the second half of 
July, that is, the period of reaping of barley and harvesting of beans; so, the election was 
decided by the votes of the most propertied, also due to this circumstance under this peculiar 
order of voting.669  
The person controlling the election, after his speech (contio), announcement of the names of 
the candidates and prayer addressed to gods, opened voting; then, took a seat on the sella 
curulis set up beside the voting bridge. Voters, who lined up per centuriae, were given a wax 
covered piece of wooden board, on which they wrote the initials of the name of the candidate 
preferred by them; then, they cast their board in the ballot-box (cista) set up at the other end 
of the wooden bridge. After one centuria had cast their votes, votes were aggregated in the 
ballot counting chamber, and candidates’ names were written down, marking the centuriae’s 
decision by scores beside their names. Once two candidates had reached fifty percent plus one 
vote of the ballots of centuriae, voting was discontinued and was proclaimed conclusive. The 
institution of campaign silence was unknown in the Republic of Rome, so, agents tried to 
campaign for their candidate even at the gate of the bridge. If it was foreseen that the result of 
voting would be unfavourable for the ruling class, they tried to influence the outcome 
sometimes by rather powerful intervention, for example, the voting bridge collapsed 
“accidentally”, or augures stated that they were seeing ill omen670—in both cases election was 
declared void or postponed by several days, which provided sufficient time for turning public 
feeling. 671 
Just as the election of magistrates was a necessary part of the order of the state of the 
Republic of Rome, in these elections election fraud/bribery (ambitus) played a part too. Very 
soon after the making of the Twelve Table Law, in 432, the first statutory provision was 
published, which prohibited for applicants to call their fellow citizens’ attention to themselves 
with specially whitened clothes made shining. In accordance with Roman terminology, it was 
always only ambitus that violated legal order, ambitio did not; the latter was often used in the 
sense of petitio, its meaning was sometimes undoubtedly pejorative but it never became a 
legal term.  
From the second half of the second century we know of the existence of two acts that 
sanctioned ambitus—they are lex Cornelia Baebia from 181672 and an act from 159,673 but 
their content is not known. In the age between C. Gracchus and Sulla, the system of 
quaestiones perpetuae was already quite extended. The first news provided on a lawsuit 
specifically on the charge of ambitus is dated to this period: in 116 one of the consul’s offices 
for the year of 115 was won by a homo novus Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, who was charged by 
his rival having lost the election, P. Rutilius Rufus with ambitus. In turn Scaurus did the same 
against Rufus; otherwise both of the accused—who were prosecutors at the same time—were 
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acquitted.674 The existence of lex Cornelia de ambitu made by Sulla is somewhat disputed,675 
our understanding of leges Corneliae is not complete since there are two sources on these acts 
available. First, Cicero’s speeches; secondly, the writings of the lawyers of late principate, 
which are known only in the form bequeathed in the Digest. Cicero refers to these acts only to 
the extent his interests manifested in the given speech, that is, the rhetorical situation makes it 
necessary; so in no way does he make an effort to be exhaustive as it is not his duty. The 
lawyers of the principate dealt with only those acts of Sulla that remained in force after 
Augustus’s reforms. The following reference, however, gives ground for considering the 
existence of lex Cornelia de ambitu possible. It asserts that in earlier ages676 the convicted 
were condemned to refrain from applying for magistrate for ten years.677 The aforesaid lex 
Cornelia can be hardly lex Cornelia Baebia from 181 since between his speech delivered in 
defence of Publius Cornelius Sulla and lex Cornelia more than ten years had passed 678 , and 
as in this period other laws sanctioning ambitus were also made, it cannot be supposed that 
the extent of punishment would have remained the same.679 
In the periods after Sulla, quaestio de ambitu was usually headed by a praetor, so for example 
in 66 C. Aquilius Gallus fulfilled the office of praetor ambitus.680 On the laws following this 
stage, information is supplied by Cicero in Pro Murena. At the request of a tribune, C. 
Cornelius in 67, lex Calpurnia was born,681 what can be known about its sanctions is as 
follows. It contained expulsion from the senate, banning from applying for offices for life 
(contrary to the ten years’ term defined under lex Cornelia) and certain pecuniary 
punishments.682 A senatus consultum from 63 emphatically sanctioned a part of the acts 
regulated under lex Calpurnia; so for example, the act of recruiting party adherents for money 
upon the reception of the applicant in Rome; the act of distributing a great number of free 
tickets and seats for gladiators’ games; and the act of hospitality to an excessive extent.683 
This senatus consultum probably interpreted and specified the aforesaid law.684 The events of 
the year 64, however—primarily the increasing losses of Antonius and Catilina—made it 
necessary to make a new law. This law became lex Tullia enacted in 63, supported by all the 
candidates applying for the consulate of the year 62, which threatened with ten years’ exile as 
a new punishment, and took firmer action against distributing money, and punished absence 
from legislation due to alleged illness. Furthermore, it banned the arrangement of gladiators’ 
games during two years before applying, with the only exemption from such ban being an 
obligation to do so as set forth in a last will and testament.685 That is how the law wanted to 
prevent paying money directly to voters, and intended to limit the number of the entourage of 
the applicants (as an increasingly great entourage almost appearing to be a triumphal 
procession might have suggested sure victory to voters). It is a fact however—as Joachim 
Adamietz’s witty and quite to the point remark reveals—that the actual limits of ambitus were 
determined by nothing else than the confines of the financial possibilities of the candidates.686 
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In relation to election campaign, it is absolutely necessary to mention Commentariolum 
petitionis, written in, the oldest campaign strategy document that has been preserved for us, in 
which Quintus Tullius Cicero, Marcus’s younger brother, gives advice to his elder brother on 
how Marcus can win consul’s elections, that is, how he can rise to the highest position of the 
Roman Republic. It is rather dubious if Quintus published—could have published—this work 
after it had been possibly revised by Marcus, in which he outlines the organisation and 
management of the election campaign since he explores the details of the fight for votes with 
relentless honesty. Günter Laser sums up the core of Quintus’s writing as follows: in order to 
obtain the consul’s office the applicant should not shrink back from any tricks, false promises, 
lies, pretence and approaching/flattering any group that fits the purpose.687 The exploration of 
this uninhibited opportunism and manoeuvring was in no way in the interest of the ruling 
class of the late Republic, and it would have put especially Marcus in an unpleasant situation 
since he could not have shielded himself from the shadow of the suspicion that—especially as 
a homo novus—he was able to win consulate because he used all these tools in practice.688  
As a matter of fact, Marcus was not lacking knowledge of the process of applying for offices 
either, however, it can justify Quintus’s effort to sum up relevant experience that he had also 
applied for minor offices (magistratus minores), and so he could add his personal 
observations to his brother’s strategy.689 The plural used in sentences with more personal 
tone690 also indicates that the writer of the letter might have had a direct relation with the 
addressee. As a matter of fact, the Commentariolum was not published by Marcus either in 64 
or later since by doing so he would have allowed to have an insight into his own political 
intentions and opportunism, but the charges against Antonius and Catilina gathered in these 
notes he could use with clear conscience and comfortably in his later oration In toga 
candida.691 Quite openly, Quintus explores his brother’s far from favourable situation in 
applying for the consul’s office. In the eye of the nobility he is considered homo novus,692 
who is not backed either by a proper group of clients, or sufficient financial support; while his 
competitors, Antonius and Catilina are abounding in all these.693 Although the term homo 
novus was never defined exactly, it was used in a dual sense: as a narrower denotation it 
meant all of those who did not have any consul among their ancestors; in a wider sense it 
denoted those whose forefathers, even if not having obtained the highest rank, did obtain 
some office or were allowed to be the members of the senate. The optimates used this term 
contemptibly since for them it meant only the parvenu; however, Cicero declared about 
himself quite proudly that he had obtained all possible offices at the youngest age permitted 
by law, although he did not come from the aristocracy of the senate. A similar thought can be 
read in Pro Murena too.694 
For Marcus his own character and view of life must have meant a disadvantage too since 
being a Platonist it was alien to him to apply pretence (simulatio) indispensably necessary for 
application,695 and to make friends with people in order to adjust to voters.696 His key weapon 
was his oratory skills that helped him to make himself popular among the people 
(popularis);697 on the other hand, he had to beware of appearing a people’s party politician 
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since it was not the urban masses (urbana multitudo) that would decide the outcome of the 
election.698  
In what follows it is worth surveying what role associations played in election campaign, 
which sheds light on the operation of one of the important tools of Clodius’s politics to be 
discussed in the next chapter, as associations were established not only for the sake of 
influencing the election. The associations founded by private persons, usually called 
collegium, held together the communities providing protection and assistance for persons 
living at the same settlement and belonging to the same religious cult but were primarily not 
meant to serve everyday political fights.699 To cover their expenses certain associations 
claimed admission fees (capitulare) or regular monthly membership fees (stips menstrua),700 
which of course limited the number of members; that is, most often the members of the 
collegia were from the wealthier layers of urban common people (plebs urbana), traders, 
craftsmen, ship owners and not from simple labourers.701 If an association, which did not 
claim any membership fees, was not able to finance its expenses from its own resources, it 
could rely on the generosity of its leaders, or a patron but if it engaged a conduct which was 
contrary to the maintainer’s intentions, then it could lose the support.702 The political 
significance of collegia increased during periods of applications for magistrates; however, 
even then it was enough for the applicant to win over the leading personalities of the 
collegium to his goals, the rest of the members obediently followed the opinion leaders.703 
Clodius’s activity added a peculiar element to the political operation of certain associations. 
Clodius definitely raised the number of collegia that did not claim any membership fees and 
brought together the scum of the city, which highly shocked Cicero.704 The maintenance and 
“representation” expenses of these associations were most probably covered by Clodius 
himself, and in return the members could express their gratitude to their patrons in several 
ways and forms; consequently, in theory Clodius could easily mobilise masses.705 These 
collegia led by Clodius were actually gangs operated by keeping the appearance of legality 
but used as tools to raise riots; and it was not in the interest of decent citizens to risk their 
reputation, proceeds and life—by closing their shops and leaving their daily jobs—for the 
sake of Clodius.706 Later, Clodius made efforts to use the collegia maintained by him as a 
kind of private army,707 which were, looking at their “results”, sufficient for Clodius 
achieving his short-term plans and disturbing the privacy of the public for a short while, but 
for seizing power for a longer period (which was perhaps not included in Clodius’s intentions) 
both financial resources and proper motivation were missing. After Clodius’s death, the 
collegia lost their impact produced on political events; nevertheless, later on the leaders of the 
State were very careful in their ways with associations.708 
The question arises, what proportion of the population the institution of the clientele covered 
and as part of that what services the clientes were obliged to provide for their patronus; and to 
what extent the wider masses could be manipulated and mobilised through the clientele. Since 
the early period of the Republic the relation between the patron and the client had been based 
on mutual trust (fides), under which patricians, having outstanding authority (auctoritas), 
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dignity (dignitas) and wealth (vires), and later plebeians undertook to protect citizens in need 
of and asking for protection,709 as well as travelling aliens (hospites) in the form of various 
benefits and favours (beneficia, merita) both financially and before the law.710 In spite of their 
dependant relation to their patron the clients preserved their personal freedom, and were not 
compelled to waive their right to political activity or participation in public life; what is more, 
their patrons promoted them to do so.711 In addition to expressing esteem (reverentia) and 
gratitude (gratia) the clients were obliged to provide several services for their patron.712 So, 
for example, they arranged for accommodation for their patron or his friends,713 shared the 
payment of penalties,714 supported their patron in court proceedings,715 during the period of 
applying for or fulfilling offices they provided spiritual and financial support for their 
patron,716 in danger they undertook to protect him personally,717 as a foreign client they 
supplied goods to the patron,718 and preferably they informed as many people as possible 
about the generosity of their patron.719 On the grounds of all the above, the clients were in 
many cases meant to articulate the patron’s interests and views to the wider masses clearly 
and efficiently.720 Although the clientele provided an essential basis of support for the patron, 
the citizens fulfilling patronatus were far from relying only on clients in search of tools that 
could be used for their political purposes since the attachment of the clientele was of ethical 
rather than legal nature, on the one hand, and the clients, pursuing their own occupation, could 
not always be available to the patron, on the other. 
The social significance of the clientele depended to a great extent on the social position of the 
client, and, therefore, the patronus—ingenuus relation and the patronus—libertinus relation 
must be clearly separated from each other. A part of free-born clients belonged to a social and 
economic layer identical with or similar to that of the patron, and needed the patron’s support 
only for the sake of strengthening their own position, or for obtaining an office721—in this 
case the clientele meant friendship between persons of equal rank (amicitia).722 These clients 
belonged to the higher census class, and so at the comitia centuriata and in a provincial tribus 
they could articulate their opinion and advance their patron’s interests as competent 
persons.723 As a matter of fact, not all free-born citizens belonged to the wealthier layers, and 
they turned to the patron primarily for urgent legal or financial help, but they could hardly 
return the favours did to them as due to the peculiar features of the Roman election system 
they did not have the opportunity to cast their votes and these votes were not evaluated unless 
the elections were expected to produce a dubious outcome.724 Compared to the latter, the 
applicant for the office appreciated the support of men with greater prestige much more; so, 
for example, the support of the leaders of collegia (principes), who in the given case did not 
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constitute a part of the clientele but produced major influence in their association, district and 
their entire place of living, and had considerable impact on changes in the morale of voters.725 
The representation of the institution of salutation (salutatio) casts interesting light on the 
applicant’s social relations: salutatores from lower layers of society visited several applicants 
on the same day, so the conduct engaged by them during the election could not be considered 
secure and stable (communes/fucosi suffragatores). Therefore, the patron applying for the 
office ought to have appeared grateful to them, and had to praise their activity both to their 
face and in front of their friends as by doing so he could expect them to leave their other 
patrons and become firm and committed voters (proprii/firmi suffragatores)—the applicant 
was not supposed to bring up his suspicion arising or proved regarding their loyalty, and 
against his better conviction he had to assert his trust in them.726 The patron could never be 
absolutely sure of the support and gratitude of salutatores for they could compare the goods 
and benefits received from him to the allowances granted by other applicants they had also 
visited, i.e., economically independent citizens seemed more secure voter’s base. The 
endeavour to recruit and hold inconstant salutatores and clients becomes understandable 
when one considers that the patron applying for a magistrate could produce the appearance of 
popularity and influence by having a lot of people crowding around him during salutation.727 
More important and more respectful salutatores were allowed to have a word directly with the 
patron; their presence made the masses aware that the applicant was worthy of more extensive 
support.728 The salutatio provided opportunities for the applicant for gathering information on 
the morale and desires of common people, which their close circle of friends (amici) did not 
provide insight into; consequently, the patron—client relation served mostly exchange of 
information. The relation between the patron and the freedmen developed somewhat 
differently: their relation remained closer even after liberation but this relation was based as 
much on the requirements of moral standards as on the requirements of legal norms; in 118 in 
his edict Rutilius Rufus limited the range of services that could be demanded by the patron,729 
but a freedman was not allowed to take legal action against the patron,730 and it was only 
Augustus’s lex Aelia Sentia that formulated statutory sanctions against ungrateful 
freedmen.731 
Accordingly, the clientele made up of free-born citizens and freedmen cannot be considered 
uniform in terms of the strength of their attachment to the patron since it was exactly due to 
the moral nature of the attachment that the patron did not have any legal means to collect 
outstanding claims and unfulfilled obligations. Although a patron deceitfully acting against 
his clients became the object of the contempt of society, this did not mean that he was 
deprived of his rights. Servius’s commentary quoting the text of the Twelve Table Law 
attached to the relevant locus of Vergil’s Aeneis732—which asserted that the patron deceiving 
his client should be damned (sacer)—implied ethical offence and not criminal law facts. In 
this case the term sacer presumably did not mean a person who was to be sacrificed to gods 
and could be killed freely733 but a person who engaged guilty, that is, despisable conduct;734 
Servius most probably followed the tendency of the late period of the Republic of Rome that 
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idealised Roman past.735 Even if we presume close patron—client relations regarding the 
archaic age, the significance of clienteles dramatically diminished by the 3rd century, and owing 
to the growth of the number of citizens we can no longer reckon with stable clientelae during 
Sulla’s rule of terror, much rather ad hoc patron—client relations organised for specific 
purposes should be presumed under which fulfilment of moral obligations was no longer of 
great account.736 If there had been no mobility of such a great extent within and between 
clienteles, then the patrons and applicants for offices would not have been compelled—even 
at the expense of ambitus—to recruit clients.737 Clients from lower layers of society became 
important to the patron not so much for getting their votes—which sometimes they were not 
even allowed to cast in the elections—much rather for their capacity to mediate the opinion of 
the masses to him, which helped him to prepare for what opinion they would like to hear from 
him in public appearances.738 
With the loosening of the patron—client relation, or owing to the fact that the client would 
seek a patron that represented his interests better, and the patron would seek clients in his 
environment who had more considerable influence and so had greater capital of relations, this 
process reached the stage where the lower layers of society, which constituted a considerable 
part of clients, were able to produce direct influence on political leaders. A grand entourage 
represented the acknowledgement of the politician and his legitimisation by the citizens,739 
whereas a decreasing number of people forced him to revise his views entertained so far.740 
On the other hand, it was just due to the unstable and unreliable nature of the clientele that in 
the last century of the Republic applicants for offices relied, in addition to their clients, on 
their relatives, friends, neighbours in the district, their freedmen and slaves when compiling 
the urban accompaniment—this diversity enriched not only the spectacular entourage but 
opened roads to each layer of society and created relations for the applicant.741 So the 
clientele was only one of the means of political fight, and far from being the only or the most 
important one,742 all the more as Livius’s description asserts that the purpose of the clients 
taking action before the court of justice was not to raise sympathy with the defendant much 
rather to prevent a larger mass from getting together.743 
 
III. 1. 3. Contentio dignitatis as rhetorical strategy in Pro Murena 
 
The structure of the speech can be outlined as follows.744 Cicero replies to the reproaches 
addressed to him for having undertaken defence.745 In antique rhetoric it is not rare for the 
counsel of defence to apply the strategy to clear himself first. His style is solemn right in the 
first sentence both in terms of vocabulary and rhythm, the use of creticus.746 In the main 
part747 he follows the disposition of the charge divided into three parts.748 In the first very 
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short part, he refuses the charges brought against Murena’s conduct of life (deprehensio 
vitae). In the second part, he deals with the chances of the election of the two competitors.749 
This was required because the charge subsequently stressing the point that Murena had no 
chance intended to prove that he had won owing to nothing else but dishonest means: that was 
what Cicero wanted to reply to. He emphasises that social background and the office obtained 
through it are equal in the case of both parties,750 by virtue of this none of them could 
overcome the other. Murena obtained esteem with his career till then and achieved victory for 
himself by using this esteem.751 He compares the glory of the orator’s and the soldier’s career 
to the lawyer’s career,752 in which competition (studiorum atque artium contentio)—as the 
rhetorical situation required—as a matter of fact the eloquence and the res militaris become 
the winner. After that, however, Cicero puts forth more compelling reasons to support 
Murena:753 for example, the ludi that he arranged as praetor.754 The fact that, contrary to 
Sulpicius Rufus,755 he undertook to administer a province,756 and finally that his election was 
supported also by commander Lucullus and his troops, who returned from the third war with 
Mithritades to Rome. Then he launches an attack against Servius:757 he criticises the tactics 
followed by him, in particular that instead of advancing his own victory Sulpicius prepared 
the evidence of the charge of ambitus against his enemies right from the outset, and by that 
involuntarily drove those who were afraid of Catilina’s victory to Murena’s camp.758 It is in 
the third part759 where he comes to the actual charges. First, he replies to the charges brought 
by Cato, and the consideration thereof,760 since it was Cato’s excessively exercised firmness 
that made him support the charge.761 As earlier pettiness and certain out-of-date institutions of 
the jurisprudence,762 now he makes the sometimes exaggerating strictness of Stoic ethics the 
subject of scorn.763 This charge is followed by his factual but rather narrow and not too 
convincing disproof.764 Emphasis is laid not so much on production of evidence but on the 
assertion that the lawsuit itself is a highly false step and that anyone who wanted to attain 
through it that next January only one consul should enter office would deliver the res publica 
in the hands Catilina and his accomplices.765 Thus, his aim is to protect the State and his 
citizens.766 In the peroratio767 he calls the judges’ attention to the point that in their decisions 
they should keep public interest in view.768 
In Pro Murena Cicero—in addition to emphasising the political weight of the lawsuit—
achieved success, that is, Murena’s acquittal by comparing the career of the two applicants 
(studiorum atque artium contentio and contentio dignitatis), in which he was helped by 
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moderately used humour and irony as the most important tools. In the Orator Cicero provides 
theoretical foundations for all the three kinds of style, however, he points out that, in addition 
to its other attributes (avoiding prose rhythm and complex sentence, dropping hiatus, use of 
munditia and elegantia, moderation in applying both ornament and tropes, figures)769 the most 
characteristic trait of simple style is witticism and irony. When using them the orator is to 
make sure that he should not cause irreparable harms; should thrust stings only into his 
enemies; should do that with moderation and not ceaselessly; and should not hurt all of them 
and not in any way. Regarding temperance to be followed by the orator—and actually 
complied with by Cicero in Pro Murena—Quintilian notes that the orator should not ever 
want to hurt anybody, and especially should not have the slightest intention of being 
compelled to give up a friend rather than a witty remark.770 It is worth observing that Cicero 
behaved in a very similar spirit towards Sulpicius too: he states of Sulpicius expressis verbis 
that owing to his other merits, i.e., self-control, dignity, justness, loyalty and all his other 
merits he has always considered him especially worthy of consul’s and any other dignity,771 
and he deems it highly praiseworthy that he has acquired erudition in civil law, kept awake, 
worked a lot, helped many people.772 Ironic remarks are in each case aimed only at 
iurisprudentia.773 In the light of that, we should survey the career of the two competitors, 
Murena defended by Cicero for political reasons and Sulpicius Rufus, the opponent in the 
lawsuit, who otherwise maintained a friendly relation with the orator, and the orator’s relation 
to the field represented by them, res militaris and iurisprudentia.  
Lucius Licinius Murena was born in 105, and fulfilled war service under his father’s 
commandership between 83 and 81 in Asia Minor, and took part in his triumphs too.774 In 75, 
he fulfilled quaestorship together with Sulpicius.775 In 74, with consul L. Lucullus he returned 
to the war against Mithridates ignited again in the meantime.776 In 65, he was again 
Sulpicius’s collega, and as praetor urbanus he had plenty of occasions to become quite 
popular through organising the pompous ludi Apollinares.777 As a propraetor in 64 he was 
given Gallia Narbonensis as his class. The prosecutors reproached him with the newness of 
his clan,778 but Murena was not homo novus in the traditional sense of the word since he was 
the fourth in the row of generations who attained the office of praetor, and this term was used 
for those whose family members had not obtained any of the magistratus curules providing 
ius imaginum.779 One of the pillars of his success was his strong financial background proved 
among others by the games organised by him as praetor, and improved by his activity as 
propraetor in Gallia. Also, the current political situation was grist that came to his mill: 
against the danger Catilina was threatening with a well organised combat ready army was 
required, and among the applicants only Murena had such an army.780 No significant acts 
taken by him are known from the period after his consulate. The life work of Servius 
Sulpicius consisting of one hundred and eighty volumes, irrespective of the given political 
                                                 
769
 Adamik 1998. 130. 
770
 Quint. inst. 6, 3, 28.  
771
 Cic. Mur. 23.  
772
 Cic. Mur. 19.  
773
 See Bürge 1974. 80ff. 
774
 Cic. Mur. 11. Cf. Münzer 446. 
775
 Cic. Mur. 18.  
776
 Cic. Mur. 20. 89. 
777
 Cic. Mur. 38.  
778
 Cic. Mur. 17.  
779
 Adamietz 1989. 15. 
780
 Adamietz 1989. 18. 
72 
 
situation and the results of the election, properly shows the jurist’s intellectual superiority 
over Lucius Licinius Murena, who was a rather colourless character.781  
The Romans considered war a natural part of life, and were fully aware that they can thank 
their imperium to their military virtue, virtus militartis. So in their mind the craft/art of war, 
res militaris preceded any other activity, and the conditions under which they could be 
exercised were created by the peace won/forced by res militaris. Corpus Ciceronianum, 
however, does not include plenty of loci that express this view: although Cicero 
acknowledges that the glory bequeathed by the ancestors to the people of Rome is present in 
many things, almost in everything, especially military affairs.782 When praising the 
statesman’s vision and perfect orator’s skills of Cn. Pompey he points out that it is exactly 
these traits that constitute the essence of a commander’s dignity.783 In De officiis he further 
elaborates the traditional Roman view proclaiming the priority of res militaris: it is true, he 
says, that for a young man the best recommendation for glory is given by his war merits,784 
but it is necessary to review and deny the opinion supported by many which asserts that deeds 
of war are greater and more glorious than deeds of peace—he warns.785 Then, drawing the 
conclusion he takes the position that if we want to judge properly, we must acknowledge that 
several deeds of peaceful civil life have appeared greater and more excellent than deeds of 
war.786 Convinced and convincingly, he quotes the sentences, which some evil and envious 
people dare to attack,787 proving that brave deeds of peaceful civil life are of not less 
importance than deeds of war, what is more we must make greater efforts to carry out the 
former than the later.788  
Servius Sulpicius Rufus came from a patrician clan but his family did not play an important 
part in public life of Rome.789 His grandfather did not attain any significant position in cursus 
honorum, and his father belonged to the order of knights.790 As a young man he pursued 
studies just like Cicero; he studied rhetoric in Rhodes. Then, having returned from there he 
turned from elocution to jurisprudence.791 He fulfilled quaestor’s office in Ostia, presumably 
in 75,792 in 65, he became praetor and chaired the quaestio peculatus.793 He fulfilled both of 
the offices in the same year as Murena.794 After he acted as praetor he did not accept any 
province but stayed in Rome and continued to act as iuris consultus.795  
As it is known, in 63 he lost the elections. What were the reasons for that? Servius Sulpicius 
did not have proper social background and relations. Cicero notes regarding the orator’s 
activity that with these abilities men without noble origin also won consul’s dignity since they 
had obtained considerable influence, highly strong friendly relations and great support.796 
With the phrase homines non nobiles Cicero refers to his own career too, which was not 
                                                 
781
 Adamietz 1989. 19. 
782
 Cic. imp. Cn. Pomp. 6. 
783
 Cic. imp. Cn. Pomp. 42. 
784
 Cic. off. 2, 45. 
785
 Cic. off. 1, 74. 
786
 Cic. off. 1, 74. 
787
 Cic. off. 1, 77. 
788
 Cic. off. 1, 78. 
789
 Cic. Mur. 16. 
790
 Cic. Mur. 16. 
791
 Cic. Brut. 151. Nam et in isdem exercitationibus ineunte aetate fuimus et postea una Rhodum ille etiam 
profectus est, quo melior esset et doctior, et inde ut rediit, videtur mihi in secunda arte primus esse maluisse 
quam in prima secundus. 
792
 Cic. Mur. 18. 
793
 Cic. Mur. 35. 42. 
794
 Cic. Mur. 18.  
795
 Cic. Mur. 42. 
796
 Cic. Mur. 24.  
73 
 
unprecedented but highly rare as the six hundred consuls of the last three centuries of the 
Republic included only fifteen homines novi.797 
Gratia was sine qua non of Roman public life, which a politician had to have by all means 
among its adherents and the people,798 and was indispensable when obtaining an office.799 
Although today the means of obtaining gratia would be assigned to the scope of corruption,800 
Cicero also clearly distinguished gratia from fraud/bribery.801 Without this strong social 
intertwining several institutions of Roman law—for example mandatum, negotiorum gestio, 
commodatum—would have become inoperable,802 and if gratia and amicitia had not tied 
leading Roman circles together, then a much greater public administration apparatus would 
have been needed to govern the empire.803 Cicero points out that in jurisprudence none of 
these (gratia, amicitia, studium) can be found.804 It is, of course, questionable to what extent 
this statement can be considered Cicero’s own opinion and to what extent a necessity 
generated by this particular political situation. Beneficentia and liberalitas (just as gratia, 
amicitia and studium referred to in Pro Murena)805 are not purely ethical categories but also 
tools of success in public life.806 Once cultivating jurisprudence had become proper means to 
achieve that, the first men of the State held it in their possession, but in the troublesome 
present age it has lost its shining. The great jurist of the age means Servius Sulpicius Rufus; it 
is with him that the order of knights starts to enter the field of jurisprudence. So the statement 
that claims that jurisprudence does not provide proper background for acting in public was 
dictated only by the given political situation and not by Cicero’s own conviction. Similarly, 
the statement that by no means does a safe path lead from jurisprudence to consulate is only 
partly true.807 In 63 the res publica no longer lived in times when jurists often got to the top of 
cursus honorum. On the other hand, until 95 we know of eighteen lawyers who occupied 
consul’s office (Appius Claudius Caecus and Cornelius Scipio Nasica even twice); the twenty 
consulates so produced took place between 201—95.808 The next year after 95 in which the 
consul’s office was fulfilled by a jurist was 51, and the jurist was Servius Sulpicius Rufus.809 
Sulpicius’s failure in 63 was due to personal reasons too. Not being a quite determinant 
character he saw his competitors’ initial success, gave up fighting too early, and instead of 
working hard to achieve his own victory, he made efforts to come up with charges against the 
would-be winners.810 This tactics—in view of Murena’s popularity based on his activity as 
praetor, and the general fear from Catilina—as it were predestined Sulpicius to lose. 
When in 51—winning over Cato, who fought on his side in 63811—he finally attained 
consulate, he was not able to take firm and determinant actions in that highly stormy 
period.812 He died in 43 as an intermediary of peace in the civil war flaring up.813 Cicero 
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highly acknowledged the merits of Servius Sulpicius both in his life,814 and after his 
death815—he did not doubt his personal excellence in the Pro Murena either.816 He demanded 
public funeral ceremony and the erection of his statue before the rostra; both acts of paying 
last honours took place as Cicero requested.817 
Servius Sulpicius’s jurist activity deserved to be praised by Cicero since his life work was 
quite extensive and composite. He bequeathed a responsum collection consisting of one 
hundred and eighty books,818 which was made public by his disciples, Aufidius Namusa819 
and Alfenus Varus,820 and he is noted for the creation of three new genres. He was the one 
among the lawyers of the age of the Republic on whom the influence produced by Greek 
philosophy was the most manifest.821 His achievement in establishing a school is 
characterised by the fact that ten of his disciples are known.822 Cicero himself praised this 
method applied by Servius when walking on new roads in jurisprudence surpassing his 
predecessors,823 and pointed out that through his philosophical education he was able to create 
a coherent system often missed by Cicero from earlier jurisprudence. He completely broke 
with the traditions of the past; beside ius civile he cultivated ius praetorium with scientific 
demand; and extensively used the method of dialectic.824 
In the analysis of Cicero’s relation to jurisprudence we should dispense with the description 
of the literature of the subject area of Cicero iuris consultus, now accumulated to an immense 
extent. Following the system of Gábor Hamza’s825 analysis it seems to be more appropriate to 
look for an answer in the mirror of the sources to the question what role Cicero meant to 
assign to legal knowledge, jurisprudence in his own activity, rhetorical training and steering 
the ship of State. 
In his letter written to iuris consulti, citing examples of the technical elements of 
jurisprudence he uses the terms vos soletis826 and in vestris libris,827 i.e., clearly separates 
himself from those who pursue this craft in practice. It is with reason to attribute similar 
meaning to the phrases used in Topica—offered to and created at the urging of Trebatius828—
in vestris actionibus,829 and vestris mysteriis in Pro Murena,830 vestris formulis atque 
actionibus831 and vestrae exercitationi.832 Likewise, he proudly cites Gallus’s statement that 
the given topic is subject not to law but to the field of Cicero.833 In Digest several references 
are made to Cicero. In the fragments of Pomponius’s Enchiridion Cicero is quoted primarily 
as exemplum,834 and his sentences are of rhetorical-political weight rather than having legal 
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auctoritas.835 In Digest one can find quotations from non-legal authors at several points;836 
e.g., in Marcianus837 and Pomponius.838 Apart from Enchiridion, Cicero is quoted in Digest at 
four points,839 regarding each legal case in the aforesaid spirit. So these references do not 
prove that classic iuris consulti considered Cicero a collega.840 
All this, however, does not justify to handle Cicero as an alien body in jurisprudence, or to 
consider jurisprudence a field basically far from Cicero since the opinion. “Nihil hoc ad ius; 
ad Ciceronem” was indeed shared only by iuris consulti, and emphasises no more than 
pursuing law in practice, in the technical sense was alien to Cicero. Legal practice is, 
however, only one branch of iurisprudentia, its usefulness in everyday life does not provide 
evidence of its primate in an absolute sense. It is a fact, on the other hand, that during his 
whole life Cicero maintained a quite close relation with those who pursued jurisprudence in 
practice. He considered the two Scaevolae, the augur and the pontifex as two of his masters. 
In Laelius de amicitia he gives an account that after he had put on toga virilis, his father took 
him to Mucius Scaevola, the augur, and from then on he never leaved his side; then, after his 
death he went to pontifex Scaevola, whom he calls one of the most talented and most diligent 
men of the Roman State.841  
Furthermore, it is worth surveying what role or significance Cicero attributed to legal 
knowledge in orators’ training. In Cicero’s values eloquence definitely preceded 
jurisprudence, which is quite obvious from the statement he made regarding Servius Sulpicius 
Rufus that he wanted to be the first in the second science rather than the second in the first;842 
that is why he elected to pursue eloquence instead of jurisprudence. The field of jurisprudence 
is narrower than that of elocution, and due to its nature elocution is subtler than jurisprudence 
since a iuris consultus can act successfully without any knowledge of ars oratoria, but an 
orator cannot do without certain legal knowledge. Thus, orators’ training must include legal 
studies,843 as an orator—and specifically a perfectus orator defined in De oratore—may not 
despise any science since they are all associates and servants of an orator’s speech.844 
This formulation of this conclusion Cicero puts in the mouth of Crassus, his master, one of the 
protagonists of the dialogue in De oratore.845 He emphatically underlines the use of legal 
knowledge in the later stages of the dialogue too. In particular, by asserting that people would 
need to undertake the burden of studying, even if understanding law were a great and hard 
task, because of the great benefit that they can win by acquiring it, but in his view there is no 
science that could be more easily acquired than jurisprudence.846 In Brutus, when praising his 
only worthy, at that time already dead, opponent, colleague, Hortensius, Cicero underlines his 
legal knowledge;847 and in Pro L. Valerio Flacco he makes his opponent, who is not well 
versed in law, the target of scathing irony.848 Furthermore, he points out that for him—
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contrary to most of the orators—the knowledge of ius civile had always been very 
important.849 
As a summary of studiorum atque artium contentio it is possible to quote Quintilian’s opinion 
on the entire Pro Murena when he praises Cicero’s procedure stating that, albeit, he 
acknowledged all the merits of Sulpicius and praised him, yet advised him not to apply for the 
consulate.850 Cicero takes the edge of Sulpicius’s and Cato’s charges by the weapons of 
humour and irony. While doing so, to increase the comic effect aimed against lawyers he 
often uses Grecisms, proverbs, terms taken from legal jargon, quotations from (legis actio) 
procedure, and adds comments in standard language, in a chattering tone to them. On the 
contrary, when he turns to res militaris and eloquence, his style becomes ceremonially high-
flown. It is, however, quite apparent that a considerable part of his statements are rhetorical 
topoi, repetition of widespread critical comments regarding a specific occupational group (in 
this case lawyers)—of which several comments are made as righteous criticism. Praise is 
always addressed to the given person, Sulpicius, whereas carping affects only his occupation. 
In Pro Murena Cicero does not deny the general importance of jurisprudence and the law as a 
system of norms, the importance of the role they play in the life of the public and the State, 
but makes a (successful) attempt in a given—and as we have seen highly critical—political 
situation to avoid the Scylla of the condemnation of Murena and by that the flaring up of 
Catilina’s plot and the Charybdis of insulting alienation from his dear friend, Sulpicius. 
Throughout the speech he refrains from shaking the bases of law and order; his criticism 
remains on the surface; and this criticism—just as the praising of res militaris—is not 
inevitably Cicero’s own conviction but merely a necessity dictated by the oratorical situation. 
 
 
III. 2. Lawsuit of Cnaeus Plancius  
 
The speech in defence of Cnaeus Plancius was delivered in early autumn 54, immediately 
before or after the speech in defence of M. Aemilius Scaurus. Cn. Plancius won the office of 
aedil of the year 54 by winning the election, and, as it was not rare in Rome, his competitor, 
who lost in the election, M. Iuventius Laterensis charged him of election bribery/fraud. As co-
prosecutor L. Cassius Longinus took sides with him, defence was provided by Cicero (and as 
quite often Hortensius), who—as was his custom—rose to speak as the last one. The court of 
justice was chaired by C. Alfius Flavus, of whom—in spite of his people’s party affiliation—
Cicero made positive statements elsewhere. The close relation between Cicero and his 
defendant was highly influenced by the fact that Plancius, who acted in Macedonia as 
quaestor, gave shelter to the exiled politician, which was equal to saving his life in the 
orator’s interpretation. Cicero responds to the allegations of general significance made by the 
prosecution, in not too exhaustive details; however, he turns the attention from the accused 
and his acts to his own person, and the style of the speech here is elevated to hymn of 
gratitude addressed to his friend and saviour, Plancius, who stood by the orator-statesman 
from first to last even during his exile. As on several occasions earlier and later, he 
convincingly hammered the conviction into his audience that his voluntary and self-
sacrificing exile saved the people of Rome from terrible civil war and bloodshed, and he tried 
to clarify his relation with the triumvirs far from being free from contradictions, yet stylised 
into a harmonic relation in the given situation. By describing his exile and escape in vivid 
colours and presenting a stylised figure of Plancius as a heroic saviour, he aroused the 
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audience’s compassion with the accused in a pathetic peroratio—and not without impact 
since, as it is known, in the proceedings Plancius was acquitted. 
After brief description of the historical background of the lawsuit (III. 2. 1.), we analyse Pro 
Plancio more profoundly to investigate the rhetorical handling of the facts of the case, which 
will be compared to Pro Murena examined earlier at several points to ensure better 
understanding. (III. 2. 2.) Although the case was not one of the events that stirred huge 
political storms in the last century of the Republic, and so it was soon forgotten, it can be 
considered important among charges brought due to election bribery and lawsuits conducted 
on this subject to the extent that, after Pro Murena, Pro Plancio is the second—and the last—
speech delivered by Cicero in ambitus lawsuits that have been left to us, which provides us 
with the opportunity for profound and comparative analysis of the Ciceronian handing of the 
facts of the case that he usually applied in crimen ambitus. 
 
III. 2. 1. Historical background of Pro Plancio 
 
Cnaeus Plancius came from a family in the order of knights; he was born presumably in 96 as 
the son of an honourable and wealthy publican (tax farmer). After he acted as military tribune 
and quaestor, he applied for aedil’s office in 55, running together with Iuventius Laterensis, 
somewhat younger than him, as his opponent. At that time, he won the majority of the votes 
cast; however, the election was postponed, and was repeated in the following year.851 Plancius 
and A. Plotius won, Laterensis and Q. Pedius—the latter obtained very few votes—lost the 
election.852 Laterensis did what many people did in such a case in Rome: he brought a charge 
of ambitus, i.e., election fraud/bribery against Plancius. Beside Laterensis, L. Cassius 
Longinus, brother of one of Caesar’s later assassins, acted as co- or secondary accuser; the 
defence was provided by Hortensius and Cicero. As the basis of the charge he did not choose 
lex Tullia de ambitu created in 63 during the period of Cicero’s consulship but lex Licinia de 
sodaliciis created in 55 on Crassus’s initiative to sanction use of associations set up for 
distributing bribes during election campaigns. This law seemed to be more favourable to the 
prosecutor not because of its sanction—since earlier laws held out the prospect of properly 
strict punishment: ten year exile, expulsion from the senate, being barred from applying for 
offices for life and a certain fine—but because of its procedural law aspect. For, in accordance 
with this law, the prosecutor could determine the four tribus from whom the judges had to be 
selected and the accused could refuse only one tribus, that is, his right of reiectio—right to 
refer to bias and to expel certain judges without any special reason—was considerably 
impaired compared to usual quaestio proceedings. In the procedure, actually used in practice, 
first the accused had to name the judges whom he was related to by marriage and kinship or 
confidential relation as a member of the same sodalicium or collegium, in twenty days. Then, 
the prosecutor selected one hundred from among the four hundred and fifty judges (editio), 
who were not allowed to maintain the above-mentioned relations with the prosecutor; after 
that, as part of his right of reiectio, the accused was allowed to reject fifty from among the 
designated one hundred judges, within forty days.853 
Since it evolved in relation to winning the office of aedil and not consul, the lawsuit did not 
have great political significance; however, Cicero had to cope with a rather critical situation 
due to his personal relations with the accused and the accuser854 because both Plancius and 
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Laterensis and his family did significant services and favours to him during his exile.855 As he 
was more indebted to Plancius, whom he had supported during his election campaign already, 
due to the outstanding officium to him he had to undertake his defence.856 Laterensis 
obviously took it in bad part,857 and tried to lessen Plancius’s services done to and merits 
obtained regarding Cicero.858 It was not by chance that Cicero noted at the beginning of his 
speech that he hoped that in passing judgment the judges would appreciate the merits that 
Plancius obtained with regard to the one-time consul, all the more because the court of justice 
consisted of mostly Cicero’s friends and good acquaintances, which gave hopes for the 
acquittal of the accused from the first;859 it was just their emotions that the orator wanted to 
move in his860 peroratio formulated with huge pathos as usual. 
 
III. 2. 2. Contentio dignitatis and patronus’s auctoritas as rhetorical tactics  
 
To the best of our knowledge, Cicero acted as counsel for the defence at least on eight 
occasions in criminal actions due to ambitus, however, not all the speeches were published 
and only two of them have been left to us: the oratio delivered in 63 in defence of Lucius 
Licinius Murena elected consul and Cnaeus Plancius elected aedil in 54. It is striking in both 
lawsuits that Cicero deals with the state of facts of ambitus and tries to refute the allegations 
made by the prosecution in merely one-fourth861 and one-fifth862—or, in the latter case, stricto 
sensu, one-twentieth863—of the oratio. This similarity allows to infer that what we have here 
is a rhetorical tactics independent of the specific case, which the judges and the audience 
actually expected the advocate to come up with in ambitus lawsuits.864 It might also arouse 
the attention that in both speeches Cicero speaks about himself at length, which is not justified 
by the legal facts of the case at all. The explanation for this is found in the practice of Roman 
orators/advocates as in Rome it was not only his rhetorical competence but his entire authority 
that an advocate or a patron made available to the accused or client brought before court and 
thereby guaranteed the authenticity of the case undertaken and the person defended, by full 
weight of his personality to the judges—what is more, he identified himself with his acts and 
fate.865 Accordingly, the opponent, as a matter of fact, worked towards attacking and shaking 
the authenticity of both the accused and his defending counsel; therefore, in the two particular 
cases the prosecution considered it necessary to speak exhaustively about Cicero too. This 
custom can be seen again, for example, in Pro Cluentio866 and is explained in De oratore.867 
In Pro Murena, the orator feels it necessary in the prooemium already to respond to 
reproaches against him for having undertaken the case at all.868 As one of the four accusers, 
beside Servius Sulpicius Rufus, who lost the elections, and S. Sulpicius Rufus junior and C. 
Postumius, not known specifically, M. Porcius Cato—who took an oath in public before the 
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elections that if the election would be won by any other person than his brother-in-law, 
Silanus, he would bring a charge of ambitus against him869—criticised Cicero (although as a 
consul he created lex Tullia de ambitu870 which held out the prospect of ten year exile as a 
new punishment and took firmer action against those who distributed money) for having 
undertaken the defence of Murena charged of election bribery. Cicero was highly criticised 
also by Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the most significant jurist of the age, who considered 
Murena’s defence a betrayal of their friendship. All this was meant to undermine the 
authenticity of Cicero as a defending counsel, which would have weakened his defendant’s 
position too.871 
In Pro Plancio, Cicero notes that in their statement for the prosecution M. Iuventius 
Laterensis and L. Cassius Longinus spoke more about him than about Plancius;872 
accordingly, in the third third of his speech Cicero discusses solely his own person and the 
services and favours done to him by Plancius.873 Several allegations of the prosecutors were 
involved in the statement of the defence in the form of remarks; for example, the allegation 
that in the description of his own exile Cicero went too far in praising Plancius’s merits.874 
The merits obtained by the accused with regard to the defending counsel are described in 
details not only in Pro Plancio:875 Pro Sestio also contains longer arguments with such 
content.876 Obviously, the prosecutors’ intention must have been to separate Plancius 
completely from the judges’ sympathy towards Cicero owing to his exile, that is why 
Laterensis insisted on his allegation that the merits Plancius had obtained regarding Cicero’s 
exile—if they were true at all—should not have any weight in the Judges’ eyes.877 In harmony 
with that, the prosecutors recalled scornfully that Cicero had begged in tears to the judges in 
vain in defence of Cispius, who also did several services to him.878 
The rather trivial commonplaces brought up as argument by Laterensis included the point that 
Cicero had earlier as a consul caused to involve exile in the sanctions ordered by lex Tullia de 
ambitu for no other reason than to be able to make the peroratio of his defence speeches more 
efficient.879 Also, he reproaches the orator for his years of study on Rhodes in order to point 
out that the moral looseness of eastern provinces must have been dear to Cicero.880 It is rather 
double-edged criticism by the prosecutor that Cicero failed to exploit the point inherent in 
Laterensis’s stay on Crete: the play on the words island and chalk (creta).881 For applicants 
for offices made their clothes more shining and white by chalk, which was prohibited by law 
very early, in 432.882 Furthermore, he condemns Cicero for addressing a letter on his 
consulate to Pompey, the commander, probably with unpleasant content, highly stressing his 
own merits, which circulated in Rome—we have no further information on its content as it 
has not been left to us.883 Similarly, he criticises Cicero’s decision that he had gone into exile 
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instead of undertaking fight—attributing all this to Cicero’s cowardice.884 He does not omit to 
emphasise that Cicero is not acting by free will at the time when the speech is delivered 
either—suggesting dependence on Pompey.885 All this, although has nothing to do with the 
facts of the case, served to undermine the authority of the defending counsel and thereby the 
authority of his defendant.886 
The personal motivation of the prosecution is clear since in Rome a prosecutor did not have to 
be objective and unbiased at all.887 In the charge of ambitus the accusers who had lost the 
elections might have been driven by the motive that if the accused elected for the given office 
were convicted, they could take their place888 as it did happen in 65 in the case of L. Aurelius 
Cotta and T. Manilius Torquatus after P. Cornelius Sulla and P. Autronius Paetus elected 
consul had been convicted. There were good chances for Servius Suplicius Rufus and Marcus 
Iuventius Laterensis hoping for the same in the event that Murena and Plancius were 
convicted. Anyone who decided to bring a charge, as a matter of fact, exposed himself to 
personal attack by the defending counsel.889 It was not by chance that Torquatus referred to 
Cicero’s tyranny and autocracy (regnum) in court of justice in the lawsuit against Sulla890 as 
Cicero was not sparing with attacks against the prosecutor, tribune L. Labienus in Pro Rabirio 
perduellionis.891 
The attacks against Cicero were of great weight in the Plancius lawsuit and in several cases 
hit Cicero in sensitive points: Cassius brought up Cicero’s attempt at entering into alliance 
with Pompey, which, however, failed,892 Iuventius reproached Cicero for undertaking 
Cispius’s defence, and in connection with that he parodied the famous “quo usquem tandem” 
passage893 of the first Catilinarian oration;894 similarly, they ridiculed his pathetic 
perorations.895 All this, however, was dwarfed by their suspecting him of leaving Rome in 58 
and going into exile out of cowardice and sacrificing his freedom to flatter the triumvirs—the 
orator responded to it in natural and deep indignation.896 Briefly but resolutely, he attacked his 
enemies at the time, Clodius, Gabinius and Piso.897 
Furthermore, in both lawsuits against Murena and Plancius, Cicero had to cope with the 
difficulty that the adverse parties in the lawsuit, that is, the prosecutors, were his good friends. 
He supported Sulpicius in his election struggles, and maintained relations with Labienus’s 
family since his exile, however, Murena’s acquittal was definitely in the interest of the State 
because that was the only way to ensure that at the beginning of the year two dynamic consuls 
could take over control over the state organisation undermined by the conspiracy, and it is an 
undeniable fact that Plancius did much greater service to Cicero by providing him with shelter 
in Thessaloniki than Labienus’s family. Therefore, the orator could not use the well-tried 
strategy of stressing his defendant’s merits by dealing the opponent a devastating blow; 
instead, he had to find some middle-of-the-road solution by which he could both clear the 
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accused and was not compelled to start a serious attack against the prosecutor.898 It was not by 
chance that Quintilian noted that in Pro Murena Cicero acknowledged Sulpicius’s all virtues 
and although he praised him, he advised him not to apply for consulate.899  
The fundamentum ac robur totius accusationis,900 that is, the attack against Cato was justified 
just by the unquestionableness of his motifs and singular authority. It was just this authority 
that made the senators at the session of the senate held a few days after Pro Murena was 
delivered, on 5 December 63, in the Concordia temple901 join what Cicero summed up in the 
fourth Catilinarian oration, in opposition to Caesar, who proposed life imprisonment of the 
conspirators,902 after Cato had also demanded death penalty for the traitors,903 which was 
executed that evening in Tullianum. It was just this that Cicero tries to defend against in his 
ironic attack against Cato’s cold stoicism so that the statesman’s unbelievable authority, that 
is, purely his name should not be detrimental to the accused.904 Acknowledging Cato’s moral 
greatness, he endeavours to present his standpoint taken in the particular matter as a trait alien 
to life, alien to the spirit of Roman people in order to take the edge of the charge and ruin the 
image in the judges that anyone Cato has resolved to bring a charge against must be by all 
means guilty.905 It is not by chance that the edited version of Pro Murena left to us does not 
contain detailed refutation of the charges made by Servius Sulpicius junior and Postumus—as 
the arguments brought up by them were not backed by moral authority similar to that of Cato, 
Cicero was not compelled to take the sting out of their argument by delicate shading.906 
In legal terms, it does not belong to the charge and its refutation either to compare the life and 
activity of the competitors, having lost in the election struggle, acting as accusers in the 
ambitus lawsuit, to that of the winners of the election, the accused parties of the lawsuit. 
Cicero, however, in response to the allegations of the prosecution, touches on the conduct of 
life of the accused parties (reprehensio vitae),907 the comparison of the eligibility, authority 
and worthiness of the office of the accused parties having won and the accusers having lost in 
the elections (contentio dignitatis).908 Only after that does he deal with the crime of election 
bribery/fraud rather briefly and try to refute the relevant charges (crimina ambitus)—in the 
case of Pro Murena, also by inserting, before the fact-based, yet rather taciturn and not really 
convincing refutation,909 the response to the motifs of the charges brought up by Cato.910 
The examination of the conduct of life of the accused parties (vita anteacta) is of a highly 
critical tone in the statement of the prosecution in both cases. Cato reproached Murena for his 
stay in Asia and the presumption that he took pleasure in eastern luxury,911 his sympathy for 
dancing, which was not worthy of a free Roman citizen in the eyes of the Romans912—
however, none of these criticisms was connected with the crime of ambitus. The prosecutors 
reproached Plancius for the charge of bigamy, ravishing an actress, Atinia,913 releasing a 
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prisoner from prison unlawfully914 and the too resolute action taken by his father, Plancius 
senior for the sake of publicans (publicani).915 These allegations were not connected either 
directly or indirectly with the actual charge, ambitus. However, accumulation of charges not 
supported by facts—more exactly, as Cicero often stressed it: abusive language and 
defamation—was general practice in any lawsuit, not just ambitus lawsuits, as a tool of 
influencing the climate of opinion against the accused.916 
In ambitus lawsuits it was traditional to compare the competitors’ dignity, eligibility for office 
(contentio dignitatis) both by the prosecution and the defence. In Pro Murena this constitutes 
a rather lengthy, independent part;917 in Pro Plancio—referring to the sensitivity of just the 
accuser, Laterensis918—Cicero rejects the use of this tool;919 later on, however, albeit, 
emphatically in response to Crassus’s counts of the indictment, he uses them anyway.920 By 
all that, the defending counsel tries to achieve a double result: on the one hand, he wants to 
prove his defendant’s high eligibility for the office to be filled; on the other hand, he explains 
the causes of his election victory. Simultaneously, he gives explanation for the accuser’s 
election defeat, arguing that it was due to the defeated party’s fault and not to his defendant’s 
acts, even less to possible bribe.921 Accordingly, in the part of Pro Murena that can be called 
contentio dignitatis, discussion of Sulpicius’s defeat was given an important place too,922 and 
in Pro Plancio it is after the seeming rejection of the opportunity of contentio923 that the 
orator comes to Laterensis’s election defeat on two occasions.924 The structure of contentio is 
identical in both speeches: Cicero discusses the career of the competitors in chronological 
order.925 
In Pro Murena, in response to Sulpicius’s argument that he outdoes Murena in social 
background, the orator underlines the significance of individual achievements,926 and to the 
fact that he was announced first in the election of the quaestor he opposes the point that what 
must and can be investigated on the merits is nothing else than the achievements attained in 
office filled in the same year—and in this respect none of them excelled.927 In response to 
Suplicius’s argument that he would have been more worthy of consul’s office because he 
stayed in Rome from first to last, while Murena stayed in the east as commander, Cicero 
points out that it is not presence but merits that count.928 At this point, in studiorum atque 
artium contentio, the orator opposes soldier’s activity to lawyer’s activity and involves the art 
of rhetoric as a third element in the comparison, and this way jurisprudence as a profession 
dealing with unnecessarily overcomplicated, insignificant matters is given the third place 
only.929 Praise of res militaris is a response to Cato’s criticism that Murena’s merits as 
commander are insignificant, if for no other reason, because the war in Asia was fought 
against women and not men.930 Cicero beats off the argument of victory obtained in the first 
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place in the election of praetors by the topos of the unpredictableness of public opinion,931 and 
underlines the magnificence of the games arranged by Murena, and opposes it to the fact that 
Sulpicius had not arranged any.932 
Furthermore, Cicero emphasises that the electors appreciated Murena’s role fulfilled in 
administration of justice, contrary to the severity engaged by Sulpicius in this respect, which 
arose from the nature of the field he controlled, and that the commander’s activity in the 
provinces also provided him with great support, whereas the jurist was not willing to assume 
any task outside Rome.933 After discussing the causes of Murena’s victory, he comes to the 
direct causes of Sulpicius’s defeat. Electors clearly noticed that Sulpicius did not strive for 
winning the elections in the first place, instead, he dealt with the opportunity of bringing a 
charge in case he would lose and collecting evidence against his rivals, which suggested that 
he did not see many chances for victory.934 Furthermore, he fought for making lex Calpurnia, 
which sanctioned ambitus, stricter, and in this effort he was supported by Cicero as consul and 
friend by creating lex Tullia de ambitu—yet, this had not made him sympathetic to electors 
either.935 Finally, the critical political situation, i.e., general fear of Catilina’s possible victory, 
favoured Murena, whom citizens considered a firm support against threatening danger, while 
they did not presume that the anxious and hesitating Sulpicius would take such a firm 
action.936 To sum it up: Cicero took the position that Murena’s victory arose from his own 
excellence and the faults made by his rival, Sulpicius but by no means from unlawful 
practices and bribery.937 
In the Plancius lawsuit Cassius criticised and condemned Cicero’s defendant,938 while he 
appreciated Laterensis’s merits and competencies.939 Whereas the opponent underlined 
Laterensis’s nobilitas and deemed him worthy of the aedil’s office owing to his social 
background, Cicero (just as Plancius in Murena’s lawsuit) emphasised individual virtus, 
merits, aptitude in the case of homo novus.940 A homo novus, in other words, a person whose 
ancestors did not get higher offices (cursus honorum), was in certain respects in a 
disadvantageous position in the struggle for winning given offices compared to the members 
of the nobility because the latter could proudly refer to their ancestors’ deeds carried out for 
the benefit and greatness of the people of Rome. The homines novi who achieved the highest 
degree of public dignity, in several cases—as it can be observed in the example of Cato the 
Elder or Cicero—followed ancient ideals more consistently and, one should say, with 
neophyte enthusiasm. Prior to Cicero, it was in 94 when a homo novus, more specifically, C. 
Coelius Caldus, was elected consul. At the same time, Cicero—in order to win the people’s 
support and make advantage out of disadvantage—voiced the rather populist view that 
members of the nobility handled the consul’s office as their own privilege, and proudly 
emphasised his own merits, by which he was able to get the highest dignity of the State even 
against the nobility.941 
Anyway, regarding Laterensis he used the tools of humanitas and urbanitas as the accuser did 
not belong to his personal enemies.942 In the case of Plancius, Cassius challenged lack of 
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triumphuses, military achievements, rhetorical and jurist competencies—that is, there are 
good chances that he used the arguments that Cicero formulated in Pro Murena with regard to 
various professions. In response, Cicero as defending counsel expounded that the opportunity 
of triumphs would become available, for that matter, through holding given offices, and that 
by his activity on Crete and in Macedonia he did prove his military aptitude, and that he had 
never claimed to have knowledge obtained in rhetoric and jurisprudence, instead, he could 
show prominence in character, which was much more appreciated by the people of Rome than 
professional knowledge.943 At the same time, Cicero lessens the weight of Laterensis’s merits 
obtained in Cyrene also to his detriment by an ironical dialogue narrated in relation to his 
activity as proquaestor in Sicily, with the morals that Laterensis would believe in vain that he 
had carried out significant deeds in remote provinces, the public might have not even heard of 
his being away from Rome.944 
To take care of the sensitivity of the opponent who otherwise maintained good relations with 
him, Cicero discusses the reasons for Laterensis’s election defeat separately from contentio 
dignitatis,945 and gets down with it primarily by the topos of the unpredictableness of public 
opinion and unreliability of public judgment.946 The tricks of winning mercy of the people 
were discussed in details by his brother, Quintus in Commentariolum petitionis where he 
expounded that applicants should formulate what they have got to say in accordance with 
electors’ desires and needs rather than their own conviction, and pointed out that promises 
made kindly are more important than keeping such promises.947 Apparently, it was just this 
that Plancius forgot about, and before the court of justice consisting of senators and knights 
Cicero could safely refer to the shaky and unreliable value judgment of the people,948 and, to 
completely reduce the edge of the attack against Laterensis, he declared that if the people had 
had firm conviction, had orientated themselves in terms of merits and values in forming their 
opinion, then they would have elected Laterensis aedil.949 
The people blamed Laterensis for not making efforts to win their favour and for relying on the 
advantages provided by his social background only in winning the election.950 Similarly, 
giving up the fight for tribune’s office already commenced in 59 was to his detriment because 
the public considered it indifference,951 and asserting his high-born origin might have evoked 
antipathy instead of sympathy in the plebs.952 Later on, Cicero returns again to the thought 
that Laterensis’s defeat was caused by lack of humbleness to be engaged to the mercy of the 
people (supplicare, se submittere).953 The consequences of Laterensis’s faults were increased 
by the circumstances that supported Plancius: the support of his home town,954 the 
commitment of publicans ranged on his side by his father, the leader of the publicans,955 and 
Cicero’s help, who thereby thanked Plancius for the favours he had done to him during his 
exile.956 Furthermore, his activity in Africa, on Crete and in Macedonia,957 and his successful 
tribune’s activity was in favour of Plancius.958 
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It should be noted with regard to publicans that they made it possible that state administration 
with a low headcount had to be maintained in Rome because well-to-do publicani, most often 
from the order of knights, constituted a company for the economic implementation of 
important goals in the life of the State (for example, construction of water pipes, providing the 
army with arms). The late age of the Republic used the terms knights and publicans often as 
synonyms; however, overlapping between the two categories by no means meant identity: 
some publicans had assets between forty thousand and one hundred thousand sestertii, while 
the extent of knights’ census was set as four hundred thousand sestertii. In the company of 
publicans the members assumed burdens and shared benefits in proportion to their share; the 
most propertied were accountable to the State for implementing the enterprise usually by their 
landed estate; on behalf of the State the magistrate entered into a contract with them. The key 
task of publicans was their role assumed in taxation in the provinces: they paid the amount of 
tax determined for the given province to the state treasury in advance, and on the leased 
territory during the lease period they could freely collect the amount they had paid in advance. 
The governors, as a matter of fact, often abused their position and imposed unlawful burdens 
on provinces; so, inhabitants were compelled to take out loans from publicans, who usually 
disbursed the amount demanded at usurious interest rates. Accordingly, judgement of 
publicans was disputed; in his letter to his brother—as a matter of fact, in a statement not 
addressed to the general public—Cicero himself called them the greatest burden of provincial 
administration.959 In several cases publicans supported the election of persons favourable to 
them by covering a major part of their campaign costs—it was not by chance that Cicero’s 
brother, Quintus tried to convince him that he should win publicans’ benevolence to support 
his own consul campaign.960 Cicero called publicans the flower of the order of knights of 
Rome,961 the knights themselves strong support of the rest of the orders.962 C. Gracchus 
already relied on knights actually as an order, and entrusted Asia province to them as 
publicans. 
In Pro Plancio a peculiar element of contentio dignitatis is the projection of the personality of 
the two candidates to their hometown, Tusculum in the case of Laterensis and Atina in the 
case of Plancius. Tusculum was a distinguished settlement south-east of Rome, where several 
consuls’ families came from. Therefore, it is understandable that the inhabitants of 
Tusculum—as numerous men who had held consulship lived in the town—did not attribute 
special significance to Laterensis’s aedil’s office; consequently, they did not make many 
efforts to help him to win the desired office. Atina, lying not far from Cicero’s hometown, 
Arpinum, was far from being so respectful and notable; so, its inhabitants made more efforts 
to help one of the citizens born at their settlement to win the aedil’s office since thus glory fell 
on them too, which the inhabitants of Tusculum had plenty of.963 
Therefore, by contentio dignitatis Cicero tried to shed light primarily on the fact in both 
speeches—by analysing both the virtues and strengths of the winner/accused and the faults 
and failures of the loser/accuser—that his defendants had not been in need at all of trying to 
influence the outcome of the election by bribery as there were sufficient arguments that made 
them sure of their victory. Thereby he indirectly proved that the charge of ambitus was 
unfounded. Secondly, however, contentio dignitatis served to enable him to prove to the 
judges, as public opinion representing electors, that the winner of the election was by all 
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means more suitable for the given office than his opponent—the enumeration of faults and 
failures committed during the election campaign was also meant to support the above as 
reasons for the train of thoughts that a person who controls his election campaign with more 
aptitude will hold the office more efficiently. Based on all that it can be inferred that the 
orator wanted to convince the judges also of the point that not only should the winner be 
acquitted for lack of crime but the results of the elections should not be invalidated due to the 
person’s eligibility and the accuser’s ineligibility either.964 
Refutation of the charge of ambitus on the merits is very short, almost insufficiently concise 
in both speeches.965 The reason for that can be looked for, on the one hand, in the fact that 
from both lawsuits only Cicero’s speeches have been left to us, so neither the statements of 
the prosecution, nor the rest of defence speeches are known to us, and as in both lawsuits 
Cicero rose to speak as the last one as was his custom, we could presume that the defending 
counsels taking the floor before him had already refuted the legally relevant counts of the 
indictment on the merits of the case, point by point. At the same time, it can be presumed that 
Cicero would have somehow referred or alluded to these refutations—however, no traces of 
that can be found. It is highly probable that both the prosecution and the defence set out from 
arguments related to person, and counts of the indictment that could be specifically supported 
and refuted did not play any considerable part—if for nothing else, due to the low number of 
proofs arising from the character of the cases. Defending counsels much rather tried to 
prove—all the more because the dividing line between ambitus sanctioned by law and morally 
contestable and legally acceptable ambitio could not be sharply drawn—that in the course of 
winning the electors’ favours no scandalous, exaggerating steps contrary to traditions and 
customs were taken.966 Due to the indistinct dividing line between ambitus and ambitio we 
can possibly accept Wilhelm Kroll’s statement that these Ciceronian speeches can be 
considered, for that matter, praise of properly and moderately exercised ambitus too.967 
In Pro Murena Cicero argued that whereas Cato disapproved any kind of search for electors’ 
favours, that is, entourage, hospitality and distribution of free tickets to circus and theatre 
performances, Murena, in the course of all these steps, took care of complying with and 
respecting generally accepted customs to sufficient extent: he recruited entourage not for 
money and theatre seats and feasts were made possible by his friends’ generosity, which was 
not prohibited by law or unwritten law either.968 In Pro Plancio he could simply respond to 
the charge that Plancius entered into coitio, that is, alliance allowed by law with the other 
winning candidate, Plotius: originally it was Laterensis who wanted to enter into alliance with 
Plancius, however, it failed. At this point, it is possible to presume the cause behind the 
argument of the prosecution: it was not Laterensis that the agreement set out in the coitio 
favoured.969 The circumstances of distributing money in Circus Flaminius, the origin and 
function of the money could not be determined exactly and could not be proved, so this 
charge seemed to be weightless too970—at least in Cicero’s narrative. And for lack of proper 
evidence, Cicero could easily consider all the other statements gossip and defamation.971 
Thus, based on all that, Plancius did not amount to the state of facts of lex Licinia, and 
demanding the application of this law was nothing else than a bad faith manoeuvre from the 
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first by the prosecution to make the situation of the accused more difficult.972 The provision of 
lex Licinia that set forth that the prosecution could designate four tribus, of which the judges 
were selected, was used by Laterensis contrary to the spirit of the law,973 since he left out just 
the Voltinia district where bribes had purportedly taken place, and whose judges for this 
reason could have judged the case with greater overview—Cicero’s above opinion was 
obviously shared by Hortensius too, who expounded it in his own defence speech on the day 
before Cicero’s oration was delivered.974 It was undoubtedly impossible to prove Plancius 
guilty of communis ambitus because this would have required to certify that distribution of 
money was carried out in an organised form, directly launched by the candidate—in other 
words, gratia and observantia of allowed extent only helped Plancius on the side of his 
friends and supporters.975 
Basically, Pro Murena and Pro Plancio are made of identical elements, although the elements 
are arranged somewhat differently. Both the prosecution criticises the defending counsel, 
Cicero and Cicero resolutely criticises and attacks the accusers, Cato, Suplicius and 
Laterensis, not sparing sarcasm. On the one hand, the prosecution endeavours to make the 
person of the accused, having won the elections, inauthentic during reprehensio vitae, and 
thereby support the necessity of ambitus. On the other hand, the defence tries to prove 
ineligibility of the defeated accuser through contentio dignitatis to convince the judges 
thereby that the losing party can reproach nobody else than himself for his defeat, and for this 
reason the winner had not only not committed any fraud or bribery during the election 
campaign, but he was not in need of it either. It clearly explains this tactics when we consider 
that in case the winner was convicted, then the loser placed behind obtained the office that 
constituted the subject of the dispute; that is, if the counts of the indictment proved true, it 
guaranteed, in addition to conviction and punishment of the accused, that the accuser, having 
lost the elections, could win the office not obtained by votes. The fact-based refutation of 
crimina ambitus crowned this argument only but had no exclusive value for the outcome of 
the lawsuit, all the less as the judgment in the action-at-law unambiguously contained a 
political decision too. The jurors voted not only on guilt and innocence but on the fate of the 
office to be fulfilled; therefore, their vote was influenced, in addition to the case of ambitus, 
by their conviction developed of the eligibility of the accuser and the accused, that is, the 
parties opposed as competitors in the election struggle.976 
In both cases the orator builds his statement by combining these elements in accordance with 
the circumstances. In the prooemium of Pro Murena he immediately responds to the 
objections of the prosecution that are aimed at Cicero undertaking the defending counsel’s 
tasks as a consul in office and thereby betraying his friendship maintained with Sulpicius,977 
and in the peroratio he uses the dignity of his office as a weapon that can be used for the sake 
of his defendant.978 Before addressing specific charges, he believes it is useful to convince the 
judges that Murena’s conduct of life is irreproachable and he is eligible for the office,979 
which he emphasises in a lengthy contentio dignitatis in an enlarged form by stressing 
Murena’s merits and questioning Sulpicius’s aptitude, and by underlining the faults and 
failures made by him during the election campaign.980 The attack against Cato, cast in 
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humorous form, takes the edge of the charges, by which he presents the objections brought up 
against Murena as the outcome of the philosopher-statesman’s too anxious conscience and 
approach alien to life.981 Emphasis of the imminence by Catilina—which Suplicius, otherwise 
having excellent traits and values deserving acknowledgement by all means from a human 
viewpoint, would not be able to efficiently oppose—reinforces Murena’s position. So, Cicero 
as a consul defends his elected successor in office—as the verdict of acquittal shows—
successfully, and the defence rests on three pillars: Murena’s aptitude, Sulpicius’s ineligibility 
and failures, and realistic recognition of the dangers of the situation in current politics. 
In Plancius’s lawsuit the prosecution also started a co-ordinated attack against the counsel for 
the defence and former consul, Cicero because the accusers believed that they could achieve 
their goal against Plancius only by weakening Cicero. Accordingly, Cicero highlights 
Plancius’s merits and services by which he supported him during his exile, in the prooemium 
already, and builds the entire third part of the speech: the refutation of the charges made by 
Cassius982 and Laterensis983 and the peroratio984 on them. Thus, the significance of the 
identity of the defending counsel far surpasses that of his defendant in this case too, and it can 
be stated that Plancius’s acquittal was owing almost exclusively to Cicero’s moral weight, 
independently of the acts and failures of the accused. From among contentio dignitatis and 
exploration of the causes of Laterensis’s election defeat, first, the second element appears,985 
on the one hand, to take care of Laterensis’s sensitivity, and, on the other hand, to reduce his 
accuser’s drive by enumerating the faults committed. Only after that comes Cicero to clearing 
his defendant’s conduct of life,986 as it were forcing the accuser into defence position, because 
he—according to Cicero’s argument—attacked Plancius by distorting the provisions of lex 
Licinia de sodaliciis, that is, in unfair manner.987 This tactics highly reminds one of the 
criticism against Cato—Cicero strives to convince the judges that the prosecutors’ action, 
although it might seem to be lawful, is by all means seriously unfair. Laterensis’s accuser’s 
position could have been by no means strengthened by the somewhat condescending, 
patronising encouragement by which Cicero urged him not to give up hope: successes in 
public life will certainly not keep him waiting in the future if he learns a lesson from his faults 
and takes the advice he has just received.988 After having properly prepared the field, the 
orator refutes the actual charge of ambitus by lapidary conciseness, all the more because—as 
Cicero argues henceforth in the contentio dignitatis—Plancius’s favourable opportunities and 
aptitude, and the support provided by him, among others, to him as exiled former consul,989 
made it unjustified from the first for his defendant to use unlawful tools.990 
From the Ciceronian practice of ambitus lawsuits it can be unambiguously ascertained that the 
judgment and, as its antecedents, the role of the prosecution and the defence orientated itself 
primarily in terms of political aspects. The party who brought the charge was often a 
competitor beaten in the elections, who could not only expect the proceedings to impose 
sanctions on unlawful practices through the conviction of his one-time competitor, the 
accused in the lawsuit, but, based on Roman practice, could certainly count also on obtaining 
the office that he had not been able to obtain by winning the electors over, as a benefit of the 
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lawsuit. Consequently, when deciding the issue of guilt or innocence, the judges deliberated 
the past, conduct of life of the accuser and the accused, i.e., the winner and loser of the 
elections, the necessities demanded by the situation of current politics, the eligibility of the 
parties concerned and—as Pro Murena and Pro Plancio convincingly proves it—the political 
weight of the patron who took action for the sake of the accused.991 
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IV. Crimes of violence (Pro Caelio, Pro Sestio, Pro Milone) 
 
 
IV. 1. Lawsuit of Marcus Caelius Rufus 
 
Cicero delivered his speech in defence of Marcus Caelius Rufus charged de vi, on 4 April 56, 
on the first day of the Ludi Megalenses. Pro Caelio represents a highly important stage in 
Cicero’s fight with Clodius (and his clan), which fight produced significant, sometimes fatal 
impact on the great orator’s life and thereby on the political events of the end of the Republic. 
The first stage of the hostile relation can be dated to 73 when Clodius dealt a heavy blow on 
Terentia, Cicero’s wife through accusing the Vesta priestess, Fabia, Terentia’s half-sister of 
incestum. Among others, this was the injury that Cicero wanted to take revenge for in 61 
(partly encouraged by his wife Terentia) by his testimony made against Clodius in the Bona 
Dea trial, which, however, due to the fact that Clodius was acquitted, ended with a result not 
meant to be achieved. In return, Clodius responded by urging Cicero’s expulsion in 58 and the 
destruction of his house on the Palatine. In 56, as a result of peculiar coincidence of political 
and private relations, Cicero was given the opportunity to deal a heavy blow on Clodia, 
Clodius’s elder sister in his Pro Caelio, whom he mocked in the trial with murderous humour 
using the means of Roman theatre, especially of comedy, and, thus, arranged a peculiar 
theatre performance during the Megalensia, which served as the time of the Ludi scaenici. 
Albeit, it does not belong to the history of the Pro Caelio to be investigated here, we mention 
that as the last stage of the hostile relation Cicero defended Milo in 52, who killed Clodius in 
a street fight.  
After outlining the background of the Bona Dea case that sowed the seeds of the conflict 
between Cicero and the gens Clodia (IV. 1. 1.) and the circumstances and historical 
background of the lawsuit (IV. 1. 2.), we analyse the rhetoric situation provided by the Ludi 
Megalenses and genially exploited by Cicero (IV. 1. 3.) and the orator’s tactics applied in the 
speech in defence of Caelius (IV. 1. 4.). 
IV. 1. 1. A Bona Dea scandal—beginnings of the fight between Cicero and Clodius 
 
The development of the hostile relation between Cicero and P. Clodius as well as his elder 
sister, Clodia cannot be understood without being aware of Cicero’s testimony made in the so-
called Bona Dea trial and the causes that made him do that. It was at the beginning of 
December 62 when highborn women of Rome, including the virginesVestales, celebrated the 
festival of Bona Dea at the house of the pontifex maximus, Caesar. The name of Bona Dea is 
direct translation of the Greek Agathē Theos, who became generally known as a healing 
goddess;992 based on the inscription referring to her993 and the representations from Attica we 
are discussing here a figure of Hygeia.994 This ritual was held in Rome at the house of a 
magistratus cum imperio,995 and only the matronae of the ruling class and Vesta priestesses996 
were allowed to take part in it.997 The festivity was led by the wife of the magistrate, so, Bona 
Dea did not have a priestess of her own.998 With respect to the present case, it is of special 
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importance that every male being, be it human or animal, was strictly excluded from the 
ritual. 
No exact picture regarding each detail is provided by historical sources999 on what happened 
during this night; the following, however, can be established with acceptable certainty: 
Clodius somehow found his way into the house (Plutarch claims that he found the door open 
and that is how he entered). He pretended to be disguised as a woman with a harp1000 but the 
assertion made by Plutarch and Appian that disguising was greatly facilitated by him not 
being compelled yet to shave in those days is false; they simply forget about the fact that at 
the time of the Bona Dea scandal Clodius was already twenty-nine/thirty years old. Dio 
Cassius claims that his purpose was to seduce Caesar’s wife, Pompeia (which did happen as 
Dio Cassius asserts), but that is not certain at all. Anyway, the ritual was led by Caesar’s 
mother: Aurelia and not by Pompeia.1001 The disturbed festivity was later repeated by Vesta 
priestesses (instauratio).1002 
In the senate the Bona Dea scandal was first put forth by Q. Cornificius, and the body referred 
it to the Vesta priestesses and the pontifices, who held a session under the chairmanship of the 
pontifex maximus, Caesar.1003 In addition to Caesar, this body included one more member 
who played a part in the later trial: L. Cornelius Lentulus Niger, who fulfilled the dignity of 
flamen Martialis.1004 The senate received a report stating that the disturbance of the Bona Dea 
ritual was deemed nefas. After this report, albeit, before the trial, Caesar divorced his wife and 
announced that he would not be willing to appear in court as a witness—thereby reassuring 
Clodius that there had been no break in the friendship they had entertained.1005 The motifs of 
Caesar’s behaviour have remained a mystery; it cannot be cleared up whether he did not want 
to release Clodius, as a significant tool of his politics, from his hands, or he believed that the 
dignity of pontifex maximus required that in a situation like that he should divorce his wife, 
not suspected of any serious acts. 
The senate accepted the report, and resolved to set up a special venue of jurisdiction in order 
for it to investigate the incestum committed by Clodius.1006 The members of the court of 
justice were not elected from album iudicum by drawing lots—as it was customary in the 
quaestiones—instead, the chairing praetor selected the participants from specific persons, 
which enhanced the suspicion that the judges must have been prejudiced against Clodius right 
from the first.1007 For this reason, tribune Fufius Calenus vetoed the charge submitted by M. 
Piso.1008 The matter was delivered to the public, from among Clodius’s opponents three 
persons—Cato, Favonius and Hortensius—took firm action quite resolutely. Then, the senate 
was convened again, and having put down Fufius Calenus’s resistance they decided to 
proceed in the form originally planned—it was this fact on which Cicero informed Atticus on 
13 February.1009 At the next session of the senate Fufius made two proposals: first, regarding 
the point that the trial on Clodius’s case should be held; secondly, that the judges should be 
appointed by drawing lots.1010 The first proposal was accepted, the second one was 
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dismissed,1011 the senate entrusted Fufius to submit the charge to the people. According to 
Cicero this happened because Hortensius and his circle were fully certain that Clodius would 
be sentenced by any court.1012 
Accordingly, the formal accusation was made approximately before 15 March, 61. Of the 
lawsuit itself rather few facts are known to us; the charge was expounded by three persons, 
three Cornelii Lentuli: L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, L. Lentulus Cornelius Lentulus Niger 
(flamen Martialis) and Cn. Cornelius Marcellinus.1013 Against the charge Clodius intended to 
prove the alibi that on the day of the Bona Dea ritual he had been in Interamna and not in 
Rome. To refute this alibi several matronae participating in the Bona Dea festivity acted as 
witnesses, including Caesar’s mother, Aurelia and Caesar’s elder sister, Iulia.1014 Similarly, 
Cicero made a testimony pleading that on the day of the ritual Clodius visited him in Rome—
certain sources1015 claim this visit was paid three hours before the scandal (i.e., late at 
night),1016 other interpretations1017 assert it took place during the salutatio in the morning.  
Presuming but not admitting the authenticity of Clodius’s alibi, confirmed by C. Causinius 
Schola, his guest-friend from Interamna: he could have made the approximately 140 km trip 
from Rome on horseback in a day. Eventually, Clodius was acquitted; several causes of this 
outcome of the lawsuit can be made probable: it cannot be ruled out that the members of the 
court were bribed, the money presumably was provided by Crassus (each member of the jury 
must have been given three-four hundred thousand sestertii)1018—both Catulus,1019 and Cicero 
referred to this possibility.1020 Besides possible bribery, the jury’s fear might have also 
arisen,1021 and there might have been doubt to what extent Aurelia was able to recognise 
Clodius exactly.1022 Since decision in the lawsuit was not adopted as Cicero had desired, and 
through his testimony he had made Clodius his deathly enemy, which resulted in a tragic turn 
in his later career—exile, it is worth highlighting the motifs that had made Cicero take such 
firm action in the lawsuit. (Regarding the defeated parties in the case: in addition to Cicero, 
Pompeia was the other defeated party in the Bona Dea lawsuit because the scandal served a 
good excuse for Caesar to get rid of his wife, who otherwise could not be suspected of having 
an affair with Clodius.) Cicero himself emphasised unselfish and purely moral reasons of his 
behaviour,1023 however, his first account of the disturbance of the ritual written to Atticus was 
not free from certain cynical overtone.1024 
He describes the action taken against Clodius as one of the (subsequent) steps in the combat 
against Catilina and alleges to have discovered connections between the Catilina’s plot in 63 
and the elements that supported Clodius in the Bona Dea trial.1025 This explanation, however, 
does not seem satisfactory to the extent that Clodius had been—as we shall see—a long-time 
personal enemy of Catilina, and he personally had not taken part in the plot.1026 Plutarch1027 
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identifies the following reasons for Cicero making a testimony incriminating Clodius in the 
Bona Dea trial. Cicero had been induced by his wife, Terentia to take this step, whose hatred 
was aimed not so much at Clodius but at his elder sister, Clodia due to the point that Clodia 
had purportedly wanted Cicero to divorce Terentia, and marry her, Clodia. Through Cicero’s 
testimony Terentia wanted to deteriorate the relation so that this step could not be taken, and 
Cicero wanted to clear himself of the suspicion. Plutarch mentions this possibility merely as 
talk of the town, and it is in accordance with that, that researchers of the modern age have 
mostly refused this version.1028 In spite of that, it is worth casting an investigating glance at 
this explanation too. Plutarch dates Clodia’s intention regarding Cicero to the year 61. The 
chronology indicated by Plutarch is sometimes quite uncertain, but the event he gives an 
account of often constitutes a historical fact in spite of the erroneous determination of the 
point of time.1029 
The story appears in a more realistic light if we attempt to place it in the year 63 instead of 61. 
After making a survey of the political marriages entered into and planned around this time,1030 
the marriage entered into between Clodia and Metellus Celer can be dated to the end of 63.1031 
Through that Metellus Celer got in the circles of the optimates, and became the son-in-law of 
Pompey’s opponent, Lucullus. It cannot be excluded that the party of the optimates knowingly 
attempted to alienate Pompey’s key supporters from him. In 63, Cicero having taken steps 
against the populares became a man of political significance in the eyes of the optimates—it is 
possible that it was at that time when they tried to attain that Cicero should divorce Terentia 
and marry Clodia. And if after that the politically promising marriage to be entered into with 
Cicero was not accomplished, then they contented themselves with Metellus Celer. Cicero 
probably did not want to disrupt his marriage for certain temporary political advantages, and 
did not consider the marriage practice usually accepted in the circles of the notables of Rome 
a political trump card.1032 Yet, even if we do not accept this hypothesis, Plutarch’s thought 
that Cicero had been induced by Terentia to stand as witness against Clodius does not seem 
groundless if a former clash between the two families is taken into consideration.1033 
The hatred between Terentia and Clodius goes back to 73 when Clodius charged Catilina with 
incestum committed against Fabia. Fabia was a virgo Vestalis and Terentia’s half-sister. 
Owing to Catulus’s help, Catilina was acquitted; yet, the case highly damaged Fabia, and 
thereby Terentia’s family. There are some loci available to us on the case: so, for example, 
Sallust mentions incestum as a fact,1034 and a reference to it is also available in Cicero.1035 
Presumably, the Bona Dea ritual held in 63 at the house of the consul at that time, Cicero led 
by Terentia gave a push to Cicero to take action against Catilina since the participants of the 
Catilina’s plot had already been arrested in Rome but Cicero had not made a decision on their 
fate yet. The matronae celebrating the Bona Dea festival saw the altar bursting into flames, 
which qualified a prodigium,1036 and it was interpreted by the virgines Vestales and Terentia 
taking part in the festival as a need for Cicero to take firm action against the conspirators in 
order to restore pax deorum.1037 The priestesses and Terentia must have been inflamed also by 
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Fabia having been put to shame through Catilina making mockery of her reputation.1038 The 
attempt at providing the interpretation claiming that disgracing the Bona Dea festival in 62 
might have been Clodius’s political response to using the festival in 63 in order to influence 
Cicero1039 does not seem well-founded.1040 First, because Clodius did not belong to Catilina’s 
adherents; secondly, because it is hard to presume that he had had such a conscious political 
concept. Both the hypothesis of the jealousy due to the presumed plan of the marriage to be 
entered into with Clodia and the fact of the hatred felt because of Fabia having been shamed 
by Catilina and Clodius clearly indicates that Terentia produced highly great influence on 
Cicero with respect to the testimony to be made against Clodius.1041 Clodius also wanted to 
shift the responsibility of Cicero’s action to Terentia; at least, in 58 as tribune he deluded 
Cicero1042 that he should not flee from Rome—just to enjoy his revenge all the more.1043 
Albeit, Caesar offered Cicero the position of a legatus so that he could leave Rome; it has not 
been clarified whether this had happened before or after Clodius was elected tribune. 
However, although being aware of the danger, he did not leave. The consequences not 
foreseen either by Cicero or Terentia are widely known. In 58, Clodius was elected tribune; to 
this end, he had had to be adopted by a plebeian family, which was implemented with the 
consent of Caesar as pontifex maximus, and he submitted the following bill: anyone who had 
caused any Roman citizen to be executed without court proceedings should be outlawed. This 
law (which was enacted with retroactive force!) was targeted at Cicero personally, who had 
had Catilina’s five accomplices executed in Tullianum during the Catilina’s plot without court 
proceedings but with the approval of the senate.1044 Cicero went into exile and on the site of 
his villa on the Palatine ravaged to dust Clodius had a temple erected for goddess Libertas.1045 
As Imre Trencsényi-Waldapfel remarks: “In the history of the world, it was not the first and 
not the last act of abusing the name of liberty but certainly it was one of the most repulsive 
ones.”1046 Since neither Cicero nor Terentia1047 were able to foresee the fatal consequences of 
the testimony made in the Bona Dea trial that occurred in 58, it cannot be considered 
inconsistent for them to proceed in the action at law in 61 by making an attempt at obtaining 
redress through Fabia for the injury suffered by the whole family in 73. 
 
IV. 1. 2. Historical background of Pro Caelio 
 
In April 56 BC, the then twenty-five year old1048 M. Caelius was charged by L. Sempronius 
Atratinus as main prosecutor, and L. Herennius Balbus and P. Clodius as subscriptores before 
the quaestio de vi. The defendant himself made a statement of the defence.1049 Furthermore, 
M. Licinius Crassus Dives and—taking the floor as the last one as was his custom1050—Cicero 
acted as counsel for the defence. The charge was made presumably on the grounds of lex 
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Plautia de vi (65/4),1051 which was created, according to Cicero’s account, against infamous 
citizens who raised riot, and who besieged the senate with weapons, used violence against 
magistrates and attacked the State.1052 
At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that it was not lex Plautia, made on praetor’s or 
tribune’s motion, but lex Lutatia de vi that provided grounds for the charge; however, the 
interrelation of these two statutes—and possibly the fact whether in this case it is possible to 
speak about two separate statutes de facto—is very problematic.1053 Tradition links lex Lutatia 
with the name of consul Q. Lutatius Catulus and dates its making to 78/77. Regarding lex 
Plautia, in the literature it arises as an unclarified circumstance—which for this reason 
provides grounds for misunderstanding—that, in addition to lex Plautia de vi made most 
probably in 65, we are aware of a lex Plautia de reditu Lepidanorum from 89, linked with the 
name of tribune Marcus Plautius Silvanus too.1054 Furthermore, the determination of the legal 
grounds of the proceedings against Caelius is not made easier by the fact that in the peroratio 
Cicero refers to lex Lutatia as grounds for the charge or at least he connects the relevant 
statute with Lutatius Catulus,1055 however, there might be another way to interpret this 
reference: Catulus as consul made a proposal on making the statute, which was later carried 
through by tribune Plautius.1056 There are good chances that Andrew Lintott’s view might be 
valid when he states that lex Plautia de vi repeated the provisions of lex Lutatia de vi that 
applied to acts against the State (crimen maiestatis, vis publica); however, it supplemented it 
by stipulations penalising violence against private persons (vis privata) too.1057 As a matter of 
fact, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis completely that in his argument Cicero referred 
not necessarily to one statute that sanctioned vis but by mentioning lex Plautia and lex Lutatia 
within the same speech he, for that matter, summed up the states of facts of the leges de vi, 
not shrinking back from some generalisation and, for the sake of convincing, some distortion 
either.1058 
From among the acts Caelius was charged with, the first three, which were expounded in 
more details in the statement of the defence made by Caelius and Crassus, are known to us 
only from Cicero’s summary.1059 Cicero kept for himself the expounding of the assassination 
against the Alexandrine philosopher Dio.1060 The counts of the indictment are connected in 
some form with the legates of Alexandria who intended to protest before the senate against 
Ptolemaios XII having been put back to the throne of Egypt by Rome (concerning the second 
and fourth counts of the indictment this can be established at first glance). The legates led by 
Dio arrived to Rome in 57, but King Ptolemaios supported by Pompey made every effort to 
thwart the audience before the senate.1061 The charge claimed that Caelius had been involved 
in these acts of Ptolemaios and Pompey from the outset. The pulsatio Puteolana was probably 
an attack made against the legates of Alexandria immediately after they had arrived to 
Puteoli; it cannot be ruled out that the seditiones Neapolitanae are connected with that in 
some form or other.1062 If the legates heading from Naples on Via Appia to Rome used 
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protection by a magistrate, then it can be deservedly called seditio using the proper Roman 
technical term since it denotes defiance against the power of the state.1063 
We cannot either prove or disclaim the relation of the bona Pallae1064 with the legates of 
Alexandria.1065 In this respect, it is necessary to refer to the view that asserts that the present 
lawsuit can be considered a dispute at law of primarily political nature; so, it was meant to 
attack Pompey, Ptolemaios’s patron, and Cicero’s task was to deprive the case of any 
implication of current politics.1066 Contrary to this, the following points can be offered for 
deliberation: the prosecutors were motivated basically by private rather than political 
motifs.1067 In particular, the fact that in February 56, Caelius brought a charge of ambitus1068 
against the, at the time of the lawsuit, seventeen year old L. Sempronius Atratinus’s blood 
father, L. Calpurnius Bestia, who—being defended by Cicero—was acquitted from the charge 
of election bribery; and he wanted to summon him before the court due to ambitus again.1069 
This second accusation was prevented by Atratinus by bringing a charge of vis;1070 
consequently, Richard Heinze claims that political considerations in this lawsuit constituted 
the means rather than the aim.1071 Pompey’s popularity reached its bottom;1072 thus, for the 
prosecutors it was actually advantageous to be able to attack Caelius as Pompey’s adherent. In 
this respect, Cicero himself, as a matter of fact, tried to mitigate the political edge of the 
dispute at law. Pompey’s name does not occur on a single occasion in the Pro Caelio.1073 In 
addition to specific counts of the indictment Cicero touches several issues that do not actually 
belong to the scope of the charge: specifically, the alleged attempt by Caelius to murder 
Clodia, Metellus Celer’s widow.1074 He handles the attempt to poison Clodia in a somewhat 
separated form, but from a remark1075 it comes out clearly that this element plays a material 
part in the chain of the demonstration of evidence. Consequently, Caelius had obtained money 
from Clodia to be able to hire Dio’s murderers,1076 and if later on he wanted to poison Clodia, 
from whom the money came from, then, its aim was to get rid of the woman who later on 
learned of the assassination.1077 
 
IV. 1. 3. Ludi Megalenses as theatrical background of the lawsuit 
 
After having given a brief account of the historical/political situation and the stages of the 
hostile relation between Cicero and the gens Clodia, we should turn our attention to the 
rhetoric situation developed by the circumstances and to the point how Cicero handles it. De 
Saint-Denis calls Pro Caelio the wittiest of Cicero’s orations,1078 which results to a great 
extent from the date when the speech was delivered (on 4 April), from the maximum 
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exploitation of the somewhat contradictory situation provided by the first day of the Ludi 
Megalenses through the tools of humour.1079 Ludi Megalenses (4—10 April) was the festivity 
of Magna Mater (Kybelē), whose cult was borrowed and introduced in Rome in 205/4 
immediately before the end of the second Punic war on the grounds of the instruction of the 
Sibylline Books.1080 At that time, they turned to the seat of the cult,1081 in the present case, to 
Attalos, King of Pergamon, who handed over the black stone representing the goddess, and 
equipped a ship for carrying it to Rome.1082 Another tradition has it that the stone was taken to 
Rome directly from Pessinus.1083 The goddess was brought to Rome with ritual ceremony, the 
senate entrusted Scipio Nasica to receive the Magna Mater. Certain sources assert that in 
order to prove her innocence the Vesta priestess Quinta Claudia set the boat stuck on the sand 
bank of the Tiber, which transported the stone, to sail again alone.1084 In her temple on the 
Palatine Claudia also had a statue;1085 this temple was completed in 191, and it was at that 
time when the Megalensia and the staged plays (ludi scaenici) held on this occasion were 
introduced. In the ritual of the Ludi Megalenses—just like in the entire Roman cult of 
Kybelē—no part was given to the raging dance of the galli recalling Attis’s self-
mutilation.1086 On the other hand, archaeological find proves the appearance of the Attis cult 
simultaneously with the cult of Magna Mater for during the archaeological excavations on the 
Palatine Hill in the last century small statues representing Attis were found in the cell of the 
Kybelē temple from the layer from the 2nd century. This unambiguously refutes the standpoint 
which claims that Kybelē’s cult had been borrowed and introduced in Rome without Attis’s 
cult1087 as this seemed doubtful merely on the grounds of philological findings.1088 
As it has already been mentioned, theatre performances were held on the Megalensia right 
from the outset.1089 Apart from stressing the two members of the gens Claudia being directly 
affected in the trial and the contrast between Clodia and Quinta Claudia,1090 there was another 
link between the Megalensia and the history of the family. Clodius disturbed the festival of 
Magna Mater on several occasions. He caused the second scandal on 8, 9 or 10 April, 56,1091 
when accompanied by armed slaves he attacked and occupied the theatre where the 
performance was being held.1092 Thus, this happened a few days after Pro Caelio was 
delivered. However, those who listened to the oration might have thought and most certainly 
did think of the first incident since in 58 Clodius was involved in an action against the Kybelē 
sanctuary in Pessinus1093 when Brogitarus, who supported Clodius’s gang with money, 
obtained the Kybelē priest dignity (accompanied by royal title) in Pessinus with Clodius’s 
assistance, after having expelled the legitimate fulfiller of this office and broken up the 
cult.1094 This way, the gens Clodia was closely linked to the Megalensia both in terms of 
history and current political issues. 
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IV. 1. 4. The “improvised” comedy as rhetorical strategy 
 
At the beginning of the speech Cicero as it were expresses his regret that it is a pity that 
judges are not granted any rest even on holidays1095 and cannot watch the theatre performance 
just being held. So, the orator stages his own theatre performance, comedy for them,1096 and 
puts Clodia1097 defined as the source of the charge in the centre. By doing that he is not trying 
to make the defendant appear a nice person to the judges, instead, he drives the attention to 
the opponent’s motive force, opes meretriciae,1098 and it is absolutely not doubtful to those 
listening to the speech whom the term meretrix covers: the chief witness of the charge of 
attempted murder against Dio, the Roman merry widow, Clodia Metelli known from her 
licentious way of life. Before responding to the actual charges (de vi), he deems it is important 
to reply to the invented defamation made to the detriment of Caelius.1099 From the part 
regarding vita ante acta1100 the following key charges can be discerned: Caelius had violated 
pietas and fides, had not paid due respect to his father,1101 and had not acted properly 
concerning Calpurnius Bestia either when he had caused him to be summoned;1102 luxuria,1103 
which both Herennius and Clodius reproached Caelius with;1104 dissolute life in young 
age;1105 remarks of political nature: friendly relation with Sergius Catilina;1106 alleged 
participation in the conspiracy;1107 crime of ambitus,1108 and attack against a senator in the 
election of the pontifex.1109 The grouping of the charges may be discretional but their order 
mostly follows Caelius’s course of life.1110 
The third part1111 discusses the assassination against Dio; the prosecution supports this by 
Clodia’s statement claiming that Caelius had obtained money from her in order to bribe 
Lucceius’s slaves, and then tried to get rid of her as an incriminating witness.1112 Cicero 
expounds these two statements made by Clodia as independent charges;1113 he refutes the 
charges of aurum1114 and venenum1115 separately.1116 It is one of Cicero’s clearly perceptible 
objectives to alleviate the political overtones of the trial as much as possible; among others it 
is for this reason that he does not focus on the attack against Dio. Crimen veneni is properly 
known, presumably other persons’ testimonies were available to support Clodia on the issue 
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that Caelius had attempted to hand over poison to Clodia’s slaves. Quite interestingly, during 
the entire oration Cicero does not provide any other version instead of this story; he contents 
himself with making the inconsistencies in the opponent’s pleading ridiculous, and 
emphasising that corpus delicti is not available to them. Although thereby he does not fully 
dispel suspicion regarding Caelius but at least he can take this detail out of its original 
context.1117 
Several material questions arise in the middle part of the speech.1118 After having covered the 
de vita, or de moribus, paragraphs, the orator drives the attention to the actual counts of the 
indictment. With a few sentences he briefly presents the assassination against Dio. He refers 
to the point that King Ptolemaios was the author the murder, who used Asicius, having been 
acquitted in the meantime, as a tool—for this reason, even the shadow of suspicion could not 
be cast on Caelius.1119 After that, he suddenly returns to the objections made against Caelius’s 
conduct of life (deliciarum obiurgatio).1120 With respect to minor licentiousness he takes a 
liberal position believing that youth has the right to sow their wild oats as long as they do not 
cause any serious harm by that,1121 and in more serious cases he asks the judges to distinguish 
the subject (res) from the defendant (reus); that is, to notice that the objections raised concern 
young people of the period in general and not specifically Caelius.1122 Then, he passes on to a 
definite crimen luxuriae: the money obtained from Clodia allows to infer a quite intimate 
relationship, which ended with a bitter split.1123 Instead of the continuation, logical at first 
sight (on the one hand, he could deny the existence of this love affair; on the other hand, he 
could fully doubt the authenticity of the two crimina due to its sudden break), Cicero chooses 
to take another track: in what follows1124 he doubts the authenticity of Clodia’s testimony on 
the grounds that as a left and jealous mistress she is not able to judge Caelius without bias. 
Thereby he anticipates the subject, de vi, that belongs to the argumentatio;1125 through that vis 
and luxuria change turning into each other in paragraphs 23—50:1126 vis,1127 luxuria,1128 
vis,1129 luxuria,1130 vis.1131 
This point is highlighted by an excellent observation made by Richard Heinze when he asserts 
that the construction of the prosecution is primarily and exclusively based on Clodia’s 
testimony; so, it could not ruin its authenticity by presenting Clodia as Caelius’s left mistress; 
consequently, it was only Cicero who could bring up this relation in the lawsuit.1132 Thus, he 
defended Caelius against an accusation (since the liaison with Clodia is far from being so 
general as amores and libidines referred to) that had not been made against him.1133 The 
whole thing seems all the more appropriate as there is no single point in the entire Pro Caelio 
where Cicero presumed that the love relation between Clodia and Caelius is a fact known to 
the general public listening to the case. At several places he keeps mentioning certain 
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generally spread rumours regarding the sexual life of each of the persons separately but never 
concerning the affair between them. So, it is Cicero who reduces Clodia’s and Caelius’s 
licentious conduct of life engaged by both of them individually to a common denominator and 
invents connection between them.1134 
The situation would have been exploited by a counsel for the defence less genial than Cicero 
as follows. First, he would decrease the significance of crimen luxuriae, and would point out 
the highly general nature of the charges and the right of youth to engage in free and easy way 
of life. Secondly, he would cast doubt on Clodia’s authenticity—which is perhaps not so 
difficult since in 56 satirical poems on incestuous relation maintained with her brother 
Clodius had been rather widespread among the people1135—and thereby he would question 
whether the Roman court could grant great authenticity to the testimony of the meretrix. This 
orator, as we have said, less genial than Cicero would face the following difficulties. How can 
he measure by two measures; that is: why is he so forbearing regarding Caelius’s lascivious 
conduct of life and why so strict regarding the same in case of Clodia? (It is a fact that 
whereas Caelius is merely a young man, Clodia is a consul’s widow but the oration could 
possibly become inauthentic through this duality.) Even if Clodia—exactly due to her conduct 
of life—were not a witness considered too authentic, this would by no means give reason for 
her to lie. And on the whole why would she have been up to making a false testimony against 
Caelius?1136 
It is a brilliant construction by which Cicero takes the sting out of possible objections. How 
would the case look like if Clodia had been Caelius’s lover? The edge of moral aversions 
against Caelius is actually eliminated by the fact that it is not possible to commit adulterium 
with a kind of woman like Clodia since she is ranked among amores meretricii. And thereby 
the question regarding the reason for Clodia’s testimony is solved at one blow: the left lover is 
thirsting for revenge, and it is for this reason that she makes a false testimony; subsequently, it 
cannot be evaluated. On the other hand, at first sight, Cicero does not have too extensive 
background at his disposal to build the love relation between Caelius and Clodia: both of them 
live on the Palatine, and it is not really their ascetic conduct of life that they are notable for. 
Cicero, however, finds one more point: the prosecution claims that Clodia had given money to 
Caelius, who later wanted to poison Clodia (aurum et venenum). According to Cicero’s 
construction, which seems quite obvious, all this had taken place because of a highly intimate 
relationship and a quite stormy break. However, it is still hard to solve the dilemma: the 
claims made by the prosecution are either true and then Caelius is guilty in the assassination 
against Dio; or, if they are not true, then the Caelius—Clodia liaison cannot be developed. 
Thus, Cicero must acquit the defendant (luxuria), and must make Clodia’s testimony 
inauthentic (vis). If the relation between the two of them had been widely known, then Cicero 
would have had to place the point on luxuria in the part of de vita ac moribus and the attack 
against Clodia in the part of crimen de vi. This way, however, he deals with Clodia’s 
authenticity under the points of crimina auri et veneni, and builds and manipulates the 
Clodia—Caelius relation.1137 
Now, let us look at how Cicero creates this relation. At the beginning of the speech1138 he 
does not name Clodia yet, he refers to opes meretriciae only, which properly and excitingly 
rhymes with intolerabilis libido and nimis acerbum odium.1139 When he mentions Caelius’s 
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moving to the Palatinus he formulates more clearly.1140 Here, Cicero uses the well-known 
Medea motif, which has already arisen a few times during the lawsuit since Atratinus called 
Caelius pulchellus Iason, and referred to the story of the golden fleece regarding the hired 
gold, and Caelius called Atratinus Pelia cincinnatus.1141 And he continues to develop the 
thought.1142 He refers the motif of money and poison (duo sunt autem crimina, auri et veneni) 
to the scope of subject of luxuria, and intends to draw conclusions from that regarding the 
relation between Clodia and Caelius. Yet, if he uttered this expressis verbis, then he would 
acknowledge that the charges are true.1143 
Cicero repeats the opponent’s charges with an “ut dicitur” phrase but he lets them appear real 
and true—more properly he suspends the response to be given to them—as long as they fit in 
with his aims.1144 It is here where he conjures up Appius Claudius Caecus (prosopopoiia) 
from the underworld—which is no way a tool that belongs to genus grande1145 in the present 
case1146 but a trick full of comic circumstances1147—in order to be able to compare ancient 
Roman virtues to Clodia’s conduct of life. Seemingly, this does not serve defence since the 
ancestor conjured up is convinced of the justice of the charge of aurum et venenum.1148 
However, the old censor’s speech now unambiguously feeds the fact of the relation between 
Clodia and Caelius and Clodia’s corruptness into the judges’ head.1149 
It is after this that the reprehensio testis may be implemented with respect to Clodia, which 
presents Clodia as a jealous, left lover mistress, and proves that Caelius is not an adulter, that 
is, adulterer, but only an amator, that is, a lover. In accordance with the above cast (first, 
Cicero and then Appius Claudius Caecus spoke), here again the orator himself and then 
Clodius Pulcher pleads; thereby Cicero shifts the burden of proof mostly to the two persons 
summoned. Cicero’s tactics here becomes much clearer: if the charge of poison and gold is 
true, then Clodia was Caelius’s lover; if she was his lover, then her testimony is useless, so 
the charge of poison and gold is not proved.1150 Thus, the charge of poison and gold, which 
has been so summed up by Cicero in order for him to create a liaison, now becomes needless; 
therefore, it should be concealed, and that without being noticed, so that the judges should not 
remember what premises their conclusions were based on.1151 The crimina auri et veneni are 
merged with crimen luxuriae, and in the rest of the speech they are referred to as such. In the 
speech put into Clodius’s mouth it is now considered a fact that Clodia is Caelius’s mistress—
whereas Appius Claudius deduced this only from various signs of suspicion.1152 The level the 
two actors are informed corresponds to the listeners’ seeming level of knowledge. Clodius 
details the love affair rather licentiously—and thereby Cicero dealt a deathly blow on Clodia’s 
confession.1153 
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In the editing of paragraphs 30—36 of the Pro Caelio we can see several threads running side 
by side. In terms of content:1154 hypothetical deduction of the affair and split from gold and 
poison (here the speaker is Cicero),1155 the actual (now not hypothetical) conclusion (Appius 
Claudius Caecus is the speaker),1156 hypothetical conclusion of the inauthenticity of Clodia’s 
testimony from the affair and from the split (here the speaker is Cicero again),1157 actual 
conclusion drawn by Clodius.1158 In terms of the real aim of the demonstration of 
evidence:1159 proving the existence of the affair,1160 ruining Clodia’s authenticity.1161 In terms 
of the facts to be seemingly proved: acquitting Caelius of crimen luxuriae;1162 ruining 
Clodia’s authenticity.1163 After that he frees Caelius from characterisation as an adulter since 
he has proved that Clodia is living a life not worthy of a Roman matrona; accordingly, it is 
not possible to commit adulterium with such a woman, a meretrix. Although in the points 
concerning the above1164 Cicero does not mention Clodia by name, and the formulation of the 
evaluation is somewhat hypothetical, later he states that Clodia is living meretricio more.1165 
By this response the orator replies to the thoughts of the two types of fathers involved in the 
proceedings. However, both fathers agree1166 that young people have always been permitted 
to engage in a certain libidinous conduct, and this libertine conduct might include affairs 
maintained with the kind of women like Clodia, which belongs to the scope of amores 
meretricii.1167 
In presenting the liaison with Clodia Cicero uses the rhetoric tools of humour and irony on 
several occasions. So it seems to be appropriate to review what role humour and irony as 
orator’s tool played in the theory of Antique elocution, in particular, especially in the Corpus 
Ciceronianum. The usefulness of fun, geloion was first discussed by Gorgias, who claimed 
that the opponent’s seriousness should be contrasted by fun and his mock by seriousness in 
order to destroy its impact,1168 as it is quoted by Aristotle too.1169 It is at this point where 
Aristotle refers to the fact that in the Poetics he has already expounded how many types of 
geloion there are; but the part of the Poetics where he discussed comedy has been lost. He 
adds that a part of that suits free men, and another part does not; therefore, the orator should 
use the former ones.1170 The fact that several Greek authors have dealt with the issue of 
humour is mentioned in Cicero’s works.1171 These Greek writings, however, have not been 
preserved to us. Quintilian can see fundamental difference between the two greatest figures of 
Antique eloquence, Demosthenes and Cicero in terms of wit and humour: whereas 
Demosthenes lacked high spirits, Cicero could not keep within bounds in witticism.1172 In the 
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Orator1173 Cicero touches, in his work De oratore gives and exhaustive exposition1174 on the 
issues of wit, jokes and humour. As sources he used his own practice, collections of Roman 
jokes and peripatetic writings. His scrivener, Tiro published a thesaurus of examples summed 
up in three books on this subject. 
Cicero starts the treatise by making the statement that jokes and humour are quite often very 
useful,1175 then, he goes on by saying that he himself has seen that in lawsuits lots of things 
can be achieved through witticism.1176 Cicero looks for answers to five questions regarding 
laughing. What is laughter? Where does it come from? Should the orator want to create 
jollity? How far may he go? What types of ridiculum are there?1177 One of the actors of the 
dialogue, C. Iulius Caesar Strabo claims that the first question does not belong to the 
subject;1178 he answers the second one by citing Aristotle that ridiculum should be applied in 
the field determined by the attributes: ugly and grotesque.1179 To the third question the answer 
is clearly yes.1180 To the fourth question he replies as follows: the orator shall not make fun of 
either special turpitude or grave misfortune1181; similarly, a person favoured and respected by 
the public shall not become the target of scorn.1182 The prime law is thus moderation.1183 From 
the answer given to the fifth question we learn that one of the types of jokes is created by the 
thing itself, the other one by the formulation.1184 After that, he identifies the sources of 
ridiculum the orator may draw on1185 and those he shall not.1186 Laughter is most often 
evoked, for example in jokes, by the orator saying something that nobody expects; in this case 
we are laughing at our own error.1187 In defining the idea of the perfectus orator1188 Cicero 
identifies three kinds of style—simple, medium and sublime—and he notes that, albeit, some 
persons are excellent in specific types of style, very few have mastered all of them.1189 In 
Orator Cicero provides theoretical foundations for all the three kinds of style, however, he 
points out that, in addition to its other attributes (avoiding prose rhythm and complex 
sentence, dropping hiatus, munditia and elegantia, moderation in applying both ornament and 
word and thought figures), the most characteristic trait of simple style is witticism and sharp 
tongue. When using them the orator is to make sure that he should not cause irreparable 
harms, should thrust stings only into his enemies, and should do that with moderation and not 
ceaselessly, and should not hurt all of them and not in any way. He calls this the purest 
Atticism, although in this respect none of the recent Atticists have reached any special 
elegance.1190 
Several essential elements of Roman comedy have been highlighted by Segal, who claims that 
as a perfect opposition to Roman everyday life ruled by negotium and industria appears the 
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so-called Plautian day where the key attributes are ludus and voluptas.1191 During the period 
when theatre plays were performed, activity on the forum discontinued (Ludi Romani, Ludi 
Apollinares, Ludi plebei, Ludi Megalenses),1192 so, a kind of exemption from gravitas that 
permeated the entire Roman life entered into force. In comedies, each player step out of the 
world of their everyday life: young people do not obey their father, matronae do not follow 
their husband’s will, and slaves brief their masters without being punished. Education is 
sometimes aimed at the outsider, who will be integrated in society if he accepts criticism, 
whereas he will be definitely cast out as the hindrance of the play if he continues to be an 
outsider.1193 The persons injured by Plautus’s humour are often the milites gloriosi and the 
Cato censorious kind conservatives, puritan figures. In the works of Terence the opposition 
between strict fathers and jolly sons is a highly favoured motif (fathers mostly “improve” and 
start to tolerate their son’s conduct of life).1194 In Pro Caelio,1195 in the syncresis of the two 
father types Cicero quotes the words of two fathers from the comedies of Caecilius and 
Terence. The former one is severe and tough, the latter one is well-intentioned and forbearing, 
it is not by chance that the quotation comes from Micio’s speech in Adelphoe.1196 The words 
of the two fathers can be to some extent linked to the two actors conjured up in the previous 
paragraphs, Appius Claudius Caecus and P. Clodius Pulcher, and create an impressive parallel 
with the relation between Cicero and his intellectual/spiritual son, Caelius, which is a definite 
opposite of the relation between Clodia and her younger brother/husband, Clodius.1197 
In Clodia’s characterisation the orator quotes Ennius’s tragedy entitled Medea exul, and uses 
the lines with tragic tone for producing the comic impact. (Besides Medea, Clodia was 
compared to another, not really positive mythical female figure too, more specifically to 
Clytaemnestra, although it is not uttered in the speech; so, the nickname quadrantaria 
Clytaemnestra from Cicero’s mouth came from Caelius.1198) That is how Caelius becomes 
Iason, his move to the neighbourhood of Clodia-Medea a mythical journey, and the left merry 
widow a sorceress.1199 Later he presents the adventure of handing over the jar,1200 not so much 
in the spirit of comedy, more as a kind of mimus.1201 In this kind of plays (and this is highly 
significant in the characterisation of Clodia as meretrix) prostitutes entered the stage.1202 The 
comedia dell’ arte kind of mimus not having a definite story was far from being a form of 
entertainment to improve morals; it often produced the impact expressed in risus mimicus 
through its obscenity. Adultery and attempted poisoning constituted the cornerstone of its 
subject matter; accordingly, Cicero describes what has happened in the bath as obscenissima 
fabula.1203 He presents the events aimed at handing over and obtaining the pyxis as muliebre 
bellum, in the course of which Clodia becomes imperatrix and her men provincia hiding in 
the wooden horse of Troy.1204 Clodia’s characterisation as a meretrix1205 constitutes a perfect 
contrast with the image of the obedient and ethical matrona who safeguards the purity of 
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home. Clodia’s whole appearance and behaviour fits in with a meretrix, and not with a mater 
familias,1206 but her familiaris are her slaves and the bath master,1207 and regarding this point 
Cicero refers to the nickname quadrantaria twice.1208 Plutarch claims that this title has been 
stuck to her because she would be given one quadrans by her lovers as payment,1209 and he 
calls Caelius by the name Quadrantaria Clytaemnestra.1210 Caelius is attacked by opibus 
meretriciis1211 assisted by prostitutes; so, Clodia leads her army as a kind of miles 
gloriosa.1212 
In Cicero’s career there were several more triumphant points and ones that formed history to a 
greater extent, yet—as it might have become apparent from some of the references made 
here—there were few moments when as an orator he was able to present such a gleaming 
theatre play and genially constructed composition to the judges as he did at the Megalensia in 
the year 56. The speech did not fail to reach its result: Caelius was, as a matter of fact, 
acquitted; and the lawsuit offered a great occasion for Cicero to take revenge—even if just in 




IV. 2. Lawsuit of Publius Sestius 
 
Cicero delivered his speech in March 56 in defence of Publius Sestius, who was charged on 
the grounds of lex Plautia de vi with acts of violence offending public order/public 
tranquillity, of which his defender convincingly proved that they were measures required by 
the situation of lawful defence. We need to make it clear: the speech can be considered 
primarily a brilliantly executed statement of one of the important fundamental postulates of 
Cicero’s philosophy of the state rather than a lawyer’s or orator’s achievement. Pro Sestio is 
the first occasion when Cicero, having returned from exile, can formulate his program of 
rethinking the idea of res publica harrowed by civil strife and the preserving-renewing 
reorganisation of the State. In this speech Cicero clearly takes a stand for Sulla’s 
“constitution”, that is, for what he interpreted as Sulla’s constitution: arguing for 
strengthening the position of the senate meant to govern the State. His defendant was 
acquitted: owing not only to the brilliant handling of the facts of the case but most probably to 
the political program presented in the speech with exhaustive details, yet captivating pathos 
that won his audience’s approval.  
Below, first, we analyse the historical-legal background of the speech, which provides an 
insight into the events that evoked and followed Cicero’s exile and calling him home. (IV. 2. 
1.) After that, it is worth paying attention to the thought of philosophy of the state articulated 
in Pro Sestio as Cicero determines the notion of optimates destined to govern the State by 
taking an individual approach—adjusting to the rhetorical situation but being true to his 
political conviction. In this respect, he defines the goal that guides decent citizens (optimus 
quisque) in public life: (cum dignitate otium), which crystallises in two key words: dignitas 
expressing moral values, firmness of mind, strength of character and dignity, and otium, the 
interest in material well-being, security (in law) and public tranquillity. (IV. 2. 2.) Finally, we 
examine briefly how and possibly with what modifications the thought of philosophy of the 
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state voiced in Pro Sestio, the extended optimates definition and the key words dignitas and 
otium appear in a fully developed form in one of Cicero’s most important works on the 
philosophy of the state—the most important one beside De legibus and De officiis—in De re 
publica. (IV. 2. 3.) 
 
IV. 2. 1. Historical background of Pro Sestio 
 
Cicero reached the zenith of his career, indisputably, in the year of his consulate, 63; it was at 
that time when the homo novus, the man from the order of knights, whose ancestors did not 
hold magistratus curules,1213 ascended to the row of the leaders of the state, principes 
civitatis, and having created the desired concordia ordinum1214 while exposing and 
suppressing Catilina’s plot he was confident that by his deed he had ensured for ever that his 
fellow citizens would be grateful to him and he would have permanent and authoritative 
influence on public life.1215 Cicero was disappointed in his hope sooner than he could have 
expected: two of the tribunes who entered office on 10 December 63, L. Calpurnius Bestia 
and Q. Caecilius Metellus immediately started fierce agitation against Cicero under the 
pretext that merely on the grounds of senatus consultum ultimum awarded to him as a 
consul,1216 without judgment at law he had five conspirators executed1217—which, for that 
matter, met with the approval of both the senate and the public—and vetoed his wish to 
address a speech to the people on the last day of his office, 29 December. (The senatus 
consultum ultimum and the senatus consultum de re publica defendenda cannot be identified 
with today’s concept of state of emergency as this would presume a closed constitutional 
order that Rome did not have. By senatus consultum ultimum, which provided for declaring a 
person public enemy (hostis rei publicae, hostis publicus), the senate provided opportunity 
and guarantee for the magistrats to protect the State.1218) So, Cicero could merely take a 
public oath that by his measures he had saved the State.1219 Soon, on 5 December 61, he wrote 
to Atticus that the concordia created by him and the merits he had obtained would not provide 
him with proper protection.1220  
He hoped to find this protection at Pompey who, having significantly extended the territory of 
the empire and excellently arranged for administration of the territories conquered, as the hero 
of great deeds1221 returned home at the end of 62, after six years to Italy. Although the senate 
acknowledged his claim for triumph,1222 it did not satisfy his other claims (approval of his 
measures taken in the east; giving land to his veterans). Dissatisfaction of Pompey, who 
reconciled with Crassus, and Caesar’s initiative created the so-called first triumvirate with the 
aim, to put it shortly, that no event, changes or measures could take place in public life that 
might violate any interests of the three of them.1223 Pompey, who maintained a friendly 
relationship with Cicero, tried to win him over to this triple alliance. Cicero—although it was 
clear to him that accession to the triumvirate would provide protection against attacks against 
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him due to his actions taken against Catilina’s adherents—distanced himself from the triple 
alliance with little political vision and great moral conviction because he was not willing to 
make a common cause with Caesar, whom he considered the manifestation of people’s 
party/populist politician in the first place. To produce greater pressure on Cicero, Caesar used 
P. Clodius Pulcher as a tool1224, who passionately hated Cicero.1225 
Clodius,1226 to take revenge on Cicero for the lawful injury he suffered from him, decided to 
have himself elected a tribune. In 59, with the approval of comitia curiata through 
arrogatio,1227 changing his name from the patrician Claudius to Clodius, he had himself 
adopted by a plebeian, and so he could be elected a tribune with the support of the 
triumvirs.1228 After commencing his activity as a tribune on 10 December 59, he carried 
through four bills, by which he could provide grounds for his subversive activity. He made the 
grain to be distributed to the people free of charge;1229 by abrogating lex Aelia et Fufia he 
terminated the institute of obnuntiatio, that is, the opportunity that holding of the popular 
assembly and voting on bills could be adjourned in case of unfavourable auspicia;1230 he 
again permitted to set up collegia, founded with political purposes, suitable for giving rise to 
public disturbances, which were banned by law in 64,1231 and deprived censors of the 
opportunity that under moral adjudication1232—except when formal accusation was made and 
the accused was found guilty by both censors—they should impose reprimand, infamia on 
anybody or exclude anybody from their order.1233 
Clodius concluded a bargain with the two consuls in office in 58, Gabinius and Piso (Caesar’s 
father-in-law), that after their year in office, under proper military and financial conditions 
they would get the provinces they wanted.1234 At the end of 58, he submitted lex Clodia de 
capite civium, which set forth that everybody who had Roman citizens executed without court 
proceedings should be outlawed. This law enacted with retroactive force (!) did not mention 
Cicero by name, yet the aim of the legislation crushing the law became unambiguously clear 
to everybody. Cicero put on mourning toga, and appeared before the popular assembly 
begging. Clodius and his gang instigated rioting. Thereupon, thousands of citizens—primarily 
members of the order of knights—went into mourning. A delegation appeared before the 
senate. Piso was absent from this meeting of the senate, and Gabinius refused to do anything 
in favour of Cicero. On the proposal of tribune L. Ninius, the senate resolved to go into 
mourning in a body.1235 Gabinius summoned common people (contio plebis) and declared that 
the senate had lost all of its political significance, and threatened the order of knights with 
bloody revenge because of the events on 5 December 63, i.e., having Catilina’s accomplices 
executed by Cicero; to give greater emphasis to what he said, by edict he exiled L. Aelius 
Lamia, who was working for Cicero, to two hundred miles from Rome.1236 Soon, the consuls 
gave a command to the senators to take off mourning and wear their usual clothing.1237 At 
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contiones Clodius again and again repeated that he acted with the agreement of Caesar, 
Pompey and Crassus,1238 and although none of the three expressed their opinion coram 
publico, Cicero hoped that Pompey would keep his promise made earlier with the intention to 
help.1239 
Pompey, however, to flee from the embarrassing need to take a stand, withdrew to his estate 
in the countryside, all the more—as the speech implies—because his enemies suggested to 
him that Cicero’s adherents wanted to take his life.1240 Clodius, to legitimate his acts, 
convened a popular assembly where he addressed a question to the consuls and Caesar 
regarding the executions that took place on 5 December 63.1241 Gabinius and Piso 
disapproved Cicero’s action in terms of legality since Cicero as a consul had some 
participants in Catilina’s plot executed without judgment and the opportunity of provocatio ad 
populum Roman citizens were entitled to indeed1242—at the same time, they “forgot about” 
senatus consultum ultimum that vested consuls with additional rights. Caesar referred to it that 
he had been against the death penalty when it was passed already,1243 yet he would consider it 
improper to apply the law with retroactive force. (Caesar offered Cicero a legate’s position to 
be able to leave Rome; it has not been clarified whether this happened before1244 or after 
Clodius was elected tribune1245 but Cicero did not leave.)1246 
Thereupon, Cicero went into voluntary exile;1247 later on he certified his act by asserting that 
by staying he would have trigged a civil war—as all decent citizens would have sided with 
him—but he could not assume liability for that.1248 Exile was not punishment but escape from 
punishment, which Roman citizens were entitled to (ius exulandi) before or after conclusion 
of the lawsuit.1249 So, early March 58, Cicero went into exile, his house was robbed; the loot 
was shared by Clodius and the consuls, who sacrificed the good of the State for the provinces 
they longed for.1250 By another law Clodius attained that Cicero’s full property was 
confiscated, and the exile was banned from choosing a place of living closer than five 
hundred miles from Rome.1251 (Following Cicero, another strong man of politics in the senate, 
Cato was also sent away from Rome—however, in his case they took care of the appearance 
of fairness.1252)  
Clodius now could feel he had Rome under his control indeed, and with his armed hordes he 
strove to quash every opposition to him.1253 Not only did he provoke Pompey1254—he helped 
Tigranes to escape, who had been brought to Rome as prisoner by Pompey,1255 and he sold the 
sanctuary that belonged in accordance with Pompey’s orders to King Deiotarus’s territory for 
a huge sum to Brogitarus, to whom he arbitrarily granted royal title too1256—who did not 
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appear in public for he no longer felt secure,1257 he also turned against Caesar who helped him 
to power and to such an extent that at end of his activity as tribune he questioned the validity 
of Caesar’s laws and regulations. It was at that time that those who had helped Clodius to 
power definitely realised what fatal error they had made by supporting their defendant. 
Clodius was unsuitable for acting as a political ally and at this point the optimates would have 
had the opportunity to forge political unity and get Pompey threatened by terror side with 
them through separating him from Caesar, who brought Clodius to tribune’s office. The 
optimates, however, worn out their force in petty-minded civil strifes,1258 and one-time allies, 
Pompey and Crassus could not come to an agreement either; so, cliques of optimates, 
Pompey, Crassus, Cicero’s adherents, Clodius and the mob all brooded over their own way to 
find solution, not knowing that long term political trends were determined in Caesar’s camp in 
Gaul.1259 
Nevertheless, Clodius’s “politics” brought it along as natural consequence that 
recalling/rehabilitation of Cicero was actually put on the agenda, which happened indeed on 1 
January 57 at the senate session led by consul P. Lentulus Spinther. The other consul, 
Metellus Nepos, who otherwise entertained hostile emotions against Cicero, putting aside his 
private injuries, voiced his agreement with the agenda; and the one-time consul, L. Aurelius 
Cotta believed that such a senate decree (senatus consultum) was sufficient for Cicero’s 
returning home since the applicable lex Clodia was invalid from the first.1260 Pompey 
demanded resolution of the popular assembly, reckoning that otherwise the people’s party 
would organise rioting, and the senate agreed with this view. Only and solely tribune Sex. 
Atilius Serranus requested one day for thinking, and at the January sessions through his 
continuous intercessio he prevented decision-making.1261 Then, eight tribunes loyal to Cicero 
led by Q. Fabricius seized initiative and submitted a motion for calling the exile home, to be 
put to the vote on 23 January. Under cover of the night, however, Clodius, with armed slaves 
and gladiators of his brother, praetor App. Claudius Pulcher, occupied the Forum and 
scattered the popular assembly. In the course of that, among others, Cicero’s younger brother, 
Quintus was assaulted, and for the following days Clodius and his horde subjected the streets 
of Rome to their rule—the senate and the consuls were powerless.1262 
Milo, after he had made an unsuccessful attempt as a tribune to bring a charge de vi against 
Clodius, decided to render Clodius’s gangs harmless by his own troops.1263 Milo’s example 
was followed by Sestius also as a tribune, after Milo had almost fell victim to a fatal 
attack.1264 The “militia” set up by Milo and Sestius—as it were in response to Clodius’s 
gangs—soon gained ascendancy over them, and public order was relatively restored in 
Rome.1265 At the beginning of July 57, Lentulus again put the issue of calling Cicero home on 
the agenda of the senate, and Pompey read out his relevant proposal—now the senate was not 
willing to postpone the case any more and resolved that if no decision was made on the issue 
in the popular assembly, then Cicero should by all means, albeit, without the resolution of the 
popular assembly, return to Rome.1266 At the contio held on the Mars field, Lentulus and 
Pompey resolutely stood up for Cicero, and on 4 August the comitia centuriata accepted the 
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proposal.1267 Cicero did not simply return to but marched in Rome in a triumphal procession 
never seen before.1268 
Even then Clodius did not give it up; he blamed Cicero for the inflation that emerged in those 
days—thereby trying to instigate public disturbances—and chased away the labourers hired 
for rebuilding his house.1269 (Cicero attained invalidity of the irregular consecratio of the plot 
on the Palatine executed by Clodius and its declaration by his speech registered under the title 
De domo sua.) Milo tried again to take action against Clodius by using the quaestio de vi 
publica but on the proposal of the senate he abandoned his intention to bring a charge.1270 
Simultaneously, Clodius made an attack on P. Sestius too, who had resolutely fought for 
calling Cicero home, and on 10 February 56 he brought a charge of ambitus (election bribe) 
and vis publica1271 on the grounds of lex Plautia de vi1272 against him at the same time—the 
latter case was concluded on 14 March with the acquittal of Sestius.1273 (The state of facts set 
forth in lex Plautia de vi was sanctioned later on by lex Pompeia de vi adopted in 52. Around 
46, Caesar probably also sanctioned acts of violence by lex Iulia de vi; later on, the most 
detailed laws, which now clearly distinguished vis publica from vis privata, were caused to be 
enacted by Augustus in 17.1274) The charge brought de vi—more precisely, the prosecutor, P. 
Albinovanus1275—reproached Sestius for recruiting and arming gladiators to achieve his 
political goals.1276 Clodius lined up L. Aemilius Paulus, Gellius Publicola1277 and, among 
others, P. Vatinius as witnesses.1278 The quaestio was chaired by praetor M. Aemilius 
Scaurus, the defence was provided by Q. Hortensius, M. Crassus, L. Licinius Calvus and—
rising to speak as the last one as was his custom—by Cicero.1279 
The orators who took part in the lawsuit constituted a politically quite heterogeneous 
company since they included one of the members of the triumvirate, Crassus, the conservative 
Hortensius, the people’s party Calvus and as a person standing in the middle, creating unity, 
Cicero. Among others, this composition of persons might have encouraged Cicero to define 
the role of those destined to govern the State of Rome and the fundamental principles of 
governance, in a train of thoughts of great breadth.1280 
 
IV. 2. 2. Cum dignitate otium – definition of fundamental political values  
 
Cicero’s argument in the lawsuit is completely logical and clear. How could be Sestius 
convicted de vi for he had tolerated the raging of Clodius and his gang for so long in 
tranquillity, and only after he had been attacked by Clodius’s gang on the Forum while he was 
exercising his office—and it was thanks to pure luck only that he stayed alive—did he set up 
guards to protect himself?!1281 Sestius used the tool of lawful defence only when law did not 
                                                 
1267
 Cic. Sest. 109ff. 
1268
 Cic. Sest. 131. 
1269
 Krüger 1991. 194. 
1270
 Cic. Sest. 95. 
1271
 Cf. Boyancé 1941. 172ff.; 174. On vis (publica) see Zlinszky 1991. 114ff. 
1272
 Fuhrmann 2000. 281. 
1273
 Cic. Q. fr. 2, 4, 1. Cf. Fuhrmann 2000. 281. 
1274
 Sáry 2002. 167. 
1275
 Krüger 1991. 194. 
1276
 Cic. Sest. 78. 84. 90. 92. 
1277
 Cic. Sest. 110ff. 
1278
 Cic. Sest. 132ff. 
1279
 Cic. Sest. 3. Cf. Fuhrmann 2000. 281. 
1280
 Materiale 2004. 148. 
1281
 Krüger 1991. 195. 
111 
 
provide him with proper protection.1282 Based on all that, Sestius did not commit crime, much 
rather he used the principle of “vim vi” and “arma armis repellere cuique licet”.1283 
The speech seems prima facie somewhat confused and “jam-packed”, and only a few 
passages of the speech deal with the person of the accused on the merits.1284 Much more room 
is occupied by the narrative of the orator’s own vicissitudes and triumph, that is, exile and 
home coming.1285 Cicero dwells on his notions on the State and the role of statesman, which 
he commends to the attention of especially young people.1286 This is accompanied by the 
prooemium1287 and the invective against the incriminating witness, Vatinius, who spoke about 
the optimates in contemptuous voice, calling them natio (natio optimatium) 1288 with insulting 
words.1289 Based thereon, the superficial spectator might agree with the opinions, voiced in 
the Antiquity already, that Cicero far too much deviated from the original subject of his 
speech, and might give credence to the presumption that Pro Sestio in the form it has been left 
to us has nothing to do with the speech actually delivered.1290 When studying the oratio more 
carefully, we can agree with Manfred Fuhrmann’s opinion that the speech constitutes a 
closed, well edited, logical whole. As the orator expounds that the charges affecting Sestius 
had been refuted point by point by those who spoke before him, so he has nothing else to do 
than praise Sestius’s conduct of life and activity as tribune, in a widely drawn mirror of the 
historical-political background.1291 Accordingly, the speech after the prooemium can be 
divided into historical1292 and program setting1293 parts,1294 which are concluded by the 
peroratio turning into pathetic fortissimo, which states that if Sestius is to go into exile, then 
the orator will not hesitate to follow him there since he can thank his return from his own 
exile to Sestius.1295 
It is worth analysing the part of the speech, which can be considered mere excursus having an 
end in itself, that contains Cicero’s political creed and the most precise definition of 
optimates’ role taken and obligations assumed in public life in Corpus Ciceronianum.1296 The 
paradigmatic nature of Sestius’s case enabled the orator to frame guidelines in the philosophy 
of the state that could get to more people through the statement of the defence as means of 
mediation than in theoretical reasoning, philosophical works.1297 What might be superficially 
considered mere excursus is a carefully thought-over and efficiently built argument: the 
definition of the concept of optimates is followed by enumeration of the most important tasks 
of the State, and then, by determining the goals of persons who shape public life, the 
significance of otium and dignitas, the orator connects the seemingly extended theoretical 
train of thoughts again with the stream of the oration. 
To respond to the disparaging remark made by the prosecutor on optimates, he develops his 
own optimata definition by interpretatio extensiva setting out from the optimates—populares 
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opposition. The optimates and populares, as a matter of fact, did not mean party affiliations, 
not even groups orienting themselves in terms of some sort of political/public life 
principles/slogans but primarily groups of given politicians who achieved their goals relying 
on the senate (optimates) and the popular assembly (populares) respectively—in many cases 
the distinction covered difference in political style rather than content.1298 According to 
Cicero, optimates are those who—contrary to populares—do not seek applause and approval 
of the masses but try to earn acknowledgement of all decent citizens (optimus quisque).1299 
The community of decent citizens comprises thoughtful, sober people living under balanced 
financial circumstances, irrespective of their class status—that is, even “well-meaning” 
liberated slaves. Consequently, the optimus quisque are all decent Roman citizens, people 
belonging to the highest orders, inhabitants of Roman cities and agricultural workers, traders, 
liberated slaves who are by nature not depraved, not insane, not taking pleasure in civil strife. 
Thus, optimates are opposed by depraved adventurers, people who upset public life.1300 And 
what is the common goal of these so various people? The objective that unites all sober, 
honest citizens with orderly conduct of life: preservation of tranquility by maintaining 
dignity.1301 
And the political philosophy of optimates is nothing else than “cum dignitate otium”.1302 
Dignitas is appreciation, dignity obtained by individual merit or social background—that is, it 
is not a “civic right’. Dignitas is in every case a kind of award for an office fulfilled in public 
life, a service carried out for public good, efforts and peril undertaken for the sake of maiestas 
imperii/rei publicae, which raises the person who has become worthy out of the grey mass of 
average people.1303 This award, however, is not identical with the contents covered by honos 
and laus because they can be attained by exemplary handling of a particular, given historical 
and political situation too. Dignitas is a greater and, first of all, more permanent value: to a 
certain extent it can be related to the concept of nobility since it far extends beyond the glory 
of a year in office or a military expedition, it can be passed from generation to generation, and 
might legitimise the influence, power in public life of late descendants too. It is just stormy 
periods of the State when this inherited dignitas can be attacked by subversive elements; so, 
the task of optimatas is to protect this value—not primarily for their own sake but to serve 
public good, stability.1304 
Otium is, in a certain sense, the opposite of negotium, that is, every activity that can be carried 
out outside the field of public life. The phrase “otium” often goes together with the terms 
“pax”, “concordia”, “salus”, “quies” and “tranquillitas”, as it were as the opposite of 
“novae res”, “seditio”, “discordia” and “tumultus”. Thus, both dignitas and otium can be a 
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trait of a single person,1305 a group1306 or a whole institution—for example, the empire or the 
State,1307 and can denote public tranquillity and public safety.1308 
It arises as a natural question whether the concepts otium and dignitas cover contents that 
refer to public or private conditions.1309 Rémy gives the answer that the use of these concepts 
taken to refer to the collective and the individual must be strictly separated from each 
other,1310 and that these two keywords in Pro Sestio are meant to reflect idealised and 
desirable conditions of public life, in which dignitas denotes enforcement of the rule of ordo 
senatorius considered “traditional”, i.e., ordered to exercise power in Sulla’s constitution, and 
otium denotes public tranquillity arising from this status quo.1311 In other cases Cicero used 
the concept of dignitas often to name the influence of the individual, more specifically, the 
senator and his power exercised in the senate, and otium to describe the deservedly earned 
tranquillity enjoyed after leaving office.1312 The strict distinction set up by Rémy was replaced 
by a somewhat subtler interpretation in others’ works. Pierre Boyancé, for example, 
increasingly emphasised that in Cicero’s works dignitas lies both in private sphere and public 
life; he wanted to deduce this Ciceronian concept from Greek, primarily peripatetic 
philosophy.1313 Literature—e.g. Chaim Wirszubski—considered excessive nearing of dignitas 
to private sphere exaggerated and demonstration of Greek philosophical roots problematic;1314 
yet, Chaim Wirszubski somewhat overshot the mark too, and interpreted the idea of dignitas 
as a category that excludes political, philosophical and ethical deliberations.1315 
With his habitual ability to see the essence in synthesis, Manfred Fuhrmann declared that both 
Pierre Boyancé’s approach of taking only Greek philosophical bases into account and Chaim 
Wirszubski’s approach of ignoring other factors outside Roman realpolitik are one-sided and 
therefore wrong. Fuhrmann integrates the two contradicting theories by claiming that the 
results of Greek philosophy served as tools for Cicero to formulate individual thoughts 
regarding Roman public life.1316 
Thus, in Pro Sestio Cicero applies the phrase cum dignitate otium both to the entirety of 
public life and the leaders of the State; yet, in this respect, due to fundamental characteristics 
of Roman public thinking we cannot charge the orator-statesman with mala fide mingling of 
in rem and personal components, which are to be strictly separated nowadays, as it is done by 
Chaim Wirszubski.1317 It is just Cicero’s res publica definition that makes it justified and self-
explanatory to mention “in rem” and “personal” elements of the State, i.e., abstract power 
and the elite exercising it in a particular form, together and forge them into a harmonious 
unity.1318 
The state of otium can be realised only if the State is governed by the optimates, and the 
people of Rome acknowledges their dignitas, by which they can guarantee otium and dignitas 
of the res publica, that is, the stability of religion, state organisation, administration of justice, 
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foreign relations and military administration.1319 This fragile balance is threatened by danger 
from two sides. On the one hand, by subversive elements, anarchists, depraved political 
adventurers similar to Clodius,1320 on the other hand, by the citizens who keep only one of the 
two basic values in view: who either strive for dignitas without protecting otium or are willing 
to give up dignitas for the sake of otium—the latter assume especially high risk because while 
chasing the false illusion of safety they fail to notice that, by giving up dignitas, otium will be 
endangered too.1321 
After that, he enumerates examples from the rows of propugnatores rei publicae, who 
protected the State, undertaking trouble and danger, against subversive activity of the 
populares, which formerly involved significant peril as in those days the politics of the 
populares pleased the people.1322 Taking it to refer to the time when the speech was 
delivered, the orator, however, makes it clear that the ambitions of the populares evoke 
aversion also in verus populus,1323 the people who approve the politics of the optimates and 
long for otium, and that people like Clodius can only expect applause from the hired, heckled 
mob.1324 He resolutely calls citizens of Rome—who, except for hostile elements, all enrich 
the rows of the optimates, according to this extended definition—to follow the example of 
the enumerated men who long for and indeed attain authority, acknowledgement and glory, 
who will be remembered for ever; at the same time, he does not deny that the task to be 
undertaken is hard and involves troubles and perils.1325 
The leaders of the optimates, the principes civitatis, who follow the senate, which guarantees 
the good of the State, freedom, tranquillity and dignity of the people, must face their enemies 
(audaces, improbi), who sometimes come from influential circles (potentes), however, 
examples of history show that these subversive elements, who tried to impress the mob, were, 
in most of the cases, badly defeated.1326 At this point, Cicero warns the youth—for, as he said, 
the definition of the concept of the optimates also served this1327—to keep dignitas and gloria 
attainable through activity carried out for the sake of res publica in view1328 because he is 
afraid that, threatened by recent events and calamities suffered by them, there will be no 
citizens who are willing to undertake duties and obligations in public life.1329 Therefore, he 
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does not omit to stress that—just as vanguards of the politics of the optimates are quite 
often—he was exiled; yet, he was soon called to return home and was reinstated in his former 
dignitas.1330 
The analysis of optimates’ situation and role in public life far exceeded the extent required by 
the success of Sestius’s case, however, it is organically connected with other elements of the 
speech, as the orator points it out too.1331 In spite of rhetorical exaggerations we can agree 
with Cicero.1332 Sestius takes the part of optimates, that is, every decent citizen (quisque 
optimus), as it is proved by his entire conduct of life and political activity1333 since he has not 
only stood up for Cicero, who has done so much for saving the State, but has represented the 
interests of the senate, of entire Italy and in general of res publica1334 against fanatic, 
subversive and traitorous political adventurers, who are deservedly referred to with scathing 
irony by the orator.1335 (If we put the portrait of Gabinius and Piso in the scales of history, 
then Cicero undoubtedly drew a grotesque caricature of them; if, however, we want to judge 
the description in terms of its literary value, then we should qualify the images masterpieces 
of Ciceronian irony.1336) What was at stake in the fight of Milo, Sestius and the citizens who 
allied with them (the senate, the citizens and entire Italy)1337 against Clodius, Gabinius, Piso 
and the heckled-hired scum of society1338 out for the destruction of the State was not calling 
Cicero home but primarily otiosa dignitas,1339 the basic values and institutions of the 
community, which villains brought undeservedly to office, uninhibitedly abusing laws and 
their power strove to ruin by violence1340 and cunning, foolishly.1341 
In the formulation of the pair of opposites of ius and vis1342 Cicero could look back on 
prefigurations like, among others, Ennius.1343 For the poet the figures of the soldier who uses 
violence and the orator who uses the weapon of convincing represent two entirely different 
spheres: the key characteristic of the orator is bonus, his tools are sapientia and ius; opposed 
to him stands the horridus miles, whose main tools are vis and ferrum. Both figures grow 
beyond themselves through their symbolism as they set us two possible archetypes of settling 
disputed issues, representing the order of procedure of peace and war. Cicero uses the pair of 
opposites of vis—ius emphatically elsewhere too,1344 that is, it can be established that by that 
time this duality as a literary topos had been deeply rooted in Roman thinking.1345 
The basic principle “cum dignitate otium”, which, beside creating consensus/concordia 
ordinum—i.e., unity of the order of senators and the order of knights1346—and onmium 
bonorum,1347 was one of the fundamental goals of Cicero’s activity as consul too, did not fail 
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to produce its impact during delivery of the speech either since the judges acquitted Sestius 
without any votes against it, which was, according to Cicero, a result hard to underestimate 
politically either.1348 Pro Sestio was delivered just at the right time and gave the opportunity 
to Cicero to expound his program of the theory of the state embedded in a rhetorical situation 
as for this brief moment a relative balance of forces developed in Rome between interest 
groups working against each other, and Caesar, who was able to turn the scales in his favour, 
was far away and did not directly intervene in the course of events.1349 
Unfortunately, as it is well-known, in the long run Cicero did not have proper instruments 
available to him either to enforce the goals and basic principles articulated here since the 
Rome of the age could be no longer the place of making political decisions, only the place of 
legitimising them—as it is proved by Caesar’s example. Caesar soon met Crassus, then 
Pompey, and they renewed the triumvirate of 60. On the “proposal” of the senate, Cicero had 
to give up the debate of the law on settling Caesar’s soldiers, which was put on the agenda for 
15 May 56. Thus, otium had been preserved but dignitas had been lost; and the politics of the 
populares, which was again headed by Caesar, was, according to indications, followed not 
only by the mob of the city but also by poorer layers, presented as optimates in Pro Sestio by 
Cicero.1350 
Nevertheless, in Pro Sestio Cicero gives a brilliant model how an orator-statesman can in a 
crisis situation threatening the fundamental institutions of human co-existence make the 
community suddenly aware of the danger of chaos and how he can try to induce hesitating 
people to dare to act in the present in line with guiding principles re-thought after having 
returned to basic values of the State and public life in the past.1351 The fortunate harmony of 
dignitas1352 and otium, that is, idealistic basic values and material interests, and the 
formulation of the requirement to realise it even at the expense of sacrifices deservedly raises 
Pro Sestio among Cicero’s most excellent speeches and makes it one of the important 
prefigurations of the theory of the state framed in De re publica. 
 
IV. 2. 3. The basic values defined in Pro Sestio in De re publica  
 
Cicero, after he was compelled to realise that he could not continue his career in public life 
where he had finished it before his exile, from then on devoted most of his energy to 
theoretical works. In his first work relevant also in terms of the philosophy of the state, De 
oratore published in 55, he dealt with the issue of training, educating optimus civis Romanus; 
in his last work of such nature, De officiis written in 44, he analysed the issues of the ethics of 
“the best citizen” again.1353 De re publica written between 54 and 51 and published in 511354 
is a survey of the peculiar features of the State, more specifically, the ideal State, optimus 
status civitatis or optimus status rei publicae.1355 
For Cicero, the ideal state, as a matter of fact, means Roman res publica since it was built on 
the talent of not one man but many people, and it was created not for one generation but a 
long series of centuries and generations.1356 For Cicero, the basic pillar of the Roman state 
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structure built on the triple of ius—fas—mos1357 was social consensus, i.e., concordia 
ordinum: understanding between the order of knights and the senate; thus, the operation of the 
ideal state requires permanent and reasonable harmony between certain social classes, layers 
and groups too.1358 
In Cicero’s work, the phrase res publica comprises three elements: gathering of people; legal 
unity/legal security providing grounds for this grouping; and community of interest that 
makes co-existence justified.1359 Therefore, res publica can be, irrespective of form of state, a 
kingdom, rule of the aristocracy or as well of the people—however, wherever power is 
concentrated in the hands of a single person, a tyrant who keeps, instead of public interest, 
solely his own interests in view, we cannot speak about a state.1360 The Roman constitution, 
that is, miktē politeia described by Polybios is ideal—and this thought is borrowed, with some 
modification, also by Cicero1361—because it fortunately combines specific features of various 
forms of state and so ensures both stability of the state organisation and freedom of the 
individual and the community without one impairing the other. The role of consuls fulfilled in 
state governance is the manifestation of the monarchic principle; the weight of the senate is 
the manifestation of the aristocratic principle; and the role of popular assemblies is the 
manifestation of the democratic principle.1362 
Let us see whether the extensively interpreted concept of “optimates” created in Pro Sestio 
can be followed in De re publica. Concordia ordinum—i.e., the thought of integrating ratio 
and res, the idea and social reality1363—which is formulated in De re publica too, does not 
only mean the unity of the order of senators and the order of knights but contains other social 
classes, layers and groups.1364 Concordia ordinum is supplemented by consensus omnium 
bonorum, which clearly shows that in De re publica Cicero did not want to give up the idea 
that he had already voiced in Pro Sestio, i.e., that all decent citizens—irrespective of their 
social and financial standing—are at the same time optimates, which means nothing else than 
that they want and serve the good of the state and public good.1365 As Gábor Hamza declares 
it too, the phrase concordia ordinum in De re publica most probably refers to the more 
narrowly interpreted plebs too, as that is how res publica becomes res populi.1366 The ideas of 
concordia ordinum and consensus omnium bonorum announced against members of 
Catilina’s plot and later Clodius’s adherents ensure the opportunity for maintenance or 
possible modification of constitutional order, if it is based on social agreement. The thought 
of equality of rights everybody is entitled to declared in De re publica served also as a moral 
foundation for Roman expansion.1367 This idea, however, was first announced by Cicero in 
Pro Sestio, extending the right and obligation of collaboration to every decent citizen 
(quisquis optimus)!  
How does the principle of “cum dignitate otium”1368 appear in De re publica? Further bases 
of Cicero’s ideal state are consensus iuris and communio utilitatis. Here, ius does not mean 
positive law only but also natural law, ius naturale. Among others in De legibus he articulated 
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the requirement that positive law shall be in harmony with natural law since that is the only 
way the law of Rome may lay claim to being the common law of the entire world. Exemption 
from ius naturale shall not be given either by the popular assembly or the senate; it is eternal 
and unalterable; it is fundamental obligation of the lawmaker and the judge to proceed in 
accordance with it,1369 and the task of the law is to separate the lawful from the unlawful.1370 
Law and ratio are inseparably interconnected, what is more, synonyms of each other in a 
certain sense; accordingly, law must come not from praetor’s edictum or the Twelve Table 
Law but from philosophy itself; so, it can never lose its force.1371 Consequently, he could 
frame his demand also in strict imperativus: Lex iusta esto! The other pillar, communio 
utilitatis is nothing else than the economic motivation of various social classes, layers and 
groups, which is an indispensable basic condition of social co-existence. 
The requirement of combining dignitas and otium, i.e., idealistic basic values and material 
interests, in a fortunate harmony and creating social collaboration in line with that was 
articulated urgently by Cicero in Pro Sestio already. In our view, consensus iuris made a 
guiding principle in De re publica is directly parallel with dignitas taking a prominent 
position in Pro Sestio, thus, with the idealistic idea, basic value that makes Roman citizens 
optimates, and, as a successor concept to it, synthesises what is contained therein to a higher 
level, and sums up these elements in the collective definition of iustitia. Similarly, communio 
utilitatis can be clearly related to otium, i.e., material, everyday interests that, beyond ideas, 
urge citizens to act.1372 
Rhetoric virtuosity, current politics and philosophy of the state—all these are exemplarily 
combined in Pro Sestio. It is guidance for the responsibly thinking elite and citizens of Rome 
on preserving and restoring the stability of res publica. Guidance for redefining classical 
values; an alternative to the value-destroying irresponsibility of people like Clodius. At that 
moment the orator-statesman could not know but might have wanted what occurred two years 
later: Clodius, who wanted to bring about the downfall of Cicero, died in a street fight 
provoked by him; and Milo, who killed Clodius and thereby did a great service to the public, 
would be defended by Cicero—unfortunately, with no success. 
 
 
IV. 3. Lawsuit of Titus Annius Milo  
 
On 18 January 52, in Bovillae two emblematic figures of the optimates and the populares, 
Milo and Clodius clashed, and members of Milo’s followers killed Clodius. Milo’s defence 
was undertaken by Cicero; the final hearing was held on 8 April, which was perhaps the 
weakest performance in Cicero’s career: both Clodiana multitudo and Pompey’s soldiers 
embarrassed him, clamour and shouting in stopped him short, made him irresolute, what is 
more, frightened him; he could not deliver the prepared speech with the planned constantia, 
he spoke flustered unable to collect his thoughts. His delivered speech was taken down in 
shorthand as usual; and Pedianus Asconius, who gives us a highly accurate account of the 
events, could still read the minutes that contained the speech and shouting in; it is, therefore, 
an indisputable fact that Pro Milone published later—as a matter of fact, apart from certain 
overlapping thoughts—is not identical with the oratio made on 8 April 52. 
First, we outline the historical situation that provides the background of the lawsuit (IV. 3. 1.); 
then, after clarifying the events around killing of Clodius, we attempt to reconstruct the course 
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of the lawsuit (IV. 3. 2.); later, we outline the structure and legal background of the argument 
(IV. 3. 3.). After that, we make an attempt at outlining the reasons, in more details, for 
publishing the revised version of Pro Milone, i.e., a speech delivered in an undoubtedly lost 
case. (IV. 3. 4.) Finally, we sum up the elements of philosophy of the state that appear in Pro 
Milone, and place them in the entirety of Cicero’s state concept, paying special regard to the 
fact that Pro Milone is the first Ciceronian work in which the motif of killing the tyrant, 
which afterwards returns as a fully developed thought in De re publica and De officiis, 
appears as a right and obligation a responsibly thinking Roman citizen is entitled to and bound 
by. In the course of that, we point out the parallels drawn by Cicero between Catilina and 
Clodius. (IV. 3. 5.) 
 
IV. 3. 1. Historical background of Pro Milone 
 
Milo was born as a member of gens Papia in Lanuvium; then, he was adopted by his maternal 
grandfather, T. Annius—who as the inhabitant of the same municipium maintained relation 
with Oppianicus and his wife, Sassia, depicted by Cicero in Pro Cluentio by rather dark 
colours—and from then on he bore the name T. Annius Milo, however, he inherited rich 
estate from his father too.1373 (Cicero’s several friends, senator C. Velleius and senator L. 
Thorius Balbus, Q. Roscius the actor and grammarian L. Aelius Stilo came from 
Lanuvium.1374 In 49, Cicero himself wanted to buy an estate there; however, it could be 
carried out most probably only in 45.1375) Nothing is known of Milo’s political career before 
he was elected a tribune in 57; however, historical records reveal that he took action as one of 
the eight tribunes who—led by tribune Q. Fabricius—drafted a petition for the sake of calling 
Cicero home.1376 When on 23 January 57 at the concilium plebis they would have voted on the 
motion, Clodius’s gang—including several gladiators borrowed from his brother praetor 
Appius Claudius Pulcher—disturbed the assembly by violence and prevented voting.1377 Milo 
detained the gladiators; later, however, Serranus released them.1378 After that, Milo tried to 
bring a charge against Clodius before the quaestio de vi, however, the edicts suspending 
administration of justice prevented him from doing so.1379 After their attempts at settling the 
crisis by lawful means had failed one after another, Milo and Sestius also set up a private 
army from gladiators and professional boxers,1380 however, it cannot be known whether it was 
this fact or the pressure exercised by Pompey that removed the obstacles of the final voting on 
4 August at the comitia centuriata on the bill on calling Cicero home.1381 Pompey, on the one 
hand, managed to bring down rising grain prices, which highly furthered improvement of 
public feeling, and, on the other hand, he lined up a considerable number of voters from 
municipia at the popular assembly.1382 It must be made clear, however, that in 57 Milo did not 
undertake any part in personal defence of Cicero who returned home in 57 because Clodius’s 
horde was able to disturb the reconstruction of the house of Cicero and his brother without 
any trouble, and when Cicero was attacked on Via Sacra, he was defended by his own 
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guard.1383 Several people suspected that Cicero was in the background that Milo prevented 
Clodius from being elected aedil, however, there are good chances that this was part of Milo’s 
personal revenge, and Cicero could only hope in silence that the conflict would end with 
Clodius’s death,1384 which did not happen for the time being.1385 
In the second half of December 57, aediles for the next year were elected, including Clodius, 
who used his position to bring a charge before the popular assembly against Milo—so, it was 
at that time when Cicero defended Milo as an orator first.1386 The atmosphere must have been 
similar to that in 52; the orator had to speak in the midst of continuous murmur, shouting in 
and disturbance.1387 After the trials held on 2, 7 and 17 February 56, final voting was set for 7 
March; however, it is not known whether it took place at all.1388 By then, the force of Milo’s 
private army had reached and exceeded that of Clodius, and Cicero, who had formerly been 
rigidly against use of violence in public life, this time gave his now tacit, now expressis verbis 
consent to armed fight as long as it served the goals that he also wanted to achieve.1389 Milo 
already gave resolute help to Cicero when in April 56 Clodius’s gang attacked him again,1390 
and the relation between Cicero and Milo was hammered into a personal friendship and close 
political alliance.1391 
Milo’s praetorship can be most probably dated to 55, i.e., to the third year before his 
consulship as in accordance with the provisions of lex annalis at least two years shall have 
been passed between holding two magistrates. In the fight for praetorship he was resolutely 
supported by Pompey.1392 Milo soon married Fausta, Sulla’s cousin, who divorced C. 
Memmius before that,1393 which was a serious step towards his consulate resolutely supported 
by Cicero too. In 54, four persons applied for the consul’s offices of the year 53: C. 
Memmius, supported by Caesar and originally by Pompey too, Cn. Domitius Calvinus, M. 
Valerius Messala and M. Aemilius Scaurus.1394 Scaurus—as half-brother of Fausta and 
Faustus Sulla, that is, now as Milo’s borther-in-law—hoped to have the support of his former 
brother-in-law, Pompey, whose divorced wife, Mucia Tertia he married. Furthermore, he 
believed that through Faustus Sulla’s wife, Pompeia (Pompey’s daughter) he could also 
strengthen their relation, however, in August and September 54 in the lawsuit due to crimen 
repetundarum, in which he was defended by Cicero, Pompey did not side with him, and later 
completely backed out from behind him.1395  
The election campaign involved not only bribe but violent and armed competition. Milo also 
hoped that his marriage would make his relation with Pompey closer; actually, it meant 
danger to him. Milo resolutely sided with Scaurus in the hope that as consul he would provide 
him with efficient help to fulfil the consulate of the year 52.1396 Cicero supported Messala,1397 
however, he was worried about the tension between Milo and Pompey, which became 
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increasingly apparent since Pompey tried to turn Caesar too against Milo.1398 In the meantime, 
referring to ill omen the election was postponed, and Scaurus tried to catch his rivals in the act 
of bribe; and some people was hoping that the elections could be held later on under the 
supervision of an interrex or dictator, specifically Pompey.1399 Milo was pondering over 
intervening in the course of the event by arms,1400 Cicero, putting his moral concerns aside, 
would have supported him in theory; yet, he was alarmed by the danger of open conflict with 
Pompey as it was just that for which he had not undertaken formal accusation against 
Gabinius either. Undoubtedly, Cicero hoped that the efforts to increase Milo’s influence and 
support his plans for consulship would restore his own weight in public life.1401 
Imperfect information is available on the events of the year 53, yet, it is a fact that the election 
of the magistratus curules had not happened before the summer,1402 and Pompey used all his 
forces to have dictator’s authorisation voted for himself;1403 however, the senate gave him 
authorisation only for ensuring orderly and lawful conduct of the election as proconsul.1404 
During the campaign of the election of magistrates in 52, violence definitely grew: Clodius’s 
gang attacked consuls Messala and Domitius Calvinus, according to Cicero’s narrative M. 
Antonius wanted to have Clodius assassinated,1405 and Clodius, who wanted to become 
praetor originally in 53, postponed his plan to the following year, due to holding the elections 
late, and so he inevitably conflicted both with Milo and the two candidates for consul, 
Hypsaeus and Metellus Scipio, supported by Pompey.1406 
In the meantime, Cicero vehemently tried to win Curio, who had returned from Asia, over to 
ensuring Milo’s campaign,1407 he expounded that all his thoughts were filled with Milo’s 
consulate since that is what both officium and pietas demanded from him. He invited Curio to 
take over management of the campaign, and briefly summed up everything for him that 
Quintus had summed up for him in 64 in Commentariolum petitionis. It is not probable that 
Curio undertook the task because later on no reference to this sort of activity or to gratitude 
felt by Cicero towards him for that can be found in any of the letters. Also, interesting light is 
shed on Cicero’s efforts by Gabinius’s defence in the lawsuit due to crimen repetundarum, 
which is quite difficult to date as the only reliable source in this respect is Pro Rabirio 
Postumo.1408 Rabirius Postumus was also charged of crimen repetundarum, and, for that 
matter, due to the amount given to him by Gabinius, arising from blackmail and abuse of 
authority, and Cicero, overcoming his personal aversion, undertook defence of the accused 
(accused parties) so that he should not get confronted with Pompey. Several valid arguments 
against dating Gabinius’s lawsuit to the end of 541409 are formulated by Andrew Lintott.1410 
Gabinius returned to Rome on 27 September 54 where he was charged of crimen 
maiestatis;1411 on 11 October a debate was in progress on who should bring a charge of 
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repetundae against him; on 21 October a charge of ambitus was brought against him too. On 
24 October, at a rate of thirty-eight/thirty-two he was acquitted of the charge of maiestas.1412 
Regarding the issue whether the lawsuit could be commenced and conducted in the rest of the 
year, it is necessary to take the order of holidays of the following months unsuitable for legal 
proceedings into consideration too: from 26 October to 1 November Ludi victoriae Sullae, 
between 4 and 17 November Ludi plebei were arranged, and in the remaining period there 
were several other festivities, which made it almost impossible to conduct a longer lawsuit. 
Furthermore, lack of magistrates made it difficult to conclude a lawsuit commenced at the end 
of 54 in the beginning of 53 as praetor’s offices were not filled, so, the function of iudex 
quaestionis (quaesitor) could have been fulfilled maximum by the interrex.1413 It is also hard 
to imagine that the lawsuit due to crimen repetundaum had been concluded by the end of 54 if 
we take into account the duration allowed for the accuser to search for evidence (inquisitio) in 
this sort of cases—in this respect it is enough to think of the lawsuit against Verres: with 
respect to Sardinia Cicero was allowed thirty days, in the case of Sicily he had to be satisfied 
with fifty days, although originally he asked for one hundred and ten days as the side 
competing for formal accusation, acting in collusion with Verres won one hundred and eight 
days for Achaia.1414 Paying regard to all that, even cautious estimates would claim that at least 
one hundred and fifty days must have been required for collecting evidence of Egypt and 
Syria, in other words, the lawsuit could scarcely commence before March 53, which seems to 
be supported by the fact that no reference to the lawsuit against Gabinius can be found in 
Cicero’s correspondence in 54.1415 At the same time, Cicero—although his conviction would 
have demanded and several of his friends urged him to—did not join the charge of maiestas 
lest he should incur the hatred of Pompey, and he excused Quintus by claiming that the charge 
was weakly founded and poorly built from the first, so it would have been a fault to lend his 
name to it.1416 
So, Cicero, putting his personal antipathy aside, and to ensure Pompey’s support to Milo, 
undertook the defence of both Gabinius and Rabirius Postumus against the charge of 
repetundae; yet, even by that he did not achieve his desired goal. In 53, no election was held 
for the magistratus curules of the year 52, and Pompey prevented tribune T. Munatius 
Plancus from appointing an interrex for conducting the election of consuls because he was 
afraid that the election of his future father-in-law, Metellus Scipio would be unfavourable to 
him. Milo, however, supported by Cicero, was not willing to surrender to Pompey’s plans, 
and electing Milo consul was a great threat to Clodius too for as the consul of the year 52 he 
would have supervised the nomination, campaign and election of the praetors to be elected for 
the year 51.1417 
 
IV. 3. 2. Lawsuit of Milo – Cicero’s narrative and Asconius’s description  
 
Below it is worth surveying the chronology of the Milo lawsuit and its precedents in short—
primarily on the basis of Asconius, who had (when he wrote the history of the lawsuit 
approximately one hundred years later) several sources of the period, Cicero’s delivered 
speech and the Acta of the given period available to him. When setting up the chronology, as 
a matter of fact, supplementary sources can be and should be taken into consideration, such 
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as, for example, Cicero’s letters, Plutarch’s and Dio Cassius’s accounts, although the latter 
state facts as appropriate in a condensed form in several cases, and sometimes merge events 
for the sake of dramatic effect. Asconius very rarely contradicts himself, so, in the rarest cases 
and with the greatest caution can it be alleged that his narrative is inaccurate, tendentious or 
intentionally fictitious.1418 Relevant dates always reflect the condition prior to Caesar’s 
calendar reform, in this respect it is necessary to pay regard to the fact that the year 52 
contained an Intercalarius; accordingly, the order of months was as follows: January consisted 
of twenty-nine, February twenty-four, Intercalarius twenty-seven, March thirty-one and April 
twenty-nine days.1419 
On 18 January 52, Q. Pompeius Rufus and C. Sallustius Crispus delivered a hostile speech 
against Milo at the contio plebis,1420 even before the conclusion of the contio Milo left for 
Lanuvium on Via Appia, namely, as dictator of the settlement he had to inaugurate the flamen 
of the local cult into his priestly office—according to Cicero the same day,1421 according to 
Asconius the following day.1422 Already on the previous day, Clodius had gone to one of the 
stations of his election campaign, Aricia, and on 18, on the way home he stopped at a small 
village in Alba, Bovillae, and most probably visited Pompey’s villa in Alba too.1423 Milo 
interrupted his journey in Bovillae at around the ninth hour (three in the afternoon), that is, 
three hours before dusk.1424 Later on—according to Asconius in the ninth, according to Cicero 
in the eleventh hour (i.e., five in the afternoon)1425—Milo, who travelled on carriage with his 
wife and followers, armed slaves and gladiators (presumably three hundred of them), rode 
northward with three of his followers and about thirty armed slaves.1426 The clash took place 
in front of the Bona Dea sanctuary, near Clodius’s estate;1427 according to Asconius’s 
narrative, the last member of Milo’s followers had words with Clodius’s followers, Clodius, 
hearing the clamour, turned back and in response to his threatening gestures one of Milo’s 
men threw his spear, which hit Clodius in the shoulder. Clodius was taken to a nearby inn, 
however, Milo’s men attacked the inn and killed Clodius.1428 They threw Clodius’s corpse to 
the road, which was found and taken to Rome by senator Sextus Teidius.1429 As a result of the 
clash, eleven of Codius’s slaves were killed, two of Milo’s slaves were wounded, and his 
coachman was most probably killed.1430 
Here, it is necessary to highlight a few points that make the authenticity of Cicero’s narrative 
somewhat improbable, especially with regard to the character and time of the clash. The clash 
probably began not in the eleventh hour of the day, i.e., around five in the afternoon since—as 
Bovillae was located thirteen miles from Rome—then the senator could have scarcely arrived 
in Rome with Clodius’s corpse in the first hour of the night, and if Milo had to inaugurate the 
flamen on that day indeed, then it is not probable either that he arrived at Bovillae so late. In 
the presentation of the clash Cicero strives to give the impression as if Milo had been attacked 
by Clodius’s men both from the side and from behind, and that numerous of Milo’s slaves 
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were killed, and he tries to make Clodius’s gang appear as big as possible.1431 Asconius did 
not say a word about the death of Milo’s men, and the fact that Clodius was taken not to his 
villa but an inn allows to make it probable that Milo’s troop cut off connection between the 
scene of the clash and the villa. Asconius’s account, which was written on the basis of 
delivered pleadings, evidence and the account of Acta Diurna, allows it to suggest that the 
accidentally occurring clash was concluded by the intentional assassination of the wounded 
Clodius.1432 
At the murdered Clodius’s house on the Palatine, the mob of the city gathered in huge 
numbers; the same evening, Clodius’s wife, Fulvia exhibited Clodius’s corpse in public.1433 
The next day, on tribune Titus Munatius Plancus’s proposal the corpse was taken down to the 
Forum and was placed on rostra.1434 Plancus and Pompey, who strove to prevent Milo from 
being elected consul, began to heckle the crowd against Milo; the mob took the corpse to the 
Curia to burn it, however, in the course of that the Curia and the Basilica Porcia caught fire 
and burned down.1435 In the meantime, the patricians held an assembly on the Palatine where 
M. Aemilius Lepidus was elected interrex, who was demanded by the adherents of Scipio and 
Hypsaeus supported by Pompey to hold the elections immediately, which he refused as a 
completely unlawful step. The crowd at once attacked both the house of the interrex and the 
house of Milo, who was away, however, they were driven back; thereupon, with torches 
robbed from the grove of Libitina they marched to the house of Scipio and Hypsaeus and the 
gardens of Pompey,1436 whom they proclaimed now consul, now dictator.1437 
Marcus Caelius, Cicero’s one-time disciple and defendant, as a tribune convened a popular 
assembly where Milo and Cicero could expound that Clodius set a trap for Milo, who used the 
tool of lawful defence only when he killed Clodius.1438 As no elections could be held due to 
armed disturbances of peace, senatus consultum ultimum was adopted with the content that 
the interrex, the tribunes and Pompey as proconsul should make arrangements to ensure the 
safety of the State and Pompey should recruit an army from Italy to restore public order.1439 
Approximately thirty days after Clodius’s death, Q. Metellus Scipio lodged a complaint with 
the senate claiming that reference to situation of defence was unlawful and untrue, and 
demanded to conduct investigation and proceedings.1440 In the meantime, although a part of 
the people demanded that Pompey should be appointed dictator, on the grounds of the 
resolution of the senate Pompey was granted the office of consul sine collega—hard to define 
in terms of public law.1441 Now Cicero could not see good chances for the election of Milo, 
who got between two fires due to the raging of Clodius’s adherents and the fact of holding out 
the prospect of and later on ordering investigation. Undoubtedly, Clodius’s assassination did 
not appear to be a politically wise step by Milo; however, it probably imbued Cicero with the 
feeling of personal satisfaction.1442 He considered Milo’s act, who had now turned from a 
political ally into a friend, morally fully approvable, and placed him in one row with Servilius 
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Ahala and Scipio Nasica, who were compelled to commit homicide in order to save the 
State.1443 
Clodius’s two cousins started to demand that Milo’s and Fausta’s slaves who had taken part in 
the clash at Bovillae should be interrogated, and by actio ad exhibendum claimed extradition 
of the slaves,1444 Hortensius, however, argued that—in view of the fact that Milo had already 
liberated the slaves who protected the life of their master—as freemen they could not be 
extradited for interrogation.1445 In the case, the most influential and venerable representatives 
of the optimates, Cicero, Hortensius, Cato, Faustus Sulla and Marcus Marcellus resolutely 
sided with Milo.1446 At the same time, Pompey behaved with Milo by preserving the 
appearance of fairness; so, for example, when he received the message that Milo’s slaves 
wanted to murder him, he investigated the matter under consilium amicorum, and invited 
Cicero too to be a member of it,1447 and when Milo sent him the message that he was ready to 
withdraw from applying for the consul’s office, he replied that he did not want to directly 
intervene in filling offices in such fashion, so, he did not desire to persuade anybody to apply 
or dissuade anybody from applying.1448 Presumably, the reason for that might have been that 
Pompey was sure of the success of the candidates supported by him, and did not want that an 
election without opposing candidates should make the legitimacy of the elected consuls 
questionable.1449 At the same time, Pompey tried to give the impression that he was really 
afraid of an assassination purportedly threatening him from the side of Milo and his 
adherents;1450 however, the issue of the assassination attempts cannot be clarified, and it 
cannot be decided whether Milo’s men were preparing for such an act indeed or the news 
spread about it served nothing else than increasing antipathy against Milo. 
On 22 January, Milo asked Pompey to grant him an audience and offered him to waive his 
application for the consul’s office, Pompey, however, declared that he did not want to 
intervene in such fashion in public affairs—yet, he refused to give Milo the opportunity to 
meet him personally.1451 On 23 January, Q. Pompeius Rufus accused Milo before the contio 
of preparing for an assassination against Pompey.1452 Around 27 January, tribune M. Caelius 
Rufus and Milo stepped before the contio with the argument that Clodius had prepared for 
assassination against Milo. 
It might have been in early February, between 3 and 10 that they issued the resolution of the 
senate that authorised Pompey to hold conscription all over Italy and recruit an army;1453 it 
might have been at the same time that they adopted the senatus consultum ultimum that 
ordered “state of emergency”.1454 Although Dio Cassius dates the senatus consultum ultimum 
to the days immediately following Clodius’s death1455 and conscription by Pompey to a time 
somewhat later;1456 yet, even at this point no weighty arguments support that Asconius’s 
precise description and the chronology based on it should be questioned.1457 Around 18 
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February, in the senate Q. Metellus Scipio heavily attacked Milo’s defence referring to self-
defence1458 and declared that Milo’s arguing was unfounded due to all the circumstances of 
the case, the number of the slaves as well as the number of injuries and deaths suffered on the 
sides of the opposing parties. At the end of February, Pompey returned to Rome, however, he 
set up his accommodation in his villa outside the pomerium, claiming that there he felt more 
secure of Milo.1459 
At the end of February or at the beginning of Intercalarius, Clodius’s two cousins, with the 
support of Valeius Nepos and Valerius Leo, put forth the claim under actio ad exhibendum 
that Milo and his wife, Fausta should extradite their slaves so that they could be interrogated 
in Pompey’s presence; for the same purpose Herennius Balbus announced their claim for 
Clodius’s slaves, and Caelius Rufus demanded extradition of Quintus Pompeius’s and 
Hypsaeus’s slaves. Hortensius argued that Milo’s slaves could not be extradited as now they 
were freemen since their master had liberated them for saving his life. At that time, the six 
most important and most venerable representatives of the optimates, Quintus Hortensius, 
Cicero, Marcus Marcellus, Marcus Calidius, Fautus Sulla and Marcus Porcius Cato clearly 
stood up for Milo already.1460 Simultaneously, rumours started to spread about electing 
Pompey1461 or Caesar dictator.1462 The office of the thirteenth interrex after Clodius’s death, 
Servius Sulpicius Rufus, which commenced on the twenty-first day of Intercalarius, was 
interrupted on the 24 by electing Pompey—rather doubtfully in terms of public law—consul 
sine collega, that is, his one-person consulship,1463 which took place (with quite a propaganda 
value) one day after the Regifugium, i.e., the holiday celebrating the chasing away of 
kings.1464 The senate granted Pompey the right to choose a collega beside him, however, only 
after two months later.1465 
On the twenty-sixth day of Intercalarius, Pompey—with express reference to the events at 
Bovillae and setting the Curia on fire—put forward a proposal to the senate to make the 
sanction of vis and ambitus stricter and to reform the order of procedure of both crimes in 
such form that, first, hearing of the witnesses would be implemented, then, the prosecution 
would have two and the defence three hours to plead their arguments.1466 Milo and his 
adherents, as a matter of fact, felt the danger implied by setting up the quaestio 
extraordinaria, and on the following days made an attempt at thwarting the enactment of the 
law, so, for example, tribune Caelius Rufus was compelled to back out only upon being 
threatened by Pompey by armed forces.1467 On the twenty-seventh day of Intercalarius, Q. 
Hortensius, supported by Cicero, put forward a proposal that Clodius’s assassination, setting 
the Curia on fire and attacking Aemilius Lepidus’s house should be qualified contra rem 
publicam acts1468 so that thereby he could take the edge of Pompey’s laws directed against 
Milo and his act could be judged under quaestio ordinaria.1469 Q. Fufius Calenus demanded 
that Clodius’s death should be treated separately from other events,1470 however, this proposal 
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was vetoed by T. Mutatius Plancius and C. Sallustius Crispus.1471 On 1 March, Pompey’s 
laws were enacted,1472 their ratification must have taken place after 26 March, once the 
popular assembly had accepted them. In the meantime, Cicero went to Ravenna to try to 
persuade Caesar—in order to counterbalance Pompey’s political overweight—to apply in 
absentia for consulate.1473 
On 15 March, Pompey postponed the session of the senate claiming that he was afraid of 
Milo’s armed attack.1474 At the next session, P. Cornifius charged Milo of having come to the 
senate with arms; thereupon, Milo lifted his tunica so that they could see that he had come 
without arms. In response, Cicero declared that all charges against Milo were fabrications.1475 
At a contio, T. Mutatius Planus summoned one of Marcus Lepidus‘s libertines, M. Aemilius 
Philemon, who alleged that as he witnessed Clodius’s assassination Milo took him captive 
and kept him in custody for two months. According to Asconius, this allegation—whether it 
was true or not—seemed to be suitable for turning public feeling against Milo.1476 Plancus and 
Q. Pompeius Rufus also summoned a triumvir capitalis, and questioned him if he had 
detained Galata, one of Milo’s slaves, who took part in killing Clodius. The triumvir capitalis 
said only that the slave was caught as fugitivus at a taberna, and that the tribunes did not let 
him taken back to Milo. The next day, M. Caelius Rufus and another tribune took the slave 
back to Milo.1477 Cicero was under increasing pressure to leave Milo to his fate; yet, he 
resolutely stood by him.1478 
On 26 March, the popular assembly passed the two leges Pompeiae—this interval was 
necessary because lex Caecilia Didia of 98 stipulated that between rogatio and promulgatio a 
trium nundinum should elapse, which expired by then.1479 L. Domitius Ahenobarbus was 
elected quaesitor of the court of justice set up on the grounds of Pompey’s laws.1480 Clodius’s 
two cousins, who had earlier brought a charge of de vi against Milo, brought a charge of 
ambitus now based on the new laws against Milo, the prosecution was joined by C. Ateius 
and L. Cornificius; P. Fulvius Neratus brought a charge of de socaliciis against Milo.1481 
Between 27 March and 3 April, A. Manlius Torquatus held divinatio to choose from among 
the four applicants who wanted to represent the charge of ambitus, and Appius Claudius 
senior, one of Clodius’s cousins, who brought a charge of vis too, was chosen; P. Valerius 
Leo and Cn. Domitius acted as co-prosecutors.1482 On 4 April, Milo’s representatives 
appeared before the court of justice chaired by M. Marcellus and attained that the lawsuit due 
to ambitus would be postponed to a date after the proceedings to be conducted due to vis.1483 
Appius Claudius demanded extradition of Milo’s fifty-four slaves for interrogation, 
whereupon Milo replied that they were no longer under his control; Domitius as quaesitor 
ordered that Claudius should select the slaves to be interrogated.1484 C. Causinius Schola 
testified that he was present when Clodius was assassinated, M. Marcellus wanted to put 
questions to him but the Clodiani made so much clamour and disturbance that Marcellus 
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Domitius was compelled to seek protection on the judge’s pulpit. All this induced Pompey to 
promise to safeguard the trials thereafter with arms.1485 
Pompey managed to bring Clodius’s adherents under control to a certain extent for the time of 
hearing the witnesses. In the course of that the attack against the inn, killing the innkeeper and 
throwing Clodius’s corpse on the road were revealed.1486 M. Porcius Cato confessed that M. 
Favonius had said to him: Clodius declared on 15 January that Milo would be dead in three 
days.1487 On 6 April, Clodius’s mother-in-law, Sempronia and his wife, Fulvia testified, which 
considerably made the public feeling side with them.1488 After that, T. Munatius Plancus held 
a contio where he fired the crowd up so that they should not let Milo escape.1489 
Perhaps the weakest performance in Cicero’s career took place in this lawsuit: both the 
Clodiana multitudo and Pompey’s soldiers embarrassed him, clamours and shouting in 
stopped him short, made him irresolute, what is more, frightened him; he could not deliver the 
prepared speech with the planned constantia, he spoke flustered unable to collect his 
thoughts.1490 His delivered speech was taken down in shorthand as usual; and Asconius could 
still read the minutes that contained the speech and shouting in; it is, therefore, an indisputable 
fact that Pro Milone published later—as a matter of fact, apart from certain overlapping 
thoughts—is not fully identical with the oratio made on 8 April 52.1491 Afterwards, Cicero 
recalled this unsuccessful performance with indifference—whether pretended or real 
indifference it cannot be decided.1492 According to Dio Cassius’s narrative, it was on this day 
that Milo tried to persuade Cicero to get out of his lectica only after the court of justice had 
appeared so that the soldiers and the heckled crowd should not increase his tension since he 
usually struggled with strong stage fright when he started his speeches as it is generally 
known.1493 
Shops were closed on the day of the trial, the Forum was secured by Pompey’s army; first, the 
accusers, Appius Claudius, M. Antonius and P. Valerius Nepos spoke, then, as the only 
defender, Cicero. Milo was convicted at a rate of thirty-eight/thirteen.1494 On 8 or 9 April, 
Milo was convicted due to ambitus too in his absence.1495 On 11 or 12 April, Milo was again 
convicted due to vis based on lex Plautia in his absence.1496 After 12 April, M. Saufeius, who 
took part in the clash at Bovillae and against whom a charge of vis was brought and was 
defended by Cicero and Caelius Rufus, was acquitted by one vote.1497 Approximately on 13 
April, Milo went into exile to Massilia.1498 After 18 April, a charge was brought again against 
Saufeius on the grounds of lex Plautia—he was defended, beside M. Terentius Varro Gibba, 
by Cicero again—but he was acquitted at a rate of thirty-two/nineteen.1499 Against Sextus 
Cloelius, who had Clodius’s corpse taken to the Curia and was thereby indirectly considered 
instigator of setting the Curia on fire, a charge was brought after 22 April, and he was 
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convicted with a huge majority of the votes cast as public feeling turned against the Clodian 
mob again.1500 
 
IV. 3. 3. Handling of the facts of the case in Pro Milone 
 
M. Iunius Brutus—one of Caesar’s later assassins, addressee of Cicero’s history of eloquence 
entitled Brutus—voicing the conviction of several people, represented the view in his 
fictitious speech written in defence of Milo and published later that the assassination of 
Clodius constituted huge gain for the State.1501 According to Asconius, in his delivered speech 
Cicero took up the position that though a person might be convicted for the sake of the public 
but in the absence of lawful judgment or other statutory authorisation nobody should be killed 
by referring to the interest of the state1502—so, it is unambiguously clear that it was only the 
version of the speech left to us, i.e., the not only extensively re-edited but re-written version 
representing a completely new argument at certain points (which was published for 
legitimisation purposes and was in circulation as a political pamphlet), into which Cicero built 
the train of thoughts that acknowledgement rather than punishment would be due to Milo for 
killing Clodius as thereby he had done immense service to res publica.1503 At the same time, it 
is possible to accept Andrew Lintott’s view that, compared to Asconius’s account, the rest of 
the arguments of the published speech and the delivered oration might have mostly 
overlapped.1504 
Obviously, Cicero could not argue differently—as it was an undeniable fact that Milo’s slaves 
had killed Clodius—than by claiming that they acted in a situation of lawful defence as decent 
slaves ought to, that is, they protected their master.1505 As a key legal argument he uses the 
“vim vi” and “arma armis repellere cuique licet” principle.1506 Right at the beginning of his 
speech he makes it clear that he would base his argument on it as follows. The end of the 
prooemium/exordium contains the description of the legal question of the case (stasis, status, 
quaestio, constitutio). The possible forms of handling the case in accordance with Antique 
rhetorical theory are as follows: in the case of status coniecturalis it had to be clarified 
whether the suspect had committed the act, i.e., the question is aimed at the person of the 
perpetrator; status definitivus applied to the legal classification of the admitted act; in the case 
of status generalis or qualitativus they investigated if the committed act was subject to the 
scope of the given punitive statute; and in the case of status translativus they examined which 
law was to be applied and which court of justice was competent in the case. Status generalis 
can be taken more or less as the equivalent of the present-day reasons for excluding 
unlawfulness—for example, lawful defence, state of emergency, etc. Others argued that the 
case should be judged in terms of status generalis; more specifically, that killing of Clodius 
was not a crime because it served the interest of the state, thus, it occurred completely rightly. 
Cicero did not choose this path since he did not want to use either the tool of deprecatio (by 
which the accused admits his guilt and asks for pardon referring to his earlier merits) or the 
opportunity of comparatio, which presents the act as a deed performed for the sake of the 
state. In his argument he used the tool of relatio criminis1507 and wanted to prove that Clodius 
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had intended to murder Milo, and Milo had acted in self-defence only. At the same time, it 
can be established that setting out from the stable legal and political grounds of reference to 
the situation of lawful defence he does not lay smaller emphasis on emotional impact and uses 
the tool of comparatio, that is, he presents Milo’s act committed in self-defence as a deed 
beneficial to the State—the latter assessment was most probably not voiced in the delivered 
speech and was inserted in the published version only.1508 
The argument of the prosecution somewhat helped Cicero as the Appii Claudii argued that 
Milo set a trap for Clodius with premeditated malice to be able to murder him, which Cicero 
could easily refute.1509 The primary aim of the court of justice set up by Pompey must have 
been to punish the abettors—in this case Milo, who did not kill Clodius with his own hands—
rather than the slaves and freemen belonging to the people of the house of Milo and Clodius 
who clashed on Via Appia. In accordance with that, the phrase “dolo malo” well-known from 
the praetor’s edict1510 was in several cases adopted in the usage of quaestiones de vi too.1511 
On the other hand, to distinguish voluntary homicide from involuntary homicide, the phrase 
“dolo” was used already in the par(r)icida definition attributed to King Numa.1512 Lex 
Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis ordered to punish bearing of arms suitable for manslaughter 
and bearing of arms with intent to kill.1513 Taking all this into consideration, there are good 
chances for presuming that lex Pompeia de vi providing grounds for the proceedings against 
Milo also contained the phrase “dolo (malo)” and, accordingly, the accusers might have also 
wanted to prove that the act had been premeditated, prepared, which Cicero could easily 
refute.1514 
Accordingly, Cicero, responding to the usage of the prosecution, uses the phrases “insidiae” 
and “insidiator” several times;1515 however, he strives to refute that the point would have 
been that both Milo and Clodius had planned in advance to kill the other, and emphasises that 
the plan of the murder was formulated and became determination unilaterally in Clodius.1516 
He convincingly refers to the opportunity provided by ius naturale that killing of the 
aggressor insidiator does not qualify an unlawful act.1517 Cicero endeavours to turn it to his 
and his defendant’s advantage that the senate qualified the events taken place on Via Appia 
treason when he tries to prove regarding the clash that it was seemingly condemned but 
practically approved by the senate.1518 In the narratio the orator touches on lawful defence as 
well as stresses that the slaves killed Clodius not upon Milos’s instructions.1519 Presentation of 
the situation of lawful defence bears a clear resemblance to the relevant locus in Pro Sestio 
where the orator describes Sestius’s act as the only possible form of defence against 
Clodius.1520 Cicero, at least in the version of the speech left to us, elegantly disregards the 
point of the case most critical to Milo: the attacking of the inn, that is, the circumstance that 
even the most brilliant orator could not have presented as direct outcome or manifestation of 
lawful defence. 
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After the speeches had been delivered, both the prosecution and the defence repudiated and 
demanded expulsion of five senators, five knights and five aerar tribunes from the members of 
the quaestio;1521 so, a total of fifty-one jurors voted. According to Asconius, twelve senators, 
thirteen knights and thirteen aerar tribunes voted for Milo’s guilt, and six senators, four 
knights and three aerar tribunes voted for his innocence; furthermore, Asconius describes that 
according to certain people Marcus Porcius Cato most certainly took a stand for acquitting the 
accused as he declared several times that Clodius’s death was a great relief to res publica.1522 
During the following days Milo went into voluntary exile to Massilia. 
Milo’s property was sold by auction for the twenty-fourth of the real value, which either 
meant the real ratio or was indicated merely in the sense of a very low amount,1523 but in this 
respect it is not possible to answer the question with full certainty whether this took place as 
second punishment of the judgment, i.e., through state sectores, or merely due to accumulated 
debts under usual bankruptcy proceedings on creditors’ initiative paying regard to the fact that 
the debtor went into exilium.1524 Yet, the following arguments are in favour of the above. 
Publicatio bonorum was connected with traditional exile as punishment (aquae et igni 
interdictio) in accordance with Sulla’s laws, and this state most probably existed until 
Caesar’s legislation, which increased punishment for homicide by forfeiture of property as 
second punishment.1525 In this respect perduellio was considered an exception because in 
most of the cases forfeiture of full property was imposed as second punishment.1526 Lex 
Plautia de vi held out the prospect of exile,1527 however, lex Pompeia de vi, which provided 
grounds for the proceedings against Milo, framed a not specifically known but stricter 
sanction, which might have meant forfeiture of property too, and the circumstances of the 
case and Cicero’s correspondence1528 allow to make it possible that the sale of Milo’s 
property by auction did not serve satisfaction of private law claims but was implemented as 
second punishment of exile.1529 
 
IV. 3. 4. The published version of Pro Milone – reasons for publication  
 
It is worth paying some attention to the question why Cicero published Pro Milone in a re-
written and re-edited version. It is all the more noteworthy because Cicero usually did not 
publish his speeches delivered in lost lawsuits.1530 Perhaps it is not needless to survey the 
series of the most important, winning defence speeches left to us: on the basis of Pro Roscio 
Amerino (in 80), Pro Cluentio (in 66), Pro Murena (in 63), Pro Sulla (in 62), Pro Archia 
poeta (in 62), Pro Flacco (in 59), Pro Sestio (in 56), Pro Caelio (in 56), Pro Balbo (in 56), 
Pro Plancio (in 54), Pro Scauro (in 54), Pro Rabirio Postumo (in 53) and Pro Ligario (in 46), 
to the best of our knowledge, Cicero’s defendants were acquitted. The outcome of Pro Roscio 
comoedo (presumably in 76), Pro Fonteio (in 69) is not known; the trial of Pro Rabirio 
perduellionis (in 63) was interrupted.1531 In this respect, Pro Milone is an exception: the 
accused was convicted, Cicero, however, published the revised version of the speech. From 
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among defeated oral pleadings, in addition to Pro Milone, Pro Valero, delivered between 80 
and 70 and lost in the meantime, was published; Cicero did not publish the unsuccessful 
speeches delivered in defence of Scamander (in 74), Antonius (in 59), Cispius (in 56), L. 
Caninius Gallus (in 55), Gabinius (in 54) and Scaurus (in 52); accordingly, they have not been 
left to us. The speech delivered in defence of Manilius in 65, with an outcome not known to 
us, has not been left to us either. During the ten years preceding the Milo lawsuit, Cicero 
managed winning cases only, in this respect and with regard to the fact of publishing, Pro 
Milone constitutes an exception.1532 
Wilfried Stroh explains the publication of Pro Milone by pedagogical reasons, that is, 
Cicero’s intention was to set an exemplum to young orators.1533 On the other hand, there must 
have been not much sense in Cicero setting the speech of a lost lawsuit as an example to 
students; at most it can be conceived on the basis of the explanation that he might have 
wanted to demonstrate by the revised version what speech he should have delivered in order 
to win the lawsuit. However, even the revised Pro Milone—which might have satisfied the 
orator-artist Cicero’s demands in vain—would have demonstrated the politician Cicero’s 
defeat to the general public. Taking all this into consideration, just as in the case of the second 
Philippic, there must have been primarily political reasons for publishing Pro Milone.1534 
 
IV. 3. 5. The motif of killing the tyrant as further development of lawful defence  
 
Below it is worth investigating how the motif of killing the tyrant appears in the speech 
delivered in defence of Milo, more precisely, in the published speech left to us, and how it is 
reflected and more elaborately worked out in Cicero’s later philosophical works. As a starting 
point it must be made clear that harmonisation of the defence of dignitas and legitimised 
application of vis—i.e., killing the tyrant as a category of public law/philosophy of the state—
was integrated in Cicero’s philosophy only after Milo’s unsuccessful defence and publication 
of the re-written/re-edited version of the speech.1535 
There is a completely striking connection between the portrait of the tyrant in De re 
publica1536 and the formulation of the demand to eliminate the tyrant from public life1537 and 
the image of “Milo as tyrannoktonos”.1538 Accordingly, tyranny is created not through filling 
some office, position or dignity; the tyrant carries the core of tyranny in his personality, being, 
which is aimed at a single goal: dominatio over his fellow-citizens, and, eventually, at seizing 
regnum.1539 Thus, the civis who frees the State from the plague of tyranny is nothing else than 
tutor et procurator rei publicae, that is, healer of the community. In Pro Milone the contrast 
becomes sharp and clear: Clodius appears as tyrannus,1540 his death as killing the tyrant,1541 
Milo as conservator populi, and through killing Clodius as tutor et procurator rei 
publicae.1542 As a historical example for tyrant Cicero very often mentions Tarquinius 
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Superbus, Sp. Maelius and Ti. Gracchus,1543 and refers to Verres from the recent past.1544 
Cicero himself was several times called tyrant by his political opponents and enemies.1545 
Cicero’s theory of killing the tyrant is primarily based on stoic philosophy;1546 at the same 
time, it is important to underline that this theory is not a direct philosophical transformation of 
the “vim vi repellere licet” principle that serves the legal postulate of defence in Pro Sestio 
and Pro Milone.1547 The stoic element of the motif of killing the tyrant can be demonstrated 
most clearly, what is more, in a form uttered by Cicero, in the third book of De officiis written 
in 44.1548 He declares that the element of killing the tyrant1549 is fully in harmony with stoic 
philosophy,1550 which also complies with naturalis ratio,1551 i.e., it is the ultimate conclusion 
of ethical consideration.1552 In view of the fact that the tyrant ruins human community and 
places himself outside the rules of coexistence,1553 accordingly, these rules are not binding 
him either.1554 Cicero extends this principle to a wider scope, more specifically, he 
harmonises it with the norms of ius naturale, ius gentium, ius divinum and ius humanum.1555 
The stoic sage acts in harmony with the laws of nature when he eliminates the tyrant from 
society, imitates the efforts of Hercules made for the sake of mankind.1556 
Cicero transforms the thesis of stoic moral philosophy into the legal thinking and concepts of 
the Romans.1557 His reasoning culminates in turning the right of killing the tyrant into the 
ethical/legal command of killing the tyrant: making common cause with the tyrant is 
excluded, he must be barred and removed from human community since he is nothing else 
than a beast having assumed human form.1558 Phalaris’s case is Cicero’s most favourite 
example, and by that he demonstrates that assassination is not only ethically fair but it is 
definitely a moral obligation (honestum necare), elimination of the tyrant from the community 
(feritas et immanitas beluae segreganda est). This again is in line with the identification of 
the tyrannus with belua also present in stoic philosophy, which is clearly formulated in De re 
publica too1559 in such form that the tyrant is the most harmful species of animals, which is 
the most hateful subhuman being both to gods and humans, that is, it lives merely in figura 
hominis.1560 Thus, the key attributes of the tyrant can be described by the following concepts: 
nulla societas, belua, genus pestiferum, exul, contra leges, contra naturam; i.e., a being close 
to a subhuman form of existence, whose assassination cannot constitute moral offence just as 
killing any harmful beast.1561 
In Pro Milone this train of thoughts and images can be clearly followed. Cicero devotes two 
paragraphs to Clodius’s sexual debaucheries,1562 three to his religious offences,1563 and 
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underlines his crimes committed against natural law and positive law.1564 All this properly 
substantiates the image depicted of Clodius’s beastly nature: the net of laws, which served to 
catch Clodius, the beast, who wants to seize regnum,1565 and of which he slipped out several 
times, and the representation of the wild beast hiding in darkness creates the image of beastly 
existence.1566 The wild animal topos occurs several times in Cicero’s corpus in the 
characterisation of both Clodius1567 and Antonius.1568 So, Clodius was nothing else than a 
belua upsetting the order of Roman societas, terrorising decent citizens, among others Cicero 
and Pompey,1569 who tried to carry through the seizing of dominatio by undermining laws 
(legibus Clodianis) too, as it is an immanent feature of every tyrant,1570 and in 58 Cicero 
himself almost fell victim to this legislation crushing the law, more precisely lex Clodia de 
capite civium. 
When Cicero refers to the circumstance of the situation of lawful defence excluding 
unlawfulness with regard to Milo’s defence,1571 on the one hand, he supports his argument by 
the terminology of the relevant passage of lex Cornelia de sicariis,1572 on the other hand, he 
does not refer to written law but to man’s innate right derived from nature in order to prove 
Milo’s act, for if an assassin, aggressor, robber or enemy attacks somebody by arms, then he 
can use every means to protect his life.1573 Consequently, in killing the insidiator, that is, 
Clodius, Milo followed the law of nature as the force of positive law does not prevail in such 
cases, for in war law is silent, and the assassin can be killed rightly.1574 With the aid of the 
basic principles of stoic philosophy, among others, Cicero extends the scope of lawful defence 
to a wide domain: educated persons were allowed by common sense, barbaric tribes by 
necessity, peoples by unwritten law and wild beasts by nature to drive back every attack of 
violence every time by every means.1575 
The orator, however, does not confine himself to prove lawfulness of Milo’s act: it is not 
punishment at all but praise that he would deserve for killing Clodius since he did a great 
service to State so to say unselfishly because all of his acts were motivated—as Cicero 
asserts—by his commitment to public good.1576 It is in this spirit that he makes Milo speak: he 
makes him wish citizens and the State tranquil and undisturbed life even at the expense of his 
own exile.1577 He raises this train of thoughts and greatness of Milo’s act to a divine-cosmic 
sphere and strikes a tone that he uses later in Somnium Scipionis when praising the merits of 
men who work for the public.1578 By that he opens a new dimension for the interpretation of 
the “vim vi repellere” principle as he distinguishes between two kinds of vis: baleful violence 
used by Clodius and the force that guarantees survival of Rome by which providence, i.e., 
providentia itself intervened as saviour through Milo in the fate of the State.1579 Therefore, in 
this sense, his defendant is no longer an independent doer but an agent who fulfils the 
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prediction made by Cicero in 57 that Milo would kill Clodius,1580 that is, a means of 
providentia because divine providence, destiny had let Clodius stay alive so that it could fulfil 
his punishment at a given place, given time and under given circumstances by Milo’s 
hands.1581 
All this is unambiguously reverberated in the relevant paragraphs of De officiis. Providentia, 
which is the form of appearance of stoic fatum,1582 that is, heimarmenē, is manifested through 
the sapiens, who is, on the basis of naturae ratio, not only entitled but obliged to kill the 
tyrannus that annihilates coniunctio civium.1583 So, in this respect, Milo is nothing else than a 
manifestation of the archetype of stoic sapiens, who, having realised naturae ratio, fulfilled 
the order of heimarmenē and freed the State from the contagion poisoning the community. 
Law and statutes, i.e., state authority was not and would not have been able to bring the peril 
embodied by Clodius under control,1584 law and order of the State could not put proper tools 
into Milo’s hands to act as avenger.1585 
It is known from Asconius that there are significant differences between the speech delivered 
in defence of Milo and the speech published, and before delivering the speech Cicero had 
rejected Brutus’s proposal to refer to lawfulness of killing the tyrant in Milo’s defence.1586 
The fact that he did not achieve his goal, that is, he did not attain Milo’s acquittal most 
probably made the orator change his tactics of argument in the re-written Pro Milone 
disseminated also as a political pamphlet.1587 Presumably, before making the speech, it was 
not for theoretical reasons that Cicero refused to accept Brutus’s argument as in 63 he himself 
had several conspirators executed without judgment and undertook the defence of Rabirius 
charged with perduellio—the difference between these cases and Milo’s case was that the 
latter was not backed by senatus consultum ultimum.1588 In 57, Cicero cherished hopes 
regarding Clodius’s assassination by recalling the example of Scipio Nasica who killed Ti. 
Gracchus as tyrant, but at that time he had not placed himself beyond the limits of positive 
law yet.1589 In the speech delivered he endeavoured to use the system of argument of positive 
law and was reluctant to resort to the tools of legitimisation of stoic philosophy—his efforts 
were not crowned by success. Afterwards, in the published version he used the system of 
argument of stoic philosophy, which he later on shaped into a structure of profound thoughts 
with respect to the idea of killing the tyrant in De re publica, De finibus bonorum et malorum, 
Tusculanae disputationes—in which he defined the time of the dialogue as the period of 
Milo’s lawsuit—and in De officiis. He might have meant the oral pleadings, stylised into a 
paper on the philosophy of the state, which highlights Milo’s unselfishness and self-sacrifice 
and which sets Milo as an example of the stoic sage, to provide consolatio for Milo.1590  
In what follows it is worth following Aislinn Melchior’s train of thoughts that convincingly 
proves that in the version of Pro Milone left to us Cicero consequently enforces the tendency 
in Milo’s representation that he compares his defendant and his acts performed for the sake of 
res publica to his own merits obtained during suppression of Catilina’s plot and identifies him 
with himself. All this might have primarily served a given political goal: as his own fate 
exemplifies the opportunity of returning/being called back from unlawful exile, he is hoping 
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that Milo will be called back too, and that is what he wanted to advance by publishing the 
oratio.1591 
The key points of identifying the two persons, Cicero and Milo are as follows: both did noble 
service to the State as they freed the community of the tyrant, however, the ungrateful crowd 
forced both of them into exile. These similarities should bring along the following as logical 
consequences: if Cicero was able to return home from exile triumphantly, then Milo should 
return home too. The enemies of Cicero and Milo embody an identical principium: in the 
identification Cicero represents Clodius as second Catilina, however, it is not Pro Milone 
where this image occurs for the first time—this identification emerges several times after his 
return from exile; for example, in De domo sua Clodius appears as felix Catilina.1592 In Pro 
Milone, identification of Clodius with Catilina is carried out by applying certain appositions 
rather than by name. In this respect it is worth comparing the usage of Pro Milone with that of 
the speeches against Catilina. The key characteristics of both Catilina and the conspirators are 
furor1593 and audacia;1594 they appear as latro,1595 insidiator1596 and parricida.1597 Clodius and 
his adherents are also characterised by furor1598 and audacia1599 just as by the classifications 
latro,1600 insidiator1601 and parricida.1602 The identification of Catilina with Clodius develops 
most clearly at the point where the orator speaks about the causes of his own exile,1603 and in 
relation to it characterises Clodius as it were as the “legal successor” of Catilina who 
undermined the State. 
Accordingly, Cicero identifies Milo’s role with his own, representing both of them as 
archetypal manifestations of real patriotism, who qualified the State for this role by 
undertaking the sublime task of killing the tyrant, that is, Clodius—in the case of Milo—and 
chasing away Catilina and having the conspirators executed—in the case of Cicero; just as the 
great and the good of past times, C. Servilius Ahala who killed Spurius Maelius, Publius 
Scipio Nasica who did away with Tiberius Gracchus, Lucius Opimius who used the 
opportunities provided by senatus consultum ultimum and did away with Caius Gracchus, and 
Caius Marius who rendered L. Saturninus harmless.1604 In the first speech against Catilina the 
orator calls the example of exactly the same men to his audience’s mind when he urges that 
Catilina should be rendered harmless.1605 In view of the fact that at the time of publishing Pro 
Milone the speeches against Catilina constituted exempla of Roman rhetorical training to be 
learned by heart, Cicero could certainly expect the readers of the oral pleadings to recognise 
the reminiscences implied by the enumeration without doubt and draw necessary conclusions 
from them with respect to the parallels between the roles of Milo and Cicero.1606 
The characters of Spurius Maelius and Tiberius Gracchus return in the second sermocinatio of 
Pro Milone, i.e., in the passage where the orator calls Milo as it were as a fictitious 
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speaker,1607 which can be considered as a kind of reminiscence of the given locus of the fourth 
Catilinarian oration again where Cicero expounds that Catilina represents a danger to the 
State greater than any of the former subversive elements, the Gracchuses and L. 
Saturninus.1608 Thereby the orator clearly demonstrates that Clodius, rendered harmless by 
Milo, also carried danger to State greater than former subversive elements, measurable only to 
the peril caused by Catilina. Just as Cicero mentions himself as conservator civium, Milo also 
becomes conservator populi.1609 When he puts the statement into Milo’s mouth that he fended 
off Clodius’s dagger that he drove at citizens’ throat,1610 it is a clear allusion to the passage of 
the third Catilinarian oration where Cicero tells the same about himself regarding Catilina’s 
weapons.1611 It appears also as a parallel between Cicero and Milo that both of them saved the 
State and peace of citizens at the expense of risking their own life and safety.1612 (At the same 
time, the orator makes use of the identification properly in other respects too: he opposes 
Milo’s courage to his own fear,1613 and Milo’s face and glance turned rigid as marble to his 
own tears.1614) 
The identification of Milo with himself has further tempting opportunities in store: in the 
person of Milo who kills Clodius he can triumph over the dead primordial enemy.1615 In spite 
of the fact that no direct evidence is available to us that by publishing the speech Cicero 
wanted to attain that Milo should be called home from exile, all these parallels and 
identifications give us a good chance of presuming it.1616 
When Cicero forwarded a copy of the published speech—which is one of the masterpieces of 
both rhetoric and political pamphlets indeed—to Milo too, allegedly he made the only remark 
that if earlier Cicero had spoken before court like that too, then now he could not eat the 
superb fish that can be caught solely in Massilia.1617 Cicero was not wrong—this statement 
makes us discern: in a certain sense Milo was a stoic sage indeed. 
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V. Caesar as judge and the injured party (Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, Pro rege Deiotaro)  
 
 
V. 1. Marcus Claudius Marcellus’s case 
 
 
The oration in defence of Marcus Claudius Marcellus was delivered in September 46 at a 
session of the senate, that is, its title (which suggests a statement of the defence before court 
of justice) does not cover its real genre or the rhetoric situation as it was produced as a 
political speech. The speech is actually a vote of thanks addressed to Caesar for granting 
pardon to M. Claudius Marcellus, one of the leading figures of the defeated anti-Caesarian 
party. Thus, Pro Marcello, one of the significant works of the late phase of Cicero’s oeuvre, 
and the first item of the so-called orationes Caesarianae, was created seemingly as a 
statement of the defence, actually as a political oration: it seems to be a statement of the 
defence, however, it is a highly important element of the corpus of Cicero’s theory of the state 
and politics.  
First, we intend to give a brief account of the changes in the relation between Cicero and 
Caesar in the mirror of Corpus Ciceronianum, primarily speeches, which is indispensable for 
the in-depth analysis of the oration. (V. 1. 1.); then, we outline the historical background of 
the speech, determining its place in Cicero’s philosophy of the state. (V. 1. 2.) After that, we 
analyse the orator’s tactic used in Pro Marcello, although the orator’s tactic will have a 
different meaning in this context as this speech is not an oral pleading (V. 1. 3.), and we 
examine the role of the political virtue sapientia attributed to the dictator in the oration and 
with respect to the warnings and wishes formulated in political life by Cicero towards Caesar. 
(V. 1. 4.) Finally, we compare the image of Caesar outlined in the speech with the reality of 
politics of the period, the image of Caesar entertained by contemporaries, highlighting the role 
of clementia, which produces effect to a direction contrary to sapientia, and pointing out the 
impacts arising from lack of leader’s/ruler’s virtues, formulated by Cicero at this point, 
produced on public life of Rome. (V. 1. 5.) 
 
V. 1. 1. Changes in the relation between Cicero and Caesar in the mirror of Corpus 
Ciceronianum  
 
In the analysis of the background of the speech it is expedient to look into the details of the 
relation between Cicero and Caesar in the mirror of their political careers running side by side 
for several decades. Regarding amicitia between them, it occurs as a basic question if their 
friendship can be considered personal or political. Friedrich Lossmann emphasises the 
personal aspects of this friendship, underlining that within the elite of Rome it was only 
Caesar who turned honestly to Cicero, who hoped to receive such attention from among 
others Pompey in vain.1618 Cicero stressed the personal motivations of their friendship at 
several points;1619 on the other hand, he did not conceal the dark sides and problematic aspects 
of amicitia.1620 Contrary to that, Jörg Spielvogel places emphasis on the political aspects of 
the friendship.1621  
                                                 
1618
 Lossmann 1962. 149. 
1619
 Cic. prov. cons. 40; Att. 13, 52, 2. 
1620
 Cic. fam. 11, 27f. 
1621
 See also Spielvogel 1993. passim 
139 
 
Although Cicero calls his friendship with Caesar vetus amicitia,1622 it would be pure 
speculation to date this friendship back to their early youth.1623 The first documented political 
conflict between them evolved regarding Catilina’s plot when Cicero wanted to threaten 
Catilina with strict punishment and force him to go into voluntary exile.1624 D. Iunius Silanus 
consul designatus asked for capital punishment for the Catilinarii, whereas Caesar referred to 
lex Sempronia, which prohibited to execute any citizen of Rome without the approval of the 
popular assembly.1625 In this respect Cicero calls Caesar popularis, yet he distinguishes him 
from demagogues.1626 More specifically he refers to Caesar with some irony as homo 
mitissimus atque lenissimus,1627 and points out his origin from notable circles1628 and his 
popularity.1629 In this situation it is by no means possible to speak about a personal conflict 
since Caesar could call also Cicero, who had full knowledge of the situation and exposed the 
plot, as witness against those who charged him with taking part in the plot.1630  
A problem greater than Catilina’s plot was caused to the orator by the fluctuating relationship 
between Caesar and Pompey and the recurring conflict between them, which Cicero usually 
tried to settle. He did that by tacit diplomacy and not by rigour and sternness typical of Cato 
the Younger, who behaved as if he had lived in Plato’s ideal state and not in Romulus’s 
pigsty.1631 In 59 Caesar offered Cicero to go with him to Gallia as a legate but Cicero refused 
the invitation—by which Caesar would have made it possible for Cicero to leave Rome with 
dignity and avoid Clodius’s ambushes, however, the orator was confident in the help of 
Pompey and the optimates,1632 eventually he was disappointed in his hope.1633 Later, in 49, he 
still made an effort to mediate between Caesar and Pompey as he was sure of the amicitia of 
both of them.1634  
Interrogatio in Vatinium testem, the invective made and published in 56 in relation to the 
Sestius lawsuit provides interesting data on the relationship between Cicero and Caesar. To 
achieve his political aims, Caesar several times used forcible prevention of the acts of 
violence committed or moved by Vatinius, so, for example, of Bibulus’s obnuntiatio.1635 
Caesar could thank also to Vatinius that lex Vatinia de Caesaris provincia was enacted, which 
guaranteed him several extraordinary titles of power on the territory of Gallia Cisalpina and 
Illyicum. Likewise, he achieved that lex de alternis consiliis reiciendis was adopted, which—
contrary to earlier practice in criminal procedure—made it possible to exclude not only 
certain judges but also decuriae or orders in trials by jury.1636 The latest after he was elected 
tribune in 59, P. Vatinius acted as Caesar’s committed adherent, and in the year of his 
tribune’s office he participated in two rather dark cases. Yet Caesar was aware that Vatinius 
lacked moral firmness since in Aquileia he presumably declared that during his tribune’s 
office Vatinius did everything for payment.1637 In those days Vatinius wanted to be elected 
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augur,1638 however, he won this office in 48 only. At the beginning of 58, Vatinius stayed in 
Rome in order to support Clodius’s intrigues ultimately aimed at sending Cicero into exile; 
and later as legate he joined Caesar who acted as governor in Gallia. 
Cicero directly points out Vatinius ‘s relationship with Caesar and calls his audience’s or 
readers’ attention to the point that whenever Vatinius refers to Caesar’s example, his self-
justification does not stand because he cannot do what his influential patron can. In the attacks 
against Vatinius, Cicero consistently tries to separate Vatinius from Caesar and emphasises 
that in some of his foul deeds he acted contrary to Caesar’s command,1639 and that he opposed 
Caesar’s laws,1640 and in certain cases, e.g., regarding Vettius’s denunciation, he simply 
conceals that Caesar is privy to the case.1641 The orator speaks with scathing irony about 
Vatinius’s failed candidacy as aedil,1642 and regarding his opponent’s tribune’s activity1643 he 
makes a concealed attack against Caesar without mentioning him by name.1644 Most probably 
when creating his invective he was driven not only by his personal disposition and the belief 
that he could separate Vatinius from Caesar but by his conviction that he could reinforce the 
situation of the optimates and Pompey somewhat alienated from Caesar; at the same time, by 
concealing delicate points, he made a gesture to Caesar too as it were proving his intention to 
approach.1645 
To decide the proconsulate to be elected for the year 55, in the summer of 56 a trial was held 
on the two provinces in Gallia and Syria and Macedonia, and it was regarding this matter that 
De provinciis consularibus was delivered.1646 In this case Cicero tried to achieve that Caesar 
should be able to retain both Gallias and that Syria and Macedonia should be allocated by 
drawing of lots, which were lead by the consuls of 58, A. Gabinius and L. Calpurnius Piso 
having played a shameful role during Cicero’s exile, whom Cicero could thereby remove 
from the leadership of their provinces. Regarding this issue Cicero openly speaks about his—
past1647 and present1648—political aversion to Caesar, however, this hostile relation was 
motivated by causes of public life rather than personal reasons: as a senator faithful to res 
publica Cicero felt obliged to take firm action against those who in his belief acted against its 
interests,1649 that is, to offer Caesar the choice that if Caesar takes hostile acts against the 
state, then he should count Cicero among his resolute enemies too, if however he acts in line 
with the interests of the state, then he can consider Cicero as one his friends.1650 
By that the five-year period began for Cicero when he acted as a forced ally of the triumvirs 
until he left for Cilicia.1651 In this period he tried to maintain friendly relations both with 
Caesar and Pompey,1652 and in this he was willing to go as far as—although he did not accept 
various offices offered by Caesar—looking for and finding excuses for Caesar for the 
collaboration with Clodius.1653 Regarding Pompey he did not omit to underline that he had 
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highly advanced and supported his return from the exile.1654 At the end of the oration he sums 
up his relation to Caesar: if there were any hostility between them, it would be high time to do 
away with it keeping the interest of public in view, or at least postpone it to other times, 
however, there is no such conflict, the edge of presumed injuries have been removed by 
beneficia.1655 This way Cicero clearly declares that he fully subordinates his private sympathy 
and antipathy to public interest.1656 
In Pisonem was delivered in 55 in the senate1657 as Piso declared that the orator had long 
made Caesar and Pompey his enemies, who actively helped Clodius to force him into exile 
and cast it in Cicero’s teeth that he addressed his attacks solely to those whom he believed to 
be in a position weaker than his, and spared, what is more, flattered those whom he should 
actually feel anger against.1658 At the same time, he formulates cautious criticism against 
Pompey since he let himself be influenced by Cicero’s enemies and did not give him 
sufficient support against Clodius’s ambushes,1659 however, Caesar, in spite of the political 
tension between them, offered him his help and the opportunity of collaboration,1660 which 
Cicero did not use, so he Caesar acted in line with his own interests definitely contrary to 
Cicero’s interests.1661 All this the orator is willing to forget and strive to act in close co-
operation with them for the sake of the public.1662 
The letters written to Quintus also reveal friendly relation with Caesar,1663 which might arise 
from the fact that among the aristocrats of Rome it was almost only Caesar, being also a man 
of intellect, who fully acknowledged Cicero’s talent, not showing either open or implied 
haughtiness to the homo novus, and driven by practical consideration motivated by his own 
and public interests.1664 On the other hand, he resolutely refuses the charge of opportunism, 
that is, the reproaches claiming that he had given up his former political principles, he 
explains the approach to Caesar by commitment to sober politics adjusted to circumstances, 
desire to keep the peace of the state and wish to avoid civil war and violence.1665 However, 
the letters from this period, written to Atticus clearly reveal bitterness and disappointment: the 
optimates had left him in the lurch,1666 he acted like a fool,1667 he is looked down on and 
despised,1668 it is no longer possible to speak about state regarding Rome,1669 they are facing 
the age of dictatorship,1670 in this shipwreck Caesar can be the only firm support.1671 The latter 
statement could be considered an ironic remark, yet, the letters dated in 54 make it clear: 
Cicero wanted to rely on Caesar as a secure point indeed,1672 or at least he considered him an 
opportunity for the implementation of the least wrong. 
                                                 
1654
 Cic. prov. cons. 43. 
1655
 Cic. prov. cons. 47. 
1656
 Cf. Epstein 1987. 15. 
1657
 Cf. Nisbet 1961. 139. 
1658
 Cic. Pis. 72–82. 
1659
 Cic. Pis. 77. 
1660
 Cic. Pis. 79.  
1661
 Riemer 2001. 51f. 
1662
 Cic. Pis. 80. 
1663
 Cic. Q. fr. 2, 13, 1.  
1664
 Riemer 2001. 54. 
1665
 Cic. Q. fr. 1, 9, 17f. Cf. Fuhrmann 1991. 155f. 
1666
 Cic. Att. 4, 5, 1.  
1667
 Cic. Att. 4, 5, 3.  
1668
 Cic. Att. 4, 6, 2.  
1669
 Cic. Att. 4, 18, 2. 
1670
 Cic. Att. 4, 18, 3. 
1671
 Cic. Att. 4, 19, 2. 
1672
 Lossmann 1962. 129. 
142 
 
In the situation threatening with civil war in 50 Cicero unambiguously feels that both Pompey 
and Caesar want to see him on his side.1673 Although he makes Caesar liable for the outbreak 
of the civil war in the first place, he does not consider Pompey innocent in the evolution of the 
situation either since both of them aimed for exclusive dominatio, and placed their own 
interest over the interest of the state.1674 He compares Caesar crossing the Rubicon to 
Hannibal,1675 and excludes the opportunity of making concessions to him.1676 At the outbreak 
of the armed conflict he felt deeply desperate over Pompey’s willingness to wage a bloody 
war too,1677 and points out: as long as two men are alive, there is no hope for restoring res 
publica1678 since no matter which one of them wins, the result would be tyranny, so the only 
aim could be to preserve or create peace,1679 and for him the only path to follow is not to take 
sides with any of them and try to stay far from their competition.1680 Although Caesar tries to 
win him over,1681 he does not undertake the condition set by Cicero, to restore peace and enter 
into compromise with Pompey.1682 He deems Pompey’s reasons lawful, his war cruel, both his 
victory and defeat dangerous;1683 in case Pompey wins, he is afraid of proscriptiones, 
however, he presumes that Caesar would spare his former enemies.1684 He feels he knows 
whom he should keep away from but does not know whom he should approach.1685 
In spite of Caesar’s express request to refrain from taking a position,1686 in June 49 Cicero 
joins the position of the senate, i.e., Pompey, which he justified by the pressure produced by 
the optimates on him,1687 and his old commitment to Pompey,1688 so his decision can be 
attributed to personal rather than political motivation;1689 yet, having left Italy he does not stay 
longer at Pompey’s camp, after the battle at Pharsalus in the summer of 48 he goes to 
Brundisium and waits to see how events take place until he is granted mercy by Caesar in 
September 47 when he can at last return to Rome.1690 
 
V. 1. 2. The historical background of Pro Marcello and its place in Cicero’s philosophy 
of the state  
 
Pro Marcello—which seems to be a statement of the defence but actually is an oration 
addressed by Cicero to the dictator expressing gratefulness over the pardon granted by Caesar 
to Marcus Claudius Marcellus—was delivered by Cicero most probably in September 46, i.e. 
before the Ludi Caesaris, in the senate, breaking his silence after a long while.1691 After the 
series of festivities arranged in honour of Caesar the relation between them significantly 
                                                 
1673
 Cic. Att. 7, 1, 3. 
1674
 Cic. Att. 8, 11, 2; 10, 4, 4.  
1675
 Cic. Att. 7, 11, 1.  
1676
 Cic. Att. 7, 11, 4. 
1677
 Cic. Att. 9, 6, 6. 
1678
 Cic. Att. 9, 7, 1.  
1679
 Cic. Att. 7, 5, 4.  
1680
 Riemer 2001. 72. 
1681
 Cic. Att. 9, 6a; 9, 7a–c; 9, 13a; 9, 16. 
1682
 Cic. Att. 9, 18. 
1683
 Cic. Att. 10, 4, 3.  
1684
 Cic. fam. 7, 3, 2; Att. 9, 10, 6. 
1685
 Cic. Att. 8, 7, 2.  
1686
 Cic. Att. 10, 8b 
1687
 Cic. Att. 8, 16, 1. 
1688
 Cic. Att. 9, 19, 2. 
1689
 Bruhns 1978. 104f. 
1690
 Riemer 2001. 75. 
1691
 McDermott 1970. 317. 
143 
 
deteriorated, so it is hard to imagine that the orator praised the dictator in Pro Marcello.1692 
After the victory at Thapsus on 6 April 46 the senate showered Caesar, who came home on 25 
July from his campaign in Africa, with several honours—a fourteen day festivity, seventy-two 
lictores ordered to the triumphs, censor’s and praefectus morum’s office for three years and 
erecting a statue representing half-gods attributes, including the dictator’s power voted for ten 
years.1693 The weeks following homecoming were spent with preparing the series of 
festivities, and by Caesar working out an overall reform package, among others, on settling 
the veterans.1694 The dictator resolutely stood up for his peace politics and made efforts to win 
over his former enemies, including Cicero, as after Pharsalus he granted most of his enemies 
pardon,1695 and assigned prioritised tasks to some of them—Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, M. Iunius 
Brutus,1696 Dolabella and C. Cassius Longinus.1697 Based thereon in his letters Cicero could 
report good news to his friends still in exile, so for example, to Ligarius,1698 Trebianus1699 and 
Nigidius Figulus.1700 
At this time Cicero could feel safe in Rome as he received proper security from Caesar and 
owing to the good offices of his friends A. Hirtius and L. Cornelius Balbus who were given 
positions in the new administration and C. Cassius Longinus, M. Iunius Brutus and P. 
Cornelius Dolabella who received pardon.1701 At the request of and addressed to Brutus he 
wrote the work on the history of rhetoric named after the addressee (entitled Brutus) and he 
began Cato maior de senectute.1702 Cassius, Dolabella and Hirtius stayed long at their 
master’s villa in Tusculum, who sent them to Caesar.1703 In his letters addressed to his friends 
he notes that his influence in Rome has significantly decreased,1704 he follows Epicure not 
liked by him,1705 he waives to produce effect on Caesar’s administration,1706 and he desires to 
live solely for his theoretical work.1707 These works, as a matter of fact, were aimed at 
praising and restoring the state of form of the republic.1708 
Although Caesar generously approached Cicero,1709 the orator could not be certain if the 
dictator indeed wanted to restore the constitutional order of the republic.1710 This is supported 
by his rather pessimistic letter written to Paetus shortly before calling Marcellus home, in 
which he expounds that even if he wants to restore res publica Caesar has committed himself 
to too many people so that he could be able to implement his possible plans, and that whereas 
the community is at the mercy of Caesar, Caesar is at the mercy of circumstances.1711 In his 
letters he mourns over the defeat of res publica1712 as he subordinated all his life and activity 
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to realising this idea; he looks at autocracy—although in De re publica he himself expected a 
dictator to save res publica1713—and lack of security in law with anxiety;1714 he is aware that 
he and his friends are partly also responsible for the situation evolved;1715 and he cannot 
console himself with the thought that general conditions would have been different if Pompey 
had won.1716 On the other hand, towards his adherents and his own friends living in exile 
Caesar tries to keep the appearance of optimism,1717 and voices his hope in the revival of res 
publica and aequitas gaining ground day after day.1718 The conditions of public life, as it is 
described in Cicero’s letters too, are illuminated solely by Caesar’s personality and the trust in 
it.1719 The one-time pater patriae is aware of the fact that his political influence has become 
next to none and therefore he is present at the sessions of the senate—not to trigger the 
dictator’s anger—but remains silent.1720 
It was in this political environment that amnesty was given to the former consul, M. Claudius 
Marcellus, the only one of Caesar’s enemies having stayed alive,1721 whom Caesar’s most 
resolute opponent, Brutus himself acknowledged as early as in his work entitled De virtute 
published in the beginning of 46.1722 Being one of the consuls of the year 51, Marcus Claudius 
Marcellus as the colleague of the famous jurist, Servius Sulpicius Rufus made efforts in vain 
to order Caesar back from his governor’s office in Gallia, tried to prevent Caesar from 
applying for consulate while being absent and made several attempts at formal accusation 
against Caesar.1723 At the same time, in 49, quite wisely, referring to lack of proper 
preparedness he took a position against starting civil war.1724 Having retired to Mytilene on 
Lesbos after Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus, he devoted his life to intellectual activity,1725 yet, 
he was not willing to ask for mercy from the dictator.1726 In his letters written in August 46 
Cicero tried to convince him stating that by refusing Caesar’s pardon he endangers both his 
property and life.1727 
To Cicero, the prime fighter for the rights of the senate, Marcellus was equal to the values and 
traditions of the old res publica,1728 and if he accepts the pardon granted by Caesar, this might 
bring along two things for Cicero. On the one hand, this fact might legitimise reconciliation 
between Caesar and Cicero after the battle at Pharsalus, which was considered treason by 
many adherents of Pompey,1729 on the other hand, the more influential adherents of the order 
of the republic returned to Rome, the greater chances there were for restoring the former order 
of the state.1730 Before Marcellus himself had taken any steps, his case was discussed at a 
session of the senate where—on the initiative of Cicero’s father-in-law, L. Piso—the body 
took the position almost unanimously to grant pardon.1731 To the question whether the 
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initiation arose from spontaneous motivation or it should be considered the play of Caesar’s 
propaganda—as it is presumed by Kazimierz Kumaniecki,1732 Pierre Grimal1733 and Arthur 
Kahn1734—it is hard to give a clear answer.1735 At this session, which gave Cicero hope that 
the senate could regain its old authority, and provided slight confidence that Caesar might be 
also willing to restore res publica1736—which confidence is reflected in his letter to Sulpicius 
Rufus too1737—he broke his voluntary silence by expressing his thanks to Caesar.1738 To his 
friend he emphasised that the revival of res publica called for his studia and Caesar’s 
voluntas.1739 In his letter to Paetus he justified both his silence and expression of opinion by 
stating that it was a wise man’s trait to do nothing hurried by which he could incur the hatred 
of the possessors of potentia.1740 
At the same time, Cicero was tormented by inner doubts whether by waiving his silence he 
had lost honestum otium that enabled him to refrain from taking a position regarding public 
affairs1741 and devote his life fully to his philosophical works, reflecting on conditions of 
current political affairs and formulating criticism against Caesar, which in 46 produced Brutus 
and Paradoxa Stoicorum as well as some parts of De legibus, Cato maior de senectute and 
Orator. Marcellus could not enjoy the benefits of Caesar’s pardon: on the way home on 27 
May 45 his friend, P. Magius Cilo murdered him, and Cicero shared the view that Caesar was 
not responsible for this murder.1742 Pro Marcello was published in May 45, nine months after 
it was delivered as Caesar could read it in Hispania.1743 Based on this, we can presume that 
Cicero re-edited the delivered oration at some points and voiced his feelings entertained after 
September 46.1744 
 
V. 1. 3. Rhetorical tactic in Pro Marcello 
 
It is worth paying attention to Sabine Rochlitz’s train of thought asserting that Pro Marcello is 
a kind of ruler’s mirror (Fürstenspiegel), that is, it presents the requirements an ideal ruler is 
to meet under the given circumstances rather than the actual traits of Caesar as a historical 
person. Accordingly, the speech is not only gratitude for the pardon granted to Marcellus but 
also a policy-making speech that makes the conditions of the period the subject of 
constructive and educative criticism.1745 Ruler’s mirror as a genre is to meet the criteria of 
description of the ideal ruler, instructive aim and, in case of a specific addressee, form of 
mediation, however, it can take the form of a letter, speech, philosophical treatise, historical 
novel, funeral address or fictitious dialogue.1746 If the ruler is addressed directly by the 
orator—as for example in Pro Marcello—then the oration providing advice (suasio, genus 
deliberativum) serves the aims of the ruler’s mirror the best, yet, quite often the orator 
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chooses the form of epideictic speech of praise sometimes containing elements of panegyrics 
(genus demonstrativum) so that excessively pedantic information should not infringe the ruler. 
1747
 In certain cases the orator uses the tool of mere description, which, however, contains a 
kind of encouragement in its spirit; yet, sometimes praise and warning are separated by the 
mood of the verb only.1748 
As it has been demonstrated by Albrecht in details, Pro Marcello unites the elements of both 
genus deliberativum and genus demonstrativum.1749 The aim of genus deliberativum is 
harmonisation of morally right action that belongs to the scope of notion of fas, iustum, pium, 
aequum and mansuetum1750 and practically useful action that belongs to the category of facile, 
magnum, iucundum and sine periculo,1751 that is, productive harmonisation of honestas and 
utilitas for the future1752 and for the sake of the community.1753 The efficiency of persuasion 
can be increased by holding out the prospect of some positive consequence and threatening 
with the occurrence of some negative result—Quintilian claims that the latter represents a 
stronger factor of motivation.1754 The pattern used in Pro Marcello is set accordingly. 
Caesar’s results attained so far are more than enough if evaluated by the measure of average 
person but far from being enough when measured by the dictator’s personality,1755 however, 
his contradictory conduct might endanger the judgement of both his contemporaries and later 
ages and might cast shadow on his deeds performed so far,1756 thereby it addresses Caesar 
sensitive of his dignitas—it was due to its injury that he triggered civil war—at his weak 
point.1757 Based on that genus deliberativum not only tries to affect the audience by objective 
arguments but also attempts to grasp their emotions, hopes (spes) and fears (metus).1758 
Furthermore, exemplum is an important tool, which gives greater weight to arguments 
made,1759 just as the orator’s, i.e., the advisor’s personality, conduct of life, moral example.1760 
In Roman elocution the scope of epideictic oration,1761 which contained praising oration 
(laudatio) and blasphemous oration (vituperatio), was restricted to testimonies before court 
and funeral addresses.1762 The key tools of epideictic oration are amplification (amplificatio) 
and comparison (comparatio).1763 Accordingly, in Pro Marcello regarding the given action 
Cicero underlines its individual,1764 first accomplished1765 implementation under severe 
circumstances,1766 more perfectly than by others,1767 surpassing even itself,1768 and its 
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consequences of great significance,1769 well-thought-outness1770 and the possible opposite 
thereof.1771 In contrast with genus deliberativum, laudatio is aimed at the past,1772 and virtues 
can be listed in a chronological or thematic order,1773 or according to external circumstances 
and internal capacities.1774 
With full knowledge of Greek ruler’s mirrors, apart from Pro Marcello, Cicero provided some 
kind of prince’s or ruler’s mirror in several of his works, among others in one of his letters 
written to Quintus, in De imperio Cnaei Pompei and De re publica. In the letter to Quintus, at 
the time of his proconsulate in Asia he compiled a governor’s mirror enumerating traditional 
ruler’s virtues, which are directly connected with Plato’s ideal of exercising power and 
wisdom,1775 and recommends Xenophon’s work entitled Kyrou paideia to his brother, which 
Scipio Aemilianus Africanus always brought along too.1776 In De imperio Cnaei Pompeii he 
presents a stylised figure of Pompey as an ideal commander,1777 and in his laudatio in 
chronological order of virtues he discusses the commander’s childhood, youth and 
manhood,1778 and depicts specific commander’s merits (scientia rei militaris,1779 virtutes 
imperatoriae,1780 auctoritas,1781 felicitas1782).1783 In De re publica, in addition to the ideal 
form of state he searches for the type of ideal statesman. Accordingly, in addition to moral 
perfection, the Greek basileus and the Roman princeps shall have full-scope political and 
military information, yet, a material difference between them is that the unlimited power of 
Greek rulers is restricted by caritas, that is, philanthrōpia, Roman statesmen are meant to be 
lead by consilium.1784 It should not be ignored that Cicero modelled the ideal statesman in De 
re publica after himself, his career and values to a great extent.1785 
In this respect special attention is to be paid to Cicero’s letters written to Caesar between 49 
and 45, in which he made an attempt at influencing the winning commander in some form by 
his advice.1786 In his letter written in March 49 Cicero praised Caesar’s unique sapientia, 
which—in the letter writer’s real view or the view he meant to mediate—was aimed at otium, 
pax and concordia prevailing in the state.1787 As most of his contemporaries classified the 
above unprincipled flattery, he was forced to give explanation asserting that he did not want 
to flatter Caesar, instead he intended to give advice and warning to the winning 
commander.1788 In the spring of 45 Cicero made an awkward attempt—following the example 
of Aristotle, Theopompos and Antisthenes1789—at reminding Caesar now having achieved 
autocracy in a lengthy letter of his obligations, however, he was compelled to arrive at the 
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conviction that he could not voice his real message due to political conditions.1790 When at 
last he managed to write his letter, in which he was compelled to mask his critical opinion as 
flattery,1791 he was relieved to learn that his writing had not been allowed by Caesar’s 
confidants, Oppius and Balbus as “censors” to be delivered to the dictator.1792 
Research has demonstrated close connection between Pro Marcello and Greek ruler’s mirrors 
as prefigurations1793—especially because the date of creating Pro Marcello, more specifically 
Caesar’s ascendance to dictator’s office especially favoured the creation of a ruler’s mirror 
kind of work—and turned the attention to the stoic and peripatetic topoi of the oratio.1794 Pro 
Marcello can be divided into two main parts, both of them can be linked to one of the two 
ruler’s mirror types, and the third short part, peroratio is a vote of thanks addressed to 
Caesar.1795 
The first part contains primarily epideictic elements.1796 Prooemium begins with the topos of 
the subject of exceptionally great significance,1797 in particular outstanding actions in the past 
portraying Caesar’s character, which right at the beginning of the oration drive the orator to 
enumerate ruler’s virtues—mansuetudo, clementia, in summa potestate modus, sapientia1798 
by which he intends to describe not only the present situation but by outlining the ideal state 
he wants to urge the addressee of the oration to implement such state.1799 After announcing 
his objective narratio, Cicero continues his speech by the pathetic praising of Caesar’s 
actions, which surpass any human measure that has ever been achieved,1800 on the other hand, 
he underlines that forgiving moderation engaged towards fellow beings based on inner 
greatness is the highest value,1801 which is able to vest humans with some kind of divine 
virtues.1802 Cicero tends to raise political/statesman’s activity to a divine sphere in other 
writings too,1803 and it cannot be ruled out that it was specifically granting and 
acknowledgement of this divine nature that represented an important stage—in addition to the 
relevant passage in Pro Ligario1804—towards Caesar’s cult in Rome.1805  
This train of thoughts includes the topos of confronting fortuna and virtus, that is, the deeds 
that the commander performs with other people’s help and those that he carries out relying 
solely on himself, and beyond any doubt the latter are of a higher order.1806 Yet, emphasising 
fortuna is a kind of masked criticism since it shades the commander’s image of Caesar’s 
commentarii.1807 If the person who exercises power is able to overcome his own passions too, 
then he can be sure of benevolentia shown by the community towards him,1808 which a good 
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ruler shall strive for—again a topos of the ruler’s mirror1809 since only this can ensure his 
lasting rule.1810 The discussion of morally right action is closed by the comparison of 
transitory earthly things and eternal perennial glory.1811 The statement that Caesar had 
surpassed all winners in terms of justness, i.e., he had overcome victory itself, introduces two 
further topoi: the image of the ruler merciful to defeated enemies and the image of the 
unconquerable ruler—it is not by chance that in 45 they erect a statue with inscription “Deo 
Invicto” to Caesar.1812 The epideictic part of the oration concludes with reference to divine 
intervention in favour of Caesar.1813 
The second part of the oration can be ranked in the scope of genus deliberativum and 
enumerates the tasks to be fulfilled by Caesar in the future.1814 The amplifications, 
comparisons and oppositions of the first part are replaced by a series of fictitious dialogues 
and rhetoric questions. In the first place Cicero deals with the issue of Caesar’s safety, 
especially because recently the dictator raised the alleged plan of assassination against him in 
the senate. Here the orator uses the usual topos of ruler’s mirrors that asserts that the ruler’s 
safety is based on the subjects’ safety, on the one hand,1815 and good rulers should not be 
afraid of their subjects since it is them who provide him with the safest protection, on the 
other.1816 So, after he has done away with Caesar’s worries, he presents a series of measures 
to be taken for common good to the dictator1817 since, again using one of the usual topoi, he 
can be the only one who as a good physician can cure the wounds made by civil war.1818  
By that Cicero reminds Caesar of his major responsibility and criticises his statement that he 
has already accomplished his earthly mission1819 as he still owes res publica thrust into civil 
war the most important thing: the work of restoration, renovation1820—as without that his war 
successes will seem to have a dubious colour in the eyes of later ages.1821 All that he owes not 
only to the state but his own nature growing beyond human boundaries too.1822 At this point 
he tries to urge the dictator to act by the well-known topos of antique ruler’s mirrors, 
reputation after death.1823 After he has repeated the fact of the division and inner uncertainty 
of the people of Rome, he acknowledges Caesar as the person who is able to create unity1824 
again using a well-known topos,1825 and addresses a single general call both to Caesar and the 
community to create unity and co-operation.1826 Again, at a highly emphatic point he uses the 
topos of the community depending on the ruler and the person and safety of the ruler, 
governing public affairs with responsibility (bonitate, aequitate) depending on the 
community.1827 Then he makes a pathetic promise to Caesar—as the issue of the guards to be 
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set up for him has been raised in the senate these days1828—that if he remains faithful to his 
conduct engaged and consistently enforces his principles represented so far, they will protect 
his life and safety by their own body.1829 
It is worth paying some attention to this closing train of thoughts by which Cicero enforces 
Caesar into a logical trap. The starting point is that a tyrant deserves death. He divides this 
into two premises: first, a virtuous ruler must not/need not to be killed, so he should not be 
afraid; secondly, Caesar has proved virtue recently. The conclusion drawn from the premises 
is: as long as he exercises his power virtuously, Caesar does not have to worry about his life. 
Dividing the above further: on the one hand, if Caesar continues to give room to his 
clementia, then he should not be afraid; on the other hand, if in exercising clementia he acts as 
a tyrant against those who were once equal with him, then as a despot he will deserve 
death.1830 Cicero calls this form of argument complexio, and means the alternative type by it 
where the questioned person who chooses any of them will not leave the situation morally 
clean, that is, he creates a kind of catch twenty-two for the person addressed.1831 He uses the 
same tactic successfully in Pro Caelio asserting that if the charge made by Clodia is true, then 
she was Caelius’s mistress, that is, she is an immoral woman and thereby she has lost her 
authenticity as a witness; yet, if she waives the charge, she will regain her dignity worthy of a 
matrona, however, she will lose the lawsuit. 
The promise that the notables of Rome will defend Caesar by their own body if he acts 
adjusted to requirements is also a masked threat. Other—sometimes ironic, sometimes 
apparently flattering—threats are as a matter of fact also masked: the single nature of Caesar’s 
glory, i.e., his glory without socius1832 and reference to the settlement of what he owes to the 
home country.1833 How can Caesar settle what he owes to the home country whose laws he 
has violated?1834 If Caesar did not acknowledge his moral obligations arising from his 
situation, if he did not act in accordance with them, and if he were indeed lead by the 
statement that he no longer expects life to bring him anything,1835 so he cannot be expected to 
do anything, then as Cicero later formulated in De officiis1836 he will exclude himself from 
human community, and as a tyrant placing himself beyond and outside the community, 
generating fear and living in fear he will deserve death.1837 
 
V. 1. 4. Sapientia Caesaris 
 
The antiquity saw criticism rather than praise in Pro Marcello, however, this conviction was 
not shared by everybody; instead, they discovered praise of Caesar’s clementia in the oration 
and a kind of urging to continue to exercise it.1838 One part of modern literature sees the 
significance of Pro Marcello in that too,1839 and some consider Cicero as the ideologist of 
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Caesar’s dictatorship.1840 Others evaluate praise of clementia Caesaris by Cicero as a doubtful 
praise, what is more, as condemning criticism by the orator.1841 Yet, almost all researches 
share the view that they underline clementia as the key concept of elementary importance of 
the oration.1842 
At the same time, it is worth deliberating the train of thoughts that claims that Pro Marcello is 
the hymn of Caesar’s sapientia rather than of Caesar’s clementia, and that earlier literature 
projected the primacy of clementia back to Pro Marcello based on Pro Ligario and Pro rege 
Deiotaro. Accordingly, here it is not the image of Caesar clemens who looks down on his 
fellow-citizens, granting them pardon from above but the image of Caesar sapiens who works 
towards the restoration of res publica and is able to integrate various political concepts in an 
organic unity that is presented.1843 The question arises whether clementia appears in Pro 
Marcello in the meaning of mercy or temperantia animi. In view of the fact that the terms 
poena or ignoscere do not occur in the oration, clementia most probably does not cover the 
meaning of forgiveness as Cicero exempts both himself and his friends from the guilt or sense 
of guilt that Caesar’s adherents—but not Caesar himself1844—tried to hammer into them.1845 
The conduct engaged by Pompey’s adherents was motivated by officium, error and fatum,1846 
but by no means by scelus; therefore, calling Marcellus back to Rome—whose several merits: 
nobilitas, probitas, optimarum artium studium and innocentia cannot be doubted—must take 
place deservedly and righteously (merito atque optimo iure) as it were based on objective 
need.1847 
At several points of the oration clementia appears as the synonym of temperantia animi1848 as 
it were as the opposite of iracundia.1849 So the right of victory does not authorise the winner 
to treat defeated adherents of Pompey as if they were external enemies (hostes), subdued 
peoples.1850 Consequently, clementia is nothing else than Caesar’s self-command, waiving of 
the opportunity to revenge himself on his defeated opponents who stand on the other side 
merely by error and not due to depravity and are therefore “not guilty”.1851 Caesar’s 
clementia—linked to the virtues of mansuetudo, modus and sapientia1852—extremely 
contrasts with the terrible experience of civil war and the cruelty of Pompey’s adherents 
announced in advance in case they should win,1853 although it cannot be ruled out that in this 
statement Cicero was lead by the intention to flatter the winner.1854 It gains special emphasis 
that Caesar had not confiscated the goods of the defeated, what is more, he returned them to 
them,1855 and that he did not made amnesty subject to humiliating conditions and 
procedures.1856 Saving the state is also organically linked to Caesar’s sapientia and clementia 
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since it was gods who vested the dictator with these virtues to enable restoration of res 
publica.1857 
The attributes of Caesar’s clementia at the very beginning of the oration—that is at the point 
which is meant to raise the audience’s attention—are the participles inusitata and inaudita,1858 
however, their content is just seemingly uncontradictedly positive: at any other similarly 
emphatic points in Cicero’s writings the attributes singular and incredible occur clearly in a 
negative sense, that is, they indicate breaking with and violence against traditional values.1859 
So, it is not out of the question that the use of these attributes contains masked criticism 
against the situation that it has at all become possible for Caesar to give pardon to citizens as 
it were to subjects.1860 On the contrary, Cicero can bravely and unconditionally praise the 
virtues of lenitas and iustitia, i.e., the values that do not contrast with the fundaments of the 
republic, and he can underline that Caesar has far outdone the winners of earlier civil wars in 
terms of aequitas and misericordia.1861 Also, he does not refuse to vest Caesar with the virtues 
of magnitudo animi,1862 mansuetudo1863 and bonitas,1864 but first of all of temperantia.1865 The 
series of Caesar’s beneficia1866—which Cicero later contests after the dictator’s death1867—fits 
in with the order of social relations of the republic,1868 that is, he does not raise Caesar beyond 
the citizens of Rome. By stressing Caesar’s liberalitas—one of the key virtues beside 
sapientia1869—Cicero reflects to the dictator’s self-image as he has always possessed 
liberalitas whereas lenitas, aequitas, misericordia and clementia became relevant only after 
the civil war, once his autocracy has become firm. At the same time, unwillingly he must 
acknowledge Caesar’s clementia too, which has slowly ascended to a state cult as in 45 the 
senate adopted a resolution on erecting the temple of Clementia Caesaris.1870 So, clementia is 
made somewhat relative as it is defined in the meaning of self-command rather than mercy, 
and by the attributes inusitata and inaudita it obtains a kind of special, new character, alien to 
Roman thinking; furthermore, it is pushed into the shadow of the virtue of sapientia.1871 
Cicero emphatically attributes the act of giving pardon to Caesar’s sapientia, political insight 
and not to his clementia, and the term sapientia and sapienter occurs four times in the oration 
mentioned together with other value concepts,1872 and five times independently,1873 that is, 
nine times in total, contrary to the notions clementia and clementer used four times in total, 
which unambiguously proves the subordinated nature of the latter concept.1874 The attributes 
of sapientia are the neutral and positive incredibilis,1875 singularis1876 and the clearly 
                                                 
1857
 Cic. Marc. 18. 
1858
 Cf. Cic. De orat. 2, 347. 
1859
 Cf. Cic. Mil. 1; Lig. 1; Deiot. 1; Phil. 11, 2; Arch. 3; Att. 3, 24, 2. 
1860
 Dyer 1990. 20ff. 
1861
 Cic. Marc. 12. 
1862
 Cic. Marc. 19. 
1863
 Cic. Marc. 9. 
1864
 Cic. Marc. 31. 
1865
 Cic. Marc. 8. 
1866
 Cic. Marc. 19. 
1867
 Cic. Phil. 2, 5. 
1868
 Cic. off. 1, 56; 2, 65ff. 
1869
 Cic. Marc. 16. 19. 
1870
 Rochlitz 1993. 55. 
1871
 Rochlitz 1993. 110. 
1872
 Cic. Marc. 1. (mansuetudo, clementia, modus, sapientia); 9. (clementer, mansuete, iuste, moderate, 
sapienter); 18. (clementia, sapientia); 19. (beneficia, liberalitas, sapientia) 
1873
 Cic. Marc. 7. 19. 25.  
1874
 Rochlitz 1993. 111. 
1875
 Cic. Marc. 1. 
1876
 Cic. Marc. 9. 
153 
 
acknowledging paene divina,1877 and the virtue of sapientia itself takes the highest position on 
the scale beside liberalitas.1878 Calling Marcellus home is not clementia but the result of 
sapientia and iudicium.1879 By that Cicero places emphasis on Caesar’s intellect, which 
appears as a significant element in his writings too,1880 at the same time, as their concepts of 
sapientia and consilium do not fully overlap, he modifies Caesar’s portrait by certain traits. 
On the one hand, in the dictator’s military successes he pushes the role of consilium in the 
background in favour of fortuna, casus, what is more temeritas,1881 and, on the other hand, he 
extends the scope of enforcing his intellect to his statesman’s acts, by which he does not want 
to flatter Caesar’s self-image but wants to force him to implement an ideal type for the sake of 
the public as he has done that earlier1882—at the same time, he was the first who presented a 
stylised figure of Caesar as sapiens.1883 
Sapientia and consilium are the motives that in Cicero’s view must govern Caesar’s politics in 
the future as he expounds this point at length in the oration.1884 It is worth mentioning that 
whereas clementia occurs only in the first part of the oratio,1885 which deals with civil war and 
the past, sapientia occurs also in the second part, which turns to the future.1886 The future and 
required field of manifestation of Caesar’s sapientia is the restoration of res publica1887 since 
real glory can be obtained by the dictator only through that,1888 and he points out that Caesar 
is far from such glory.1889 At this point it is the arm of criticism and irony by which Cicero 
tries to urge Caesar to carry out the acts for the sake of the public since he has already 
protected his own dignitas by triggering the civil war,1890 and it is just due to this that he does 
not have the right to withdraw from public affairs1891 because he has not settled what he owes 
to the State and his own greatness.1892 By turning the Caesar clemens image into the Caesar 
sapiens image raised to philosophical heights, Cicero replaces the ideal of the autocrat giving 
pardon by the ideal of the statesman rising above senators as primus inter pares, vested with 
higher responsibility.1893 As Caesar’s dignitas has now been restored, the dictator must use his 
sapientia to serve the dignitas and auctoritas of Marcellus and his clan, Cicero, the senators 
and the State.1894 
 
V. 1. 5. Clementia and sapientia—alternatives of the Caesar image and Caesar’s self-
image  
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It is worth giving in-depth analysis to what extent the Caesar image created by Cicero in the 
so-called orationes Caesarianae reflects on or corresponds with the image and features 
outlined by contemporaries, created by Caesar in his works about himself and presented in 
Cicero’s other works, primarily with the concepts of clementia and sapientia.1895 
Influenced by Greek authors, Cicero defines clementia as temperantia animi,1896 i.e., the 
reaction of the intellect to temper,1897 which is in a certain respect the collective virtue of the 
Roman people,1898 and is close to the concepts of humanitas and mansuetudo,1899 and 
placabilitas, facilitas and altitudo amini.1900 In public life it has a place, among others, in the 
patterns of conduct of governors of the provinces, who are obliged to engage self-restraint 
against life and property of those subjected to them.1901 This sense leads to the mercy meaning 
of the concept of clementia, which is nothing else than dispensing with punishment that may 
be lawfully imposed due to the unlawfulness committed.1902 On a collective level the people 
of Rome can exercise clementia in this sense against their defeated enemies,1903 as they 
considered all wars declared in accordance with the rules of ius fetiale lawful revenge against 
other peoples. In this respect sub- and superordination are prerequisites for clementia as the 
party exercising pardon has power over the party that is given pardon.1904 In De oratore 
Cicero also points out what ardent hatred can be elicited by persons who were once equal to 
us suddenly rising above us and acting in the role of the party giving pardon.1905 Accordingly, 
clementia is originally a part of relations within the family and between states, yet, it is alien 
to the field of home affairs and public life of Rome since it presumes relation between 
unequal parties, it is a concept outside law and in spite of its value content it carries some kind 
of despotism.1906 
In foreign policy of Rome clementia is primarily a virtue engaged towards defeated peoples, 
which appears in the administration of subdued people as it were as a collective feature of 
populus Romanus.1907 Actually, it is through Caesar’s civil war victories that clementia 
becomes an individual characteristic in political terms.1908 In De bello Gallico it is no longer 
clementia populi Romani but clementia Caesaris and the forms of its manifestation (ignosere, 
conservare) and its synonyms (mansuetudo, misericordia, liberalis) that appear.1909 Clementia 
as an emphatic characteristic, sometimes expressed by being reinforced by a possessive 
pronoun, occurs at several points, however, always as uttered by the defeated Galls to praise 
the commander.1910 Hirtius, the author of the eighth book of the work proceeds similarly after 
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Caesar’s death.1911 At the same time, clementia just as its opposite crudelitas are manifested 
for specific causes as a result of conscious decision: the former in order to win over allies and 
break down opposition,1912 the latter for the sake of deterrence.1913 
Nor before the civil war does Cicero refuse to vest Caesar with the virtue of clementia and 
deny his attempts at this virtue in outlining the motivation of his steps in internal politics as he 
formulates this in Pro Rabirio perduellionis delivered in 63—as it were casting it in the teeth 
of the prosecutor, Labienus that he took steps contrary to often voiced values of people’s 
party politics (lenitas legum, libertas, mansuetudo, lenis ac popularis, clemens ac 
popularis).1914 It is in this spirit that as early as in the 60’s Caesar tried to cause to hold the 
persons who enjoyed the benefits of Sulla’s proscriptiones responsible.1915 Caesar, whose 
relation to the plot has actually never been revealed, tried to save the life of Catilina’s 
adherents in the oration held in the senate by referring to clementia,1916 it is due to this that 
Cicero was compelled to interpret the concept of clementia in the given situation that it should 
be manifested to victims and not to perpetrators.1917 
At the beginning of the civil war Caesar announced the political program of clementia, which 
links him to his people’s party past,1918 and in this respect he is confirmed by his environment, 
primarily by Oppius and Balbus.1919 Yet, in his writings he carefully avoids to use the concept 
of clementia in terms of internal politics, instead he uses the terms: lenitas,1920 misericordia 
mentioned also in the case of the Galls1921 and emphasised by Cicero in Pro Ligario,1922 the 
extensively acknowledged1923 or criticised1924 liberalitas,1925 aequitas1926 and 
beneficium1927—as he knows well that it would be hard to reconcile mercy manifested to his 
fellow-citizens with the values of the republic.1928 Cicero does not refuse to acknowledge 
Caesar’s liberalitas either,1929 all the less since several financial transactions, loans disbursed 
to Cicero have been carried out between them.1930 It is owing to the pardon granted later to his 
political opponents, including Cicero himself,1931 that Cicero praises Caesar’s liberalitas on 
several occasions,1932 however, after his assassination he classifies it mere calculation.1933 
Cicero underlines Caesar’s aequitas in relation to the pardon granted to Servius Sulpicius 
Rufus,1934 Trebatius Testa,1935 Marcellus1936 and King Deiotarus1937 first of all.1938 
                                                 
1911
 Caes. Gall. 8, 3. 21. 38. 44.  
1912
 Caes. Gall. 2, 31, 4; 7, 89. 
1913
 Caes. Gall. 8, 39. 44. 
1914
 Cic. Rab. perd. 10–17. 
1915
 Plut. Caes. 7; Cato min. 23; Cic. 21; App. civ. 6. Cf. Strasburger 1938. 120ff.; Gelzer 1960. 52f. 
1916
 Cic. fam. 5, 2, 8; Plut. Cic. 23, 1ff.; Dio Cass. 37, 38, 1f.; Suet. Caes. 55, 3. 
1917
 Cic. Cat. 4, 11ff. 
1918
 Cf. Cic. Att. 10, 4, 8. 
1919
 Cic. Att. 9, 7c, 1; 8, 15a, 3; 9, 5, 3; 9, 7b, 1; fam. 8, 15, 1. 
1920
 Caes. civ. 1, 5, 5; 1, 74, 7; 3, 98, 2. 
1921
 Caes. Gall. 2, 28, 3. 
1922
 Caes. civ. 1, 84, 5; 1, 85, 3; 2, 13, 2; Bell. Afr. 8, 5. 
1923
 Sall. Cat. 54; Dio Cass. 44, 39, 1. 
1924
 Cic. off. 1, 43; Phil. 2, 116; Plut. Caes. 5, 8; Suet. Caes. 26, 3. 
1925
 Cf. Kloft 1970. 58. 
1926
 Caes. civ. 1, 32, 7. 9. 
1927
 Rochlitz 1993. 50. 
1928
 Collins 960. 
1929
 Cic. Att. 2, 18, 1. 
1930
 Cic. fam. 1, 9, 12. Cf. Strasburger 1990. 19f. 
1931
 Cic. fam. 14, 23. 
1932
 Cic. fam. 9, 13, 4; 6, 14, 2; Marc. 16. 19; Lig. 6, 23, 31; Att. 9, 11a, 3. 
1933
 Rochlitz 1993. 62ff. 
1934
 Cic. fam. 4, 4, 3. 
1935
 Cic. fam. 6, 10b, 2. 
156 
 
His conduct during the civil war—in his own presentation—develops accordingly.1939 Caesar 
emphasises that the principle of crudelitas is alien to him,1940 at the same time, most probably 
sober consideration also supported enforcing clementia to ensure sympathy of more and more 
people with him.1941 It proves the propagandistic nature of the assertion of clementia—as it is 
supported by the iconography of coins of the period1942—that in the fights at the end of the 
civil war, for example in Hispania, he no longer makes efforts to eliminate crudelias.1943 As a 
matter of fact, to those who knew Caesar’s hot temper1944 and cruelty,1945 the propaganda of 
clementia probably did not seem to be authentic1946—it is not by chance that Cicero uses the 
phrases insidiosa clementia1947 and simulatio mansuetudinis1948 sometimes with unmasked 
irony, which were confirmed by his own experience.1949 Yet, not having any other choice, 
several participants in public life of Rome, including Cicero, let themselves convinced by 
Caesar’s clementia although they were aware of its unsteady nature.1950 Others, of course, 
including Pompey,1951 Marcellus1952 and Cato,1953 refused Caesar’s clementia and contested 
that he had the right to exercise it.1954 
During his dictatorship Caesar continued his clementia propaganda, mostly because he 
wanted to neutralise his opponents by making them politically obliged.1955 This trick was 
appreciated by many since they were glad that the civil war had not lead to a Sulla like cruel 
dictatorship,1956 which must have given hope to exiles too,1957 and most probably several 
works were created to praise Caesar’s clementia.1958 Yet, the temple of Clementia Caesaris 
voted for in 45 in the senate1959 was probably never built. Some assert that hatred against 
Caesar was made increasingly fierce by the autocratic show off of his clementia.1960 It should 
be declared about Caesar’s clementia propaganda that eventually it failed—it is not by chance 
that Brutus and Ligarius, who received pardon, were among the assassins of the dictator—
since by autocrat’s mercy he deprived the senators of the Age of the Republic used to equality 
of the opportunity of freedom. Cicero deems Caesar’s assassination fully legitimate—in spite 
of the fact that he was not initiated into the plan and the implementation,1961 although 
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Antonius charged him with instigating the assassins1962—whose ideological basis was 
provided among others by his works, and he branded clementia Caesaris manifestation of 
arrogance and expression of political calculation.1963  
Contrary to the ethical categories of clementia, lenitas, mansuetudo and misericordia, 
sapientia is primarily an intellectual feature with strong social and moral affinity.1964 
Sapientia is a kind of faculty of judgement, the ability to foresee the adoption and 
consequences of proper decision, which narrows the opportunities of fortuna.1965 It can be 
manifested in the form of temperantia and clementia too; its opposite is temeritas.1966 To 
Cicero iustitia necessarily accompanies sapientia,1967 and sapientia is the totality of special 
knowledge like1968 prudentia.1969 Although sapientia somewhat overlaps with consilium, the 
latter always denotes competence regarding a specific situation, developed into capacity by 
practice and studying.  
From the earliest period of Roman literature, the virtue of sapientia appears as one of the most 
important attributes of a statesman, which is indicated by the cognomina and praedicata 
Sophus and Sapiens affixed to the name of certain persons from the early 3rd century. Legal 
scientist Pomponius asserts that the cognomen Sophus was first borne by P. Sempronius 
Sophus (consul in 304, pontifex maximus in 300, praetor urbanus in 296),1970 and the 
cognomen Sapiens was first borne by P. Atilius iuris consultus, Cato the Elder’s 
contemporary.1971 Later the name Sapiens was granted to Laelius1972 and Cato the Elder 
too.1973 In Pliny Naturalis historia one can read the laudatio funebris delivered by Q. 
Caecilius Metellus in 221 upon the death of his father, L. Caecilius Metellus, in which he 
praises his father as an outstanding warrior, excellent orator, brave commander, a man with 
several virtues and outstanding talent.1974 The statesman’s virtue sapientia is included here too 
as one of the ten most important virtues.1975 On the epitaph of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus 
(consul in 298) from approximately 200, sapientia accompanies fortitudo worthy of 
statesmen.1976 The fragment of Ennius’s Annals on the outbreak of the second Punic war 
presents the opposites of the orator’s and soldier’s activity.1977 The figures of the orator and 
soldier represent two completely different spheres; the key characteristic of the orator who 
embodies a statesman’s capacity is bonus, his tools are sapientia and ius; opposed to him 
stands the horridus miles, whose prime instruments are vis and ferrum; both figures surpass 
themselves by their symbols as they set two optional archetypes of settling disputed issues 
representing the order of procedure of peace and war.1978 
In line with this tradition, Cicero emphasises sapientia as a feature characteristic of leading 
figures of the State of Rome—Romulus,1979 Numa,1980 one-time kings in general,1981 Cato the 
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Elder,1982 Pompey,1983 Lepidus,1984 Dolabella,1985 Pansa,1986 Sevius Sulpicius Rufus1987 and 
himself,1988 and he attributes indisputable sapientia to the senate1989 and to the maiores in 
general1990 as well.1991 In De re publica the virtues sapientia and iustitia are given stressed 
importance1992 since Cicero makes the implementation of salus, aequabilitas and otium 
subject to them;1993 in his governor’s mirror kind letter to his brother, Quintus he calls the 
attention to connecting potestas with sapientia.1994 
Once, before Pro Marcello, on the eve of the civil war, Cicero already tried to refer to 
Caesar’s sapientia, more specifically in his letter written to Corfinium for dissemination,1995 
which he addressed to Caesar1996 who was yet trying to enter into compromise.1997 Cicero 
expounds the reference to Caesar’s sapientia, which he did not make as a private remark, in 
more details to Atticus asserting that he had done that for the sake of common good, in order 
to preserve the values salus patriae, otium, pax and concordia civium1998—he wanted to 
explain this to Atticus all the more as Pompey’s adherents considered it shameless flattery.1999 
One of the passages written by Brutus in early 462000 can be also interpreted as reference to 
Caesar’s sapientia.2001  
Apart from these two writings preceding Pro Marcello, by which he wanted to achieve 
political aims in both cases, Cicero has never linked the virtue of sapientia to Caesar—who 
was characterised in his view by popularis levitas2002 and whose personality has always 
evoked some kind of ambivalent attraction and repulsion in him2003—most probably Caesar 
represented to Cicero the opposite of everything that he imagined about a responsible and 
wise statesman.2004 It should be noted that Caesar has never demanded to possess the virtue of 
sapientia too much connected with the values of the republic; instead he described his 
intellectual capacities by the concepts ratio and consilium,2005 and contemporaries depicted 
these elements of his personality by the attributes prudens, acutus, vigilans rather than by 
sapiens.2006 Based on all that Cicero’s letter mentions sapientia as the requirement, 
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statesman’s wisdom Caesar was to accomplish, formulated for the sake of pax and 
concordia.2007 
Tom sum up: it can be declared that Pro Marcello delivered in 46 focused specifically on the 
virtue from among Caesar’s high merits that had almost never been attributed to Caesar by 
either Caesar or Cicero or contemporaries: sapientia. In all three orations before Caesar, a part 
of the rest of the virtues, emphatically linked to public life and related to Caesar (mansuetudo, 
liberalitas, lenitas, misericordia, aequitas, humanitas) are in harmony with the values of the 
republic; clementia placed on the other side, however, is a different case. The meanings 
temperantia animi and mercy are alien to the terminology of Roman internal politics as they 
presume relations of sub- and superordination and carry the opportunity of arbitrary decision, 
so they cannot be reconciled with systems based on relations of co-ordination. In Pro 
Marcello, seemingly meant to underline Caesar’s real traits, actually a catalogue of the 
requirements he is to meet, Cicero consciously places the emphasis on the virtue of sapientia, 
compared to which clementia plays a subordinated part only, and even then it appears in the 
sense of temperantia animi. By that the orator would want to draw Caesar’s approach 
somewhat near to the ideal state of the republic as it were by making it obligatory for him to 
restore and respect one-time frameworks.  
In-depth analysis of the text leads to the conviction that the oration sets requirements rather 
than formulates praise of Caesar’s statesman activity. Yet, it does not lack optimism, asserting 
that once the civil war is over it will be possible for Caesar to restore the institutions of the 
republic, which he has ruined by triggering the civil war, and while doing so, rising from 
among senators merely as primus inter pares but not exceeding this limit, he will provide the 
opportunity for working towards common goals. At the same time, the oration contains a kind 
of masked threat too. The promise formulated to Caesar—that the notables of Rome will 
protect him by their own bodies so he should not fear for his life—is rather relative. It is an 
ignored warning to Caesar that if he ignored the laws of nature, placed himself outside and 
beyond human community, exercised his clementia as an autocrat, then he should indeed fear 
for his life as killing the tyrant is a natural reaction of the community, nothing else than an 
attempt at restoring the injured order of the state and the world—which as it is well-known 
happened on the Ides of March 44 indeed. 
 
 
V. 2. “Lawsuit” of Quintus Ligarius  
 
After the battle of Thapsus that took place on 6 April 46 Caesar kept delaying his return to 
Rome for a long while, until 25 July—he stopped to stay on Sardinia—and this cannot be 
attributed fully to implementing measures and actions necessary in Africa since they could 
have been carried out by his new proconsul, C. Sallustius Crispus too. The triumph held 
owing to the victory in Africa—in which they carried around representations of the death of 
M. Petreius, M. Porcius Cato and Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica—must have 
further grated on the nerves of the aristocracy of Rome, because it was meant to symbolise 
Caesar’s victory both over Iuba and the senate. It was after that that Cicero broke his silence 
and delivered Pro Marcello in the senate, which was both oratio suasoria and gratiarum actio 
for the pardon granted to Marcellus, by which Caesar wanted to assure the senate of his 
benevolence and wanted to show off his power by his autocratic gesture. 
Pro Ligario delivered in 46 has been considered a classical example of deprecatio by both the 
antique and modern literature, and in historical terms it is not a less noteworthy work since 
from the period following the civil war Pro Marcello, having been delivered in early autumn 
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of 46 in the senate, is Cicero’s first oration made on the Forum, that is, before the general 
public, in which praising Caesar’s clementia he seemingly legitimised dictatorship. First, we 
describe the historical background of the oratio and the process of the proceedings (V. 2. 1.); 
then, we examine the issue if the proceedings against Ligarius can be considered a real 
criminal trial. (V. 2. 2.) After the analysis of the genre of the speech, deprecatio (V. 2. 3.) we 
analyse the appearance of Caesar’s clementia in Pro Ligario. (V. 2. 4.) Finally, we focus on 
the means of style of irony, and highlight an interesting element of the Caesar—Cicero 
relation and how the orator voices his conviction that he considers the dictator’s power and 
clementia illegitimate. (V. 2. 5.) 
 
V. 2. 1. Historical background of Pro Ligario  
 
Quintus Ligarius—who was born as the offspring of an insignificant Sabine gens, his brother, 
Titus fulfilled the office of quaestor urbanus around 54, his other brother, Quintus obtained 
quaestorship sometimes in the 50’s2008—filled the office of legate in 50 beside Considius 
Longus propraetor in the Africa province.2009 After Considius went to Rome at the end of 50 
to run as candidate for consulate, the administration of the province was left to Ligarius, 
who—as Cicero asserts—was not pleased to undertake it.2010 Immediately before the outbreak 
of the civil war, in 49 the senate appointed Q. Aelius Tubero, Cicero’s remote relative, 
propraetor of Africa, who waited before taking over the province—we do not know whether 
his illness prevented him from travelling or he wanted to wait and see what direction high 
politics would take. In Africa Ligarius also took a wait-and-see attitude. That is how it 
happened that not long after the outbreak of the civil war—after the defeat by Caesar at 
Auximum—before the propraetor designated by the senate, P. Attius Varus, Pompey’s 
adherent, Africa’s one-time governor arrived in Utica,2011 who arbitrarily took over the 
governance of the province on behalf of the republican side and ordered to set up two 
legions.2012 Ligarius was compelled to subordinate himself to Varus’s supremacy;2013 
however, both Cicero and Caesar disputed its validity as Varus’s procedure lacked lawful 
grounds.2014 
Soon, in the spring of 49—the exact date is not known, it might have taken place after Cato’s 
withdrawal from Sicily, i.e., 23 April—Africa’s legitimate governor, Q. Aelius Tubero, 
together with his son appeared at Utica.2015 Tubero was prohibited by Varus and Ligarius, 
exercising administration along the coast of Africa, to land and take over the province 
assigned to him by the senate as well as to take water and get his ill son to enter the 
province.2016 In the plea of defence Cicero shifted the responsibility for the above onto 
Varus.2017 Regarding these events Caesar did not mention Ligarius’s name either, only 
Varus’s.2018 The exact cause of the hostile conduct engaged by Varus and Ligarius are not 
known, their distrust was most probably due to the fact that Tubero kept delaying his journey 
to Africa and they suspected him of belonging to Caesar’s adherents. After that, Tubero 
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joined Pompey in Greece, and took part in the battle at Pharsalus on his side; then, we was 
granted pardon by Caesar.2019 
In the meantime, Caesar’s commander, Curio commanded troops to Africa in August 49, and 
after the victories over Varus and Ligarius he died in the battle against the ruler of Numida, 
Iuba. Only a few of Curio’s army, including Asinius Pollio, were able to escape to Sicily. Iuba 
considered himself absolute winner and had a part of the Roman soldiers who surrendered to 
Varus executed. Although Varus did not approve this step, he was not in the situation to 
oppose it.2020 As Iuba appeared to be the republican forces’ most significant support in Africa, 
the Pompeian senate awarded him the title of king and hospitality, while the Caesarian senate 
declared him enemy (hostis populi Romani). After the battle at Pharsalus Pompey’s adherents 
gathered in Africa to continue the fight against Caesar; the office of the commander-in-chief 
was given on the grounds of Cato’s decision to Pompey’s father-in-law, the consul of the year 
52, Q. Metellus Scipio. Attius Varus, Labienus and Cato submitted themselves to Metellus 
Scipio, however, internal hostility mostly worn out the force of opposition and, to a 
considerable extent, facilitated Caesar’s victory in Africa in 46. Cato proudly took his own 
life and deprived Caesar from the opportunity of exercising power—punishment or pardon—
over him, Attius Varus and Labienus moved to Hispania, and continued the fight there up to 
45.2021 
After the battle at Thapsus Ligarius was taken as captive in Hadrimentum, however, Caesar 
gave him pardon just as to Considius’s son.2022 From the fact of captivity in Hadrimentum it is 
possible to draw the conclusion that Ligarius stayed there during the entire term of the war in 
Africa and did not assume any part in war actions; yet, he could not have been a really 
significant person since the author of Bellum Africanum does not mention him by name. 
Caesar’s pardon was not rare at all as the dictator gave amnesty to everybody who 
surrendered without fight in the war in Africa; only a few even of the chiefs were killed, e.g. 
Afranius and Faustus Sulla captivated during fight—whether it was done on the direct orders 
of Caesar2023 or without his knowledge is disputed.2024 This is fully supported by Cicero’s 
statement when he speaks about a victory where only armed persons were killed.2025 
However, a granted pardon did not give permit to return to Italy.  
Ligarius’s relatives turned to Cicero as early as in the summer of 46 asking him to use his 
influence with Caesar to allow Ligarius to return to Italy, and in letters with highly official 
tone dated in August and September 46 respectively—which does not certify that they 
maintained any friendly relation2026—the orator assured Ligarius of his help.2027 It is not 
known what kind of relationship Cicero maintained with the otherwise not too significant 
Ligarii known only for their hostile emotions towards Caesar and what role Cicero’s ceaseless 
financial difficulties played in undertaking the case. It is possible that it was Brutus’s 
mediation that made Cicero undertake the case.2028 On the other hand, for a long while Cicero 
did not have any direct contact with the dictator, only with his environment, e.g., with Pansa, 
Hirtius and Postumus.2029 In Ligarius’s matter, together with Ligarius’s brothers he made 
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efforts to get close to Caesar through mediators and disclose the matter to him.2030 This was 
not an easy task because, among others, Caesar took a dislike to those who were involved in 
the war in Africa and wanted to keep them in uncertainty by delaying their return;2031 Cicero 
encouraged Ligarius by asserting that his troubles would be soon solved for Caesar’s anger 
lessened from day to day.2032 His next letter more resolutely voiced the hope in the 
opportunity of returning home soon2033 as having undertaken the somewhat humiliating 
situation to ask for audience as a senator consularis from Caesar four years younger than him, 
not being above him at all in the hierarchy of the Republic,2034 Cicero was granted personal 
hearing by Caesar where he appeared together with Ligarius’s brothers, who threw themselves 
to the ground at the dictator’s feet, and Cicero delivered a speech.2035 To all that Caesar 
responded generously, which made giving amnesty unquestionable in Cicero’s eyes, however, 
it could not be considered a completed fact.2036 
So, Ligarius’s case was in a fair way to get solved to satisfy everybody when in the last days 
of September 46 the son of Lucius Tubero, the former governor, Q. Aelius Tubero2037 brought 
a charge against Ligarius, which he wanted to support primarily by asserting that Ligarius—
and Varus—had not let him land in Africa, in the province assigned to them by the senate. 
Perhaps the charges included the relation maintained with Iuba as enemy and high treason 
implemented thereby. At the same time, it should be mentioned at the outset that in Pro 
Ligario delivered in October on the Forum Cicero did not touch on the legally relevant 
charges, however, by his speech—his speech made before the general public for the first time 
in the period following the civil war—he seemingly legitimised Caesar’s dictatorship.2038 
The defence was provided by C. Vibius Pansa, one of Caesar’s closest men—governor of 
Bithynia and Pontus in 47 and 46, governor of Gallia Cisalpina in 45, then, on Caesar’s 
proposal, consul designatus of the year 43, together with A. Hirtius—and by Cicero. 
Regarding the progress of the case it is worth mentioning Plutarch’s account.2039 Thus, 
Plutarch presumed that the outcome of the proceedings had been determined right from the 
outset, namely, it was a decided fact for Caesar that Ligarius was guilty and would be 
convicted and it was only the power of Cicero’s eloquence that turned the flow of events. 
Caesar’s pardon produced its effect: in March 44 Ligarius was one of Caesar’s assassins,2040 
then he and his family became the victim of the proscriptiones ordered by Antonius and 
Octavianus.2041 
It is a fact that Caesar pardoned Ligarius and let him return to Italy, however, the following 
doubts arise with regard to Plutarch’s version.2042 If Caesar—as Cicero’s letter asserts—did 
not entertain hostile emotions against Ligarius, why did he allow the proceedings to take 
place? There might have been two reasons for that: he either wanted to inflict punishment on 
Tubero or wanted to provide powerful propaganda for his own clementia by forgiveness. The 
intention to convict Ligarius is highly improbable since Cicero did not put forward any new 
charges that would not have been known to him at the time of writing his letter dated late 
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November, describing Caesar’s intentions.2043 Furthermore, Pansa, being the dictator’s 
confidant, would not have undertaken the defence of Ligarius, if it had been decided from the 
outset that he was guilty, and Caesar would not have assigned defence to Pansa, if he had not 
wanted to give pardon to Ligarius.2044 Caesar was very much aware that Ligarius did not have 
great influence among Pompey’s adherents and that the events in Africa were controlled by 
Varus, Cato, Matellus and Labieus. By that Caesar wanted to send a message to Attius Varus 
and Labienus fighting in Hispania: they had not lost all of their chances for settling the 
conflict with as little blood sacrifice as possible.2045 
It seems to be more probable that Caesar decided to acquit Ligarius in order to prove his by 
then proverbial generosity again. Yet, it was just the appearance of this intention that had to 
be avoided by all means: as Caesar had no other purpose by the proceedings than have his 
clementia celebrated through acquitting Ligarius, for this reason, he put on the mask of the 
angry judge having been already convinced of Ligarius’s depravity who could be moved by 
Cicero’s eloquence only.2046 Caesar as a master of political propaganda must have gladly 
grasped the opportunity offered for playing the role that his clementia was brought to the 
surface and shaped Ligarius’s fate favourably owing to the efficient oration of the counsel for 
the defence only.2047 It cannot be ruled out that for Caesar—using Cicero’s role taking for his 
own goals2048—the Ligarius case might have also served to enable him to convince those of 
his adherents who considered the scope of pardon granted by him excessive that both his more 
moderate and forgiving adherents and his defeated opponents agreed with the main line of his 
politics.2049 
Regarding this view Wilhelm Drumann does not qualify Cicero’s role specifically, yet, 
knowing his damning judgement on the orator-statesman he could not have formed a positive 
picture of it since elsewhere—very much in bad faith—he presents Cicero as an extremely 
vain figure who overestimates himself, is heated by the desire to be in the public eye, lacks 
clear political vision, and overtly humbles to potentes.2050 The question can be estimated with 
greater subtlety from the works of Matthias Gelzer and Justinus Klass if we presume that 
Cicero, using Caesar’s propaganda, tried to realise his own program: the more supporters of 
Pompey were granted pardon, the more chances he could see for strengthening the situation of 
the optimates, which in the long run could make (could have made) it possible to restore the 
order of the state of the Republic. To this end, it was indispensable to force Caesar somehow 
to implement his announced fundamental principles.2051 Handling the situation required great 
sense of tactics, seeming subordination, internal resoluteness and external flexibility from 
Cicero. Caesar’s later acts, the battle at Munda and Ides of March 44 proved that both Cicero 
and Caesar had wrongly surveyed the efforts of the other party and the political party.2052 
Clementia showed towards Ligarius was addressed not only to Pompey’s adherents fighting 
against Caesar in Africa but also to those preparing for another war in Hispania, and Cicero’s 
participation in the proceedings provided sufficient publicity for the case as well as the 
appearance of objectivity manifested by Caesar.2053 At the same time, Pro Ligario made it 
possible for Cicero—although it might have seemed to be shameless flattery in the eye of the 
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adherents of the Republic2054—to enforce his own political goals, i.e., to try to make the 
dictator committed to follow his conciliatory policy, and to find as many causes for 
exculpation for the supporters of Pompey as possible.2055 Cicero, however, presumably—
contrary to Gerold Walser’s view, who interprets the Ligarius case as demonstration of 
Cicero’s vanity and overestimation of his own role2056—took part in the play directed by 
Caesar not because he was driven by political blindness and hybris, as it were believing that 
by his orator’s ingenuity he could deceit and enchant the dictator’s clear political vision. 
Much rather his concerns formulated in the letter written to Servius Sulpicius Rufus were 
realised:2057 again he was compelled to take a position and as it were became extortable—if 
we take his promises made to his friends who lost favour, e.g., Ligarius seriously.2058 On the 
other hand, if he did not want to get again into open hostility with Caesar, he could not refuse 
to legitimise his peace policy by taking position, which policy most probably had some 
attraction for Cicero too since it was the only thing that could bring some kind of remedy for 
the empire having been exhausted in the civil war.2059 Cicero was also as much of a political 
realist to size up that it was impossible to avoid public life turning into sheer anarchy without 
some kind of compromise between the parties. Yet, he did not let Caesar use his talent as 
unprincipled tool: in Pro Ligario he ceaselessly makes an effort to certify excusable errors of 
Pompey’s adherents and does not omit to criticise the dictator’s status and the general 
conditions of Rome.2060 
Regarding the procedure followed by Caesar, there are certain similarities with his conduct 
engaged when granting pardon to Marcellus. Caesar himself was also interested in calling 
Marcellus back from exile; on the one hand, he wanted to demonstrate his generosity again; 
and, on the other hand, he wanted to advance legitimisation of dictatorship by the fact that a 
firm adherent of the republic such as Marcellus also returned home and acquiesced in the 
changes in political conditions, and by accepting the pardon granted to him as it were 
acknowledged it. In spite of the fact that Marcellus’s homecoming was a previously resolved 
fact, the dictator’s propaganda was meant to create the impression that Caesar bowed to the 
senate’s request only when he called the republican Marcellus back from exile. Caesar’s 
father-in-law, Piso mentioned Marcellus’s name seemingly accidentally in his speech 
delivered in the senate,2061 upon which Marcellus’s cousin with identical name2062 threw 
himself on the ground at Caesar’s feet to beg for pardon for his kin, then the senators also rose 
from their seat and asked Caesar to exercise mercy. The dictator, after having complained at 
length about Marcellus’s faults, seemingly utterly unexpectedly declared that he would not be 
averse to the wish of the senate. This was followed by noisy applause of the senate and 
Cicero’s speech, in which Cicero praised his human eminence. Presumably, a similar 
choreography can be observed in Ligarius’s case too. If Caesar had let Ligarius return home 
without special proceedings, he would have missed an important occasion to propagate his 
policy advocating conciliation. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to give an answer to the 
question whether Tubero had acted against Ligarius upon Caesar’s instruction or the dictator 
merely made use of the occasion being offered. 
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V. 2. 2. Procedural issues of the lawsuit  
 
Pro Ligario raises several questions that can be answered with difficulties. Why did Cicero 
not use the obvious argument in his statement of the defence that Ligarius’s independent 
power of decision was highly restricted in Africa since governance was in the hands of Varus 
and Cato, so it was not Ligarius on whom the alliance entered into with Iuba turned? Why did 
Cicero did not strive to refute the charges made by Tubero? Why did Cicero undertake the 
case although he otherwise maintained good relations with the Tuberos and almost none with 
the Ligarii?2063 Regarding the Ligarius case further questions arises: does the case under 
review constitute actual court proceedings, consequently, a real speech in court; did Caesar 
pass a judgment on Ligarius as a judge or not? Giving answer to these questions can possibly 
make further questions unimportant or no longer have a cause. 
The communis opinio gives the answer yes; and there are actually certain arguments to 
support these presumptions. Cicero calls Tubero prosecutor and Ligarius the accused, and in 
both cases he uses the proper technical term: specifically that Ligarius is an accused who 
admits his guilt, that is, an accused that each prosecutor would want,2064 and that Tubero 
accuses a man who makes a confession or a man whose case—i.e. political record—is better 
than or at least the same as his.2065 The charge is determined by Bauman as maiestas imminuta 
or as crimen maiestatis imminutae. The facts of the case that can be deduced from the 
described historical situation would have later belonged under lex Iulia maiestatis,2066 and as 
this statute of Augustus repeats the elements of earlier legislation,2067 it can be made probable 
that we can qualify Ligarius’s act treason. On the other hand, it is important to add that the 
term maiestas does not occur at all in the entire Pro Ligario, and Cicero does not determine 
the legal nature of the charges either.2068 
Also, it is against the concept of regular criminal action that the proceedings were conducted 
in the absence of the accused, i.e., Ligarius. Although Roman legal practice did not exclude 
conviction in absentia, however, the accused had to be called to appear before the law before 
commencement of the lawsuit.2069 Ligarius did not get such summons, what is more, it is a 
cardinal point of his case that Caesar prohibited him to enter the territory of Italy. 
Furthermore, the lawsuit conducted due to maiestas imminuta would have belonged before the 
quaestio perpetua de maiestate set up by Sulla since Sulla’s court of justice reforms were not 
abrogated by Caesar, he changed only the lists that formed the basis of the scope of jurors and 
the scope of identity of jurors;2070 this measure presumably constituted part of the reforms of 
the year 46. The proceedings, however, were conducted not before the quaestio de maiestate 
as it could be expected but before Caesar personally as judicial forum, in whose hands 
Ligarius’s fate was placed.2071 
Similarly, it is against the validity of crimen maiestatis as a charge that the alliance entered 
into with Iuba, King of Numidia against Caesar would have been its implementation in 
practice.2072 However, the fact of the alliance with Iuba was known to Caesar already at the 
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time of granting pardon to Ligarius, after the battle at Thapsus, so a charge based thereon 
would not have brought anything new to the knowledge of the dictator.2073 
The interpretation provided by Theodor Mommsen offers a possible solution for these 
difficulties; he asserts that the imperium of magistrates contains the right of the judge to pass 
a judgement in criminal proceedings too.2074 Although the power of administration of justice 
of the magistrate was restricted by the legal institution of provocatio ad populum, this did not 
apply to extraordinary imperia, that is, the decemvirate of the 5th century, the second 
triumvirate and the dictatura rei publicae constituendae (he ranks both Sulla’s and Caesar’s 
dictatorship under the latter).2075 This view is fundamentally shaken by Jochen Bleicken2076 
and Wolfgang Kunkel2077 by stating that provocatio protected the Roman citizen from the 
unlawful coercitio (disciplinary power) of the magistrate, however, produced no influence at 
all on iudicatio (administration of criminal justice) activity. Caesar’s dictatorship does not 
mean extraordinary imperium in the sense interpreted by Theodor Mommsen since he never 
took the title dictator rei publicae constituendae (legibus scribundis).2078 
Even Theodor Mommsen refers to a single example of the application of this extraordinary 
punitive power only: Ligarius’s case.2079 He supports his statement by the lines of Pro Ligario 
which assert that the purpose of the prosecution is not to convict but to execute Q. 
Ligarius,2080 and that this could not have been carried out by anybody in this form even under 
Sulla, who sentenced to death everybody whom he hated: since there the dictator himself gave 
orders to kill the person without anybody demanding it.2081 To this Theodor Mommsen ties 
the following interpretation: the locus clearly proves that as a dictator Caesar passed a 
judgement over Ligarius as a judge and his competence was identical with that of Sulla.2082 It 
is just the punctum saliens, however, that the locus does not make clear, i.e., that in a criminal 
case Caesar exercised administration of justice as a magistrate; as Cicero’s reference applies 
to the proscriptiones carried out by Sulla and does not mean to state that Sulla would have 
had his enemies executed after lawful investigation and declaring their guilt. It is public 
knowledge that Sulla was empowered by lex Valeria to have Roman citizens executed 
arbitrarily, without lawful sentence.2083 So, if Caesar’s powers, by which he decided the fate 
of Ligarius, was identical with that of Sulla, then we must draw the conclusion that he 
obtained unlimited power over the losers of civil war—this seems to be supported also by the 
comment made by Cassius Dio.2084  
Let us again examine the sentence of Pro Ligario considered to be of key importance by 
Theodor Mommsen, by which he wants to prove that the Ligarius case was actually court 
proceedings, specifically that the purpose of the prosecution was not to convict but to execute 
Q. Ligarius.2085 It is a fact that the purpose of each formal accusation is to convict the 
accused, in the present case, however, the opponent does not claim this, much rather to kill, 
execute Ligarius without any sentence. So, just as Sulla, Caesar can proceed against his 
enemies as he pleases, he is, however, characterised not by cruelty but by clementia, and it is 
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just exercising this that Tubero wants to prevent him from. The outcome of the case was 
probably determined on the grounds of a scenario worked out in advance by Caesar, showing 
some similarities with the Marcellus case, specifically—in spite of the description provided 
by Plutarch—in favour of Ligarius. Regarding Plutarch’s description it is worth quoting 
William C. McDermott’s witty formulation word for word: “Thus, a sad picture of the orator 
emerges, no longer king of the courts, but courting a king”.2086 As it is made clear by the 
events of the coming years: Cicero must have felt the same and did not forgive. The 
proceedings learned of from Pro Ligario cannot be considered a real criminal action because 
the decision was not in the hands of the quaestio de maiestate but in the hands of the dictator 
Caesar, who did not have any exceptional imperium that would have entitled him to pass a 
judgment on criminal cases affecting Roman citizens as a magistrate. 
 
V. 2. 3. Pro Ligario as deprecatio 
 
The above is also supported by the form of the speech; Pro Ligario is a so-called 
deprecatio,2087 which is a tool of influencing arbitrary decisions of persons exercising power 
rather than a tool of the defence in court of justice as it is also noted by the author of Auctor 
ad Herennium.2088 So, if Cicero chose a form for his speech that could not be used in court 
proceedings,2089 then this also makes it probable that in Ligarius’s case the dictator adopted 
decision not as a magistrate acting as a judge. The orator himself declares that he turns to 
Caesar not as a judge.2090 Right at the beginning of the oration he emphasises that he 
considers his task is to raise Caesar’s compassion rather than refute the charges2091 as most 
probably Pansa had already dealt with possible forms of refuting the charges.2092 The purpose 
of deprecatio is not defensio facti, i.e., the defence of a given act but ignoscendi postulatio, 
i.e., praying for remission of punishment to be imposed due to a committed act or error.2093 At 
the same time, it should be noted that Pro Ligario is not purely deprecatio but also a 
statement of the defence, as Cicero presents several fact-based arguments to defend 
Ligarius.2094 The usual elements of deprecatio are commonplaces (loci communes) meant to 
evoke misericordia,2095 so, for example, the audience’s sympathy can be aroused by referring 
to humanitas, fortuna, misericordia and rerum commutatio.2096 Accordingly, deprecatio is not 
a genre of the court of justice, its scope of application is the senate and consilium—i.e., it 
must have been clear to the audience of the period that Cicero saw through the play of passing 
a judgment directed by Caesar and used it for his own benefit.2097 
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The logically and psychologically proper arrangement of arguments, as a matter of fact, 
constitutes a tense structure in Pro Ligario too,2098 and, accordingly, the misericordia-topoi 
filled with temper, meant to affect Caesar’s clementia, were placed in the speech 
consciously.2099 Already in the prooemium the orator makes it clear that he builds on Caesar’s 
misericordia,2100 thus, he makes his audience aware of the fact that his purpose regarding 
Ligarius is not liberatio culpae since in his opinion his defendant has not committed crime by 
joining Pompey2101 but errati venia, i.e., obtaining forgiveness for taking erroneous 
position.2102 In accordance with that, the orator leads the thread of Tubero being a committed 
adherent of Pompey along the speech in order to reveal the real motivation of the accusation 
thereby. 
The narratio, which is emphatically meant to outline the facts without emotions,2103 is 
followed by the argumantatio2104 that—contrary to the orator’s promise—nevertheless serves 
the defence of Ligarius: especially the paragraphs contrasting the crudelitas of the Tuberos 
intending to restrict Caesar in exercising pardon with Ligarius’s begging and tears as well as 
with Caesar’s clementia, humanitas, misericordia and lenitas.2105 By that he turns Caesar’s 
brightly gleaming clementia away from the prosecutors and as it were urges him to side with 
his defendant,2106 and turns crudelitas that the Tuberos reproach Ligarius with around, and 
lets it fall back on the prosecutors.2107 He deprives Ligarius’s case of its individuality, and 
contrasts the general miseria of the civil war with misericordia showed by Caesar, general 
luctus with his lenitas, general crudelitas with the dictator’s clementia.2108 The virtue of 
humanitas especially comes to the front for misericordia and clementia are its most beautiful 
forms of manifestation—since as Quintilianus expounds, it is just this that deprecatio intends 
to turn the attention of the target audience and the addressee of the speech to.2109 By 
underlining Caesar’s well-known humanitas Cicero as it were obliges the dictator to adhere to 
enforcing this virtue,2110 and reminds the Tuberos of studia humanitatis, which was once not 
alien to them either.2111 By that he again sets Caesar and the wing of his party urging for 
conciliation against the Tuberos desiring petty-minded revenge.2112 
He makes it as it were obligatory for Caesar to keep to his principles formulated in his own 
propaganda since misericordia and lenitas are virtues frequently voiced during the civil war 
too; his humanitas can be certified by his adherents and his clementia by the whole empire. 
By all that Cicero uses the key features of Caesar’s self image as a tool for strengthening 
deprecatio.2113 The following passages shed light on the purpose of these paragraphs heavily 
charged with emotions.2114 Here he tries to clear Ligarius of the scelus that even after 
Pompey’s death he continued to fight against Caesar in alliance with the ruler of Numidia, 
Iuba, who was officially declared enemy by the senate by then having sided with the 
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dictator.2115 It was just this difference, i.e., remaining loyal to Pompey even after his death, 
that the prosecutors wanted to emphasise and thereby to take the most important argument, 
i.e., that the Tuberos also fought on the side of Pompey, away from the defence.2116 In other 
words, the function of this part of the argumentatio highly charged with emotions is to win 
the dictator’s sympathy for the benefit of Ligarius and at the same time to help the orator to 
get over the pitfalls of his argumentation expounded regarding the desperate Pompeian 
position of the accused, while driving the attention of the audience and Caesar away from its 
logical pitfalls.2117 
The heightening of emotions and temper reaches its climax in peroratio: Caesar can have no 
other choice than exercise the virtue of clementia.2118 He repeats that his speech had no other 
goal than to produce effect on the dictator’s humanitas, clementia and misericordia, however 
within the frameworks of praeteritio he does not omit to mention that he tried to refute the 
charges against Ligarius by fact-based arguments too.2119 The task of peroratio is commovere, 
the effect produced on the decision-maker’s emotions,2120 and in the case of deprecatio this 
aspect is reinforced because the orator underlines several elements from Ligarius’s personality 
and deeds that were to move Caesar’s emotions. So, for example, he stresses that his deeds 
were moved not by hatred against Caesar,2121 that he badly tolerates being far away from his 
brothers,2122 that he stayed in Africa not upon his own resolution but by being prevented by 
the storms of danger-fraught times of the civil war,2123 and that Ligarius’s family had obtained 
several merits with regard to Caesar.2124 He points out that many people from all over Italy 
appeared in mourning to beg for Ligarius.2125 He refers to the pardon granted earlier by the 
dictator to others,2126 Caesar’s clementia,2127 misericordia,2128 humanitas,2129 liberalitas,2130 
bonitas,2131 and crowns all that by the praise that mortals having mercy on their fellow beings 
become similar to gods.2132 So, the orator used all the available tools of deprecatio, not 
omitting, beside ignoscendi postulatio, defensio facti either—thereby, albeit, accepting the 
choreography set up by Caesar, using his clementia- and misericordia-propaganda for the 
benefit of his defendant.2133 
 
V. 2. 4. Clementia Caesaris  
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In Pro Ligario both the term clementia2134 and misericordia2135 occur six times, and so rise to 
the most important form of conduct, feature demanded from and attributed in advance to 
Caesar. Here clementia means forgiving for error,2136 which Caesar is required to do in his 
capacity as father2137—stressing father’s characteristic is perhaps reference to the parens 
patriae title.2138 So, the conduct arising from clementia is ignoscere,2139 that is, contrary to 
Pro Marcello, here clementia is shifted from the concept of temperantia animi towards the 
meaning mercy.2140 At the same time, ignoscere is suitable for expressing humanitas,2141 
misericordia2142 and clementia2143 and thereby the border between these concepts and virtues 
fades away, and misericordia and clementia become the form of manifestation of humanitas 
Caesaris.2144 To achieve this goal, i.e., the pardon to be obtained for Ligarius, the orator, 
acknowledging the dictator’s superiority, praises Caesar’s clementia and in his view he 
deserves praise primarily because after his victory he did not keep this virtue out of the reach 
of his enemies either,2145 which is a sufficient cause for his former enemies evaluating and 
experiencing his victory as benefit too.2146 
By praising Caesar’s clementia he introduces the part in which he speaks about his own 
former hostile emotions towards Caesar2147 in order to make capital of it for his defendant: 
Ligarius is more worthy of Caesar’s clementia than the orator himself because the former has 
never been hostile to Caesar, his unpleasant situation can be traced back to the unfortunate 
interplay of circumstances rather than to his own conviction. By that Cicero dresses his own 
Pompey supporter past in the cloak of praise of Caesar to overcome the dictator’s antipathy. 
At the same time he expresses his conviction that if the leaders of the opposition in Hispania 
accept the opportunity of peace offered by Caesar, they will not become disloyal to their 
ideas, instead, they follow the command of common sense—it is, of course, a question 
whether Cicero’s argument, to be more precise, his personality seemed to be authentic in their 
eyes since they could have possibly considered the orator a traitor.2148 
As a matter of fact, it is undecided how much the praise of Caesar’s clementia came from 
Cicero’s heart as—in spite of the fact that this time to serve the peace of the community he let 
himself be used as the tool of Caesar’s propaganda—internal reservations and questioning of 
the superiority of the one-time equal rival could not have vanished without any traces from 
Cicero’s soul. Reference to Caesar as father2149 and denial of the effect his own orator’s 
performance produced on Caesar’s decision2150 perhaps did not lack ironic overtones.2151 
Cicero was not likely to have acknowledged the legitimacy of the situation deep inside as he 
did not give up his ideal of the republican state,2152 yet, he did not openly give voice to his 
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bitterness and criticism, he dressed his conviction in an ambiguous form.2153 If Caesar wanted 
to disguise the trial of Ligarius as official court proceedings, then it can be considered delicate 
irony masked as flattery on Cicero’s side to refer to the dictator as pater thereby depriving 
him of his capacity as judge.2154 He must have chosen deprecatio as the genre of his speech 
for similar reasons, which is obviously not a genre of court of justice, and, accordingly, 
neither aequitas, nor iustitia are mentioned in the speech. On the other hand, in spite of slight 
criticism and irony by which he addresses Caesar’s public law position, to obtain clementia 
and misericordia he uses the dictator’s propagandistic concepts for his own purposes.2155 
The concept of sapientia occurs only once in the entire speech and—just as in Pro 
Marcello—is used as the synonym of political consideration and common sense.2156 The 
concept of consilium also occurs only once in Pro Ligario and refers both to Caesar and 
Pompey, and in a negative sense, specifically, with respect to upsetting public order.2157 It is 
due to the different objectives of the two orations that sapientia as the central concept of Pro 
Marcello is thrust into the background. An oratio every time serves utile: the primary 
objective of Pro Marcello is to outline the future of the public under the rule of Caesar as 
primus inter pares, the function of Pro Ligario is to acquit his defendant and to obtain pardon 
for him. While in Pro Marcello—as its theme covers general political issues—clementia 
Caesaris is thrust into the background, Pro Ligario deals with the fate of a single person, for 
this reason the virtue of clementia comes to the front.2158 At the same time—as Pro Ligario 
serves to break the opposition in Hispania and to support Caesar’s propaganda aimed at 
conciliation to be made with his enemies fighting there—for this objective the image of 
Caesar clemens is more suitable than the image of Caesar sapiens, who is willing to let 
bygones be bygones and forgive. Compared to Marcellus, Ligarius’s political weight is rather 
low—which cannot be necessarily said of Marcellus—so it is not specially humiliating for 
Cicero to ask for pardon for an enemy who has been much below Caesar from the outset. The 
oration made in favour of Marcellus was delivered in the senate; consequently, it was also a 
warning addressed to the senators of the need of reconciliation for the sake of common 
good—so, sapientia was the key concept that connected the audience, i.e., Caesar and the 
senators. On the contrary, Pro Ligario was delivered on the Forum and the audience was the 
populus Romanus—so, Cicero thought it was more expedient to put this key word of people’s 
party politics in the centre.2159 Between the orations the political climate in Rome had 
significantly changed as a result of Caesar’s conduct, which left its mark on Cicero’s frame of 
mind sensitive of delicate vibrations.2160 At the same time, Pro Ligario lacks the cautious 
optimism of Pro Marcello—in the meantime Caesar’s triumph had taken place—as if Cicero 
had given up hope that Caesar sapiens would restore res publica, and trustful tone is replaced 
by irony.2161 
 
V. 2. 5. The issue of legitimacy of Caesar’s power in the mirror of Pro Ligario 
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William C. McDermott—just as Cicero himself—does not consider Pro Ligario a first-rate 
masterpiece of the orator; yet, he points out that in using irony it has an outstanding place in 
the orator’s lifework.2162 It is not by chance that it is quoted by Quintilian, who based his 
textbook on rhetoric mostly on Cicero whom he enthusiastically respected,2163 and from 
among Cicero’s fifty-two orations quoted by him, he refers most frequently, after Pro 
Cluentio (sixty-seven quotations) and Pro Milone (sixty-seven quotations), to Pro Ligario 
(fifty-three quotations), which is highly noteworthy as contrary to the two hundred and two 
paragraphs of Pro Cluentio and one hundred and five paragraphs of Pro Milone, Pro Ligario 
consists of merely thirty-eight paragraphs. They are followed in order of reference by Pro 
Murena (twenty-five quotations), Pro Caelio (twenty-two quotations), the second Philippica 
(twenty quotations) and the first speech against Catilina (fourteen quotations). In contrast, the 
fourth speech against Catilina, Pro rege Deiotaro, De imperio Cnaei Pompei, the ninth 
Philippic, Pro Sestio and the first Verrine oration are quoted only once in each case by 
Quintilian, and he does not refer to Pro Sulla, De provinciis consularibus and the first 
Philippica at all. Regarding Pro Ligario Quintilian calls the attention to masterly handling of 
the facts of the case and exemplary use of irony.2164 Thus, Quintilian considered Pro Ligario, 
unique of its kind, a work of outstanding significance in training rhetoric.2165 
In the peroratio of Pro Ligario, with huge pathos Cicero enumerates the notables of the order 
of knighthood who appeared in mourning clothes before Caesar, the people of the house of 
the Brocchi, L. Marcius, C. Caesetius and L. Corfidius.2166 The latter, for that matter, could 
not be present when the speech was delivered as by then he was dead2167—this error also 
proves that Cicero could not be directly acquainted with Ligarius and his family: most 
probably he had never seen the person mentioned by him but, as he was unknown, his absence 
could not be noticed by many people. This pathetic enumeration of the “notables” constitutes 
powerful contrast with Caesar, L. Tubero and Pansa, and it becomes clear that Ligarius 
himself was the least important in the lawsuit. The use of pathos in this form, without cause 
and therefore turning into the opposite must have made Caesar—and deep inside certainly 
Cicero himself—smile.2168 
Certain sentences of the oration had a clear meaning to the audience, for example, the point 
where Cicero describes that all of them threw themselves to the ground at Caesar’s feet 
begging for pardon—including the orator himself.2169 In the account written to Ligarius 
Cicero depicted that the brothers and relatives of the accused threw themselves to the ground 
at Caesar’s feet and that he spoke in accordance with the case and Ligarius’s situation.2170 The 
audience might have taken Cicero’s words literally; the dictator, however, could remember 
well that Cicero had not thrown himself to the ground at his feet—to what extent Caesar 
might have taken this phrase as irony cannot be known. Calling the four years younger Caesar 
pater has again certain troublesome overtones.2171 According to Dio Cassius, Caesar was 
granted the title parens patriae in 44,2172 and albeit it took place two years after Pro Ligario 
was delivered, the intitulatio must have become public knowledge earlier.2173 To address 
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Caesar pater could not be easy for Cicero as it was him who was given the title pater patriae 
in 63 by the senate, on the initiation of Q. Lutatius Catulus, for exposing and suppressing 
Catilina’s plot; also, it is undecided how much this address sounded authentic or ironic from 
Cicero’s mouth to the ear of either the audience or Caesar.2174 
Two paragraphs of the oration with clearly demonstrable ironic references and overtones 
deserve more profound analysis. In the seventh paragraph Cicero relates that after the war had 
begun and had been mostly fought, he, free from any restraint, upon his own decision, joined 
the army that took up arms against Caesar. He admits that he is saying all that before the man 
who, although being aware of this, returned him to the state before they ever met; who sent 
him a letter from Egypt telling him to stay who he was; who, although being the Roman 
people’s only imperator in the whole empire, let him be the other one (and news on that was 
brought by Pansa); who allowed him to keep the bundle of sticks decorated with laurel as long 
as he wanted; and who believed that he would save the orator indeed if he did all that without 
depriving him of any of his titles.2175 At first hearing or reading, Cicero’s words seem 
flattering effusions, which Caesar was not in want of these days; yet, even if nobody else did, 
the dictator certainly discovered the irony hidden between the lines. It is worth comparing the 
content exposed here with Cicero’s letters written in the relevant period between November 
48 and August 47, primarily to Atticus. 
The first sentence of the paragraph seems to be true, however, the five elements following it 
need to be analysed more profoundly. The statement on pardon granted by Caesar is true as on 
17 December 48 Caesar gave instructions to Dolabella to write a letter to Cicero: he may 
return to Italy. This permit had significance because M. Antonius as magister equitum banned 
Cicero by name from Italy.2176 When in August 47 Cicero received Caesar’s letter, he was 
unable to decide how much he could rely on what was written in it and how secure returning 
would be.2177 Only the meeting at the end of September 47 convinced Cicero that he could 
leave Brundisium and return home. In other words, only after the meeting did Caesar gave 
him back to the state. In those days Cicero wrote several letters to Caesar’s influential men, 
so, among others, to Balbus and Oppius2178 and Caesar himself, and in this letter he tried to 
find excuses for his brother, Quintus for joining Pompey.2179 Although on 12th August 47 
Cicero received a highly generous letter (litterae satis liberales) from Caesar, he gave an 
account of this to Terentia, yet—as it has been already mentioned—this did not dispel his 
fears.2180 It is not probable that this writing referred to in a somewhat cold tone is identical 
with the letter written from Egypt that was mentioned in the letter. Thus, there is a good 
chance of presuming that the letter from Egypt is mere fiction and Caesar could be very much 
aware of that too.2181 The bundle of sticks decorated with laurel as badges of power and the 
person of Pansa are referred to only once but not at the same place in the correspondence from 
this period,2182 however, without the additional information provided in Pro Ligario. Most 
probably it was Caesar and Pansa who were surprised the most at the news purportedly 
brought by Pansa—and disclosed by Cicero.2183 
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The statement that Caesar offered Cicero imperator’s office was probably based on the 
presumption that even at their meeting in September 47 Caesar made an attempt at winning 
Cicero over to supporting his politics, Cicero, however, refused to take part actively in public 
matters.2184 It was always Caesar’s more or less confessed yet never actually realised desire to 
win the support and acknowledgement of older senators in higher ranks—and Cicero had a 
special place among those whose sympathy he tried to obtain.2185 In 60, by the mediation of 
Balbus, Caesar offered Cicero the opportunity of joining the first triumvirate,2186 and in July 
59 he urged him to accept the office of legate in Gallia offered by him,2187 which Cicero again 
refused.2188 In March 49 Caesar as imperator sent a letter to Cicero, whom he addressed also 
by the title of imperator, in order to win his support but he did not succeed.2189 All this clearly 
proves that Caesar judged Cicero’s influence in public matters and the moral weight of his 
political standpoint both more favourably and more realistically than several modern 
historians.2190 
Taking all the above into consideration, we can presume that Caesar had the meeting with 
Cicero in Brundisium organised for a definite cause,2191 and for such a cause that he did not 
want to disclose in a letter. With good sense William C. McDermott makes it probable that he 
wanted to entrust Cicero as magister equitum to administer Italy for the period of time while 
he was busy with the campaign in Africa; he probably offered him, owing to his activity in 
Cilicia, the opportunity to retain the triumph that Cicero had longed for,2192 likewise the status 
of patrician, which he later granted to several people,2193 for example, to Octavianus too,2194 
and, in his absence, the rank of princeps/primus rogatus in the senate, which Cicero most 
probably enjoyed as senator consularis in 62 and 60. If Cicero had accepted this invitation, 
beside the unus imperator he would have been alter imperator indeed.2195 
Modern historiography has often tried to doubt Cicero’s practical skills in public 
administration/politics, in spite of his successful activity as proquaestor, consul in Sicily and 
proconsul in Cilicia. That Caesar had much better opinion of Cicero’s qualities is proved by 
his offers repeated several times. In 47 the opportunities offered by Caesar would have raised 
Cicero again to the forefront of politics, on the one hand, and, would have posed him a worthy 
challenge that he would have been able to meet properly, on the other—however, he was far 
from being so uninhibited, opportunist, thirsty of power and glory as his Antique and modern 
critics would like to present him. Probably listening to his inner conviction, Cicero refused the 
offered post—which he gave no account of either to Atticus or anybody else—and told his 
friends no more than Caesar had provided him with the opportunity of returning home.2196 
Although in a negative context, Dio Cassius brings up that Cicero had not become magister 
equitum.2197 Also, Dio Cassius puts the statement into Q. Fufius Calenus’s mouth that Cicero, 
after having been granted pardon and patrician’s rank by Caesar—the latter statement is 
obviously not true—he ungratefully assassinated him; not himself but by instigating others to 
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commit the assassination.2198 These two loci clearly supports that Caesar might have made an 
offer with this kind of content to Cicero in order to win his support, and, nevertheless, news 
about this must have somehow leaked out from their meeting in Brundisium.2199 Thus, we 
have to declare that a part of the statements made by Cicero in the seventh paragraph is no 
more than pure fiction—but the reference to the opportunity that Caesar offered him the office 
of alter imperator can be possibly true. 
In summary it is worth paying some attention to the beginning of the peroratio of Pro 
Ligario, in which, albeit in hidden form, Cicero throws light upon the illegitimateness of 
Caesar’s power and clementia.2200 In the thirty-third paragraph Cicero relates that Caesar 
declared: the opposing party—that is, Pompey’s adherents—considered everybody who was 
not with them enemy, however, he considers everybody who is not against him his own 
adherent.2201 This clearly reveals the contrast between the characters of Caesar and Pompey of 
which Cicero already spoke about in Pro Marcello too, specifically that in case of Pompey’s 
victory even his own adherents were afraid of the blood bath that Pompey had announced in 
advance.2202 Caesar (just because of his often praised clementia) wanted to implement quite 
the contrary: as Cicero notes after the dictator’s death, he hamstrung/obliged his enemies by 
the appearance of mercy/temperance.2203 Yet, from this passage of Pro Ligario, even if 
nobody else did, Caesar could hear irony: Pompey could allow himself to make this statement 
because with proper legitimisation, on the grounds of the authorisation of the senate he fought 
for maintaining the lawful order of the state whereas Caesar, who set the aim of overthrowing 




V. 3. “Lawsuit” of King Diotarus 
 
In November 45, Cicero delivered his statement of the defence before Julius Caesar in favour 
of King Deiotarus (Pro rege Deiotaro), who, just as Q. Ligarius, sided with Pompey in the 
civil war. By then, in November 45, Caesar had defeated Pompey’s sons in the battle at 
Munda; then, he held a triumphal march over them. The triumph caused huge 
dissatisfaction2204 as triumphal marches were meant to legitimise victories over external 
enemies and not compatriots.2205 His grandson, Castor and the one-time royal physician hired 
by him, Phidippus the slave acted as prosecutors of King Deiotarus; they charged the king 
with capital offence,2206 assassination attempt against Caesar dated by them to 472207 and 
conspiracy,2208 that is,2209 the charge can be described in brief by the facts of the case of 
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perduellio, and crimen imminutae maiestatis.2210 Cicero, who had maintained good relations 
with the King since he was proconsul in Cilicia, undertook the defence.2211 
First, we review the charge against King Deiotarus to find out if the proceedings conducted 
against the King can be considered a criminal action de iure at all. (V. 3. 1.) After that, we 
intend to analyse Pro rege Deiotaro as a rhetoric work with respect to the political program 
that appears in it and Caesar’s image drawn by Cicero, which also allows examination of how 
Caesar’s “reforms”, that is, the efforts made towards eliminating the form of state of the 
republic, are treated and commented upon in Cicero’s lifework and philosophy of the state. 
(V. 3. 2.) 
 
V. 3. 1. Historical background and procedural law awkwardnesses of Pro rege Deiotaro  
 
Deiotarus’s situation vis-à-vis Caesar became rather unpleasant after the battle at Pharsalus, 
which the prosecutors did not omit to exploit for their own benefit, because in 48 he visited 
Pompey in his camp. Caesar, who had the integrity of Deiotarus’s royal title and empire 
enforced in the senate as consul, interpreted this gesture as an act of ungratefulness.2212 
Although in 47 Deiotarus asked for the opportunity to meet Caesar to exculpate himself for 
his conduct that Caesar found injurious, Caesar refused the favour of a meeting, bringing it to 
the King’s knowledge that in 48 already he was the repository of legitimacy, therefore, purely 
on the grounds of Roman public law Deiotarus would have been obliged to be loyal to 
him.2213 After Pharsalus, Deiotarus sided with Caesar and supported his campaign in 
Alexandria,2214 yet, Caesar decided that although Deiotarus could retain his royal dignity, he 
should give up a significant part of his empire.2215 This dismemberment, which took place 
after the battle at Zela in Nikaia,2216 meant the following: a part of Deiotarus’s empire in 
Armenia was granted to Arzobarzanes, ruler of Cappadocia, and a Galatian territory was 
allocated to Mithridates, ruler of Pergamum.2217 For a while Deiotarus hoped for the victory 
of Pompey’s adherents in Africa, however, after their defeat he definitely distanced himself 
from them.2218 After Mithridates’s death not much later, Deiotarus attempted to get Caesar to 
return him the rule over the Galatian tetrarchia, which, however, Castor Saocondarus, 
tetrarcha and Deiotarus’s son-in-law wanted to prevent by all means.2219 
After the battle at Munda that took place in March 45, Caesar received Deiotarus’s delegation 
in Taracco, and in a letter addressed to the King he held out the prospect of adjudging the case 
favourably.2220 Anticipating the adoption of this decision, Castor Saocondarus’s son, Castor, 
Deiotarus’s grandson brought a double charge against his grandfather, founding it on the 
testimony of the escaped slave, Phidippus, the King’s former physician, claiming that he had 
prepared assassination attempt against Caesar—on the occasion of the visit he paid to Galatia 
in 47—and together with C. Caesilius Bassus he secretly plotted against Caesar.2221 The 
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prosecutors most probably founded their claim on Caesar’s aversion to and bias against 
Deiotarus.2222 
By this turn the case constructed an until then unprecedented political and legal situation, 
namely, prior to that it had never occurred that a rex iussus was summoned before a Roman 
court for being charged with capital offence, to say nothing of the fact that no foedus 
iniquum2223 whatsoever entered into with Deiotarus submitted the King to the jurisdiction of 
Rome. The charge against Deiotarus was based on the testimony of his slave, Phidippus, 
which, in addition to being morally displeasing, created an impossible legal situation since in 
Rome a slave was not allowed to testify against his master in a criminal action. Furthermore, 
it added to these awkwardnesses that in those days Deiotarus did not stay in Rome, and in 
accordance with the order of Roman criminal procedure no proceedings could be conducted 
against the accused in his absence.2224 The case was made more delicate by the fact that the 
charge due to the assassination planned and attempted against Caesar was brought before the 
dictator himself, who in accordance with the principle “nemo iudex in propria causa”2225 
would have by no means had the right to act as judge in the proceedings – not even in the case 
if he had been just as Sulla entitled to the title of dictator rei publicae constituendae (legibus 
scribundis), which in theory vested him with unrestricted punitive power.2226 Yet, easily rising 
above all these reservations Caesar himself desired to proceed in King Deiotarus’s case as a 
judge. 
Cicero,2227 as a matter of fact, did not omit to bring up these awkwardnesses,2228 but being 
compelled to present these legal abuses as Caesar’s merits,2229 he made capital of this need, 
declaring that the dictator would guarantee that he should not be afraid of any inequity in the 
case.2230 Cicero’s words also reveal that Caesar did not take the principle of passing judgment 
in consilium2231 into account either, and the orator, while emphasising the dictator’s 
clementia, was compelled to make the absurd charges inauthentic by weighty counter-
arguments.2232 Although the biography written by Suetonius on Caesar asserts that in his 
administration of justice he proceeded very strictly and justly,2233 we can by no means take 
this statement to refer to Deiotarus’s case, at most to the judgments passed by Caesar during 
the term of his proconsulate, on the one hand, and to those passed in the disputes arising from 
the ager publicus allocated to his veterans after the civil war,2234 on the other.2235 
Consequently, the proceedings against King Deiotarus can be in no circumstances considered 
a criminal action; on the contrary, it provides a glaring example of Caesar’s arrogance 
disregarding law and order of the Republic and defiantly showing off his personal power. 
The outcome of the lawsuit is not known, Caesar presumably adjourned decision.2236 There 
are good chances of excluding the opportunity of acquittal since later Cicero noted that Caesar 
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adjudged no issue whatsoever regarding Deiotarus justly.2237 Nor can it be ascertained that 
Deiotarus was sentenced as Cicero would have probably used the fact of death sentence as an 
argument against Antonius, who wanted to have a law from Caesar’s purported legacy, which 
could be reinstated to Deiotarus’s earlier reign, adopted as authentic.2238 Irrespective of the 
result of the lawsuit, immediately after Caesar’s death, Deiotarus took possession of the 
territories that the dictator had disannexed from him,2239 and this annexation was 
acknowledged as lawful by a regulation made public by Antonius—presumably in return for 
significant valuable consideration.2240 
 
V. 3. 2. Shaping Caesar’s image as rhetorical tactics in Deiotariana 
 
Cicero begins the prooemium of his speech with an enumeration disguised as captatio 
benevolentiae, listing the circumstances in the proceedings that make him uneasy. The 
accused whose life is at stake is a King, what is more, a highly recognised friend of Rome. 
The prosecutors are two good-for-nothings—Deiotarus’s cruel grandson and Deiotarus’s 
bribed slave, who voluntarily testifies against his master although in Rome even during the 
tortures compulsory in the interrogation of slaves it was prohibited to put questions to them to 
which they could have made a confession incriminating their master.2241 The accused is not 
present, Caesar acts as judge in his own case; the trial takes place not before the public of the 
Forum but in Caesar’s palace.2242 They key words of prooemium/exordium are metus, timor 
and perturbatio, however, he expresses his concerns not only due to the specific case but the 
general danger threatening security in law.2243 He draws conclusions regarding the entirety of 
the community from the Diotarus case just as he did concerning the Marcellus and Ligarius 
case. Yet, he tries to make the impression as if sapientia, praestans singularisque natura 
shown by Caesar,2244 his favourable countenance,2245 aequitas and audiendi diligentia 
reassured him2246—probably in order to influence his defendant’s case towards a favourable 
direction (insinuatio).2247 However, success of Caesar’s natura and sapientia might be 
overshadowed by public opinion.2248 He expects Caesar to arrive at a just outcome with regard 
to the proceedings, this, however, does not change his conviction that the lawsuit is a priori 
iniquum and a kind of attack against the fundaments of law and order.2249 
The concept of clementia comes up first at the beginning of the argumentatio, and appears 
together with the concept of fides and constantia.2250 By bringing up that Deiotarus stood by 
Pompey, the orator tries to take the sting out of Caesar’s anger as well as reminds the dictator 
of his promise made to the King, specifically, that he would adopt a forgiving attitude to 
him.2251 Again, the metus theme of the prooemium emerges, and in such form that Caesar, 
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through the political amnesty already granted and having acknowledged his title of King and 
guest-friend, has brought an end to Deiotarus’s desperate fear, re-ranking him from the group 
of enemies to the category of friends who have forgotten about their obligation.2252 In order to 
explain why Deiotarus took the position to side with Pompey by “erroneously” sizing up the 
situation of internal politics in Rome2253 he extends the arguments to cover all of the adherents 
of Pompey, and tries to interpret it as loyalty to legitimate institutions, and, first touching on 
the King’s case solely in terms of public law/politics and not criminal law, he draws general 
conclusions regarding the community.2254 It was clementia showed by Caesar earlier that 
brought an end to the community’s metus and timor, and in the future this virtue is no longer 
formulated as the consequence of personal mood or decision but as a requirement with 
binding force that the dictator should meet.2255 The motif of fear is carried through the whole 
speech as it were as a Leitmotiv: if Caesar did not feel that his given word was binding upon 
him, then he would become a tyrant, who excites fear and dread around him.2256 In Pro 
Ligario2257 and Pro Marcello2258—contrary to Pro rege Deiotaro—it is just lack of fear that 
the orator stresses; i.e., that he need not be terrified of speaking honestly before Caesar. 
Accordingly, the content of the meaning of clementia is modified: the emphasis is shifted 
from Caesar’s personal generosity expressed in Pro Marcello and from the inclination to 
forgive for error underlined in Pro Ligario to the requirement of the steadiness of political 
clementia practised earlier.2259 Fides and constantia to be adopted in exercising clementia 
come to the front, and Cicero—after brief refutation of the assassination attempt, transferring 
the matter from criminal law to the plane of politics—addresses Caesar not as a judge but as a 
dictator. So, if Caesar wants to avoid to be looked at as a tyrant, he must consistently keep to 
his earlier principles. Refuting the arguments of the prosecution, he quotes a letter of 
Blesamius, a subject of Deiotarus, in which—presenting these statements as gossip in bad 
faith—he voices his view that Caesar is already considered a tyrant because he had his statue 
erected beside the statues of kings.2260 The orator himself neither confirms, nor refutes the 
charge of tyranny,2261 instead, he points out that contrary to Deiotarus’s subjects he and his 
fellow-citizens were born as free men in a free Roman state—which implies a bitter contrast 
with the present, Caesar’s dictatorship,2262 especially because Cicero does not conceal the 
rage and anger manifested by Caesar either.2263 
Reference to Caesar’s clementia sometimes does not lack ironic overtones since Cicero relates 
that in 47, owing to Caesar, Deiotarus, having been deprived of the major part of his 
territories by the resolution adopted in Nicaea, could contemplate with a philosopher’s 
quietude in the evening of his life for he had been relieved of the burdens of ruling.2264 
Antiochus paid the same price for furor as Deiotarus for an excusable error2265—all that 
highly questions the value of Caesar’s clementia. Albeit, in the form of a rhetorical question 
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he denies that Deiotarus can suffer any further loss and damage through grave iniuria2266—but 
reference to this opportunity in the form of denial indicates the opportunity of grave inuiria as 
real danger: the King being sentenced by Caesar. It is just this iniuria that is the most 
important characteristics of tyranny, and if Caesar withdrew the pardon granted earlier, he 
would inevitably draw the charge of tyranny against him.2267  
So, Cicero formulates a kind of “warning” to Caesar. If Caesar sentenced his one-time guest-
friend, Deiotarus, this would remind the people of the bloodshed of Sulla; the erection of his 
own statue—with the inscription “Deo Invicto” in the Quirinus temple2268—is yet accepted 
by the people of Rome but if Caesar should go beyond that, this would amount to tyranny.2269 
Thus, reference to tyranny is actually made, even if only from the mouth of Deiotarus’s 
delegates and grandson.2270 This raises a question difficult to answer: whether Cicero wants to 
make a success of his case before Caesar merely in accordance with the situation of the 
present moment (as Ulrike Riemer assumes2271) or (following the proposition of Helga 
Botermann and Sabine Rochlitz) the warning formulated by the orator is also a threat, which 
is going to be fulfilled by the Ides of March 44.2272 
At this point Cicero presents a stylised figure of Deiotarus as a kind of philosopher king, 
which does not correspond with the historical Deiotarus image known to us—since he did not 
even shrink back in fear of murder committed against his own family members2273 and so 
much disagreed with Caesar’s territorial regulations that immediately after Caesar’s death he 
marched into his earlier provinces.2274 In Cicero’s presentation, however, Deiotarus becomes 
a King who rises above changes of fortuna and lives fully aware of his internal values, which 
are not only good but are sufficient for a happy life—virtus, magnitudo animi, gravitas and 
constantia.2275 The pair of opposites of the “bonus rex Deiotarus” and the “Caesar tyrannus” 
becomes a ruler’s mirror, similar to Pro Marcello, albeit, it makes Pro rege Deiotaro a 
negative ruler’s mirror. Here the orator, instead of modelling the ideal ruler after Caesar, 
confronts the dictator with the requirements that he is to meet as reality appearing in the 
person of Deiotarus. Although the topos of the ruler appreciating internal values more than 
anything else is in line with the theme of Pro Marcello,2276 in the orator’s presentation, 
however, Deiotarus has already realised and achieved all that Cicero set as a goal to Caesar in 
Pro Marcello.2277 The idealised and, as a matter of fact, unhistorical Deiotarus is in possession 
of generosity and consistency2278 that Cicero deems doubtful in the case of Caesar.2279 
Cicero prepares the stylised Deiotarus image of the peroratio well in advance. As refutation 
of the assassination attempt against Caesar, first of all he brings up Deiotarus’s personality, 
who is characterised and guided, in addition to prudentia and virtus, by fides, religio, 
probitas, constantia, integritas and gravitas2280—as it were as the opposite of Caesar, whose 
fides and constantia can be righteously doubted by the public. To refute that after the battle at 
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Pharsalus the King was only waiting for Caesar being defeated in the war in Africa, Cicero 
endows Deiotarus with several virtues that belong to the scope of temperance—
mansuetudo,2281 frugalitas, modestia, temperantia,2282 pudor, pudicitia2283. It is especially 
interesting that reference is made to the virtue that is missing from the catalogue of ruler’s 
virtues—fortitudo, iustitia, severitas, gravitas, magnitudo animi, largitio, beneficentia, 
liberalitas2284—the ancient Roman frugalitas, which is an asset possessed by optimus pater 
familias and diligentissimus agricola et pecuarius.2285 Thus, this virtue characterises private 
persons rather than kings;2286 yet, it is one of the most valuable traits beside temperantia, 
moderatio and modestia as a synonym of the Greek sophrosynē.2287 It is by stressing just this 
virtue that he criticises Caesar who behaves more and more as a rex in Rome and has gone 
beyond human measure in his power ambitions.2288 
In the peroratio he as it were compels Caesar to make his choice: if he allows his iracundia to 
govern, he will be just as cruel, i.e., a tyrant, as the prosecutors; but if he lets his clementia 
and misericordia prevail, then he must give pardon to Deiotarus.2289 Thereby he drives the 
dictator’s attention to the point that very little—the exercise of fides and clementia—separates 
him from the form of ruling his power is now referred to in Rome: tyranny. Here, most of the 
virtues attributed to Caesar in Pro Marcello and Pro Ligario appear as features of Deiotarus 
only and Caesar’s sapientia and aequitas are presented in much paler and more relative 
colour. Clementia Caesaris—in the meantime celebrated by official cult, which must have 
been rather displeasing to Cicero—emerges at more emphatic loci than in Pro Marcello, 
however, with strong critical and ironic overtones. 
Although later on Cicero himself commented upon Pro rege Deiotaro with not much 
appreciation and called it oratiuncula with some disdain, the fact, however, that he edited and 
sent it to his friends, for example, Dolabella, as a modest gift woven by rough thread2290 
implies that he attributed significance to it that pointed beyond the circumstances of the 
specific lawsuit, and wanted to provide publicity for it, primarily for the criticism formulated 
in the speech against Caesar’s autocracy.2291 Caesar, returning in the first days of October 45 
from the war in Hispania2292 to Rome by triumph, started to behave more and more like a 
rex.
2293
 The cult his personality was celebrated by assumed increasingly exaggerating forms—
although, as tradition has it, Cicero was the first to make proposals on acknowledgements to 
be granted to Caesar, while doing so he did not miss to keep sensible measure in view.2294 It 
happened in those days that—motivated by fear,2295 out of overzealousness, provocation or on 
Caesar’s initiative2296—Caesar’s statue with the inscription “Deo invicto” was erected in the 
Quirinus temple,2297 and the senate adopted a resolution on erecting the temple of Clementia 
Caesaris. Much to the delight of Cicero, who saw it as a mockery of the ideal state of the 
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Republic, the Caesar statue carried around on the occasion of Ludi Caesaris was not greeted 
by much jubilation by the people.2298 It came out that Caesar wanted to restore the name of 
the state of form of the Republic only and not its core and actual aspect,2299 he did not live up 
the hopes attached to him in Pro Marcello, and Cicero was compelled to be disappointed with 
him;2300 yet, he could not fully back out of the impact produced by Caesar’s personality.2301 
Caesar required the political notabilities of the age of the Republic to give evidence of 
passivity, silent and disciplined “adapting”, “adjustment”;2302 politics were controlled by 
Caesar and his camarilla;2303 the integrity of common sapientia appeared to be vain hope.2304 
Cicero was forced to remain silent on public affairs,2305 he devoted himself to his 
philosophical works—which resulted in 45 in Hortensius, Academici libri, De finius bonorum 
et malorum and Tusculanae disputationes—in which he resolutely criticised the general 
conditions of his age and Caesar’s autocratic ambitions.2306 In the light of that, the assessment 
of Pro rege Deiotaro divided the literature on the subject. Hugo Willrich, for example, 
evaluated it as the sign of good relations between Cicero and Caesar and as the document of 
Cicero’s opportunism.2307 Otto Seel—in addition to clearly identifiable criticism of Caesar 
and the general conditions—discovered in it the picture of demoralisation by power, 
specifically, demoralisation of both the person who exercises power and the person who bows 
to power, which created a humiliating, undeserved situation for both Caesar and Cicero.2308 
Matthias Gelzer, however, claims that the oration clearly shows how far Cicero could go even 
in Caesar’s presence in discussing political issues and that he openly gave evidence of his 
values supporting the republic.2309 In Pro rege Deiotaro Eckart Olshausen unambiguously 
discovers the reflection of Cicero using his defendant’s case as a tool to enable him to reveal 
his thoughts before Caesar on political issues and expound his opinion on the conditions of 
the age.2310 Helga Botermann considers this oration ultimate settlement of accounts with 
Caesar and his state, in which Cicero makes Caesar’s state as tyranny the subject of 
criticism.2311 
In the mirror of all that it can be declared that Cicero was deeply disappointed in his hopes 
attached to Caesar;2312 the gap between them became irreconcilable, and in the speech it is 
possible to reveal masked condemnation of Caesar and idealisation of his opponents.2313 That 
in those days Cicero might have already thought of assassinating Caesar is revealed by a letter 
written to Atticus,2314 in which the orator referred to Caesar’s purchase of a house in Quirinal: 
the house stood near to the Salus and Quirinus temple, and Cicero remarked that he would 
like to see Caesar close to Quirinus and Quirinus’s fate rather than to balanced welfare 
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(salus), by which he clearly lets his younger brother infer identification of Romulus, 
assassinated according to certain traditions, with Quirinus.2315  
As Suetonius left it to us, in a letter Cicero purportedly writes about Caesar: when he was 
aedil he was already thinking about royal power, striving for royal authority.2316 It is worth 
paying some attention to the loci where Cicero refers to Caesar as rex. The letter addressed to 
Atticus—which mentions Caesar with ironic overtones2317—was written on 14 August 45,2318 
and the one to Matius at the end of August 44.2319 On the other hand, it cannot be concealed 
that it was not only Caesar whom Cicero called rex, earlier he called Pompey the same, 
however, stressing his positive traits.2320 Cicero was addressed by the title rex, and, for that 
matter, peregrinus rex, among others, in 62 regarding the execution of the plotters—and not 
in flattery.2321 Consequently, the concepts of rex and tyrannus belonged to the generally 
accepted phrases of rhetoric in Roman public affairs in naming men who were striving for 
autocracy or at least prime power positions, dominatio.2322 In the letter mentioned earlier, 
written to Atticus on 17 May 45, regarding purchase of property by Caesar, Cicero makes a 
statement which is open for interpretatio multiplex, that he would like to see Caesar close to 
Quirinus rather than to Salus.2323 The background of the text is provided by the fact that the 
villa purchased by Caesar was located near to the Salus and Quirinus temple, and Cicero 
wished Caesar the fate of Quirinus rather than salus, that is, welfare and health.2324 Quirinus 
as a Roman god was quite often identified with Romulus, who founded Rome but was later 
assassinated since he ruled as a tyrant—so Cicero wished a similarly bloody end for Caesar 
too.2325 
The political rhetoric of the period used the name of Romulus as the synonym of tyrant—so, 
for example, the invective attributed to Sallust called Cicero Romulus Arpinas,2326 and in 67 
Pompey, entrusted to wage war against pirates, wanted to have himself vested with a too wide 
scope of power by lex Sabina, whereupon C. Calpurnius Piso warned him not to strive for 
Romulus’s laurels if he does not want to come to the same end as Romulus.2327 Although 
Cicero did not mention Romulus’s name in a negative context—what is more, he comments 
on the founder of the city in expressly praising context and in acknowledgement,2328 his 
positive “Romulus propaganda” did not evoke much response.2329 Livius discloses two 
versions on Romulus’s death. According to more widely known tradition, Romulus was 
enveloped by a cloud during a huge storm and ascended to heaven;2330 according to the legend 
less kept in evidence, and understandably less popular, in his old age he became a tyrant and 
was torn to pieces by the senators with their bare hands.2331 Later on, religious faith identified 
the last member of the ancient Jupiter—Mars—Quirinus triad2332 with the first King—that is 
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how the legend on the King having become a god, on the one hand, and on the assassinated 
tyrant, on the other hand, was created.2333 Caesar took firm steps to introduce the Romulus—
Quirinus cult, and in his last years he placed great emphasis on his own legitimisation as 
“second Romulus”. In view of the fact that the apotheosis of statesmen after their death was 
alien to Roman thinking—the act of deification could take place solely temporarily during the 
triumph through cultic identification with Iuppiter on the Capitol firmly supported by several 
preventing rites2334—in order to build his own later cult, Caesar resolutely propagated the 
respect of Romulus Quirinus.2335 It was not by chance that the senate had a statue erected for 
him with the inscription “Deo Invicto” in the Quirinus temple—probably upon suggestion 
from “above”, which Caesar did accept.2336 Cicero mentions the opportunity of this cultic 
identification a few times, mostly, however, he handles this identification rather 
cautiously.2337  
At this point it seems to be justified to sum up or repeat what was expounded regarding the 
motif of killing the tyrant in Pro Milone. Cicero openly calls Caesar tyrannus after his 
death;2338 the stoic element of the motif of killing the tyrant can be demonstrated most clearly 
in the third book of De officiis written in 44.2339 He declares that the element of killing the 
tyrant2340 is in harmony with stoic philosophy to the greatest extent,2341 which also suits 
naturalis ratio,2342 i.e., it is the ultimate conclusion of ethical consideration.2343 In view of the 
fact that the tyrant ruins human community and places himself outside the rules of 
coexistence,2344 accordingly, these rules are not binding him either.2345 His reasoning 
culminates in turning the right of killing the tyrant into the ethical/legal command of killing 
the tyrant: making common cause with the tyrant is excluded, he must be barred and removed 
from human community since he is nothing else than a beast having assumed human form.2346 
Phalaris’s case is Cicero’s most favourite example, and by that he demonstrates that 
assassination is not only ethically fair but it is definitely a moral obligation (honestum 
necare), elimination of the tyrant from the community (feritas et immanitas beluae 
segreganda est). This again is in line with the identification of the tyrannus with belua also 
present in stoic philosophy, which is clearly formulated in De re publica too2347 in such form 
that the tyrannus is the most harmful species of animals, which is the most hateful subhuman 
being both to gods and humans, that is, it lives merely in figura hominis.2348 Thus, the key 
attributes of the tyrant can be described by the following concepts: nulla societas, belua, 
genus pestiferum, exul, contra leges, contra naturam; i.e., a being close to a subhuman form 
of existence, whose assassination cannot constitute moral offence just as killing any harmful 
beast.2349 
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In the proceedings against Deiotarus no sentence was passed. After Caesar’s death, in De 
divinatione Cicero puts the statement into Deiotarus’s mouth that he did not regret that instead 
of Caesar, who had deprived him of his kingdom, he sided with Pompey because by doing so 
he protected the authority of the senate (senatus auctoritatem), the freedom of the people of 
Rome (populi Romani libertatem) and the dignity of the empire (imperii dignitatem).2350 This 
statement (no matter if together with Hermann Strasburger we accept it as authentic2351 or not) 
from the mouth of a non-Roman as justification of his act sounds insult since he refers to 
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In the analysis of the lawyer’s handling of the facts of the case and rhetorical tactics 
manifesting itself in Cicero’s statements of the defence, in summary it should be made clear, 
and in harmony with what has been said in relation to each speech—whose repeated 
recapitulatio here can be dispensed with—it needs to be reiterated that the primary aim of the 
speeches was (could have been) nothing else than to win success in the given lawsuit. It is this 
ultimate goal to which he subordinates the intermediate aims identifiable in the speech, 
discernible in inventio, dispositio and elocutio since his intention is not to give an exact 
description or reconstruction of the events or historical facts of the case but, every time, to 
make the process of convincing bring result; so, the function of each element can be 
understood and interpreted from the ultimate goal only.  
We began our work with Quintilian’s words written on Cicero—let us close it with his words 
too for it would be hard to sum up the ingenuity of the greatest orator of all times more 
worthily than that! “In all what he says there is so great authority one is ashamed not to 
agree, and it inspires confidence not in the lawyer’s efforts but the witness’s or the judge’s 
reliability while all the master strokes that nobody could imitate even by utmost practising are 
flowing naturally; yet, the speech, than which nothing more beautiful we have ever heard, 
gives a magnificently free and easy impression. Therefore, it was not undeservedly that his 
contemporaries told about him that he had control over courts of justice, and in the eyes of 
posterity he attained that Cicero should mean the name of elocution itself and not just a man. 
So let us cast our glance on him, he should stand before us as a model, and one who likes 
Cicero very much should know about himself that he has improved.”2353 
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Lists of Abbreviations 
 
 
I. Abbreviations of Antique Sources 
 
 
Amm.    Ammianus Marcellinus 
 
App.   Appianus 
civ. Bella civilia 
Hann.    Hannibalica    
 
Arist.    Aristoteles 
rhet.    Rhetorica 
 
Arnob.   Arnobius 
   Adversus nationes 
 
Asc.    Asconius 
   Commentarius in Cic. Mil. 
 
Auct. ad Her.   Auctor ad Herennium 
 
Bell. Afr.   De bello Africano 
 
Caes.    Caesar 
civ.    De bello civili 
Gall.   De bello Gallico 
 
Cic.    Cicero 
ac.   Academica 
Arch.    Pro Archia poeta 
Att.    Epistulae ad Atticum 
Balb.    Pro Balbo 
Brut.    Brutus 
Caecil.   Divinatio in Caecilium 
Caecin.   Pro Caecina 
Cael.    Pro Caelio 
Cat.    In Catilinam 
Cato    Cato maior de senectute 
Cluent.   Pro Cluentio 
De orat.   De oratore 
Deiot.    Pro rege Deiotaro 
div.    De divinatione 
dom.    De domo sua 
fam.    Epistulae ad familiares 
fin.    De finibus bonorum et malorum 
Flacc.    Pro Flacco 
Font.    Pro Fonteio 
har. resp.   De haruspicum responso 
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imp. Cn. Pomp.  De imperio Cnaei Pompeii 
inv.    De inventione 
Lael.    Laelius de amicitia 
leg.    De legibus 
leg. agr.   De lege agraria 
Lig.    Pro Ligario 
Marc.    Pro Marcello 
Mil.    Pro Milone 
Mur.    Pro Murena 
nat.    De natura deorum 
off.    De officiis 
Or.    Orator 
parad.   Paradoxa Stoicorum 
part. or.   Partitiones ortoriae 
Phil.    Philippicae in Marcum Antonium 
Pis.    In Pisonem 
Planc.    Pro Plancio 
prov. cons.   De provinciis consularibus 
Q. fr.    Ad Quintum fratrem 
Quinct.   Pro Quinctio 
Rab. perd.   Pro Rabirio perduellionis 
Rab. Post.   Pro Rabirio Postumo 
red. in sen.   Post reditum in senatu 
rep.    De re publica 
Rosc. Am.   Pro Roscio Amerino 
Scaur.    Pro Scauro 
Sest.    Pro Sestio 
Sulla    Pro Sulla 
tog.    In toga candida 
top.    Topica 
Tull.    Pro Tullio 
Tusc.    Tusculanae disputationes 
Vat.    In Vatinium testem 
Verr.   In Verrem 
 
CIL    Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum 
 
Coll.    Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum 
 
Comm. pet.   Commentariolum petitionis 
 
D.    Digesta Iustiniani 
Cels.   P. Iuventius Celsus 
Gai.   Gaius 
Marci.   Aelius Marcianus 
Mod.   Herennius Modestinus 
Pap.   Aemilius Papinianus 
Paul.   Iulius Paulus 
Pomp.   Sex. Pomponius 
Tryph.   Clausius Tryphoninus 
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Ulp.   Domitius Ulpianus 
 
Dio Cass.   Dio Cassius 
 
Dion. Hal.   Dionysius Halycarnassensis 
 
Enn.    Ennius 
ann.    Annales 
 
Fest.    Sex. Pompeius Festus 
   De verborum significatione 
 
Fronto   M. Cornelius Fronto 
   Epistulae 
 
Gell.    Gellius 
   Noctes Atticae 
 
Gorg.    Gorgias 
frg.    Fragmenta 
 
Ios. Flav.   Iosephus Flavius 
Ant. Iud.   Antiquitates Iudaicae 
 
Isid.    Isidorus Hispalensis 
etym.    Etymologiae 
 
Iuv.    Iuvenalis 
   Saturae 
 
Lact.   Lactantius 
inst.   Divinae institutiones 
 
Liv.    T. Livius 
   Ab urbe condita 
epit.   Ab urbe condita libororum epitoma 
per.   Ab urbe condita librorum periochae 
 
Macr.    Macrobius 
Sat.   Saturnalia 
 
Ov.    Ovidius 
fast.    Fasti 
 
Paul.   Paulus 
   Sententiarum libri 
 
Plaut.    Plautus 
Merc.    Mercator 
Mil.    Miles gloriosus 
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Poen.    Poennulus 
 
Plin.    Plinius maior 
nat.   Naturalis historia 
 
Plin.   Plinius minor 
epist.    Epistulae 
paneg.   Panegyricus 
 
Plut.    Plutarchus 
C. Gr.    Caius Gracchus 
Caes.    Caesar 
Cato min.   Cato minor 
Cic.    Cicero 
Pomp.    Pompeius 
Rom.    Romulus 
Ti. Gracch.   Tiberius Gracchus 
 
Polyb.    Polybios 
   Historiae 
 
Ps.-Sall.   Pseudo-Sallustius 
Cic.   Invectiva in Ciceronem 
 
Quint.   Quintilianus 
inst.    Institutio oratoria 
 
Sall.   Sallustius 
Cat.    De coniuratione Catilinae 
epist.    Epistulae 
Iug.    De bello Iugurthino 
 
Sen.    M. Annaeus Seneca  
contr.   Controversiae 
 
Sen.    L. Annaeus Seneca 
clem.    De clementia 
 
Serv.   Servius 
in Verg. Aen.   Commentarius in Verg. Aen.  
  
Sil.    Silius Italicus 
   Punica 
 
Strab.    Strabo 
   Geographica 
 
Suet.    Suetonius 
Caes.    Caesar 
Claud.   Claudius 
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Tib.    Tiberius 
 
Tac.    Tacitus 
ann.    Annales 
 
Ter.   P. Terentius Afer 
Ad.    Adelphoe 
 
Vell.    Velleius Paterculus 
 
Verg.    Vergilius 
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